Rethink Aadhaar

News Update: Harrassed over onerous paperwork after sister's death, Jitu Munda compelled to carry her body to a bank in Odisha

Rethink UID — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 07:39:36 +0000

In News: India’s digital welfare system is producing life-altering exclusions

Rethink UID — Tue, 31 Mar 2026 04:52:36 +0000

2025: A year of resisting coercive technologies

Rethink UID — Mon, 05 Jan 2026 03:22:12 +0000

The beginning of a new year brings reflection and contemplation. What was the past year like, and what will 2026 bring? How do we continue to resist? Like a talisman that we hold onto, here is the judgment of the Supreme Court of India which placed mandatory limitations on the lawful use of Aadhaar: “[the State] shall not unduly expand the scope of ‘subsidies, services and benefits’ thereby widening the net of Aadhaar, where it is not permitted otherwise,” and “an unrestricted extension of the Aadhaar platform to users who may be … private sector operators,” “establishment of a surveillance state,” or any “commercial exploitation” of information is “patently unconstitutional.” K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019 10 SCC 1).

In the face of this limitation, Aadhaar continues to expand. The UID is now mandatory for over 300 schemes (a 2021 list puts it at 312), many of which provide essential resources like clean drinking water, and multiple non-scheme rights and obligations, like receiving one’s income tax refund.

We continue to oppose and critique the use of Aadhaar for welfare and social security, and mourn those who died this year after being coercively deprived of their basic rights.

We remember

Risa Mankadia, who died of hunger on October 22, belonged to a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group in Odisha and was unable to access his PDS rations because he could not complete E-KYC (Know Your Customer) for his ration card in June despite trying repeatedly.

What happened this year

In the last year, we saw both privacy and democracy suffer with the enforcement of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in November 2025. The Act fails to provide adequate safeguards to citizens against the government aggregating and monetising our data and carrying out expansive surveillance, or from Big Tech profiting from it and subjecting individuals to predatory targeting. It also guts the Right to Information, a hard-won tool for transparency and accountability in government.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 has been repealed and replaced with the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025. Among the ways in which the 2025 Act hurts rural workers’ livelihoods and dignity is the imposition of a “biometric attendance system” – despite the fact that as recently as July 2025, the Ministry of Rural Development found serious flaws in an attempted digital attendance system and ordered Gram Panchayats to conduct “100%” physical attendance.

Earlier this year the LSE Identity project celebrated 20 years of its existence and critique of the 2004 UK biometric identity project that was rolled back in the wake of strong public disapproval. But in October 2025, two decades after the UK’s proposed digital ID, the UK Prime Minister praised Aadhaar, calling it a massive success. Calling on other countries to Beware of Aadhaar, Rethink Aadhaar, along with several other organisations including the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), National Confederation of Dalit Organisations (NACDOR), NREGA Sansharsh Morcha, National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW), the National Platform for the Rights of the Disabled (NPRD), and Internet Freedom Foundation launched the Beware of Aadhaar Campaign as a warning to the global community on Aadhaar as a failed and objectionable model that should not be replicated in other countries. Please read and share it widely, here.

What the future may bring?

On Christmas Day, The Hindu reported that the NATGRID has been linked to the NPR (National Population Register). NATGRID is a platform set up under the Congress government in 2010, linking government and private databases that can be accessed by the police and investigating agencies. As of the end of this year, NATGRID’s upgraded tools include facial recognition technology and the Ministry of Home Affairs “has asked the States to liberally use the platform to access datasets which includes details of driving licence, vehicle registration, Aadhaar, airline data, bank records, FASTAG, passport and travel details of foreigners and Indians, suspicious transaction reports from Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), railway passengers, and also extract and analyse data from social media posts.”

The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, begun in Bihar, will continue across the country despite the documented disenfranchisement of voters en masse – illustrating the perils of hasty digitisation with Booth Level Officers required to rely on new digital systems with little training and citizens bearing the consequences of inevitable errors. In just one state, 3.1 million voters have been left out of the first phase of the process because of “glitches” in converting a PDF file to CSV; countless others may find themselves vote-less as the State deepens its dependence on technology in core electoral functions, a trend that now extends beyond enrolment to the act of voting itself through the introduction of mobile-based voting in Bihar’s panchayat elections.

The upcoming digital census in 2027 must be read in the same continuum of institutional stress-testing. Though still to be carried out by enumerators, it places technology and databases at the centre of how people are recorded, carrying forward familiar risks of exclusion, opacity, and administrative overreach.

Is the surveillance state coming or is it already here? What kinds of challenges can we bring to these systems of mass surveillance in the new year? And will we even be left standing after these exercises in exclusion? We demand accountability and #DatabaseSeAazaadi!

2025: A year of resisting coercive technologies

We began the year with a caution against the APAAR ID and its impact on school-going children. For your ease - access explainers, resources on related concerns, and relevant RTI responses on this here. APAAR is now mandatory for CBSE board exams, and despite accounts of increasing exclusions, it continues to spread further. Maharashtra has announced APAAR will be required for all state board examinations as well.

January 2025 saw the release of draft rules to operationalise the Digital Personal Data Protection Act. The rules fail to introduce any reasonable limitations on government use of people’s personal information, allowing the government to intrude on people’s personal information without limit. Along with other civil society organisations, Rethink convened a public reading of the rules, and was involved in drafting a letter to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology critiquing the manner in which the Rules had been drafted and released. The letter was endorsed by 13 organizations, and over 140 individuals, and submitted to the Ministry. We also prepared a joint submission on the rules with the Article 21 Trust.

In April 2025, the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) proposed linking Aadhaar cards with the EPIC database. We wrote about how legally unsound and dangerous this was, and highlighted its potential impact on India’s electoral integrity. The statement was endorsed by over 150 individuals and circulated in the media.

In 2025 we saw more tinkering with electoral integrity with the Special Intensive Revision exercises, which began in Bihar in July. We authored a statement titled “Bihar as the Laboratory of Electoral Mismanagement,” calling for the ECI to immediately suspend the SIR. Of course, not only did that not happen, but the SIR has been extended nationally to 12 more states and union territories, with West Bengal in current focus. A follow-up statement on the issue after the SC’s interim order on Bihar, is here.

To think together about these growing concerns on citizenship, identity, and documents, and to understand how to witness the events then ongoing in Bihar, we organised a webinar titled “India’s Identity Crisis: Bihar's Special Intensive Revision, Aadhaar and Citizenship”, with scholar Dr Usha Ramanathan, activist Kamayani Swami and editor Santosh Singh in Bihar, advocate Prasanna S, and professor Jean Dreze. The recording of the full webinar is here.

In June, we focused on the expanding, coercive Aadhaar net, despite recorded exclusions and fraud. In July, our newsletter focussed on voting rights, and rounded up other relevant updates and interesting readings on the issue. In August, we hoped to bring public attention to Aadhaar-enabled grave human rights violations, and included reports and analysis on other technology and digitisation related concerns. Simultaneously, other rights violations continued, affecting privacy and data security, expanding facial recognition, monetising data, and exports of this technology in India’s neighbourhood, most recently in the military junta-ruled Myanmar.

In September, Professor Jagdeep Chhokar, founder of Association of Democratic Reforms passed away. Prof. Chhokar, among India’s most steadfast advocates for electoral transparency, was among the pioneering thinkers who opposed the linking of Aadhaar to voter ID as ill-thought, illogical and unnecessary in 2021 and campaigned for wide social and political inclusion till the end. We remember him with the deepest respect.

Till the last weeks of 2025, resistance to forced digitisation and coercion continued – in the form of litigation by anganwadi workers in the Bombay High Court, by government teachers in Maharashtra and a powerful strike by over 2 lakh gig workers. More strength and solidarity to them!

As we enter the new year, and look back on the old, we gather our strength to continue resistance, spread awareness and create and collect resources. We can only do this work with the support of readers and people like you. Please continue to share relevant readings and reports with us, and share our newsletters, resources with others. No2UID and happy new year <3!

Rethink Aadhaar Campaign

For signing up for Rethink Aadhaar mailing list, please click:

https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/rethink-aadhaar

Twitter: @No2UID
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/no2uid/

Write to us at: contact@rethinkaadhaar.in

Digital coercion causes one more hunger death; APAAR ID derails education

Rethink UID — Thu, 30 Oct 2025 14:15:57 +0000

Rethink Aadhaar Newsletter September-October 2025

Note to readers: We are able to compile these updates because readers send us relevant information. If you think something is worth sharing widely, please send it to us and we will try to include it in the updates. Email: contact@rethinkaadhaar.in @no2UID

Coercive digitisation violates fundamental rights:

Harsh digital coercion in Aadhaar-linked systems has caused yet another starvation death in India’s interior villages.
Risa Mankadia, a single elderly man who belonged to a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group in Odisha was unable to get his rice rations after he was not able to complete E-KYC(Know Your Customer) for his Antodaya – meant for the poorest of the poor families – ration card in June despite trying repeatedly.
He died of hunger on October 22, noted the Right to Food Campaign. Earlier, activists have investigated more than 20 deaths where those with fragile livelihoods and who faced chronic hunger have starved after officials cut off their food and welfare rights for not enrolling in Aadhaar or failing to link their details online to Aadhaar.

Rethink Aadhaar demands an investigation into Mankadia’s death and accountability from the union government and Odisha officials and companies running Aadhaar systems for the denial of vital social security in Mankadia’s final months.
The union government has tried to market and export Aadhaar biometric ID to other countries such as Sri Lanka. More recently, the UK government advertised its own digital ID card with claims that the switch to Aadhar saved India’s government over $10bn each year, a dubious claim that has never been proven. In the backdrop of Mankadia’s death was the fact that the Odisha government and the Union government were denying 15.66 lakh families their right to food merely because they have been unable to do the re-KYC process. These families will stop getting subsidised food and bear the burden of proving their KYC and the government capitalises on denials showing these as “savings”.
Digital ID for children is creating new roadblocks to the right to education: The APAAR ID’s restrictive and centralised requirements are excluding children from schools, potentially resulting in not recognising their credentials and ineligibility for crucial examinations. A “single misplaced letter, a placeholder birthday, or a typo made years ago by an overworked teacher can derail a child's education.” APAAR was rolled out as a diktat to schools, without any consultation, following the Aadhaar playbook.

For more on APAAR, see the following videos:

PART 1| APAAR ID अपार आईडी स्वैच्छिक होने पर भी क्यों हो रही है ज़बरदस्ती? Is APAAR ID safe? – https://youtu.be/4ntjK0rOWwk

PART 2 | APAAR ID की ज़बरदस्ती? क्या है आपके अधिकार! APAAR ID being forced? Know your Rights! – https://youtu.be/-2q5k4hLPkg

Our January update contains links to resources, explainers, important RTIs on APAAR ID

The Meghalaya government is insisting on Aadhaar production by applicants for an SC/ST scholarship but the Meghalaya High Court has held, as an interim measure, that applicants cannot be disqualified for non-production of Aadhaar. Meanwhile, the Meghalaya government has acknowledged that QR codes can be tampered with in its push to use a specific application to scan and verify Aadhaar QR codes.
The vulnerabilities of a digital vaccine certification system – COWIN – have been exposed as the COWIN portal was inaccessible for multiple weeks in August and September, affecting people’s right to travel and access their own health records.
People with loans may soon be locked out of their mobile phone — a lifeline for people in India today — at the whims of lenders in case of default. The extreme consequences of permitting a lender to control a person’s access to their phone in “Digital India” cannot be overstated – consumer activists warn that “This practice weaponizes access to essential technology to enforce behavioural compliance, locking users out of livelihoods, education, and financial services until repayment.”
Aadhaar is a hurdle even for switching to environment-friendly solar power in UP: “mismatches between the names in the electricity department records and the Aadhaar cards” cause problems for people simply trying to get loans for their solar power equipment under central schemes.

Digitisation is causing rampant risks to privacy and information security:

Activist Srinivas Kodali’s complaint to the Chief Electoral Officer, Telangana alleging misuse of personal data has revealed serious abuse of personal information by the state government.
The Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Telangana has admitted that the personal information of voters in the state from the ECI database was shared with the state government, allegedly to link voter IDs with Aadhaar, and the data was used for different purposes after that without the ECI’s permission – including creation of a facial recognition system – a flawed form of algorithmic identity verification. This comes after the CEO initially denied the allegations.
Access to the data was not limited by the State government – it was shared with a private company to create a pensioner verification system.

The incident highlights the impossibility of preventing misuse of data once aggregated by any government body, and serves as a reminder that India still does not have a functioning data protection law which could potentially hold the government – as a data fiduciary – responsible for unauthorised and unlawful use and dissemination of personal data.

In the absence of any limitation on use of data by governments, Maharashtra and Rajasthan are planning to monetise the personal information of welfare scheme beneficiaries — including name, age, gender, religion, caste, income range, assets and education, and links to vehicle ownership, tax status, and health records. This information may be made available to private companies for their “market research” — a blatantly unlawful use of personal data collected for a completely different purpose, without any consent from the individuals or any perceptible public interest.
Companies which develop facial recognition technologies for the state to surveil people are often the same companies involved in facial recognition for other uses – for example, mobile voting in local elections, raising more questions about governments misusing personal data.

Meanwhile, Aadhaar use and digitisation expands:

The 2027 Census exercise will likely bring new challenges and risks for privacy and inclusion:

The multiple technological measures proposed for information collection raise issues of “privacy, data protection, and the potential for state-led surveillance” and “India’s vulnerability to cyberattacks amplifies these risks, threatening both the integrity of the census process and the security of citizens’ data.”
Census enumerators and supervisors will use their own mobile phones to collect people’s intimate personal information in 2027 — with no regard for the security and integrity of the information or how the supervisors may use it.

The UIDAI plans to permit facial authentication through Aadhaar for online transfers of high amounts – without any evaluation of whether this will affect the real problem of scammers and digital fraud when the person’s face is authenticated, or how many people will need to update their biometrics to be able to transfer their own money.
Aadhaar in an armistice agreement: The MHA and Manipur Government will require Kuki-Zo insurgent groups to obtain Aadhaar cards and link them to their bank accounts in order to access the stipend they are entitled to under a 2008 pact.
After the Supreme Court directed the ECI to accept Aadhaar as proof of identity during the Special Intensive Revision, the ECI will also accept Aadhaar as proof of identity for voters who are on the electoral roll but do not have a physical voter ID card.
Simultaneously, the ECI is deploying new “tech-enabled” voter ID cards just weeks two months ahead of the Bihar assembly elections, which have already served as an experiment ground for the Special Intensive Revision. These will require fresh applications and downloads to registered mobile numbers risking further exclusion from the electoral process.
Despite evidence of fake or misused Aadhaar by ticket-booking bots on IRCTC through Tatkal, the platform has made it mandatory to use Aadhaar to book even reserved general tickets during the first 15 minutes of the opening of general reservation.
Labour skills will be digitised in a “real-time” labour market information system which is in the works and will reportedly use “AI” and machine learning to work — but it is unclear which sources data will be collected from, or which issues the specific use of AI and ML is aimed at resolving.
The UIDAI CEO insists that Aadhaar is not “functional” but a foundational ID and fraud is not a problem — while fake Aadhaars are the reason for repeated verification and for non-acceptance as proof of anything.

Aadhaar and digitisation continue to make money for others:

26% of Jan Dhan accounts in public sector banks are inoperative — raising concerns about the real value of these accounts for the general public, and whether the banks are doing anything to improve accessibility for their customers once on-boarded and recorded as a win for “Digital India”.

The private company Protean eGov Technologies saw its shares surge 11% after UIDAI awarded it a work order worth ₹1,160 crore to run district-level Aadhaar Seva Kendras (ASKs). Experts and scholars like Reetika Khera have documented how dysfunctional and dystopian ASKs can be, causing bureaucratic nightmares for people dealing with demographic or biometric errors and updations.
Online real-money gaming has succeeded, making private companies rich, due to the “spread of UPI, cheap smartphones, cheaper data” and in the process, have led to addiction and huge financial losses for Indians. “Behind flashy apps and jackpots lies a complex web of mule accounts, payouts and payment tricks that move thousands of crores beyond the screen.”

Related reading:

What does “digital sovereignty” mean: Do Indian companies pursue the goals of Indians, or their government?

Aadhaar for the UK? Not quite: Although the UK announced plans for a biometric digital identity system in the UK “Brit Card” to serve as a work permit, this is neither a wholesale approval of Aadhaar, nor a certainty. More than 1.6 million people have opposed the plan, describing it as “a step towards mass surveillance and digital control” which would put “incredibly sensitive information” at risk. Indians are sharing lessons from Aadhaar to warn against any mandatory biometric ID, highlighting the human rights violations caused by social and economic exclusion and the lack of privacy and oversight.

Reportage in Jacobin on India’s “Citizenship by algorithm”: How Aadhaar is being used to “undertake a biometric, religious, and genealogical project of redefining citizenship”.

State surveillance in Pakistan: An Amnesty Tech report warns that “Pakistan is developing one of the world's most comprehensive surveillance programmes outside China.” The framework includes a phone-tapping system that can surveil at least 4 million phones at any given time, and an internet firewall that can block two million active internet sessions at once. Amnesty has documented the involvement of a nexus of companies based in Germany, France, United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, Canada, and the United States.

The internet as a forum for democratic movements in Nepal and Bangladesh, and lessons for regulation in India: The use of platforms like Discord in the recent uprising in Nepal highlight the internet's evolving role in democracy — it can be used for effective and safe communication and mobilisation but can also serve as a carrier of misinformation or propaganda. India should avoid digital authoritarianism, recognizing its incompatibility with democratic and economic goals.

The labour behind the technology: “Thousands of ‘overworked, underpaid’ humans train Google’s AI to seem smart”.

Re-post: APAAR ID the latest in "voluntary-mandatory" double-speak, worsens exclusion of poorest children

Rethink UID — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 09:27:29 +0000

In light of numerous instances of APAAR ID exclusion and fresh coercion being reported, we are re-posting our update from this year’s beginning January 2025 with links to resources, explainers, important RTIs links on it

Dear friends,

2025 begins, and with it, we see an increasing tendency on the part of the state to introduce Aadhaar-coded technology across domains, from education to agriculture, land, and more. We believe it is important for the Rethink community to extend our concerns beyond Aadhaar, to rethinking digital as a whole. So, while we aim to continue the fight against Aadhaar and allied technologies, we also hope to address other tech initiatives.

In this, the first newsletter of 2025, we focus on the APAAR ID - a ‘voluntary’ ID launched by the Ministry of Education (MoE) to create a database of all students in India, part of the ‘One Nation, One Student ID’ programme. Amidst alarming reports on the decline of school enrollment rates, the introduction and push for APAAR raises concerns about access and exclusions, along with the usual concerns about data safety. Launched in October 2023, APAAR is part of the National Education Policy 2020, and provides a singular lifelong ID for students to store all academic records, credits, and certificates. The ID is also mandatorily linked with the Academic Bank of Credits (ABC) and with DigiLocker.

The APAAR ID raises many concerns - it has no legal or statutory backing, and has no guidelines, framework for implementation, or other policy documents that clearly lay out the procedures to be followed. The consent form is ambiguously worded, the data safety measures are vague, and the benefits are unclear. The APAAR rollout process is one we have seen many times before with respect to identification systems, where it is supposed to be voluntary, but reports from across the country reveal the manner in which officials, parents, students, and teachers are facing immense pressure to ensure full coverage.

Remember the APAAR ID is not mandatory - we can and must resist. We also share resources at the end of this email that parents/guardians can use for taking action.

We are sharing some relevant links, explainers, and coverage below.

This explainer by the Internet Freedom Foundation unpacks the ID in detail, and analyses concerns relating to data protection, privacy, and consent.

On the APAAR ID

FAQs on APAAR by the Ministry of Education. The MoE has also provided resources, including brochures explaining the ID, explaining the application process flow for parents and for schools, and a brochure clearly stating the ID is voluntary, that it cannot be made without an Aadhaar for the guardian and student, and the data security protocols (unclear and contradictory!)
APAAR ID explainer in The Indian Express.

On its voluntariness

The MoE’s brochure and the APAAR ID website clearly state that the ID is voluntary. Schools must ask parents to fill out hardcopy consent forms which schools are required to store, along with a digital copy that will be generated and stored in the UDISE+ portal.
The parental consent form can be found on this page - and it raises red flags. The form states that parental consent can be withdrawn at any time, but it also states “...any personal data already been processed shall remain unaffected on such withdrawal of consent.” Considering that the APAAR ID is linked with the Aadhaar of the guardian and the child, and shares data with multiple other databases including UDISE+, DigiLocker, the Academic Bank of Credits, and the Vidya Samiksha Kendra, this provision in the consent form is a cause for concern.
News reports show a very different and familiar story - voluntariness exists on paper, while bureaucrats, school administrators, teachers, and parents face enrollment deadlines, increasing pressure, and even threats of pay cuts for teachers. [Odisha; Mumbai; Ahmedabad; Andhra Pradesh; Punjab; Ludhiana]

On access

While the MoE has emphasised that the APAAR ID is voluntary, and does not preclude access to any government programmes, scholarships, internships, or any other schemes, parent groups have expressed concern that refusing consent could mean their child will lose out on advantages.
Aadhaar of the student and one guardian is mandatory for generating an APAAR ID. First, this makes APAAR inaccessible for all students who do not have an Aadhaar card; second, this violates the spirit of the SC judgement stating that Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for access to any scheme or benefit.
The APAAR ID application is only processed and approved after Aadhaar authentication is conducted. This is causing widespread fear and confusion, because in multiple cases student names are spelt differently in their Aadhaar and their birth certificates, and other such demographic details mismatches are also common.
Making IDs legally voluntary, but for all purposes making access to entitlements and benefits contingent on the ID, and thereby making it mandatory in practice was seen widely in the case of Aadhaar; when access to PDS entitlements, MGNREGA work, BPL pensions, farmer schemes, and innumerable other initiatives was predicated on the possession of an Aadhaar card.

On data security

In the context of previous student data leaks, concerns about data privacy are prevalent amongst parents/guardians.
The statement by IFF and this blog by SFLC.in lay out the data concerns more thoroughly.

Action points

This RTI reply by the MoE states clearly that APAAR ID is not mandatory. We also share two template letters (here and this one drafted by IFF) that guardians can use to write to schools about their concerns and refusal to consent to the creation of APAAR for their wards. The APAAR ID is still in the stage of its rollout, and we urge all of you to share these resources with your friends/family who have children facing pressure to enroll in APAAR from their educational institutions.

Please also write to us with your experience of the ID enrollment process, and your experience in refusing it. Sharing our stories and resources with each other strengthens our collective fight.

A warning on India's biometric identity model

Rethink UID — Fri, 24 Oct 2025 02:21:24 +0000

As Indian government tries to promote its model of biometric ID model to other regions, a growing list of articles and reports documenting the risks of Aadhaar:

Privacy and Surveillance

The Different Ways in Which Aadhaar Infringes on Privacy

https://thewire.in/government/privacy-aadhaar-supreme-court-

CIS Report, Information Security Practices of Aadhaar (or lack thereof): A documentation of public availability of Aadhaar Numbers with sensitive personal financial information https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/information-security-practices-of-aadhaar-or-lack-thereof-a-documentation-of-public-availability-of-aadhaar-numbers-with-sensitive-personal-financial-information-1

Aadhaar’s Function Creep visible in digital ID for education: “APAAR” ID’s most disturbing feature is not its invasive data collection, but the clandestine manner of its implementationhttps://www.deccanherald.com/specials/digital-database-or-coercive-report-card-apaar-id-3469158

and ‘The Impossible Maze Of India’s New Student Identity Project—APAAR’ https://www.boomlive.in/decode/apaar-id-india-digital-education-aadhaar-crisis-29721

Security AND Data Breaches

‘Here are the major security breaches of Aadhaar and what was actually affected’

https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/aadhaar-security-breaches-here-are-the-major-untoward-incidents-that-have-happened-with-aadhaar-and-what-was-actually-affected-4300349.html

‘Indian state government leaks thousands of Aadhaar Numbers’ https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/31/aadhaar-data-leak/

‘UIDAI restricts Aadhaar portal access to 5,000 designated officials after alleged breach’

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/uidai-firewalls-5000-officials-post-breach/articleshow/62423133.cms

‘Cops In India Are Using Artificial Intelligence That Can Identify You In a Crowd’, reports HuffPost India

https://www.huffpost.com/archive/in/entry/facial-recognition-ai-is-shaking-up-criminals-in-punjab-but-should-you-worry-too_in_5c107639e4b0a9576b52833b

Errors, hassles, social exclusion of those already vulnerable

‘Without Aadhaar, without identity’. Vyom Anil, Jean Dreze write in The Indian Express: People who lose their Aadhaar number may not be able to retrieve it, and risk losing all social benefits https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/flaw-in-aadhaar-architecture-uidai-card-enrolment-7389133/

A detailed investigation into the working of an Aadhaar Seva Kendra in Ranchiillustrates the bureaucratic ordeals imposed on people trying to update or enrol in Aadhaar

“My face changes with each surgery. How many times will I update my Aadhaar?” Indian acid attack survivors take their fight against exclusionary digital ID norms to Supreme Court https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9VF3Qr4oAg

‘Starvation Deaths and Denial of Welfare Entitlements – Insights from Jharkhand’. An investigation by Siraj Dutta into more than 27 deaths caused by starvation in the five years after Aadhaar was made compulsory shows how it worsened chronic hunger when the poorest communities could not access digital technologies that had been mandatory https://www.scribd.com/document/836730293/SSRN-id3870242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3870242

‘Tribal communities across Maharashtra face barriers to accessing education, health care, and government schemes because they could not register in Aadhaar’ https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/maharashtra/an-anonymous-life-without-an-aadhar-identity/article69939921.ece

A study by scholars at LibTech, how Aadhaar-centered digital systems requiring constant updates threaten people’s access to food under the public distribution system https://idronline.org/article/rights/infrastructures-of-exclusion-how-e-kyc-impacts-access-to-food/

“Savings” false claims of Aadhaar apparatus

Aadhaar’s $11bn Question: No basis for government statement on Aadhaar “savings”
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/aadhaars-11-bn-question-the-numbers-being-touted-by-govt-have-no-solid-basis/articleshow/62830705.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

More than 8 million drop in number of marginalised scholarship beneficiaries’ list linked to Aadhaar being forced, and tech glitches, delays https://news.careers360.com/89-lakh-drop-sc-st-obc-scholarship-students-aadhaar-card-link-pre-post-matric-pms-yasasvi-shreshta-nsp-ssp-portal-delays-nep

In a bid to build digital “golden data” records on every citizen, the most vulnerable were struck off social security registers, declared “dead” or absent https://thewire.in/rights/companies-gain-elders-lose-in-rajasthans-turn-to-cradle-to-grave-digital-governance

Opinion: Data is the new gold and Aadhaar is the tool to get it (Usha Ramanathan, 30 December 2016)

The mother of all disruptions (Jean Dreze, December 2016)

Resisting violations of the Supreme Court Orders on Aadhaar (Anupam Saraph, 12 December 2016)

Sharing Aadhaar data: HC notice to Centre, Reliance (Special Correspondent, The Hindu, 14 December 2016)

Aadhaar Regulations grant UIDAI unchecked power, and offer little convenience to users (Prashant Reddy Thikkavarapu, November 2016)

India's Aadhaar project: An assault on welfare, privacy, and democracy (Reetika Khera, Praavita, Aashish Gupta, November 2016)

Dark clouds over the PDS (Jean Dreze, September 2016)

On Aadhaar Success, it's all hype, that includes the World Bank (Reetika Khera, September 2016)

Can biometrics stop the theft of food rations? No, shows Gujarat (Anumeha Yadav, 17 December 2016)

Aadhaar mandates violate human rights increase discrimination but governments continue to treat it as a solution | August 2025 Newsletter

Rethink UID — Mon, 01 Sep 2025 10:51:21 +0000

The pace at which Aadhaar and related mandates are mushrooming is alarming. In our August newsletter we round up recent developments, analytical articles and interviews, and ground reporting. We hope you share these updates with your networks — spreading awareness is the first step towards building public consciousness and strengthening our fight against the madness.

Voting rights and Aadhaar come closer together:

Read an interview with Dr. Usha Ramanathan on the privacy impact of linking Aadhaar with voter IDs.
The Bihar SIR exercise has led to millions being struck off the voter list in a hasty, unlawful exercise. The Supreme Court directed the ECI to accept Aadhaar in claims against de-listing.
The SIR exercise has shown that there are likely no non-citizens on the voter list in Bihar, but the fears stoked have led to announcements of a nation-wide SIR.
In Manipur, informal proceedings to conduct a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) along the lines of Bihar have begun, with people being told to produce Aadhaar.

Aadhaar continues to be arbitrarily inaccessible and unworkable:

A detailed investigation into the working of an Aadhaar Seva Kendra in Ranchi illustrates the bureaucratic ordeals imposed on people trying to update or enrol in Aadhaar.
Assam’s government announced it will stop issuing Aadhaar numbers to adults to prevent non-Indian citizens from obtaining them, despite the fact that Aadhaar can be legally provided to non-citizens, and this move will likely disenfranchise people seeking access to benefits.
The endless cycle of KYC continues as DBT beneficiaries are set to be audited again.
Aadhaar is the new “weak link” in insurance processes, allowing an opening for identity-based fraud through insurance claims.

Digitisation fails to serve the people’s interests, but continues to expand:

A look at the impact of corporate-driven tech initiatives in agriculture.
Mandating Aadhaar linkage, digital data entry, and unreliable tech has led to exclusion of 89 lakh potential scholarship beneficiaries from the most vulnerable groups including SC, ST, and OBC beneficiaries.
Unique IDs and digitisation do nothing to stop corruption or false claims: thousands of fake teacher IDs were created in Maharashtra in a Rs.3000 crore scam.
The Rajasthan Government’s attempt to build digital “golden data” records on every citizen has led to the most vulnerable being denied pensions, wrongly declared “dead” or absent.
In Maharashtra, tribal children are turned away from school because of lack of Aadhaar.
The UP government plans to introduce AI tools in MGNREGA operations without consideration for the impact on beneficiaries.
The Delhi government is expanding mandatory ID requirements for public schemes, to exclusionary effect. The pink ticket free bus scheme for women is being replaced with a “smart card” which requires Delhi residency, excluding vulnerable women who work in the NCR or have other difficulty getting address proof. Simultaneously, Aadhaar enrolment is set to get more onerous in Delhi.
Odisha’s mass ration card deletion is yet to be revoked despite clear problems in the KYC process and people’s reliance on ration to correct the high burden of malnutrition.
More than 23% of Jan Dhan bank accounts are inactive, reflecting the lack of actual access and ease of digitisation and banking.
Telangana plans digitisation of health systems in partnership with Estonia.

Aadhaar, data, and surveillance:

The MHA wants prison authorities to conduct Aadhaar authentication for persons imprisoned and their visitors, a move that has no link to welfare benefits, and could only serve to further surveillance of imprisoned people and affect their legal defences and the privacy and dignity of their families. Family members without Aadhaar are being turned away in a violation of human rights.
In Mizoram, refugees are being forced to give up biometric data, making them even more vulnerable to targeting persecution.
Parents and experts urge the Karnataka Government to not introduce facial recognition systems for school attendance, warning of misuse.

Watch Justice (Retd.) Gautam Patel’s address at the Internet Freedom Foundation’s Privacy Supreme event on the anniversary of the Puttaswamy judgment. Justice Patel traces the evolution of privacy in India, reflecting on its past foundations, present challenges, and the future trajectory of this essential right in an era of rapid technological change.

Interesting related readings:

A concise reminder of how Aadhaar came to be and its failures.
The India-UK FTA and the impact on India’s digital sovereignty.
How India’s new wave of tech billionaires are changing CSR and philanthropy.

Until next time!

In solidarity,

Rethink Aadhaar.

Aadhaar casts a shadow on voting rights | July 2025 Update

Rethink UID — Fri, 25 Jul 2025 06:32:40 +0000

With about four months before assembly elections are due in Bihar, the ECI is undertaking a Special Intensive Revision (SIR), a major development in which the entire state voter list is being re-constituted.

This is a mammoth exercise akin to the creation of a National Register of Citizens, being attempted with limited manpower and time.
The process is beyond the ECI’s remit and is likely to exclude genuine voters, especially those enrolled since 2003, since it requires production of documents like proof of parents’ date or place of birth required for proving citizenship.
Over 61 lakh voters may be excluded from the list.
A ground report by Kamayani Singh, Rahul Shastri, and Yogendra Yadav exposes the gaps between the ECI’s claims of supporting voters, and the ground reality of people forced to chase BLOs and produce multiple documents.
This exercise may be used to force Aadhaar linkage with electoral records, while raising doubts about the validity of Aadhaar as identification.

To understand the concerns over exclusion, legality, and surveillance surrounding the SIR, join the Rethink Aadhaar webinar with on India’s Identity Crisis: Bihar's Special Intensive Revision, Aadhaar and Citizenship on Sunday, 27 July, 2025 at 8:00 PM IST.

https://www.instagram.com/p/DMCZrMuyexU/

Other updates

Reiterating limitations on Aadhaar use: the Bombay High Court issues a reminder that after the Supreme Court’s judgement in Puttaswamy (2018), banks cannot insist on Aadhaar for opening accounts. The HC awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for losses incurred due to the bank’s refusal to open an account.

However Aadhaar continues to be misapplied: forcing Aadhaar verification for tatkal bookings on IRCTC has not stopped agents from buying up tickets through bots using for-sale Aadhaar-verified login credentials. Genuine users risk losing access to their accounts, especially given IRCTC’s previous data breaches.

Aadhaar use also continues to expand, now in employment: the Finance Ministry has allowed “voluntary” Aadhaar authentication to verify candidates for public sector banking jobs.

Getting, keeping, and “verifying” Aadhaar becomes more difficult:

The Manipur government is adopting a stringent verification process to enroll and update Aadhaar, including mandatory biometric updates at ages 5-7 and after 15, and headquarter approval for “adult Aadhaar” cases.
The Assam government has proposed requiring District Commissioners’ approval for adult Aadhaar applications.
The Odisha government plans to suspend 20.58 lakh ration cards for lack of e-KYC verification, forcing people to come to PDS stores or face deactivation of their ration cards. Previously, 19 lakh people were denied the right to food when the Odisha PDS mandated linking Aadhaar with ration cards.
Jan Dhan bank accounts, which were supposed to enable DBTs, are at risk of closure in an ongoing re-KYC exercise. (needs verification as the link is paywalled; the Govt insists there will be no closure of inactive accounts)
De-activating an individual’s Aadhar after their death is slow: only 1.15 crore Aadhaar numbers have been de-activated, leading to inflated numbers which spark rumours of Aadhaar fraud or duplication.

Digitisation drawbacks: The push for UPI adoption is leading to GST notices for small vendors in Karnataka, with plans to expand nationally.

Criminal justice and surveillance: A special two-part investigation into the use of facial recognition technology by the Delhi Police exposes how marginalised communities suffer the consequences of FRT’s failures, and how the Delhi Police ignored bias, abuse, data leaks, and human rights violations in sourcing this tech.

Tech and state power:

How technology companies are furthering colonial oppression through “colonial algorithms”, with AI-targeting software, surveillance mechanisms, and censorship tools to enable violence against Palestinians, and maintain repressive power structures.
An exploration of how the Indian state is expanding its powers and undermining democracy as the relationship between the governed and the governors is increasingly controlled through digital technologies.

From around the world: the Aadhaar experience serves as a cautionary tale for the Sri Lankan digitisation project.

De-link Aadhaar from voting and welfare rights in Bihar SIR, and elsewhere

Rethink UID — Fri, 11 Jul 2025 05:51:47 +0000

The SC suggested the government may consider Aadhaar as one of valid documents in Bihar voter roll exercise. Aadhaar is not a citizen ID, it continues to cause mass exclusions, privacy harms. There must be a clear separation between Aadhaar as a voluntary ID and it being a prerequisite to access any rights

Rethink Aadhaar notes the interim order of the Supreme Court of India on 10 July 2025 in the challenge(s) to the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar announced by the Election Commission of India on 24.06.2025.

Some Petitioners pressed for Aadhaar to be accepted as a valid proof of identity for the purpose of enrollment into the electoral rolls despite its role in elections being the subject of a pending constitutional challenge in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India (W.P. (Civil) 848/2022). This approach relied on Section 23(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which permits Electoral Registration Officers to mandate Aadhaar for identity verification.

Although biometric authentication is not being used in the current SIR, accepting Aadhaar as a supporting document creates the administrative and technical foundation for linking electoral rolls with the Aadhaar database in the future, including its use for biometric voter verification, as was experimented coincidentally in the recently conducted Municipal Elections in Bihar.

Aadhaar’s widespread coverage has been driven by coercive, mandatory enrolment and forced use with little to no accountability across welfare and service systems. This creeping expansion has triggered mass deletions across multiple contexts, including in Assam where Aadhaar was weaponised through biometric freezes and NRC-linked exclusions, and in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh where electoral rolls saw large-scale deletions, and also raised grave concerns of surveillance, targeted voter profiling, and the erosion of the secret ballot.

Rethink Aadhaar maintains that the electoral rolls must be completely de-linked with Aadhaar, an exclusionary, unreliable, leaking centralised database whose legal status remains unsettled. Further, that the guarantee of universal adult franchise flowing from Article 326 of the Indian Constitution must be based on a flexible, inclusive, and pluralistic approach to documentation, without privileging one form of identity. For more background, please see how Aadhaar-voter ID linking is an assault on free and fair elections.

Please write to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in , laavanyatamang@gmail.com.

Right to Food: Stop Exclusionary Facial Recognition Mandate in Nutrition Schemes

Rethink UID — Thu, 10 Jul 2025 11:48:52 +0000

Bihar as the Laboratory of Electoral Mismanagement: Rethink Aadhaar Statement on the Special Intensive Revision of Voter Rolls

Rethink UID — Sun, 06 Jul 2025 18:44:05 +0000

Rethink Aadhaar expresses deep concern about the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) decision, dated June 24, 2025, to initiate a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar. The revision introduces documentation requirements that are likely to result in the large-scale exclusion of genuine voters, particularly those who belong to marginalised and low-income communities.

It requires large segments of the electorate to produce documentation proving citizenship, including for persons born after 2004 and their parents, despite no finding of irregularities or illegality in the existing electoral roll. For those not found on the 2003 rolls, layered documentation is required: voters born before July 1, 1987 must produce documents showing their own date and place of birth; those born between July 1, 1987 and December 2, 2004 must also furnish one parent’s documents; and those born after December 2, 2004 must produce documents for both parents. The revision has been imposed without adequate notice, time, or procedural safeguards.

The exercise disproportionately burdens those without formal documentation. Data from the Civil Registration System shows that Bihar has lagged far behind most states in registration of births - in 2000, only 3.7% of births were registered in Bihar, compared to the national average of 56.2%. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5, 2019-20) corroborates this story. Bihar was in the three lowest states in terms of birth registration across the country even in 2020. Only 2.8 percent of children born between 2001 and 2025 in Bihar possess birth certificates. Many also lack passports, educational records, or other high-threshold documents. By excluding widely held identity documents such as ration cards, the revision imposes an unrealistic evidentiary bar, especially for migrant workers, women, informal sector workers, and the rural poor who have historically relied on these for state recognition.

The Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 permit removal from the rolls only if a person is shown to be dead, not ordinarily resident, or otherwise ineligible. This must be done based on due process, including notice, reasons, and an opportunity to be heard, as per Section 22 and Rule 21A. These procedural protections are crucial to safeguarding the right to vote under Article 326, and are closely linked to constitutional guarantees of equality under Article 14, dignity under Article 21, and political expression under Article 19(1)(a).

The Supreme Court of India in Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) affirmed that a person whose name appears on the electoral roll is presumed validly enrolled and may be removed only after individualised notice and a hearing. These protections cannot be substituted by blanket demands for re-verification or general suspicion.

No specific, jurisdiction-based justification has been provided for the Bihar SIR. While the ECI’s June 24 and June 30 press releases mention “illegal immigration,” “under-registration of deaths,” and youth enrollment, there is no data or local context to support a full-scale revision. A Special Summary Revision was conducted in Bihar from October 2024 to January 2025 without serious irregularities.

This is not the first time such a process has triggered disenfranchisement. In 2005, over 20 lakh voters were reportedly removed from Bihar’s rolls without transparency (Page 152, Election Commission of India (2019) Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Anupama Roy, Oxford University Press). The current directive again risks large-scale exclusion. While the ECI has claimed that 4.96 crore voters on the 2003 roll are exempt, public data suggests only 3.16 crore of them remain resident and alive. This means up to 4.76 crore voters may be required to re-establish their eligibility through new documents.

The revision also fails to account for migrant workers, who form a substantial part of Bihar’s labour force. Data from the 2024 general election revealed lower male turnout, widely attributed to out-migration. These individuals are often enrolled in their home constituencies but may be unable to return during short verification windows. The SIR provides no system for identifying or protecting such voters, despite their legal status as ordinary residents.

Recent experiments with mobile voting in Bihar’s municipal elections, involving blockchain and facial recognition, have raised serious concerns about biometric exclusions and violations of the principle of secret ballot.

The current approach reverses the constitutional presumption of inclusion and treats large sections of the population as presumptively ineligible. The burden of proof rests on the citizen, without adequate procedural support. Such an approach undermines the promise of universal adult suffrage and weakens the foundations of democratic citizenship.

Rethink Aadhaar calls upon the Election Commission of India to immediately suspend the ongoing Special Intensive Revision in Bihar. Any revision must be grounded in law, comply with due process, and reflect constitutional values of equality, dignity, and democratic participation.

We urge the following immediate safeguards to protect the right to vote:

Inclusive and locally verified door-to-door verification: Booth Level Officers should be directed to conduct home visits in a facilitative and rights-based manner, avoiding bureaucratic or coercive questioning. Verification should rely on lived residence and neighbourhood testimony where formal documents are unavailable, particularly in rural, migrant, and urban poor communities.
Acceptance of affidavits in lieu of formal documents: Voters without adequate documentation should be allowed to submit sworn affidavits affirming their citizenship and residence. These can be verified through local panchayat or municipal authorities. This ensures procedural flexibility and recognises historical exclusion from documentation systems.
Presumption of validity for previously enrolled voters: Voters whose names have appeared on any past electoral roll under the law should be presumed eligible unless there is a specific and individualised objection raised under Section 22 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1950. In such cases, changes of residence or eligibility may be verified through local field inquiry rather than requiring mass documentation. The current exemption only for 2003 roll voters creates arbitrary distinctions.
Support systems for displaced and mobile populations: Procedural flexibility must be built into the SIR to protect the rights of migrant workers and disaster-affected populations. This includes longer timelines, walk-in centres, language-appropriate grievance mechanisms, mobile help desks, and paper-based submission options. A labourer without phone access or digital literacy should not lose their right to vote because of technological barriers.

Exclusions continue, yet the Aadhaar net expands | June 2025 update

Rethink UID — Sun, 22 Jun 2025 14:54:06 +0000

Exclusions continue, yet the Aadhaar net expands | June 2025 update

Statement on the proposal to link Voter IDs (EPIC database) and Aadhaar

Rethink UID — Sat, 05 Apr 2025 09:54:20 +0000

Voter ID-Aadhaar linking is an outright assault on free and fair elections and the right to vote

It violates Election Commission’s 2023 promise in court, and is yet another coercive enrolment scheme.

The right to vote lies at the heart of democracy. Yet, the Election Commission of India’s proposal seeks to erode this right by forcing voters who decline Aadhaar linkage with their Electoral ID cards to justify their decision in person before the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO). This coercive and unconstitutional requirement creates needless bureaucratic obstacles, pressuring citizens into Aadhaar-EPIC linkage and undermining their lawful choice to withhold Aadhaar. It is a blatant violation of the Election Commission’s commitment before the Supreme Court in G. Niranjan vs. Election Commission of India (2023) that Aadhaar linkage will be entirely voluntary. No citizen should have to clear arbitrary administrative hurdles to exercise their electoral rights.

The government’s persistent push to link Aadhaar with voter IDs is legally unsound, unnecessary, and deeply dangerous for electoral integrity. Aadhaar is issued to anyone who has resided in India 182 days or more in the 12 months preceding the date of application and the UIDAI has never verified nationality. Under the Representation of the People Act, 1950, only Indian citizens residing in the country are eligible to vote. Form 6B in its present form already undermines the voluntary nature of Aadhaar-voter ID linkage by forcing voters into a false choice: either provide Aadhaar or falsely claim they don’t have one. Now, those who refuse must appear before the ERO, creating an administrative burden that pressures compliance. Instead of addressing this flaw, the Election Commission’s amendment exacerbates coercion, imposing bureaucratic barriers that make Aadhaar submission effectively mandatory.

Despite its history of mass disenfranchisement, the Election Commission is once again reviving the flawed Aadhaar-voter ID linkage. In the 2018 Telangana elections, over 55 lakh voters were wrongly deleted due to Aadhaar mismatches. A similar attempt under NERPAP in 2015 collapsed under public backlash. Yet, instead of learning from these failures, the Commission is doubling down on the same exclusionary process.

Flawed database

The Aadhaar database is riddled with inaccuracies and vulnerabilities. A 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report exposed its glaring deficiencies, including duplicate and fraudulent Aadhaar numbers, unreliable biometric authentication, missing residency verification, and severe data integrity failures. Reports estimate that 5% of Aadhaars have errors, which adds up to over 7 crore individuals/residents. The UIDAI itself has admitted to multiple courts that Aadhaar cannot serve as proof of birth or identity. Worse still, linking Aadhaar to voter IDs could facilitate electoral fraud rather than prevent it, given that self-reported errors in Aadhaar cards are 1.5 times higher than in voter IDs. (State of Aadhaar Report (2019) Dalberg, State of Aadhaar Report (2018) IDInsight) Attempts to use Aadhaar for cleaning-up of other government databases, for instance in PDS or MGNREGA, have led to significant wrongful deletions. (From Aadhaar Mandate to Mass Jobcard Deletions: Unravelling the MGNREGA Story (2023) EPW) How mandatory Aadhaar authentication leads to exclusion of the marginalised from PDS (2024), Frontline) The resulting exclusion of citizens from accessing their entitlements has been extensively documented.

Tying Aadhaar to voter IDs enables mass surveillance, facilitates political profiling, and threatens voter disenfranchisement, all without the protection of robust data privacy laws. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, remains unimplemented and offers broad exemptions to the government, failing to prevent misuse. The Madras High Court has flagged concerns over Aadhaar data misuse for political gains, as seen in Puducherry, echoing global scandals like Cambridge Analytica, which exposed how voter data can manipulate elections and undermine democracy.

This proposal is an outright assault on free and fair elections. It violates the Supreme Court’s ruling in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2018), which strictly limited Aadhaar’s use to welfare schemes for which resources were drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India. It contravenes fundamental rights to privacy, dignity, and equality, disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. India cannot allow its electoral system to be hijacked by unreliable technology and coercive state power.

The Way Forward

Instead of pursuing a reckless and unconstitutional Aadhaar-EPIC linkage, the Election Commission must withdraw the proposal entirely and abandon all attempts to link Aadhaar with voter IDs.

Additionally, in light of irregularities in the electoral process such as allegations of duplicate voter IDs, the Election Commission must also:

Revise Form 6B to ensure that voters have a genuine, explicit and unambiguous choice to meaningfully opt out of Aadhaar-EPIC linkage, without facing punitive consequences, profiling, or being subjected to bureaucratic inquisition.
Strengthen door-to-door verification of voter rolls, which remains the most effective, constitutionally sound, and non-intrusive method for ensuring electoral accuracy.
Implement social audits to improve voter roll management, ensuring transparency, public participation, and accountability in electoral roll revisions.
Adopt alternative identity verification mechanisms that do not rely on Aadhaar’s flawed biometric database and do not introduce unconstitutional barriers to voting.
Ensure robust data protection safeguards before considering any linkage of government databases, with clear prohibitions on voter profiling, surveillance, or commercial exploitation of electoral data.

The right to vote is not a privilege granted by the state. It is a right that must be protected from coercion, surveillance, and exclusion. The Election Commission must uphold its constitutional duty to facilitate free and fair elections, not undermine them. Democracy cannot function when voter rights are placed under bureaucratic siege.

The Election Commission must immediately withdraw this proposal. The integrity of Indian democracy depends on it.

Please sign the statement to call on the Election Commission to withdraw the proposal to link Aadhaar/ UID with Voter IDs and to request the Ministry of Law and Justice and the Government of India to decline any such proposal.

Joint submission on the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 by Article 21 Trust and Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — Sat, 08 Mar 2025 08:14:00 +0000

The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology had invited comments on the Draft Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025. The Rules were framed and put in public domain almost 1.5 years after the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 was passed by Parliament. The drafting of the Rules take the operationalisation of the Act one step closer, but the Rules leave much to be desired.

Presented below is a summary of the main concerns with the Rules and corresponding recommendations. Full submission can be found here.

1. Government intends to further delay the implementation of the Act by empowering itself to notify different provisions of the Rules at different times, without any outer limit. We recommend operationalising all provisions of rules within one year.

2. The requirement of notice for data collected prior to the commencement of the Act is vague and provides too much discretion to data fiduciaries. We recommend that notice for data collected prior to commencement of the Act be provided within one year.

3. Central Government has reserved with itself wide powers to notify any database held with the state or any of its instrumentality for sharing across state entities. This could potentially databases containing sensitive personal data like biometric data. We recommend laying down strict parameters for notifying such databases only to the extent necessary.

4. Vague language dilutes the mandate for the data fiduciaries to intimate data principals for any data breach. We recommend specifying a deadline of 72 hours after detection of breach for intimating the data principals.

5. No expiry date has been prescribed for data being held by the state, after the purpose is no longer being served. We recommend two years as the deadline for all data fiduciaries, including state.

6. While trying to prevent the profiling of children, the Rules enable profiling of adults in the name of verifying that a person claiming to consent on behalf of a child is indeed an adult. This amounts to requiring KYC of internet users, which is disproportionate to the problem sought to be remedied. We recommend amending the Rule to comply with the Act.

7. Rules provide no timeline for responding to requests from data principals to exercise their rights or to their grievances. We recommend that all such requests and grievances be addressed within one month from data of receipt.

8. No exemption is provided for journalistic work. We recommend providing exemptions for journalistic purposes.

9. The search-cum-selection committee for appointment of members of the Data Protection Board is executive-heavy. We recommend the committee to consist of Chief Justice of India / sitting SC judgment nominated by him, Cabinet Secretary and an independent expert.

10. Going expressly against the very principle of data protection, the government enables itself to call for any information from any data fiduciary or intermediary. We recommend that such information should not contain any personal data through which an individual can be identified.

Civil society open letter to MEITY calls for open consultations of the DPDP Act draft rules

Rethink UID — Fri, 24 Jan 2025 19:41:04 +0000

The draft rules of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act were released in January 2025, and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITy) has given time till 18 February 2025 for the public to submit comments on the same. The DPDP Act will have significant implications for a range of digital and other rights. Civil society organisations including the Article 21 Trust and Rethink Aadhaar convened a public reading of the rules and drafted a letter specifically on concerns related to the non-consultative, opaque manner in which the Rules have been drafted. This letter was signed by 13 civil society organisations and 142 concerned citizens, and submitted to the MEITy and to Shri Ashwini Vaishnaw, the Minister for Electronics and IT.

Find a full copy of the letter here.

KYCEpidemic in Jharkhand Deprives Poor People of their Own Money

Rethink UID — Thu, 12 Dec 2024 08:48:39 +0000

Press Release

KYC Epidemic in Jharkhand Deprives Poor People of their Own Money

(and also affects Jharkhand’s new “Maiya Yojana)

Countless people in Jharkhand are unable to withdraw money from their bank accounts because the accounts have been frozen until they complete “KYC” formalities. This is the main insight of recent surveys conducted in Latehar and Lohardaga district by local NREGA Sahayata Kendras.

https://x.com/roadscholarz/status/1848563748614901880

जाजपुर में एक बच्चे की मौत की भयावय खबर

Rethink UID — Wed, 19 Apr 2023 10:32:22 +0000

साथियों,

हम आपको एक आवश्यक अपडेट के साथ लिख रहे हैं

पिछले कुछ वर्षों में आधार संबधित परियोजना के दस्तावेज़ीकरण और जानकारी एकत्रित हुए हमने पाया के अनिवार्य आधार परियोजना ने हाशिये पर, कमज़ोर ग़रीबों को बुरी तरह, क्रूरता के साथ प्रभावित किया है! बहुतों को एक छोटी बच्ची संतोषी की २०१७ मौत याद होगी जिनके परिवार को राशन नहीं इस लिए नहीं मिल सका क्योंकि उनका आधार राशन कार्ड से जुड़ा हुआ नहीं था.

2018 में राइट टू फूड कैंपेन ने रिपोर्ट दी थी कि "कम से कम 19 मौतें सीधे आधार से जुड़ी थीं: मृतको सरकार द्वारा संचालित राशन की दुकानों ने भोजन राशन से इनकार कर दिया क्योंकि या तो उनके राशन कार्ड आधार के साथ लिंक या "सीडेड" नहीं थे या आधार -आधारित बायोमेट्रिक प्रमाणीकरण विफल हो आगये थे ।

हम आज आपको ओडिशा के जाजपुर में एक और बच्चे की मौत की भयावय खबर के साथ लिख रहे हैं।

इस साल मार्च में कुपोषण के कारण एक बच्चे की मौत की खबरों के बाद, स्थानीय कार्यकर्ताओं, सामाजिक वैज्ञानिकों और पत्रकारों की एक तथ्यान्वेषी टीम ने घाटिसही गांव का दौरा किया। उनकी तथ्यान्वेषी रिपोर्ट यहां देखी जा सकती है।

रिपोर्ट में पाया गया हेंब्रम तकरीबन ११ वर्ष का था जब उसकी ३ मार्च २०२३ सुबह मृत्यु हुई। उसके माता-पिता बांकू और तुलसी मजदूर के रूप में काम करते हैं। बांकू ट्रैक्टर चालक एवं दिहाड़ी मजदूर के रूप में काम करता है; तुलसी कृषि मजदूर और दिहाड़ी मजदूर के रूप में काम करती हैं। वह परिवार की प्रमुख आय कमाने वाली है। परिवार एक कमरे के प्रधानमंत्री आवास भवन में रहता है, जो कि बांकू के पिता को मिला था। परिवार के पास न तो कृषि भूमि है और न ही उनके पास कोई पशु है। जबकि बांकू और उनकी पत्नी तुलसी के पास आधार है, अर्जुन सहित उनके किसी भी बच्चे के पास आधार संख्या नहीं है। फैक्ट फाइंडिंग टीम ने यह भी पाया कि बच्चे के परिवार को 21 महीने से पीडीएस के माध्यम से राशन नहीं मिला था. अर्जुन की मां तुलसी यह नहीं समझ पा रही थीं कि उनका राशन कार्ड क्यों रद्द कर दिया गया था, टीम ने पाया कि उनके नाम की वर्तनी आधार कार्ड और उनके राशन कार्ड पर अलग-अलग लिखी गई थी, जिससे संभवतः राशन कार्ड और आधार को लिंक करने के की कोशिश में रद्द किया गया था।

टीम ने पाया कि अर्जुन हेम्ब्रम विकलांग बच्चा था, हालांकि उसके नाम पर कोई विकलांगता पेंशन नहीं मिली थी। वह स्थानीय स्कूल में नामांकित नहीं था और मध्याह्न भोजन तक भी उसकी पोहोंच नहीं थी। तथ्यान्वेषी रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है कि - "प्रभावित परिवार को विभिन्न सामाजिक सुरक्षा कार्यक्रम से कई बार बहिष्करण का शिकार होना पढ़ा है। परिवार के पास खेती योग्य भूमि नहीं है और वे पात्र होने के बाद भी राशन प्राप्त नहीं कर पाए हैं। और उन्हें शुरू में राशन कार्ड मिला था, मृतक समेत तीन बच्चो को विकलांगता पेंशन से बाहर रखा गया था, उनके [माता-पिता] मनरेगा जॉब कार्ड निरस्त कर दिए गए थे और इसका कारण स्पष्ट नहीं है, जिसके कारण उन्हें मनरेगा के काम से वंचित होना पढ़ा और पीएम-आवास योजना के तहत घर नहीं मिल रहा है। सरपंच के अनुसार कुछ समय के लिए मनरेगा का काम रुका हुआ है और उन्होंने कहा कि एनएमएमएस ऐप के साथ लोगों की अनिच्छा इसका कारण है।

कुपोषण और भुखमरी से होने वाली मौतें कई कारकों की जटिल परस्पर क्रिया के कारण होती हैं, और हमने पाया है कि आधार को लागू करने से मौजूदा समास्याएं बढ़ जाती है।

आधार कार्यक्रम के भीतर के मुद्दों को टेक्नोलॉजी से परिचित शब्द दिए गए हैं जो कार्यक्रम की लागत को हल्का और अस्पष्ट करते हैं। जब लोग राशन कार्ड और आधार में नाम बेमेल होने के कारण दोनो को लिंक करने में असमर्थ होते हैं, या जब इंटरनेट विफल हो जाता है, या जब उंगलियों के निशान काम नहीं करते हैं, तो हमे कहां जाता हैं की यह समस्याएं बिलकुल वैसी ही हैं जैसा कि एक बच्चा अभी ठोस भोजन खाना सीख रहा है बजाए राज्य के स्वम्मित्व वाले कार्यक्रम के की जिसको आबादी पर अनिवार्य रूप से थोपा गया है और जो कई लोगों को उनके मौलिक अधिकारों और अधिकारों से बाहर करता है। बहिष्करण को जनसंख्या के प्रतिशत में मापा जाता है, जिसे नगण्य या कार्रवाई के लिए पर्याप्त महत्वपूर्ण नहीं माना जाता है, और कार्यक्रम के कामकाज के लिए केंद्रीय मुद्दों को कार्यान्वयन के मुद्दों के रूप में देखा जाता है, न कि कार्यक्रम की आंतरिक विफलताओं के कारण जिसकी वजह से भुखमरी, मृत्यु की स्थिति पैदा होती है।

जब सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने आदेश दिया कि आधार सलंगन को अनिवार्य करना कल्याणकारी नामावली में शामिल लोगों के लिए उचित है, तो इसनेआधार को जोड़ने से होने वाले बड़े बहिष्करण संबंधी नुकसानों पर पर्याप्त रूप से विचार नहीं किया था।

2021 में, सुप्रीम कोर्ट 3 करोड़ राशन कार्डों को हटाने को चुनौती देने वाली एक जनहित याचिका की सुनवाई पर सहमति जताई, क्योंकि वे आधार से जुड़े नहीं थे। याचिका झारखंड, यूपी, ओडिशा, कर्नाटक, एमपी, महाराष्ट्र, बिहार, छत्तीसगढ़, पश्चिम बंगाल, आंध्र प्रदेश, तेलंगाना में भुखमरी से होने वाली मौतों का ज़िक्र करती है। इन हटाए गए राशन कार्डो के बारे में शुरू में यह कहकर जश्न मनाया गया व उन्हें हटाना उचित ठहराया गया की वे नक़ली राशन कार्ड थे, हालाँकि बाद की जांच से पता चला कि राशन कार्ड धारकों को कभी नोटिस नहीं दिया गया था। बाद की रिपोर्टों ने भी निष्कर्ष निकाला कि राशन कार्ड असली थे। मामला अभी भी सुप्रीम कोर्ट में लंबित है।

हम यूआईडीएआई के वरिष्ठ अधिकारियों से जवाबदेही की मांग करते हैं जो आधार कार्यक्रम का संचालन और कार्यान्वयन करते हैं, साथ ही साथ राष्ट्रीय खाद्य सुरक्षा अधिनियम, 2013 के तहत संबंधित अधिकारीयों से, जिनकी ज़िम्मेदारी यह सुनिश्चित करना है कि लोग भोजन के अपने मौलिक अधिकार का उपयोग करने में सक्षम हैं

रिथिंक आधार सिविल सोसाइटी फोरम ऑन ह्यूमन राइट्स (सीएसएफएचआर), ओडिशा खाद्य अधिकार अभियान और जन स्वस्त अभियान द्वारा की गई प्रमुख मांगों के समर्थन में है, जिनकी रूपरेखा नीचे दी गई है:

• बिना आधार वाले बच्चों को पीडीएस से बाहर रखना इस समुदाय के लिए चिंता का विषय है। सभी छूटे हुए बच्चों और वयस्कों को तुरंत पीडीएस में शामिल करने के लिए कदम उठाए जाने चाहिए और आधार जमा करने का दायित्व समुदाय पर नहीं छोड़ा जाना चाहिए। प्रशासन को यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कदम उठाने चाहिए कि आधार के अभाव में एक भी व्यक्ति सिस्टम से बाहर न रहे।

• भारतीय सर्वोच्च न्यायालय के पीयूसीएल बनाम यूनियन ऑफ इंडिया एंड अदर (सिविल रिट पेटिशन 196 साल 2001) अंतरिम आदेशों के अनुसार और नई शिक्षा नीति, 2023, सरकार समर्थित सामाजिक सुरक्षा और खाद्य और पोषण सुरक्षा योजनाओं और कार्यक्रमों का लाभ उठाने के लिए आधार सीडिंग आवश्यक / अनिवार्य नहीं है। आधार सीडिंग संबंधी मुद्दों के कारण किसी भी बच्चे/परिवार को उनके अधिकारों से वंचित नहीं किया जाना चाहिए।

• जिला प्रशासन को सभी क्षेत्रों के आंगनबाड़ी केंद्रों में सभी बच्चों का वजन करने की आवश्यकता है ताकि कुपोषण से पीड़ित बच्चों की पहचान की जा सके और बच्चों में कुपोषण के सामुदायिक प्रबंधन के लिए तत्काल कदम उठाए जा सकें। प्रत्येक माह विवेकपूर्ण ढंग से बच्चों का वजन एवं कुपोषण मापन किया जाना चाहिए तथा सभी आंगनवाड़ी केन्द्रों को नियमित निगरानी के साथ आवश्यक उपकरण एवं प्रशिक्षण प्रदान किया जाना चाहिए।

• टीम ने जाना कि स्कूल में मिड डे मील समुदाय के बच्चों के लिए पहला और प्राथमिक भोजन है। प्रशासन को स्कूलों में पौष्टिक नाश्ता कार्यक्रम शुरू करने के लिए कदम उठाने चाहिए जिन्हें डीएमएफ के तहत समर्थन दिया जा सकता है। साथ ही समुदाय के परिवार तथा विशेष रूप से बच्चे गर्मी की छुट्टियों के दौरान अत्यधिक भोजन संकट से गुजरते हैं, यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कदम उठाए जाने चाहिए कि बच्चों के लिए गर्मियों की छुट्टियों के दौरान भी एमडीएम जारी रहे।

• एक सार्वभौमिक पात्रता दृष्टिकोण के तहत भी, वृद्ध और विकलांग लोगों, दलितों और जनजातीय समूहों को भोजन, स्वास्थ्य सेवाओं और लाभों के विशिष्ट बिना शर्त समर्थन की आवश्यकता हैं सामुदायिक रसोई अनिश्चित भोजन और पोषण की स्थिति वाले परिवारों के लिए एक सामंजस्यपूर्ण समाधान प्रदान कर सकती है।

• स्कूल न जाने वाले बच्चे सबसे कमजोर होने के बावजूद स्कूल भोजन कार्यक्रम से बाहर रह जाते हैं; उन्हें बिना किसी शर्त के सभी खाद्य कार्यक्रमों तक पहुंचने की अनुमति दी जानी चाहिए।

• मृतक के परिवार से तीन विकलांग बच्चे, हालांकि सामाजिक सुरक्षा पेंशन के लिए पात्र हैं, उन्हें टीम विजिट के समय तक योजना के तहत नहीं जोड़ा गया है। सभी आंगनवाड़ी केंद्रों में विकलांग बच्चों के बारे में विवरण है, जिला प्रशासन द्वारा आवश्यक दस्तावेजों की व्यवस्था करने और पेंशन योजना के तहत विकलांग बच्चों और वयस्कों को शामिल करने के लिए कदम उठाए जाने चाहिए। सभी पात्र लेकिन छूटे हुए परिवारों को जल्द से जल्द पेंशन योजना के तहत शामिल किया जाना चाहिए जिससे परिवारों की वित्तीय और खाद्य सुरक्षा मजबूत होगी।

• वृद्धावस्था पेंशन लाभार्थियों की संख्या को पेंशन योजना में नकदी से बैंक हस्तांतरण में परिवर्तन के बाद समस्याओं का सामना करना पड़ रहा है। इससे वृद्ध व्यक्तियों में अत्यधिक कठिनाई और भुखमरी हो सकती है। राज्य को यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कदम उठाने चाहिए कि कोई भी पेंशन लाभार्थी इस परिवर्तन के कारण बाहर न हो या पेंशन प्राप्त करना बंद न करे और उन्हें जल्द से जल्द नकद राशि दी जाए।

• मनरेगा जो लगातार ग्रामीण कार्य और आय सुरक्षा के मामले में संजीवनी साबित हुई है, टीम को बताया गया कि एनएमएमएस ऐप में समस्या के कारण योजना के तहत काम रोक दिया गया है। इस मुद्दे को तुरंत हल करने के लिए कदम उठाए जाने चाहिए और सभी परिवारों को जॉब कार्ड प्रदान किए जाने चाहिए और गांव को आवश्यक संख्या में काम आवंटित किया जाना चाहिए। जिला खनिज निधि (डीएमएफ) और मनरेगा निधियों का उपयोग निजी कृषि भूमि और सामुदायिक भूमि के विकास के लिए किया जा सकता है, विशेष रूप से मिट्टी और जल संरक्षण, ग्रामीण बुनियादी ढांचे और सामुदायिक संपत्तियों के विकास के लिए। मनरेगा की शुरुआत समुदाय में एक कार्यात्मक क्रेच भी होनी चाहिए जो माँ को सार्वजनिक कार्य कार्यक्रमों के तहत काम करने के लिए मुक्त करेगी।

• टीम ने यह भी जाना कि किसी भी परिवार के पास कृषि योग्य भूमि नहीं है, परिवारों को एफआरए के तहत शामिल करने के लिए आवश्यक कदम उठाए जाने चाहिए और अधिनियम के तहत व्यवहार्यता को देखते हुए भूमि आवंटित की जानी चाहिए।

• पंचायती राज संस्थाओं (पीआरआई) के सदस्यों को पभूख और कुपोषण, गुणवत्तापूर्ण शिक्षा का अधिकार, स्वास्थ्य सेवाओं और लाभ, खाद्य और पोषण सुरक्षा, सामाजिक सुरक्षा लाभ और मजदूरी रोजगार के मुद्दों को संबोधित करने के लिए अधिक सक्रिय भूमिका निभाने की जरूरत है, विषेश रूप से वर्ष के लिए पीरियड में। ब्लॉक और जिला प्रशासन के साथ बेहतर समन्वय की अधिक आवश्यकता है।

जिन कंपनियों ने भूमि और प्राकृतिक संसाधनों से लाभ उठाया है, उन्होंने कठिनाई और प्रदूषण के अलावा समुदायों को वापस देने के लिए शायद ही कोई उपाय किया है। वे यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए प्रशासन से कम जवाबदेह नहीं हैं कि उनके आसपास कोई परिवार भूख से न रहे। टाटा स्टील और अन्य जैसी कंपनियों को आवश्यक संसाधनों का आवंटन करना चाहिए और एक स्पष्ट एकीकृत और समग्र विकास रणनीति विकसित करनी चाहिए और जाजपुर जिले के आदिवासी क्षेत्रों में एक मिशन मोड पर लागू करना चाहिए। समुदायों की खाद्य और आय सुरक्षा सुनिश्चित करने के लिए खाद्य और पोषण सुरक्षा, लैंगिक समानता और महिला सशक्तीकरण, जलवायु-लचीली पुनर्योजी कृषि प्रणालियों और प्रथाओं को बढ़ावा देने पर ध्यान दिया जाना चाहिए।

Update Rethink Aadhaar And Onevote

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Dear all,

We are pleased to announce our partnership with the good folks at One Vote to bring you more news, updates and thoughts about Aadhaar, and how we can reimagine our digital futures.This update focuses on two things we’re worried about: the proposed Aadhaar Voter-ID linkage, and the recent announcement on Aadhaar-linked UPI payments.

But first - the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report on the UIDAI.

CAG Report confirms criticism of Aadhaar

Time to end project?

On April 6th, 2022, the Comptroller & Auditor General released a Report on the functioning of the UIDAI which confirmed what scholars, activists have been warning about Aadhaar: it is a badly designed system, with security risks, and places an unacceptable burden on people, without accountability systems or grievance redress.

The UID was promised as a robust identification card that would “solve” the problem of duplicates and corruption, becoming the only trusted ID card any citizen needs. However, the CAG audit report shows that the UID is not a trustworthy ID, and that enormous flaws persist because of the imposition of the UID.

The report is an assessment of the Enrolment and Update Ecosystems as well as the Authentication Ecosystems of the UIDAI for the period from 2014-15 to 2018-19. It begins by stating that, “Various Ministries/Departments of the Government as well as other entities such as banks, mobile operators, rely upon Aadhaar for the identity of the applicant.” However, we note that it fails to mention thefunction creep of Aadhaar and how it continues to be made mandatory for a host of services, outside the limited uses which were permitted by the Supreme Court in its 2018 Aadhaar judgement.

It did, however, note the problems created by UIDAI's (lack of) governance, and its negligent oversight of the private parties contracted by it. Some excerpts:

"UIDAI is maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world; but did not have a data archiving policy."
“...UIDAI had not ensured that the client applications used by its authentication ecosystem partners were not capable of storing the personal information of the residents, which put the privacy of residents at risk. The Authority had not ensured security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to the process involved.”
“There were flaws in the management of various contracts entered into by UIDAI. The decision to waive off penalties for biometric solution providers was not in the interest of the Authority giving undue advantage to the solution providers, sending out an incorrect message of acceptance of poor quality of biometrics captured by them.”

The CAG report also notes the huge volume of biometric failures. Biometrics are, as we have been saying, a probabilistic technology. When UIDAI started collecting biometrics in 2010, it was untested at this scale. The report noted high numbers of poor quality biometrics in the Aadhaar database:

“Aadhaar numbers with poor quality biometrics induces authentication errors. UIDAI takes no responsibility for it and transfers the onus of updating the biometrics to the resident and also charges fees for it. Issue of Bal Aadhar to minor children below five years was largely focused towards expanding the Aadhaar footprint, without establishing uniqueness of identity of the children. Costs to the Government for issue of these Bal Aadhar numbers were at best avoidable”...

The CAG found that the huge volume of"voluntary" updates indicated that the quality of data captured to issue Aadhaar numbers was not good enough to establish unique identities. The burden of this poor quality data (and the UIDAI's biometric experiment on India) was borne by people, who were faced with denial of services because their biometrics did not match, and who were made to ensure their records were accurate.

“Troublingly, the onus of ensuring records were accurate was placed on people themselves. “During 2018-19 more than 73 per cent of the total 3.04 Crore biometric updates were voluntary updates done by residents for faulty biometrics after payment of charges.”

The CAG report recommends that “UIDAI may levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for deficiencies in their performance in respect of biometric de-duplication (FPIR/ FNIR) and biometric authentication (FMR/ FNMR). Agreements in this regard should be modified, if required (Paragraph 4.4.1) This is perhaps an attempt to introduce some accountability for biometric failures, the fact that CAG recommends the levy of penalties on providers of this technology for failures, makes it evident that biometric authentication does not work.

The report also excoriated the UIDAI for poor grievance redress mechanisms, finding:

“The grievance redressal system at the UIDAI Hqrs and Regional Offices was ineffective and was plagued with delays in redressal of grievances.”

While highlighting thevarious issues that plague the UID system, Chapter 6 of the report titled ‘Redressal of Customers Grievances’ finds that, “UIDAI caters to the entire population of India and hence Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is an important aspect of its functioning.” This confirms the criticism raised by civil society over the last decade, although it fails to recognise that UIDAI was thrust onto citizens who were forced to enrol in an evidently poorly designed and executed database project. We are not customers, we are citizens for whom some of the most basic rights have become contingent on having an Aadhaar card and successfully “authenticating” our biometrics.

The government and UIDAI must recognise that a functional and accountable grievance redress system - and system for accountability and transparency - must be at the heart of this project upon which access to basic rights has become contingent, and that began as a coercive experiment. Its recommendation for a centralised grievance redressal system will not address the problem of lack of sufficient capacity, transparency and accountability for issues within Aadhaar. As this piece from last year explains, existing grievance redress mechanisms were incapable of answering a simple question of how a person was to retrieve a misplaced Aadhaar number. ( https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/flaw-in-aadhaar-architecture-uidai-card-enrolment-7389133/ )

While the CAG report highlights the poor quality of the UID database and related issues, it is important to remind ourselves of the human cost of this faulty and coercive program including denial of school admissions, denial of pension for the elderly, denial of food under the PDS, which are just a few instances in a much larger and longer list. We reiterate our concerns with the UID project. We call upon the government to end mandatory Aadhaar linking, and to re-evaluate the viability of the project itself.

We encourage you to read the report yourselves. You can read our statement here. Please see also two articles explaining it, one by Usha Ramanathan here and one by Reetika Khera and Ria Singh Sawhney, here.

____________________________

Linking Aadhaar and Voter ID for voter verification

Cag Report Confirms Criticism Of Aadhaar Time To End Project

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On April 6th, 2022, the Comptroller & Auditor General released a Report on the functioning of the UIDAI which confirmed what scholars, activists have been warning about Aadhaar: it is a badly designed system, with immense surveillance risks, which places an unacceptable burden on people, and violates fundamental rights.

The report is an assessment of the Enrolment and Update Ecosystems as well as the Authentication Ecosystems of the UIDAI for the period from 2014-15 to 2018-19. It begins by stating that, “Various Ministries/Departments of the Government as well as other entities such as banks, mobile operators, rely upon Aadhaar for the identity of the applicant.” However, we note that it fails to mention the function creep of Aadhaar and how it continues to be made mandatory for a host of services, outside the limited uses which were permitted by the Supreme Court in its 2018 Aadhaar judgement.

While highlighting the various issues that plague the UID system, Chapter 6 of the report titled ‘Redressal of Customers Grievances’ begins: “UIDAI caters to the entire population of India and hence Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is an important aspect of its functioning.” Although confirming the criticism raised by civil society over the last decade, this fails to recognise that UIDAI was thrust onto citizens who were forced to enrol in an evidently poorly designed and executed database project. We are not customers, we are citizens for whom some of the most basic of rights have become contingent on having an Aadhaar card and successfully “authenticating” our biometrics.

The government and UIDAI must recognise that a functional and accountable grievance redress system must be at the heart of this project upon which access to basic rights has become contingent, and that began as a coercive experiment. The recommendation for a centralised grievance redressal system will not address the issues of lack of sufficient capacity, transparency and accountability for issues within Aadhaar. As this piece from last year explains, existing grievance redress mechanisms were incapable of answering a simple question of how a person was to retrieve a misplaced Aadhaar number. “The combined might of all Aadhaar assistance facilities in Bihar proved unable to help Reena Devi, a poor widow who had lost her Aadhaar card in the process of applying for a change of address after marriage. It took special access to a sympathetic official at the regional office of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) in Ranchi – 400 kilometres away from Reena’s residence – to retrieve her lost number.”

Key findings of the CAG Report:

I. Poor Data Quality

“Aadhaar numbers with poor quality biometrics induces authentication errors. UIDAI takes no responsibility for it and transfers the onus of updating the biometrics to the resident and also charges fees for it. Issue of Bal Aadhar to minor children below five years was largely focused towards expanding the Aadhaar footprint, without establishing uniqueness of identity of the children. Costs to the Government for issue of these Bal Aadhar numbers were at best avoidable”.
There is no assurance that Aadhaar enrollment was limited to those actually resident in India.
The database continues to have duplicates, despite attempts to clean up the system. UIDAI had to cancel more than 4.75 lakh Aadhaars (November 2019) for being duplicate.
Issuing Aadhaar to minors (below the age of 5) without confirming the uniqueness of their biometrics goes against the intention of the Aadhaar Act.
Aadhaar numbers were not paired with the documents relating to personal information of their holders.
Over nearly ten years, the UIDAI could not identify the exact extent of mismatch.

II. The UIDAI continues to be plagued by systemic issues and lack of accountability

"UIDAI is maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world; but did not have a data archiving policy."
UIDAI, responsible for ensuring the licensed requesting entities comply with regulations and comply with annual information system audit of operations, failed to take any action on > 50% entities which have never submitted their annual compliance reports.
“Moreover, UIDAI had not ensured that the client applications used by its authentication ecosystem partners were not capable of storing the personal information of the residents, which put the privacy of residents at risk. The Authority had not ensured security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to the process involved.”
“There were flaws in the management of various contracts entered into by UIDAI. The decision to waive off penalties for biometric solution providers was not in the interest of the Authority giving undue advantage to the solution providers, sending out an incorrect message of acceptance of poor quality of biometrics captured by them.”
UIDAI does not have a system to analyse the factors leading to authentication errors.

III. Placed the burden of ensuring correctness on residents

“Troublingly, the onus of ensuring records were accurate was placed on people themselves. “During 2018-19 more than 73 per cent of the total 3.04 Crore biometric updates were voluntary updates done by residents for faulty biometrics after payment of charges.”
The huge volume of voluntary updates indicated that the quality of data captured to issue initial Aadhaar was not good enough to establish uniqueness of identity.

IV. Grievance Redress

“The grievance redressal system at the UIDAI Hqrs and Regional Offices was ineffective and was plagued with delays in redressal of grievances.”

V. Accuracy of biometrics

The CAG report recommends that “UIDAI may levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for deficiencies in their performance in respect of biometric de-duplication (FPIR/ FNIR) and biometric authentication (FMR/ FNMR). Agreements in this regard should be modified, if required (Paragraph 4.4.1)”
While perhaps an attempt to introduce some accountability for biometric failures, the fact that CAG recommends the levy of penalties on providers of this technology for failures, makes it evident that biometric authentication does not work. Biometrics are, as we have been saying, a probabilistic technology. When UIDAI started collecting biometrics in 2010, it was an untested technology at this scale.

Oppose The Election Laws Amendment Bill Oppose Linking Voter Id And Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar joins thirteen other prominent civil rights, electoral reform, academic and digital rights groups including the Association for Democratic Reforms, Bahujan Economists, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, the Internet Freedom Foundation, MKSS and National Alliance of People’s Movements, to oppose the Election Laws Amendment Bill, which proposes linking Aadhaar and voter ID cards.

The Election Laws Amendment Bill is listed for introduction in Lok Sabha tomorrow. As per the announcement of the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs in Parliament on Friday, 17th December, the Bill may be taken up for consideration and passing in the coming week. Among other things, the Bill may contain provisions for linking Voter ID and Aadhaar as several media reports have confirmed that this proposal has received Cabinet’s approval.

The ongoing Winter Session of Parliament is scheduled to run till 23rd December, raising concerns that the Government might push for the Bill without proper consultations and discussions and in haste, before the session ends. This would be highly improper as any proposals to link Aadhaar and Voter ID is a serious matter requiring careful consideration and considerable public consultation. It is also improper that the Government is aiming to bring this Bill and provide for Aadhaar and Voter ID linking while the Parliament Standing Committee on Law and Justice is currently studying this subject and is yet to submit a report on the same.

Given that the current government has a dismal record on sending Bills to Standing Committees for study, this attempt to bring a Bill on a subject that is currently under consideration of a Committee is indicative of the scant regard the Government has for parliamentary procedures and conventions which must be resisted.

While the Ministry of Law and Justice and Election Commission of India have been going back and forth on the proposal of linking Aadhaar with Voter ID, there has been no public consultation on this proposal.

Rigorous identification requirements which act as a barrier to people being able to exercise their right to vote, are rightly termed as voter suppression measures which strike at the heart of a democracy, and should not be allowed in a democracy. The right to political participation is, at least, a constitutional right, and a right under international human rights law.

Although reports indicate that this proposal is being pushed in the name of ‘reforms,’ and that any linking will be ‘voluntary’ in nature, we are concerned that it will almost certainly lead to mass disenfranchisement, could increase voter fraud, and could violate people’s right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of data sets, as well as impede the guarantee of secrecy of the ballot.

Earlier this year, we had issued a statement endorsed by more than 500 prominent organizations and concerned citizens strongly opposing the proposal to link Aadhaar and voter ID. In the statement, we had highlighted the following harms that may arise from this proposal:

Aadhaar is not a proof of citizenship and cannot be legally used as a basis to verify or delete a citizen’s name from the voter rolls.
Earlier efforts to ‘purify’ voter rolls using Aadhaar have led to unfair and mass disenfranchisement of voters as seen in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. In 2015, the exercise undertaken through the National Election Roll Purification and Authentication Programme (NERPAP) was stayed by the Supreme Court while hearing the clutch of petitions challenging the Aadhaar program and was never permitted in its final judgment, thus making its revival, in a different form, a violation of the Supreme Court’s orders on Aadhaar linkage.
Previous attempts to ‘clean up’ databases using Aadhaar, as seen in the MNREGA or PDS beneficiaries database, have led to the deletion of genuine beneficiaries, leading to their exclusion from welfare schemes. Additionally, if biometric authentication is made a requirement, it will almost certainly lead to exclusion.
The Aadhaar database has many data quality issues which are likely to seep into the Voter database affecting its quality and sanctity, making it more prone to frauds. In fact, it has been found that UIDAI had been intensively lobbying for this proposal as a way to provide legitimacy to the Aadhaar project, which has been mired in controversy.
Linking the voter database with Aadhaar will be a frontal attack on voters’ privacy, enabling voter profiling and surveillance which would be particularly detrimental to minorities. As some previous experience indicates, this could be used to disenfranchise those opposed to a party or its ideology.
Linking Aadhaar numbers to voter rolls could also pave the way to undermine the secrecy of the ballot, which is the hallmark of our constitutional democracy.
The promise of voluntariness is a chimera. In the past, as we saw with bank accounts, a ‘voluntary’ linking of Aadhaar practically means that persons will be compelled to do so, often at the threat of being excluded from availing a service.

The linking of Aadhaar and Voter ID will also be unconstitutional as it doesn’t meet the test of proportionality laid down by the Supreme Court in its Puttaswamy judgment. For it to be proportional, the government needs to show that it is a necessary means in pursuance of a legitimate aim. There are neither verifiable estimates to show the extent to which duplication errors exist in the voter database, nor has any evidence been placed to show that linking Aadhaar with voter id will reduce such errors. The government also hasn’t shown why its traditional and time tested methods of verification are not working, or what other less intrusive means have been used for the same; nor how privacy and exclusionary harms resulting from such an exercise are proportionate to any gain that may arise from such exercise.

Call to action

As many concerned groups have said before, linking Voter ID and Aadhaar is an ill-thought, illogical, and unnecessary move which could undermine our electoral democracy, and impact voters’ trust in the electoral system. Indians’ right to vote cannot be imperilled by irresponsibly linking databases and using an opaque algorithm to “verify” identities. Technological solutions cannot replace responsible administration. Timely door-to-door verification of voters remains the most effective method of updating electoral rolls and ensuring accuracy of voter data.

We demand that the government withdraw the proposal. We also appeal to our lawmakers to push the government to not to introduce the Bill without proper deliberations or even if introduced, to ensure it is immediately sent to the Parliament Standing Committee for study and review. Hasty legislation with such wide import is detrimental to our democratic principles. Aadhaar and Voter ID linking must be resisted until a careful and impartial analysis of its advantages and disadvantages is undertaken.

***

Signed by:

Article 21 Trust

All India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN)

Association for Democratic Reforms

ASEEM, Hyderabad

Amnesty International India

Bahujan Economists

Chetna Andolan

Citizens Forum For Civil Liberties (CFCL)

Internet Freedom Foundation

Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha

Rethink Aadhaar

Right to Food Campaign

Maadhyam

Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)

National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM)

V Suresh, General Secretary, National People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)

The One Vote Project

Press Release Resist Linking Voter Id And Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

September 26, 2021

Three years ago today, on September 26, 2018, the Supreme Court of India delivered its final judgment in the cases challenging the constitutionality of the Aadhaar/UID programme. In its judgment, the Court circumscribed the Aadhaar project’s scope to a limited number of purposes, finding it constitutional only by reading it down. The Court permitted the use of Aadhaar authentication solely to welfare programmes (where Aadhaar continues to cause mass exclusions) and to link with PAN numbers for income tax (which continues to be extended).

Today, more than 500 prominent citizens and organisations have written to the Election Commission of India, strongly opposing a fresh proposal to the Law Ministry to link voter ID cards (and the "EPIC" database) with Aadhaar, as violative of the Supreme Court's judgment and detrimental to our right to privacy and right to vote, and calling for it to be withdrawn.

The statement, which calls this proposal a “dangerous idea that can disenfranchise people and fundamentally alter the structure of our democracy,” has been endorsed by 24 campaigns and organisations, including electoral reform group, Association for Democratic Reforms; civil rights groups from across the country including the Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties, Mazdoor Kisaan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), People’s Union for Democratic Rights, and the National Alliance of Peoples’ Movement (NAPM) Jharkhand; and digital rights groups such as Rethink Aadhaar, Article 21 Trust, Internet Freedom Foundation, the Bachao Project, and the Free Software Movement of India. It has also been signed by 480 prominent individuals, including former civil servants, journalists, lawyers, social activists, researchers, and students.

The Election Commission has claimed that this will help clean up voter rolls, and that any linkage will be “voluntary”. As previous representations have noted, including a recent one made by the Constitutional Conduct Group, the proposal raises concerns of mass disenfranchisement, increased voter fraud, given the large number of documented discrepancies in the Aadhaar database, and of violating citizens’ right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of datasets.

The right to vote cannot be imperilled by irresponsibly linking databases and using an opaque algorithm to “verify” identities. Technological solutions cannot replace responsible administration. Timely door-to-door verification of voters remains the most effective method of updating electoral rolls and ensuring accuracy of voter data.

Jagdeep Chhokar, former Professor and Dean of IIM, Ahmedabad, and a founding member of the Association of Democratic Reforms, said, “The insistence of the Election Commission on linking the voter ID data with Aadhaar is quite surprising, because, in the past, at least two former Chief Election Commissioners have cautioned against this linkage. The UIDAI seems to be pressuring the Election Commission for this linkage, seemingly to gain legitimacy for the Aadhaar scheme. It seems finally the then-incumbent Chief Election Commissioner caved in and agreed to do this. This was stopped by the Supreme Court in 2015 as soon as it came to the attention of the Supreme Court. Now again, the Election Commission, in collaboration with the Law Ministry seems to be trying to circumvent the Supreme Court’s directions, which is inappropriate and not acceptable. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will not take kindly to this attempt to circumvent its instructions, by a sleight of hand, or a play on words.”
Reetika Khera, development economist and Associate Professor at IIT, Delhi, and expert on the impact of technology on welfare pointed out: “Remember that during UPA-2, Aadhaar was peddled as inclusive and transformational for welfare programmes. This was done on the basis of a claim, unsubstantiated at the time and proven false later, that the ration, and NREGA databases were infested with ghosts and duplicates. The same is being repeated now. Where Aadhaar has been forcibly integrated (e.g., in the PDS, NREGA, social security pensions, scholarships, etc.), people struggle to retain or regain access to entitlements. Technocratic unaccountability has been added to bureaucratic red tape, spending money on rectifying demographic errors in the Aadhaar database. They have fallen victim to fraud, and in extreme cases, outright excluded from their legal entitlements. The same issues - fraud, corruption, exclusion - will crop up if Aadhaar is allowed in the voting process in any manner.”
Maansi Verma, of Article 21 Trust said: “The Election Commission’s proposal to link Aadhaar and voter IDs violates the Supreme Court’s judgement, and is detrimental to our right to privacy, and our right to vote."

READ THE FULL STATEMENT AND LIST OF SIGNATORIES BELOW:

Resist linking Voter ID and Aadhaar!

The Election Commission of India has moved a proposal to the Law Ministry to link voter ID cards (and the "EPIC" database) with Aadhaar. This is a dangerous idea which can fundamentally alter the structure of our democracy.

Rethink Aadhaar joins almost 500 prominent individuals, including former civil servants, journalists, social activists, researchers and students to strongly oppose this proposal, and call on the Election Commission of India to withdraw its plans. The signatories to the statement include electoral reform group, Association for Democratic Reforms; civil rights groups from across the country such as the Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties, MKSS, Adivasi Women’s Network, Chetna Andolan, and NAPM Jharkhand; and digital rights groups including Rethink Aadhaar, Article 21 Trust, the Internet Freedom Foundation, the Bachao Project, and the Free Software Movement of India.

Linking Voter ID and Aadhaar is an ill-thought, illogical, and unnecessary move which could undermine our electoral democracy, and impact voters’ trust in the electoral system. Indians’ right to vote cannot be imperilled by irresponsibly linking databases and using an opaque algorithm to “verify” identities. Technological solutions cannot replace responsible administration. Timely door-to-door verification of voters remains the most effective method of updating electoral rolls and ensuring accuracy of voter data.

The Election Commission has claimed that this will help clean up voter rolls, and that any linkage will be “voluntary”. As we noted in our earlier representation, and as the Constitutional Conduct Group has recently noted, we are deeply concerned that this will almost certainly lead to mass disenfranchisement, could increase voter fraud, given the mass discrepancies in the Aadhaar database, and could violate people’s right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of data sets. This proposal would violate the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (retd.) & Anr. v. Union Of India (Aadhaar judgment) which limited the use of Aadhaar authentication solely to welfare programmes and to link with PAN numbers for the purposes of income tax. Any proposal to link the UID with Voter IDs must be rejected.

We are concerned about the following harms from such a proposal

First, Aadhaar is not proof of the right to vote. Aadhaar is not, and was never meant to serve as proof of citizenship, which is why Aadhaar numbers were issued to all residents and not citizens. Under the Representation of Peoples’ Act, only citizens who are resident in India have the right to vote. Linking the two is senseless, and would be without any basis - in addition to being a colossal waste of public funds. Deletion of voters based on whether their records in the EPIC database corresponds to Aadhaar records has no legal basis.

Second, such a proposal will almost certainly cause mass disenfranchisement. This is not the first time that the government has tried to link Voter ID and Aadhaar to “purify” the electoral rolls. In 2015, the Central government introduced the National Election Roll Purification and Authentication Programme (NERPAP), and during the Aadhaar challenge, the Supreme Court passed an interim order on August 11th 2015, asking the ECI to suspend Aadhaar voter linkage. As this was never permitted by the Supreme Court in its final judgement and order, proceeding with this would be in violation of the Supreme Court’s judgement. Despite this, there was rampant misuse of Aadhaar data. In 2018, the chief electoral officer of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh linked Aadhaar data with voter identity cards. In 2018, during the Telangana Assembly Election, people found out that at least 55 lakh voters had been arbitrarily disenfranchised. It was only after public outrage around these arbitrarily deletions, that the government rolled this back.

Previous attempts to use Aadhaar to “clean-up” databases of other government registries, like MGNREGA and PDS, have resulted in mass disenfranchisement, and thousands of citizens have been arbitrarily deleted from systems without any notice. For example, a study from Jharkhand found that 90% of ration cards cancelled as “bogus” during Aadhaar linking were real. In 2018, even the CEO of UIDAI admitted that authentication failure for government services was as high as 12% - this translates into millions of affected persons. A recent J-PAL study in Jharkhand also found that Aadhaar based verification “either did not reduce errors of inclusion or leakage or did so at the cost of increased exclusion error”, with a high error rate of between 22% and 34% of reduced disbursals. Once lost, Aadhaar has been found to be almost impossible to retrieve; whereas for voter IDs there are simpler and more well defined ways to replace a misplaced voter ID card.

Third, such a proposal is more likely to increase voter fraud. Linking Aadhaar would dilute the sanctity of the Voter ID database. As we pointed out in 2019, self-reported errors in Aadhaar data are reportedly one-and-one-half times higher than errors in the electoral database. The assumption behind the proposal to link the two databases is that the authenticity of people’s records in the Aadhaar database will be used to determine the authenticity of a record in the Voter ID/ EPIC database. However, given widespread data quality issues in the Aadhaar database, this exercise would diminish the sanctity of records in the Voter ID database. Data quality issues in the Aadhaar database – a result of inadequate enrolment practices and lack of effective correction mechanisms – have been extensively documented - including fake entries and incorrect details. The UIDAI has itself admitted this, before various courts, and multiple Courts have refused to accept Aadhaar as proof of birth, or of identification. More recent research has also shown that Aadhaar-PAN linking has introduced fraudulent entries into the system.

Fourth, Biometric authentication for voting must not become a requirement. There are numerous reports of starvation deaths across states due to a lack of Aadhaar linkage, biometric failures, absence of adequate infrastructure and lack of adequate grievance redressal mechanisms in UIDAI’s implementation which has been painstakingly exposed by the Right to Food campaign. Fingerprints don't work for many people, especially those who work with their hands and older persons, and facial authentication is inaccurate and error-prone. The UIDAI has sought to circumvent the inaccuracy and issues in biometric authentication through an ill-conceived "nominee system", and OTPs in the case of welfare programs. How will this work in the case of voting? Will we have to send family members to vote instead, if our fingerprints don’t work? It’s also pertinent to mention that election booths are sometimes set up in remote locations, where voting has to be processed manually. Even EVMs are not connected to an internet connection, to prevent any kind of tampering. In such locations, how will biometric verification work in absence of the internet?

Fifth, linking these two databases would be an attack on the right to privacy, and scope for misuse. We have serious concerns that such a proposal would violate our constitutional and fundamental right to privacy, and the secrecy of the vote. India currently has no data protection law, and the current personal data protection bill has wide exceptions for the government. Any attempts to link Aadhaar to the voter IDs, would lead to demographic information which has been linked to Aadhaar, being linked to the voter database. This creates the possibilities for disenfranchisement based on identity, of increased surveillance, and targeted advertisements and commercial exploitation of private sensitive data. In 2019, the Cambridge Analytica scandal demonstrated the disastrous impact that deep and invasive voter profiling had on individuals and on democracies. We have seen this in India: most recently, the Madras HC has asked the Election Commission to look into allegations against the Bharatiya Janata Party that it was illegally using Aadhaar data of voters in Puducherry for making political gains in the Assembly elections. In 2019, an investigation revealed that data could have been taken from the UID database in order to delete voter names in Andhra Pradesh - names were taken from the voter lists. This could be particularly harmful against minorities - a 2018 report found that 20% of Muslim adults were missing from electoral lists in Karnataka. We have learnt from other countries how a single form of identification for voting, leads to greater disenfranchisement. In some cases, onerous identity requirements are used to block disenfranchised persons from voting.

Finally, we cannot trust the ECI’s promise of “voluntariness”. The ECI’s claim that this would be based on "voluntariness". This is a grossly inadequate safeguard. We have seen how throughout the Aadhaar project “voluntary” on paper translates to a coercive mechanism in practice; and how this changes with time and in practice.

Any proposal to link the UID with Voter IDs must be rejected.

I. Organisations

Adivasi Women's Network
Association for Democratic Reforms
Article 21 Trust
The Bachchao Project
BlockSurvey, Inc.
Center for Women and Children Solidarity Network
Forum Against Oppression of Women
Forum for Electoral Integrity
Free Software Movement of India
Honavar Foundation
Internet Freedom Foundation
J&K RTI Movement
Maadhyam
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)
NAPM, Jharkhand
National Platform for the Rights of the Disalbed 17. Oddjoint Art
OpenSpace
People's Union for Civil Liberties
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Karnataka
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Maharashtra
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Rajasthan
People’s Union for Democratic Rights (signed by Radhika Chitkara, Vikas Kumar, Secretaries)
Rethink Aadhaar
Socialist Party (India) Telangana

Individuals

Aarti
Aavishkar Rangari
Abani K Bhuyan, PSU
Abbasbhai
Abdul
Abha Rao
Abhayraj Naik, Azim Premji University
Abhi
Abhijit Nagendranath
Abhijith S
Abhilash Paul
Abhimanyu Chandra
Abhishek Gupta
Abhishek Sagar
Abhradip Acharya
Adaikala Regan
Aditi Chowdhury
Aditi Mehta, Constitutional Conduct Group
Aditi P. Kaur
Aditya Banerjee, Conservation Initiatives
Aditya Panwar
Aditya Vikram
Adv. Manoj, Manoj Harit & Co
Adv. Milind Babar
Advait Dharap
Afreen Khan
Afried Raman
Agnibesh Mukherjee
Ahesanali
Ajesh Narayanan
Alagammai
Alstrin Cyrus, Kofluence
Alwyn D'Souza
Ameya
Ameya Kelkar
Amina Yasmeen
Amit kumar
Amit Prakash Ambasta
Amitadyuti Kumar, APDR
Amitava Choudhury, Information and Action for Peoples' Right
Amogh Barakol
Amrita Johri, SNS
Amrita Shodhan
Anand Arni
Ananya Jain
Aneesh Correa
Angela
Anil Sadgopal, All India Forum for Right to Education
Anilkumar
Anirudh
Anita Das, Infosys
Anjali Bhardwaj, SNS
Ankita Aggarwal
Annapurna Menon, University of Westminster
Annie T
Anubhav
Anupama Datta, HelpAge India
Anushka
Anwesha Bhattacharya, Harvard Kennedy School
Apurva Bamezai
Archana Dwivedi
Archismita Choudhury, Internet Freedom Foundation
Ardhendu Sen
Arnav Mathur
Aroon Mohan
Aroon Raman
Arun Agnihotri
Arun I
Aruna Burte
Aruna Rodrigues
Arundhati Dhuru, NAPM
Arup Kumar Sen
Arvind
Ashish Asgekar
Ashish M
Ashok Choudhary, AIUFWP
Ashok Nehru
Ashok Sharma, Constitutional Conduct Group
Ashwin Santhosh
Ashwini
Ayush
Ayushi
Baba Fakruddin
Balaji
Bandish Soparkar
Barath N
Beena Choksi
Bernard D'Mello
Bharat Varma
Bharati Jagannathan
Bhaskar
Bidisha M
Bishakha
Bishakha Bhanja
Boma
Brindaalakshmi K
Brinelle D'souza
Britts
C B
C. Balakrishnan, Retired from the Govt of India
Chaitali Dixit
Chandrasekar R
Chantal
Chayanika Shah, Forum Against Oppression of Women
Chetan
Chhavi Sachdev
Daniel Umi
Danish Mukadam
David Bodapati, The Cedars
Deb Mukharji
Deepak Kaushik
Deepak Sanan, Constitutional Conduct Group
Deepthi
Denice Mathew Thomas
Deonis Baghwar
Derick
Divij Joshi
Divya
Divyangi
Diwan Singh
Dr V Rukmini Rao
Dr. Yogitha S, GFGC, Saragur
Dr. Mira Shiva
Dr. Shakeel
Dr. Suvajeet Duttagupta
Dr. Tony PM, Social Research and Training Centre Ranchi
Dr.Deepak Viswanath
Dr.Sudhir Vombatkere
Dunu Roy, Hazards Centre
Eesha
Elsa Muttathu
Fareeha Jabeen
Firoz Ahmad
Francis Colaso
Francis Parmar
Gabriele Dietrich, NAPM
Garima
Gaurav
Gautam Chaudhury
Gautam Mukhopadhaya
Gautam Sonti
Gayatri Singh, Sr Advocate, Bombay High Court
Geo Peter Tharappel
Gopal Krishna Pillai, Rerd. Government Officer
Gopalan Balagopal
Goutham
Gudu Sharma
Hamid Ansari
Hannan Mollah, All India Kisan Sabha
Hardik
Harikumar TP
Haritha P.E
Hemal
Himan
Himmat Singh Ratnoo
Hiren Gandhi, Darshan
I Pillai
Ibrahim
Imrana Qadeer
Indranee Dutta
Irfan Engineer
Ishwari
Jagdeep Chhokar
Jahnavi Visvanathan
Jairus Banaji
James Herenj, Convenor, Jharkhand NREGA Watch
Jaskaran Singh
Jayan
Jayati Ghosh, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
Jibraan Mansoor
Jitesh Gautam
Jittu Varghese
John Varghese
Jomy Joseph
Joseph
Jyoti Punwani
K Paul
K S Gopal
K. Sudhir, Peoples' Architectural Commonwealth
Kabir
Kalyani Menon Sen, Independent researcher
Kamayani Bali Mahabal
Kannalmozhi Kabilan, The New Indian Express
Karan
Karan Garg
Kartar K Sainani
Karthik Govil
Karthik Narayana V, Sahyadri College of Engineering and Management
Kaushik Tadvi
Kaushiki Rao
Kaustubh Mangam
Kavita Srivastava, People's Union for Civil Liberties
Keerti bhandary
Kiara
Kingshuk Dasgupta
Kingshuk Roy
Kinshuk Goyal
Koninika Ray, National Federation of Indian Women
Krishnadarsan
Kumkum Roy
Laavanya, LibTech India
Lakshmi Venkatesan
Lapanoha
Lavneet
Leon Morenas
Lizmary BC
M B Nataraj
Madhava Prasad
Madhu Bhaduri
Madhura Chakraborty, Activist
Madhura Padhye
Mahinder Pal singh
Mahua Kamat
Malaika Mathew Chawla
Malay Tewari, CPI (ML) Liberation
Malvika, Matterhorn Projects LLP
Manan
Manpreet
Mansi Mehta
Manu
Maqbool Saleem
Maria Aurora Couto, Writer
Mayuresh Vaidya
Meena Gupta
Meera Dewan
Meera. R
Megha
Megha Singh
Melroy C F Fernandes
Mit
Mohini Mullick
Mona Ambegaonkar
Mrinalini Nayak
Mubeen
Mukesh
Mukesh Malik
Mukta Srivastava
Murugu
Nafisa Barot, Utthan
Nakul Kishore Dumblekar
Nandini Nayak, Ambedkar University Delhi
Narayan Rao
Nasruddin Shaikh
Natashia Gonsalves, SUCDEN
Navamita Chandra
Navdha Malhotra
Naveen Purushothaman
Nayonika Bose
Nazar Mohammad Shavadi
NB Murthy
Neela D’सूजा
Neelakantan
Neha
Neha Chopra
Neha Das
Neil Fernandes
Nidhi
Nihar
Nikhil
Nilanjan Dutta
Nimmi
Niranjani Iyer
Nirvan, WIPRO
Nisha Biswas
Nishant Kumar
Nishi Sharma
Nitin
Nivedh
Omkar
P Chaudhuri
P K Mahesh
P. R. Dasgupta, IAS Pensioner
Padma Srinivasan
Padma Velaskar
Pallavi Sobti Rajpal
Parampath Joy Oommen
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, Independent journalist, author, publisher, documentary film-maker and teacher
Paras Katiyar
Parmu Singh
Parul Soni
Pascal Alan Nazareth
Pat
Pervin Jehangir
Phani
Philip Pinto
Piyush
Pooja Monani
Poorna
Praavita
Prabhat Patnaik, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Pracheta
Prajit Basu
Pranami Rajb
Prasad Chacko
Praveen, Times
Preeti Sampat
Prema
Primus Kerketta
Pritha Taraphder
Priti
Pritom Ghosh
Priyam
Priyanka Singh
Priyesh Pavithran
Procheta Mallik
Prof. K Satchidanandan, Indian Writers Forum
Prof.Mohan Rao
Purwa Bharadwaj
Pushkar Raj
Pushpendra, Tata Institute of Social Sciences
R K Grandhi
R Ravishankar
Rabin Chakraborty
Radha Holla
Raghavendra Rao
Raghunandan Hegde
Ragvendra Gadage
Rahul Nair, Delhi University
Rahul Saunik, Quikr India Private Limited
Rajdeep Singh Puri
Rajendran Narayanan, Azim Premji University, Bangalore
Rajesh Krishnan
Rajesh Mehar
Raju Sharma, Retired Civil Servant
Rakesh Shekhawat
Rakhi Sehgal
Ram
Ramani Atkuri, Public Health Professional
Ramani Venkatesan, Retired Civil Servant
Ramesh Tikamdas Bajaj
Ramyak Rohan Mohanty
Ranabir Chakravarti
Ranjeet Verma
Raufa Shaikh, Students for Liberty
Ravi Theja
Revathi
Ricky Saldanha
Rishav Kundu, IIIT Hyderabad
Rita Puthenkalam
Riyaz
RK Singh, Save Democracy
Rohan Mathew
Rohini Hensman
Rohini Lakshané
Rohith
Roja Mathew
Romar Correa, University of Mumbai
Roop Kaur Brar
Rosamma Thomas
Roshan
Raju
Rudi Warjri, Constitutional Conduct Group
Rupa
Rupsa Mallik
S Bharatwaj
S.Durga Bhavani
Sabih Ahmad
Sadhna Arya, University of Delhi
Sagar
Sahil Gupta
Sakina Dhorajiwala, LibTech India
Samali Banerjee
Sameet Panda, Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhijan
Samrudha Surana
Samyak Jain, Advocate
Sandeep Kumar Pattnaik
Sandeep Manudhane
Sandeep Yadav
Sandhya Gokhale, Forum Against Oppression of Women
Sandip
Saniya Khan Golandaz
Sanjay Palshiakar, University of Hyderabad
Sanjay Upadhyay, SWORD
Sanket
Sanketh D S
Sarada Mahesh
Sarath, Motherleaf
Sarika sinha
Sarosh
Satyabhama, IAS Retired CMD NSC Ministry of Agriculture
Saudha Kasim
Saumya
Saumya Kaul
Sautabh
Sayantan Chaudhuri
Shadab Ahmad
Shahvir Aga
Shaleen Jain
Shankar Gopalakrishnan, Chetna Andolan, Uttarakhand
Shantha Sinha
Sharachchandra Lele
Sharad Chandra Behar
Sharada Ganesh
Shardul Gopujkar, Parichay Legal Clinic
Shashi
Sheetal Fernandes
Shekar
Shevon Abraham Samuel
Shewli Kumar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Shilpaa Anand, BITS-Pilani Hyderabad Campus
Shirish B Patel, Shirish Patel & Associates
Shiv
Shivangi, Amity Law School, Delhi
Shivani Yadav
Shobhit Sinha
Shounak Dewal
Shubham
Siddharth K J
Sikandar Warsi
Simrandeep
Siraj Dutta, Right to Food Campaign Jharkhand
Snehan Kekre, Streamlit, Inc
Solomon
Sonia Soni, SK Finance Ltd.
Sowjanya Chandrasekhar
Sowmya Dechamma, UoH
Soumya Chakraborty
SP Ambrose, Constitutional Conduct Group
Spandana L P
Sravya D
Sreechand
Sreedev Krishnkumar
Sreeharsha Thanneeru, Rythu Swarajya Vedika
Srishti
Srujana Bej
Stuti Guha
Subhodip Mukherjee
Sudeshna Sengupta
Sudha N
Sudipto GhoshSuhail Ahmad
Suhas Kolhekar
Suhasini Mulay
Sujata Patel, Kerstin Hesselgren Visiting Professor, Umea University
Sujay Monga
Sujay Naik, Zephyr
Sukla SenSumender
Sunaina
Sundar Burra, Member, Constitutional Conduct Group
Sunil Thamizh Kumar
Suprateek Bose
Suranjan Sinha, Independent researcher
Susan Dhavle
Sushant
Swati Bishnoi
Swati Narayan, Right to Food Campaign
Syed Ali Mujtaba
Syeda Hameed, Muslim Womens Forum
T Ramakrishnan
Taj Aingh
Tamanna Khan
Tanima Xavier
Tarangini, Azim Premji University
Teesta Setalvad
Tony, ATC
Tousif Tamboli
Tushar
Uma Shankari
Upendra R
Usha Raman, University of Hyderabad
V.P.Raja, Retd. IAS officer
Vandana Prabha
Varada Balachandran
Varsha Harisubramaniam
Varun
Vasudha Verma
Vasundhar, Exceleron
Venkat
Veronica Dungdung, Samajik Seva Sadan
Vicky Rathore
Vidya Subramanian
Vidyut Gore
Vignesh Balaji Velu
Vijay Bharatiya
Vijayendra Mohanty
Vinayak Varma
Vindhya
Vinish Gupta, Centre for Holistic Learning
Vir Bharat talwar
Vishal Talreja
Visvanathan V
Vivek
Vivek Dandekar
Vivek Jindal
Vivek Mathur
Yash Marwah, Let India Breathe
Yashasvi Karnena
Zakir Husain Memaya
Zishan
Zuber

Joint Statementnbspensure Equitable Access To The Covid 19 Vaccines And Health Care Resources

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Joint Statement Facial Recognition Cannot Be Used For The Covid 19 Vaccine

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Join human rights and digital rights organisations and individuals across India, including those from the public health community in expressing their deep concern on the National Health Authority’s plans to use facial recognition for “contactless” COVID-19 vaccine delivery. Sign on here!

R.S. Sharma, the current head of the National Health Authority, and former chief of UIDAI said in a recent statement that the “Aadhaar-based facial recognition system could soon replace biometric fingerprint or iris scan machines at Covid-19 vaccination centres across the country in order to avoid infections.” This has given rise to considerable concern and anxiety for many who are yet to be vaccinated. FRT deployment would result in a drastic change in existing government policy for an inclusive rollout of the vaccination process. As per stated government policy, note that biometric authentication is not currently being used in the vaccination process. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare clarified in the Lok Sabha that Aadhaar is not mandatory to receive the vaccine, and the ICMR’s guidelines on the vaccination process are clear that multiple forms of ID will be accepted. However in fresh guidelines released in early April, Aadhaar was indicated as the "preferred" mode of identity verification. The introduction of FRTs will only exacerbate the privacy and exclusionary concerns of such a move.

Facial recognition technologies (FRT) pose a grave threat to human rights, including privacy, and are being rolled out in the absence of a valid legal basis. Their unchecked rollout increases the risk of unchecked government surveillance, and mission creep. Evidence has shown that FRTs are not accurate and linking this untested technology to the vaccination roll-out will only exclude persons from the vaccine delivery system.

As India careens into a “second wave” of COVID-19, it is crucial that the government’s focus stays on increasing the speed, range and efficacy of vaccine delivery, and not use it to test out privacy harming technologies. The pandemic offers the Centre and State governments an opportunity to expand peoples’ access to healthcare as a matter of right, ensure healthcare is accessible and affordable, and that accessibility is not limited by imposing conditionalities such as enrolment in digital identification projects, or being coerced to use privacy harming technologies.

The joint statement calls on the Government of India and public officials, specifically Shri R.S. Sharma to :

Issue a public statement clearly stating that compliance will be ensured with existing government policies for vaccination that focus on universal and inclusive delivery rather than making Aadhaar and FRT based authentication as a basis, or pre-condition for availing it.
Transparently disclosing all technical and financial details of the FRT based system, whether any pilot studies are being conducted or being considered for the rollout of FRT based system. We urge that such necessary disclosure must be facilitated with open sourcing the algorithm for the proposed FRT based system.
As part of any potential pilot programme, conduct an independent human rights and equity audit that includes a privacy impact assessment of the FRT based system.
Read the Internet Freedom Foundation’s blogpost here, and the full statement here.

Co Win Is Aadhaar Linking Being Used As Cover For Digital Health Id

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On January 16, 2020, the Government of India initiated a country-wide COVID vaccination drive, which will be facilitated via the COVID-19 Vaccine Intelligence Network (Co-WIN).

Rethink Aadhaar is concerned that the requirement in the Co-WIN vaccine delivery system, that Aadhaar authentication is to be the “preferred mode” for authentication, creates an impermissible barrier to access the vaccine and will violate the right to health. Additionally, Rethink Aadhaar is concerned about the lack of transparency around how the government plans to store and use the data that will be collected as part of the vaccine delivery process.

Co-WIN is a platform and app that has been developed by the Government of India, to track the delivery of the COVID-19 vaccine.

As per reports, the app will require citizens to “self-register” in order to get the COVID-19 vaccine. According to the Health Secretary, Aadhaar-based authentication will be the “preferred mode” to verify the identity of beneficiaries. Additionally, according to the Operational Guidelines on COVID-19 Vaccination (point 7.2.3) issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, the production of an Aadhaar number will be mandatory to receive the vaccination certificate issued once the vaccination is complete.

The guidelines state that the platform will be used to track the beneficiaries health on a “real-time basis” after they receive the vaccination. After the beneficiary receives both doses of the vaccine, the Co-WIN application will generate a “QR certificate”, which will be stored in the Government’s DigiLocker application. A DigiLocker account can be accessed either using the unique ID (an ID specific to Digilocker which is linked to the person’s Aadhaar number) or the registered mobile number of the account holder.

The Aadhaar details of persons who receive the vaccine will be used to create a Unique Health ID for them, albeit only for “willing beneficiaries”.

Thus, it appears that data collected for the vaccine delivery system will be used to populate the Digital Health ID database, and people’s vaccine certificates will be stored on DigiLocker. Collating people’s health information in this manner, even as India lacks a legal framework to safeguard citizens’ data or health information, is a dangerous step.

This raises serious concerns:

Making the vaccine or subsequent certification conditional on Aadhaar authentication or linkage, would go against all tenets of medical ethics, is a violation of the basic and fundamental right to health, and would also be poor public policy as the roll-out of the vaccine should be focused on universal access to the vaccine.
The Central government’s requirement that Aadhaar authentication is be the “preferred mode” for authentication of identities, as well as the requirement that mobile phone numbers be linked to Aadhaar to pre-register on the app, will exclude citizens. Any requirement to mandatorily link mobile numbers with Aadhaar – as some reports have indicated could be the case – would violate the Supreme Court’s judgement on the constitutionality of Aadhaar. As recent report by Medianama shows, as of August 2020, nearly 11% of India’s population still does not have an Aadhaar number. Errors happen frequently in the huge and complicated Aadhaar infrastructure, leading to authentication failures. Conditioning the vaccine to Aadhaar authentication will repeat the mass exclusion already seen after Aadhaar was linked to essential services and entitlements to food, pensions, scholarships.
The lack of privacy safeguards, either in the app or in the vaccine delivery system as a whole, is a serious violation of the right to privacy.
Details on where the data related to vaccination will be shared/stored are not addressed in the app’s consent form, which only makes a blanket statement about “maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of the information provided”. Neither the website nor the application have privacy policies that address how the health data will be protected. Data related to health is sensitive data and should be accorded the highest level of protection. The Karnataka High Court’s recent interim order on Aarogya Setu, reiterated the importance of ensuring health-related data collected to track the spread of COVID-19 is safeguarded. It held that medical information or data is a category of data to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and “the sharing of health data of a citizen without his/her consent will necessarily infringe his/her fundamental right of privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”
The vaccine delivery system is being used to populate the database for the Digital Health ID and to coerce people to use Digilocker.
This is a coercive step which is being taken without due deliberation or public scrutiny, and with no consideration for privacy rights. This would also violate the fundamental principle of purpose limitation, that data collected for one purpose (for the vaccine) cannot be reused for another (for the creation of the Digital Health ID system) without an individual’s explicit consent and the option to opt-out with no adverse implications of doing so. There are worrying reports of hospital administrations sharing Aadhaar details of its staff to register them on the Co-WIN application, even without their consent. The vaccine delivery should not be used as a cover to create a Digital health ID without sufficient public debate, and safeguards to ensure that people are free to choose not to enroll.

Rethink Aadhaar urges the Government to:

Adopt all possible measures to ease access to the vaccine, investing resources to improve health services, and delink the requirement of Aadhaar for the vaccine. A notification must be issued reiterating the point that multiple IDs, apart from Aadhaar, can be submitted to get access to the vaccination.
Clearly establish the privacy policies of the Co-WIN application, particularly with respect to the protection of the health data of the beneficiaries. More particularly, assurances must be provided that the vaccine delivery system will not be used to populate the database for the Digital Health ID or used to coerce people to use Digilocker.
Ensure that adequate safeguards are taken against making a health ID mandatory, including issuing a notification in line with the Health Data Management Policy which states that “no individual shall be denied access to any health facility or service, or any other right in any way merely by reason of not being in possession of a Health ID or for not opting to participate in the NDHE.”

The Indian public health system has administered large scale vaccine programs in the past with relative efficiency, without such restrictions and conditions, and should trust its public health systems to do so for COVID as well, without making it restrictive, conditional or linked to a digital health system which is in its infancy and surrounded by legal and ethical concerns. The vaccine delivery should not be used as a cover to create Digital Health IDs without sufficient public debate, and without enough safeguards to ensure that people are free to choose not to enroll.

Yet Another Aadhaar Enabled Scam When Will The Government Wake Up

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar-based Scholarships Scam in Jharkhand Shows How Aadhaar Leaks Public Funds, Deprives Citizens

In a recent investigation of scholarship schemes in Jharkhand, Many ways to dupe a poor student, the Indian Express brought to light how social security benefits being transferred via the Aadhaar-based Direct Benefit Transfer (“DBT”) system are being siphoned off by a nexus of business correspondents, agents, banking staff and school staff, with beneficiaries completely left in the dark.

The leaks and malpractice along the chain in the Aadhaar-based Direct Benefit Transfer of scholarships exposed by The Indian Express are not isolated instances but are an inevitable part of the design of the Aadhaar-based DBT system, as several features of this system enable these types of scams or “diverted payments”.

Three successive governments in India have pushed for mandatory Aadhaar enrolment and linking to bank accounts, even in the absence of an adequate legal framework and a corresponding electronic and bank infrastructure, claiming it would make welfare delivery better targeted, efficient, and free of middlemen. Yet, there is silence when corruption and theft of public funds enabled by the Aadhaar-DBT system are brought to light with increasing frequency. Such scams have been seen multiple times, including the “LPG scam” which was widely reported in 2017. People’s LPG subsidies were diverted, via the Aadhaar-linked DBT process, to unrelated Airtel payment banks that they had no access to. Despite being written about extensively, no action has been taken to fix the systemic issues that enable these scams.

Report Of The Peoples Tribunal On Aadhaar Related Issues 1

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Date: 2nd October, 2020

Press Release

Launch of the Jury Report from the People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related Issues

In August 1906, the Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance was signed into law in the Transvaal, in South Africa. It was a humiliating and discriminating law, forcing Indians in the Transvaal to register with the ‘registrar of Asiatics,’ submit to physical examinations, provide fingerprints, and carry a registration certificate at all times. Rebelling against this was the first act of non-violent political resistance that Mahatma Gandhi engaged in.

Today, on Gandhi Jayanti, we commemorate Gandhi’s resistance to fingerprinting, with the launch of the Jury Report from the People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related Issues which was formally released virtually today on 2nd October, 2020.

The Jury report comprises the responses and opinions of the four members who adjudicated the People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related issues, viz. Dr. Subhashis Banerjee (IIT Delhi), Dr. Tarangini Sriraman (Azim Premji University), Ms. Patricia Mukhim (Shillong Times), and Mr. Ram Sundaram (TerraPay). It also contains a summary of the proceedings and, along with the Aadhaar Tribunal Evidence Book, forms a timely critique of the Aadhaar project ten years since its inception and two years since the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the scope of the Aadhaar project.

The People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related Issues was held on 29 February and 1 March, 2020, in New Delhi. Over the two days of the Tribunal, we witnessed a host of depositions and presentations on critical aspects of the Aadhaar project by presenters speaking about various grassroots campaigns and movements. The discussions covered the Aadhaar project’s impact on welfare, its information security architecture, issues with legislative and judicial oversight, as well as the project’s function creep. A video summary of the Tribunal can be found here.

Dr. Reetika Khera (Development Economist), Dr. Sunita Bandewar (Health rights activist expert on health ethics), and Sr. Adv. Meenakshi Arora (Senior Advocate, Supreme Court) were the panelists speaking at the release of the Jury report. The entire panel discussion can be viewed here.

Dr. Reetika Khera observed that the Aadhaar project has failed to solve the problem of corruption in welfare, but poor people have paid the price of the failings of the program. She argued that the denial of benefits and exclusion has been deemed acceptable by the government while, in the garb of ‘voluntary’ use, Aadhaar continues to be expanded further. She pointed out how Aadhaar is an admission of government failure, and is based on a misunderstanding - or refusal to acknowledge - how corruption works. A ration dealer can force a person to authenticate their fingerprint for 35kg instead of signing a register, but still give the person only 30kg - mandating fingerprint authentication cannot solve this problem. According to Dr. Khera, the privacy and data protection concerns which have been expressed with Aadhaar are applicable to other technologies, which are now getting noticed. “What took 7 years for Aadhaar,” she said, “happened within 7 days in the case of Aarogya Setu”. Thanks to the rapid furore around the Aarogya Setu app, the government had to backtrack on making it mandatory. She concluded her remarks by saying that the next “scene of contest” will be the data protection laws, and there is a need to take these conversations to a wider set of people.

Sr. Adv. Meenakshi Arora initiated her remarks by reiterating the capability of the Aadhaar project to enable “360o surveillance” via allowing the linking of data silos, which to her was akin to living in a glass box. She also pointed out how, despite the Supreme Court’s judgment prohibiting it, the private sector continues to use and access Aadhaar data. Drawing on her arguments before the Constitution Bench in the Aadhaar hearings, she spoke of a case from the United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights struck down the powers of the police to retain data related to the criminal antecedents of a person. The ECHR called this a deep and serious intrusion of privacy. In contrast, the Indian Supreme Court failed to adopt a similar reasoning around Aadhaar-linked databasing. She also recounted another case relating to telecommunication data in which the Constitutional Court of Germany struck down a 6-month data retention period, stating that there was a “reasonable apprehension” that the data may be misused. This reasoning wasn’t accepted by the Indian Supreme Court either. She concluded her remarks by pointing out the leeway given to the government for the Aadhaar project, and that the government’s overdrive to link Aadhaar to various activities amounted to losing whatever little was gained by the Supreme Court’s judgment.

Dr. Sunita Bandewar opened her remarks by commenting on how the lack of public consultation on technological projects like Aadhaar doesn’t bode well for a democracy. In the absence of open and transparent conversations around the ‘buts’ and ‘caveats’ of technological projects, she said, they are reduced to mere “technocratic fixes,” which are not robust. She observed how in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the central government as well as several state governments launched several contact tracking apps without fully understanding the “social determinants” on the ground. With respect to the private interests in pushing for technological solutions, she referred to NITI Aayog’s whitepaper on Artificial Intelligence (AI) in different sectors, noting that private players with a stake in digital technology and AI played a vital role in drafting the whitepaper. Further, the whitepaper itself keeps referring to the economics of AI, with only passing mentions of ethical considerations. Concluding her remarks, she stated that data sharing is a valuable exercise, for instance in the bioethics domain especially with respect to clinical trials where good datasets are needed to understand the gendered impact of Covid-19. But in contrast, data collection and sharing of the Aadhaar database has not happened in a transparent manner, through proper public engagement.

The Jury Report launch and panel discussion concluded with brief remarks from Ms. Usha Ramanathan who argued that technology policies need to be critically analyzed from the perspective of the vested interests they serve, by creating a perception that people are inefficient, corrupt, and replaceable by technology.

------

For further information about the Jury Report and the People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related Issues, please contact Rethink Aadhaar at contact@rethinkaadhaar.in, and Article 21 Trust at art21ind@gmail.com.

5Tesn475Qe4Vwaepok94T876Vkuwpd

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Saturday, 26th September 2020, marked two years since the Supreme Court’s 2018 judgement in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019 10 SCC 1), on the constitutionality of the Aadhaar project. Building on the constitutional rights to privacy, a clear red line was drawn to contain the Aadhaar project, while Justice Chandrachud’s dissent stuck the project down in its entirety. Courts in Kenya and Jamaica have subsequently relied on Justice Chandachud’s dissent, while containing or striking down similar national ID systems. Private parties were expressly ruled out, and mandatory Aadhaar authentication was only permitted for welfare services and PAN-Aadhaar linkage. However, the spread of Aadhaar continued. This primer laid out what was and wasn’t allowed by the Supreme Court's judgement. Despite the Supreme Court’s judgement, the use of Aadhaar continues to proliferate, though the push-back, too, continues.

In 2019, some of the petitioners in the Aadhaar petition challenged the Aadhaar Amendment Act, 2019. The Amendment permits private parties to continue to use Aadhaar authentication, albeit on a “voluntary basis”. The challenge to the Act is pending consideration by the Supreme Court.
Several notifications, permitting private parties including health insurance companies to use Aadhaar have been issued over the last few months.
Review petitions challenging the 2018 Aadhaar judgement are also pending.
In August of this year, the Aadhaar Authentication for Good Governance (Social Welfare, Innovation, Knowledge) Rules, 2020 were released. These expand the permissible uses for Aadhaar authentication for digital platforms for good governance, to "prevent dissipation of social welfare benefits" and to "enable innovation and spread of knowledge”. This widens the scope of Aadhaar beyond permissible limits and needs to be challenged.

As we go through various types of lockdowns and unlockdowns, this quarterly update from Rethink Aadhaar is to share stories, research and resistance, and ask for your support and continued resistance as we challenge state and corporate efforts that want surveillance and techno-solutionism to take over our lives.

It has been several months since our last update, and like everyone else, we at Rethink Aadhaar have been trying to understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the subsequent lockdown, and its immense financial and economic impact. The country has been brought to a standstill, lakhs of people without jobs, without access to income, social security or care. Migrant workers were particularly impacted, and thousands were left stranded away from their homes and sources of income.

Odisha Government Rolls Back Order On Aadhaar Pension But Is That Enough

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On 27th August 2020, the Government of Odisha rolled back its plans to link Aadhaar to social pensions, clarifying in a notification that Aadhaar numbers were not needed for pensions in this round, stating that “Aadhaar collection is an ongoing process”. The order followed sustained advocacy by the Right to Food Campaign, Right to Food Campaign Odisha, and Rethink Aadhaar, who pointed out that close to 11 lakh of the most vulnerable would be affected by Aadhaar linkage. The government appears to have paid heed to these concerns, and resolved not to repeat the tragic story of Dukhi Jani who died of starvation after Aadhaar-failures removed her from social security nets.

However, the Aadhaar-seeding process has not been stopped in its entirety. To the contrary, in the same notification, State officials have been given instructions to enrol more people into Aadhaar. RTF Odisha and Rethink Aadhaar condemn these half measures. Ensuring only a month’s relief is merely cosmetic relief. An order of the High Court of Odisha (dated 26.08.2020 ), in WP (C) No. 20711 of 2020, directed the government to ensure that ex-gratia payments under the pension scheme were not to be denied because of lack of Aadhaar.

Linking social security schemes, whether pensions or the PDS, to Aadhaar causes a multitude of problems, and hardship to the most marginalised. It causes high rates of biometric failure at the point of sale, although biometric authentication is currently limited due to the pandemic. Enrolment in Aadhaar is also difficult for many people. Adding to the difficulties is the fact that updating Aadhaar now costs Rs.100, which puts a price on citizenship rights.

Neither Aadhaar seeding nor Aadhaar-based payments systems work satisfactorily. Wherever Aadhar has been linked to systems, it has caused multiple failures. These failures are often centralised and hidden behind an “black box,” depriving local administration of remedial powers. Aadhaar threatens the stability of well-functioning systems.

The pension schemes in Odisha are known for their progressive scope and for being people-friendly. They are a lifeline for a wide range of beneficiaries. Aadhaar-seeding would disrupt a well-working system, with no apparent gains. The most vulnerable will be arbitrarily struck off lists, with no mechanisms to appeal, and no clarity on who can help them.

We urge the government to continue its efforts to support the most vulnerable. If the pandemic and the resultant hardship has made anything clear, it’s that the imperative must be to broaden and deepen the coverage of social support. Rethink Aadhaar and the Right to Food campaign, Odisha will continue to support the state and its people to ensure that food security is available as a matter of right. The Government of Odisha must ensure that every last person is included. We call on the Government of Odisha to totally delink Aadhaar from the pension scheme.

Surveillance And Technology Session At Janta Parliament 18 August 2020

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar and Article 21 Trust anchored a Session on Technology and Surveillance at the Janta Parliament on 18 August 2020.

At the sixth session of the Janta Parliament, the House resolved to urge the government to frame a people-centric digital rights law upholding “people’s right to personhood, dignity, equality, privacy, and self-determination”.

Statement Against Mandating Aadhaar For Covid 19 Tests

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar stands in solidarity with JSA Rajasthan, JSA Mumbai and JSA Maharashtra, to condemn the recent decisions taken by state governments to mandate Aadhaar for drugs in Maharashtra and for COVID-19 tests in Rajasthan.

On 29 July 2020, the medical and health department of Rajasthan announced in directions for COVID-19 testing that it was mandatory for patients to produce an Aadhaar card before collecting their samples, which would be inputed into the RCT-PCR app. Earlier in July, there were also reports that the Food and Drug Administration department of the Government of Maharashtra had mandated, via a notification, the production of an Aadhaar card to purchase two drugs, being used on an experimental basis to combat COVID-19, Remdesivir and Tocilizumab.

The right to health is a basic and fundamental human right, recognized in the Indian constitution and in international human rights law. Healthcare should be accessible, available and affordable to all unconditionally. Linking it to an exclusionary technology or conditionalities violates this basic principle. Conditioning access to healthcare on Aadhaar will increase the risk that patients will be denied drugs or access to tests because they don’t possess Aadhaar numbers or have Aadhaar “cards”., This would also violate medical professional ethics which mandate that people should not be turned away, when services are available. In a pandemic, restricting access to drugs and testing during a pandemic is epidemiologically unwarranted, and could increase risks to the entire community.

Over the years, various attempts to link Aadhaar to health services have faced widespread condemnation. In 2018, the Ayushman Bharat healthcare insurance scheme rolled back attempts to mandate Aadhaar for this scheme. Despite this, across the country in public and private hospitals, mandatory Aadhaar has continued to deny people access to their rights including blocking women’s access to safe abortions. As per the "saturation figures" published by the UIDAI, in Rajasthan about 84.8% of the total population may have an Aadhaar, and in Maharashtra the figure may be 92.4% — which makes exclusion, a certainty.

Linking health to Aadhaar also raises extremely serious concerns about surveillance, privacy, confidentiality and ethics related to the collection, storage and sharing of health data of patients. Linking this data to Aadhaar and centralized storage, increases the risk of unethical use and could facilitate the exploitation of the data for profit. Today, India lacks a data protection law or any oversight mechanism to ensure that Aadhaar, linked with health data, will not result in its use beyond the consent sought initially. In the absence of any institutional process to ensure the safety of personal data, gathering Aadhaar along with health data poses a clear hazard to persons.

The Aadhaar Act itself mandates that demographic information collected under the Act shall not include “medical history”. The 2017 Right to Privacy judgement reaffirmed the right to privacy as a constitutional right, and defined its contours as the right to bodily autonomy. Medical records and history are “sensitive personal data,” under the S.43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and can not be collected without the informed consent of individuals. However these provisions only apply to body corporates, and contain wide exceptions permitting government agencies to collect this data for, inter alia, verification of identities.

The disclosure of personal health information has the potential to reinforce stigma, discrimination and marginalization of those seeking health care, leading to its denial and threat to lives especially for diseases such as Tuberculosis, HIV, and processes such as abortions. The disclosure of the names of patients afflicted with COVID-19, and the disastrous consequences of public shaming which ensued are illustrative of this.

It is also pertinent to mention that the stated reason behind collecting or recording Aadhaar numbers is to keep track of persons who test positive for COVID-19. However, the Aadhaar database was created on the basis of self-authenticated documents, and the UIDAI has admitted in the Supreme Court that no system of checking was adopted by it during enrolment, to validate the authenticity of the data submitted to it. In light of this, relying on such a database to check the spread of the pandemic goes against the very aims it is trying to achieve.

The pandemic has hastened the digitalisation of many systems, without adequate support or systemic reform that could address the root causes of lack of access to health. At a time when access to healthcare is even more urgent, restricting access because of Aadhaar enrolment is short-sighted and repugnant to human rights and dignity.

The pandemic offers an opportunity for national and State governments to expand peoples’ access to healthcare as a matter of right, to ensure healthcare is accessible and affordable, and accessibility is not limited by imposing conditionalities such as enrolment in digital identification projects. We call on governments to adopt all possible measures to ease access to health services, such as free and additional testing, relaxing testing criteria, investing resources to improve health services, and delink the requirement of Aadhaar for testing or care.

The letter that Rethink Aadhaar has written to the government of Rajasthan is here.

More Than 11 Lakh Pensioners Could Lose Benefits After Odisha Governments Move To Mandate Aadhaarnbsp Verification For Pensionsnbsp

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar joins the Right to Food campaign, Odisha to condemn the Odisha Government’s decision to restrict the payment of social security pensions to those whose accounts are “Aadhaar verified,” and to make the payments to those who can show Aadhaar “cards” as proof of identification. More than 11 lakh persons could lose their benefits as a result of this decision, with little recourse as the verification process is shrouded in opacity.

The move comes barely a month after the tragic starvation death of 46-year-old Dukhi Jani, a tribal widow, who had been struck off the pension and food ration lists, due to—from all accounts – Aadhaar verification failures.

Odisha’s pensions schemes have received praise for their wide coverage and people-friendly mode of payment. Under the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) and the Madhu Babu Pension Yojana (MBPY) some of the most vulnerable citizens living in poverty, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, widows, and transgenders persons, get a pension of between Rs. 500 - Rs. 900 a month. This amount is often a lifeline for the close to 49 lakh persons who are beneficiaries under these two schemes.

Mandatory Aadhaar linkage and verification threatens to curtail this tenuous line of support. In July and August, the Odisha Government’s Department of Social Security & Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities issued two circulars specifying that the pensions and an “ex gratia” amount of Rs.1000 were to be disbursed (in cash) only to those who carried Aadhaar cards as proof of identity, and only to those accounts which had been “Aadhaar verified”.

As per the updated National Dashboard of National Social Assistance Programme, only 83% of the NSAP accounts in Odisha have been “verified” by Aadhaar, while only 74% have been verified for the MBPY scheme. This means that more than 11 lakh persons could lose their benefits because of a lack of “Aadhaar verification”.

Mandatory linkages with Aadhaar have caused mass exclusions, both at the point of disbursal of welfare entitlements (because of biometric or technical failures) and during the process of seeding and verification. A January 2020 study of the PDS system in Jharkhand found that close to 88% households excluded due to Aadhaar verification were genuine beneficiaries.

There is no clear method to appeal these exclusions, and persons struck off these lists are left running from pillar to post. The Aadhaar seeding and verification processes are shrouded in opacity, as they can fail for a range of reasons, often without any of the responsible officials understanding the reason for the failure, or how it should be remedied. The Aadhaar-enabled Payments System (AePS) comes with its own share of failures, due to poor design, missing safeguards, and a confusing array of failure codes. Remedying this is close to impossible for those who are not mobile, have limited access to transportation, or live in an area far from administrative headquarters. These difficulties have been exponentially exacerbated by the ongoing pandemic.

Aware of the Aadhaar project’s harmful and exclusionary impacts, in 2017, the Naveen Patnaik government opposed linking Aadhaar to accounts of beneficiaries of welfare schemes as it would cause “hardship” to beneficiaries. However, in January 2020, it went back on this, and announced that pension accounts would have to be linked to Aadhaar for “verification” and seeding.

The purpose of verifying beneficiaries is not served by Aadhaar verification or linkage. The Aadhaar database was created on the basis of self-verified documents, and the Aadhaar “card” is just a printout, which was not intended to serve as a proof of identity. Awake to the pandemic-related threats fingerprint authentication poses, biometric authentication has been suspended in many states during the pandemic.

Making Aadhaar a barrier to welfare entitlements, particularly during a pandemic, is a callous move which can have fatal implications, as was seen in Dukhi Jani’s case. The Government of Odisha must reverse its recent order, to ensure that rights of the most vulnerable citizens of our country are not curtailed due to experiments with technology.

Legal Notice To Halt Mandatory Aadhaar For Keralas Self Governance Portal

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar joins digital rights organisations Article 21 Trust, Internet Freedom Foundation, SFLC.in and Swathanthra Malayalam Computing to endorse a legal notice that was sent to the Government of Kerala last week, by Bezwada Wilson and Kalyani Menon-Sen (prominent civil society activists, and petitioners in the Puttaswamy case, challenging the constitutionality of Aadhaar. The notice asked the Government to sever all links with Aadhaar, in relation to its recently launched Integrated Local Self Governance Management System (ILGMS).

The ILGMS, developed by the Information Kerala Mission, brings all civic registration processes under one common platform and portal and provides a single window for all services and payments related to birth, death and marriage registrations, tax payments and pensions. According to circulars dated 14.05.2020 and 28.05.2020, rollout of the programme in districts across Kerala in a phased manner began in July 2020. However, the online portal can only be accessed if a registrant inputs their Aadhaar number.

The legal notice brings to the Kerala government’s notice the constitutional and practical bars preventing it from requiring or even using Aadhaar verification for ILGMS. In KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019 10 SCC 1), a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the Aadhaar project, in light of its surveillance, security and exclusionary harms. The Court held that three conditions had to be met in order for the use of Aadhaar to be constitutional: the presence of a legitimate state aim to use Aadhaar numbers; Second, the presence of an enacted law permitting such use; And third, the requirement that this law conform to the ‘doctrine of proportionality’. This is a strict test – in the same judgement the Supreme Court struck down the use of Aadhaar for ‘seeding’ in bank accounts, despite an enacted legislative measure providing for it, finding that it did not pass the test of proportionality.

In the Puttaswamy case, Aadhaar verification was deemed permissible only for a strict category of “Section 7” subsidies and benefits, drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India, and for PAN linkage (the deadline for which has been extended multiple times). The Court cautioned against the proliferation of the use of Aadhaar, holding that “their scope is not to be unduly expanded thereby widening the net of Aadhaar”.

Since its inception, the Aadhaar project been shown to pose serious threats of surveillance, safety, security and health risks to the population, and any database or project associated with it runs the risk of being compromised. In light of this, and in the interests of security, safety and efficacy of the ILGMS system, it is imperative the Kerala government withdraw the order mandating the use of Aadhaar for registrants to the ILGMS system.

New Aadhaar Rules For Good Governance Are Constitutionally Impermissible

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar and the Article 21 Trust condemn the Aadhaar Authentication for Good Governance (Social Welfare, Innovation, Knowledge) Rules, 2020 released yesterday, which expand the permissible uses for Aadhaar authentication, for good governance, to "prevent dissipation of social welfare benefits" and to "enable innovation and spread of knowledge."

Although only permitting “voluntary” use, these rules are against the letter and spirit of the 2018 Puttaswamy judgement on Aadhaar, wherein a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court limited the use of Aadhaar to "Section 7" cases, i.e. linked to subsidies, benefits arising from the Consolidated Fund of India. While permitting this limited use, the Court cautioned against the proliferation of the use of Aadhaar, holding that "their scope is not to be unduly expanded thereby widening the net of Aadhaar". It also specifically excluded children from the scope of Aadhaar, and struck down attempts by the government to make Aadhaar mandatory for bank accounts and for cellphone records.

Particularly when read with the 2019 Amendment to the Aadhaar Act, the Rules are part of concerted attempts to cross the red lines drawn by the Supreme Court’s judgement limiting the use of Aadhaar to a limited category of subsidies and benefits. The rules have been framed under S.53(2)(aa) of the Aadhaar Act, which was inserted through the 2019 Amendment, which is presently under challenge in the Supreme Court.

The stated justifications for the rules are vague, and are, at best an attempt to put old wine in new bottles. For one, it’s ironic that these rules are being pushed through on the grounds of “good governance,” when the Aadhaar project has been shot through with total disregard for the norms underlying this concept: respect for the rights of citizens, respect for democratic processes, and accountability to citizens. The term itself is quite broad -- every government service can fall within the ambit of good governance, in effect nullifying the Supreme Court's judgment to limit it to subsidies and benefits.

Second, the government has long claimed that Aadhaar linkage prevents “dissipation of social welfare benefits”, without any evidence at all to back this claim up. In 2016, the government used “obviously fabricated” World Bank Development Report numbers to justify their push for Aadhaar, claiming it would lead to $11 billion annual savings, a figure that was later shown to be based on wild conjecture. It is based on a flawed notion of how leakages work within welfare systems, choosing to treat people who depend on these entitlements as potential defrauders, over systemic reform. What this approach has led to is mass exclusions of peoples from their entitlements, because of authentication, linkage or other failures. A widespread consequence, as Khera has pointed out, of Aadhaar authentication is that it has given more power to middlemen and disbursal agents, while its centralised system prevents localised grievance redress.

The third purpose of the rules, the “enablement of innovation and spread of knowledge,” should be seen in light of other attempts being made by the government to extract economic benefits from data. It is unclear how the government seeks to justify the use of Aadhaar Authentication for enablement of innovation. This is clearly with the intent of using data and activity trails so generated for commercial exploitation.

Finally, including the concepts of voluntariness and consent cannot make a project that is unconstitutional on account of violation of fundamental rights, constitutional. There can be no waiver of fundamental rights and the State cannot put its citizens in a situation where they are constrained to “voluntarily” offer up these rights in exchange for an ostensibly efficient or convenient system.

The overarching concern with any linkage to Aadhaar or Aadhaar-like measures is that it continues to pose serious risks to safety, security and health of the population, and compromises the sanctity of any database or project associated with it.

The pandemic has shown us all the dangers of the technology divide, and that techno-solutionism comes at a high human cost. As we pointed out in June 2020, Dukhi Jani, a 46-year old tribal woman died of starvation, after her ration card was cancelled because of Aadhaar-related failures. Exclusions due to Aadhaar are antithetical to good governance, if the objective is to enable citizens to easily access government services.

Press Statement Aadhaar Related Starvation Death In Odisha

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Dukhi Jani, a 46 year old Kandha Tribal woman has died, allegedly due to chronic starvation caused by Aadhaar-related exclusion.

The Government Of Kerala Must Withdraw Compulsory Aadhaar For State Government Jobs

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Last week, Kalyani Menon Sen, a citizen, and petitioner in the batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of Aadhaar in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019 10 SCC 1) sent the Government of Kerala a legal notice demanding that it withdraw a recent order mandating compulsory Aadhaar verification for all new applicants and recent appointees to state government jobs.

Rethink Aadhaar, along with Internet Freedom Foundation, the Article 21 Trust and Swathanthra Malayalam Computing endorse this legal notice, and call on the Kerala Government to withdraw their order.

The order, which was dated 11.06.2020, was issued by the Kerala Government's Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms. It relates to applicants and new appointments to the Kerala Public Service Commission. As Ms. Menon Sen's legal notice notes, mandating Aadhaar verification for new appointees and applicants violates the order of the Supreme Court relating to Aadhaar, KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2019 10 SCC 1). The 5-judge bench specified that mandating the use of Aadhaar numbers, whether for verification or any other purpose, was constitutionally valid for two purposes only: for linking with PAN numbers, and for obtaining welfare benefits in the nature of a subsidy which is funded from the Consolidated Fund of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also read down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act (as it then stood), and specified that the State could use Aadhaar only if it met the following two conditions: that such use was voluntary, and that such use was covered by primary legislation for that purpose.

The purpose of preventing fraud cannot and should not be carried out by breaches to privacy, dignity and autonomy of individuals, especially in the absence of any clear basis in law.

As a constitutional body, the Government of Kerala, and the KPSC are bound to uphold the rule of law and the judgements of the Supreme Court, and should withdraw the notification, and clarify that Aadhaar verification remains optional.

The legal notice is available here, and a Malayalam version of the joint statement, prepared by Anivar Aravind from Swathanthra Malayalam Computing, can be viewed here.

Statement On Delhi Government Mandating Aadhaar Number For Compensation Forms

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar condemns the Delhi Government’s move to make quoting the Aadhaar number mandatory on the compensation forms for victims of the ongoing Delhi Riots. The provision of compensation is a basic necessity and need that the Delhi Government is obligated to fulfil in order for the city of Delhi to rebuild and recover.

Even as we write this letter, civil society organisations and student bodies are working towards ensuring timely relief work. The death toll is still rising, as volunteers are now discovering unclaimed dead bodies from several parts of North-East Delhi. As of 2 March, the official death toll remains at 42 even though four more bodies were fished out of drains in North-East Delhi on Sunday. The wounded are still grappling with the reality of the extremely tedious paperwork at hospitals. First-hand witnesses are figuring out ways to deal with the documentation and evidence collection.

Homes, possessions, properties, valuables, and lives have been lost in this violence. In this ongoing crisis, many have lost everything in arson incidents including their identity cards. To ask survivors of a riot, which has also been described as a pogrom, to prove their identity is both impractical and often an impossibility. This is the latest brutal example of the shifting of the state's burden of identifying and compensating victims of violence upon the victims themselves. We strongly advocate that the Delhi Government work proactively towards assuaging the persons and families affected by the violence and towards compensating them. We cannot emphasize enough the need for urgent unconditional government interventions with timely relief.

The Aadhaar project, at the best of times, does not work. It is riddled with problems, the very least of include wrong names, birth dates, addresses, incorrectly entered details. To make such a shoddy system a prior condition for aid in a time of disaster and crisis is reprehensible and must be stopped.

The Delhi Government must remove the demand for Aadhaar numbers from its compensation forms. We further urge the government to take all necessary steps to provide full aid and support to the survivors of the Delhi Riots without imposing any further conditions.

A Peoples Tribunal Taking Stock Of The Impact Of Aadhaar Project And New Coercive Databases

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

A host of grassroots campaigns and movements, including Rethink Aadhaar, are organising a People’s Tribunal on Aadhaar-related issues in Delhi on February 29 and March 1, 2020.

Please see the note below for details; you can also visit the event page for more details and registration.

When: February 29 & March 1, 2020, 9 am onwards

Where: 301, ISI (10, Lodhi Institutional Area, New Delhi)

Event Page:

https://hasgeek.com/rethinkaadhaar/aadhaar-tribunal-2020/

Note: We request RSVPs from those interested as seating is limited.

Also, while entry to the Tribunal is free, we encourage you to contribute and help make the Tribunal more successful and impactful. To contribute, please visit:

https://www.ourdemocracy.in/Campaign/aadhaartribunal

About the Tribunal

This Tribunal seeks to review the on-ground impact over the ten years of the Aadhaar project. In particular, the two-day event will focus on the aftermath of the SC judgment, and the continued coercion through databasing of citizens since. It will feature testimonies, expert commentaries, and analysis of the impact on welfare schemes (food rations, NREGA wages, old age and disability pensions, health programmes, scholarships, children’s midday meal schemes and admissions), gender and caste inequalities, and continuing privacy and data security concerns.

Through this Tribunal, we will gather evidence from the grassroots which, with a report from the jury (comprising a former parliamentarian and a former SC judge among others), will be presented to the public in order to develop a substantive critique of the government’s continued reliance on the Aadhaar number as a “truth machine”. This is now an even more worrying development given the focus on updating the National Population Register (NPR) and subsequently preparing the National Register of Indian Citizens (NRC). We also hope to build on the Tribunal and push government agencies further to ensure that no one suffers any exclusion or deprivation for lack of an Aadhaar number, and that there is - at the very least - complete compliance with the Supreme Court judgment.

Organizing this Tribunal will require significant resources in terms of people’s time, efforts and, more pertinently, logistics - especially considering the fact that we plan to conduct follow up engagements with local stakeholders in at least five to six other cities besides Delhi. We request your kind support to conduct the Tribunal and widen the public debate on the Aadhaar project as well as the looming risks of making our rights and even citizenship conditional to enrolling ourselves in error-ridden databases coercively.

If you have any questions or concerns, please reach out to Raghu at 97177-49998.

A Cultivated Ignorance

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

An abridged version of this article, written by Reetika Khera, was published online by The Indian Express on November 28, 2019, and also featured in The Indian Express’s print edition on the same day under the title ‘Smarter than Aadhaar’.

Migrants’ woes are often invoked in making a case for portability of benefits in the public distribution system (PDS). Most recently, an article (‘A hundred small steps’, IE, September 26) did just that. However, in many cases of short-term seasonal migration (a dominant form in India), only one or two of the household members migrate, leaving the ration card behind for the rest of the family to use. What proportion of migrants would prefer to draw their ration at the place of work rather than in their village is a key piece of the puzzle in understanding the extent to which portability of PDS benefits is valued by migrants.

If the food security of migrants is the motivating concern, this need is probably better met by other initiatives such as Tamil Nadu’s Amma canteens or Karnataka’s Indira canteens, which provide heavily subsidised meals. Such community kitchens have quietly become popular across the country — Jharkhand’s dal-bhaat kendras, Delhi’s Jan Aahaar kiosks, and others in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh are such initiatives. Of course, protecting migrants from exploitation through stricter enforcement of their rights as labourers will go much further.

Currently, PDS entitlements are tied to the recipient’s place of residence. You can only draw PDS rations from the PDS outlet to which you are allocated. Thus, while a single-member household may be forced to forego her rations if she migrates, others would be able to claim benefits through those family members who stay back. A portable PDS would be a great facility for those who would like to draw their rations at the place of migration.

The promoters of portability make it seem as if it cannot be achieved without integrating Aadhaar with PDS. In 2012, the food department in Chhattisgarh took up the challenge of designing a portable PDS and launched “CORE PDS”. Step one was to rejig the supply logistics. The norm today is for each PDS outlet to receive food supplies once a month according to the (fixed) number of ration cards attached to it. In a portable system, where the number of people who draw their grain at a PDS outlet fluctuates from month to month, the government needs to put in place a flexible supply system. The fix was simple: Chhattisgarh allowed more than one delivery of grain in a month. Since end-to-end computerisation had been achieved, stocks could be monitored. An automated system sent a message to the ration dealer as soon as the digitised records showed that his stocks had fallen below a certain level, asking the dealer if he would like another delivery.

Step two was to give the ration card holders a smart card (like ATM cards) that could be used to draw rations at any CORE PDS outlet using a “point of sale” (POS) machine. Once the POS machine authenticates the smart card, sale can proceed. Offline sales were possible if server or connectivity issues arose. One-fifth of the transactions used the portability option, mostly within the ward. Convenience was the prime reason for switching shops — distance to the PDS, tenants who had moved residence, supplies running out. To cut a long story short, portability was achieved without Aadhaar.

CORE PDS was being gradually scaled up until Aadhaar came along and disrupted the process, even though smart cards are more reliable than fingerprint authentication. Chhattisgarh’s CORE-PDS was more promising than the Aadhaar-Based Biometric Authentication (ABBA) that has left behind a trail of hardship, exclusion, even deaths since its integration with the PDS.

In ‘A hundred small steps’, the authors carefully sidestep the fact that Santoshi’s death in Jharkhand was primarily the result of disruption that resulted from Aadhaar’s integration with the PDS, as well as the fact that smart cards (tested in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry among other places) provide a better technology solution for the last mile authentication than Aadhaar. Readers must ask why that is the case.

One of the authors of the article worked with a minister in the UPA-2 government in the rural development ministry that pushed against repeated warnings — warnings that were later vindicated — the use of Aadhaar in NREGA and social security pensions. Before that, he had worked with the World Bank and Monitor Deloitte. After that, he joined Dalberg and is now with Omidyar Network (ON).

Omidyar Network’s interest in the PDS and Aadhaar should also arouse people’s curiosity. How did the ON, a philanthropic enterprise of e-bay founder Pierre Omidyar, come to be so interested in Aadhaar that it sponsors research worth lakhs of rupees at the Indian School of Business, Dvara, IDInsight, etc. This is what is called “friendly research”. In a display of cultivated ignorance, the authors in question cite only their self-sponsored friendly research, blissfully ignoring independent research that has raised troubling questions. The sugar and tobacco industry have gained notoriety for having done this in the past: funding friendly research that cultivated doubt in people’s minds about independent research that highlighted the harmful health effects of sugar and tobacco.

Why would philanthropists do that? Might that have something to do with ON’s heavy investment in fintech, which is banking on mining the data lakes that Aadhaar-linked-to-every-aspect-of-your-life is creating? Given ON’s for-profit interest in Aadhaar and eKYC should their interventions in matters of social policy and welfare at least not be accompanied by a disclaimer about these investments? What was earlier “conflict of interest” is now being recast as “win-win”. Projecting Aadhaar as an enabler of portability in the PDS is just such an attempt.

The writer is associate professor (economics and public systems group), Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.

Press Statement Verify 19 Lakh Beneficiaries Left Out Of Odisha Pds After Mandatory Aadhaar Linking Demand Activists

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar Newsletter October 2019 Vol I

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Deadline for linking Aadhaar to PAN EXTENDED yet again

The Finance Ministry has yet again extended the deadline by which people can link their Aadhaar numbers to PAN, until December 31, 2019. Rethink Aadhaar maintains that such linking is disproportionate and unconstitutional. A challenge to such linking is being heard in the Karnataka High Court wherein the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) has asked for more time to respond. The HC has directed the CBDT not to take any action against the petitioners for not linking Aadhaar to PAN until the hearing is complete.

ECI proposes amendments to the RP Act to allow Aadhaar-Voter ID linking

The Election Commission wrote to the Law Commission on August 13 proposing amendments to the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which would allow linking the Aadhaar number to Voter IDs. This follows the July 16 Delhi HC direction to the ECI to consider a plea for an Aadhaar-based voting system, in response to a PIL filed by BJP member Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay. Concerned citizens wrote to the ECI in response to that direction pointing out multiple reasons to dismiss linking Aadhaar numbers with Voter IDs, including the dangers of voter profiling highlighted by the Cambridge Analytica episode, and the fact that self-reported errors in Aadhaar data were found to be one-and-one-half times higher than errors in the electoral database. Rethink Aadhaar demands that the Law Commission dismiss the proposed amendments and ensure the sanctity of the electoral process in India, which the Election Commission has most grievously failed to do.

Madras HC dismisses Aadhaar-social media linking; SC tosses issue to Centre

On September 13, the Supreme Court directed the Centre to submit to the Court its plans for regulating social media companies, including progress that had been made on the intermediary liability rules, in what is being called the WhatsApp traceability case, before the next hearing on September 24. The Court was hearing Facebook’s petition to transfer four cases pending in three different High Courts. Earlier, on August 21, the Madras HC reiterated its view that Aadhaar cannot be used to authenticate social media accounts, as it violated the SC judgment on Aadhaar.

The SC’s Constitution Bench, in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (the 2018 Aadhaar judgment) ruled out the use of Aadhaar numbers by private parties. This apart, linking Aadhaar numbers with social media accounts could result in the commercialisation of peoples’ personal data, highlighted as a potential threat in Justice DY Chandrachud’s dissent:

“...But the real issue is whether the linking of Aadhaar cards is the least intrusive method of obviating the problems associated with subscriber verification. The state cannot be oblivious to the need to protect privacy and of the dangers inherent in the utilization of the Aadhaar platform by telecom service providers. In the absence of adequate safeguards, the biometric data of mobile subscribers can be seriously compromised and exploited for commercial gain.”

In any case, mandatory linking of Aadhaar numbers with social media accounts would also violate the proportionality principle laid down by the 9-judge Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (the 2017 Privacy judgment).

Biometrics of people excluded from NRC and unable to prove citizenship to be flagged

Reports that the Home Ministry will be flagging the biometrics of those residents of Assam excluded from the final National Register of Citizens list published on August 31 and unable to prove their citizenship even after approaching the Foreigners’ Tribunal have raised fresh questions on the use of the Aadhaar number to determine citizenship. Possessing the Aadhaar number does not constitute proof of citizenship as per the Aadhaar Act, 2016 (Section 9).

There is the additional concern that such collection of biometric data can enable surveillance - something also observed against the backdrop of deporting Rohingya refugees. The lack of a data protection law in India exposes those excluded from the NRC to further dangers of data "trafficking", which as a violation of privacy rights must be seen as equivalent to human trafficking. This last aspect has also been pointed out in some conversations - that creating a stateless class is only a way of providing cheap labour in the so-called fourth industrial age.

Adivasis from Pathalgadi villages publicly reject Aadhaar

Adivasi residents of Pathalgadi villages in Jharkhand have publically rejected Aadhaar as they are apprehensive that Aadhaar will ease exploitation of Adivasis and their resources by outsiders, as the unique identification system equates Adivasis with the ‘aam aadmi’ (common man). A fact-finding team of the Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha learned that “Pathalgadi, an ancient way of disseminating important information among the community, was also used to express dislike towards certain government actions”. The team found that the state responded to Pathalgadi with severe repression and violence.

The immediate trigger for Pathalgadi was the state government’s repeated attempts to amend the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act to ease acquisition of Adivasi land. There is also anger against the constant attack on Adivasis’ right to self-governance. Gram Sabha is not consulted before implementing projects in Adivasi-dominated areas.

40-year old Jharkhand woman dies in childbirth, child sold for Rs. 10,000

40-year old Jhibal Tirkey, of Champanagar village in Jharkhand’s Gumla district, died on August 26, two days after birthing her eighth child, a girl who was subsequently sold for Rs. 10,000 to an unidentified family. Investigation into the case revealed that the family had no ration card, no Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) card and no LPG connection. Although the woman’s mother-in-law, Maudo, was eligible to receive pensions under the National Social Assistance Program, she never received any money due to a discrepancy between her voter ID, per which her age is 67, and her Aadhaar card, per which she is 51.

Marking the first anniversary of the Aadhaar judgment

The Aadhaar hearings by the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench and the subsequent judgment are a significant milestone in the struggle against Aadhaar. Rethink Aadhaar is therefore marking the first anniversary of the judgment this week as a reminder of how the fight against the Aadhaar onslaught is still ongoing. We trialled an online conversation open to the public on the takeaways from the Aadhaar judgment and on overcoming the lack of response from the UIDAI and the government on Aadhaar issues. We will be organising more such talks - do look out for our updates on Twitter and Facebook.

Aadhaar in the News

Series: One year after the Aadhaar judgment….

How Aadhaar Has Taken Over Our Lives

Spying on your body: Health Blueprint and Aadhaar

As Aadhaar's Idea Spreads From Kenya To Venezuela, We Still Need To Ask – Why ID?

What benefit does Aadhaar give to Indian citizens? And how will the NRC affect them?

Children continue to be perversely targeted

We need to keep talking about Aadhaar

Targeted money transfers using Aadhaar: A way to steal elections

‘It is a big hoax’: Col. Mathew Thomas

Concerns over linking Aadhaar to voter ID and social media accounts

An Appeal For Support On Article 21 Trust

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Last year, we created the Article 21 Trust as an engine that could power further struggles to counter the impact of Aadhaar and other civil technologies on human rights – in particular the right to life, liberty, and livelihood (as the name of the Trust might suggest). We find ourselves facing complex questions which will someday seek resolution in the highest courts in our country, just as the Aadhaar project did. Among these are questions of citizenship in the age of digital identities thrown up by the National Register of Citizens recently finalized in Assam; questions of the power of the state in relation to citizens, even as India prepares to build its “Health Stack” comprising citizens’ medical data tied to a singular identifying number; and questions of “datafication” of citizens as we engage with the prospects of a data economy. Article 21 Trust aims to develop a vision of technology- and data-driven governance that puts citizens and their welfare at its core.

Article 21 will also support Rethink Aadhaar through fundraising as well as working on necessary research. Early next year we envision organising a national tribunal on Aadhaar-related issues as we continue to campaign for doing away with (and finding alternatives for) the use of the Aadhaar number or Aadhaar-based authentication/verification, especially for welfare schemes and even on a voluntary basis. Given the pace at which the government is pushing for expanding the Aadhaar project, there is an urgent need to ensure that there are reminders of the Aadhaar project’s limited scope - with enrolment strictly voluntary - as directed by the Supreme Court.

Rethink Aadhaar could not have grown without your support – many have contributed to this campaign, supported interns financially, and through volunteer efforts. We request your continued support for both Rethink Aadhaar and Article 21 Trust. Should you wish to make a (further) monetary contribution, Article 21 Trust bank details are included below.

Name on account: Article 21 Trust
Bank A/C No.: 50200037948512
Bank name: HDFC Bank
Branch name: Hauz Khas
IFSC Code: HDFC0000467

Note on Article 21 Trust: The Trust was created in July, 2018; the current Trustees include Maansi Verma, Praavita, Prasanna S, Raghu Godavarthi, and Rohith Jyotish

Citizens Write To Election Commission Demanding Opposition To Aadhaar Voter Id Linking I

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On July 16, the Delhi High Court directed the Election Commission of India (ECI), to consider a plea for an Aadhaar-based voting system, in response to a PIL filed by BJP member Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay. The petition “proposes an e-voting system using fingerprint and face biometric” and, for that purpose, linking of Aadhaar number with voter ID. Such a system, the petition claims, will lead to an increase in voting percentage while also preventing bogus or fraudulent voting. Crucially, the petition does not mention a single study or pilot programme whose results might support either of these two claims. The Election Commission is yet to respond to the High Court’s direction.

The main concerns with this proposal are the following:

While it is assumed that Aadhaar will help reduce bogus voter IDs, there is research to show that there are more errors in the Aadhaar database than in the voter ID database. So, it is unreasonable to expect that linking Aadhaar with voter IDs will help in reducing the number of fraudulent voter IDs.
The ECI’s 2015 National Electoral Roll Purification and Authentication Programme (NERPAP) which involved linking Aadhaar with voter IDs resulted in deletion of nearly 55 lakh voters in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
Aadhaar is by design issued to all those who are residents of India including, for example, foreigners who have been legally staying here for an extended period. Aadhaar, therefore, is not a proof of citizenship whereas voting rights are restricted solely to citizens.

This issue assumes even more significance in the light of a letter recently written by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra to the ECI recommending the linkage of Aadhaar with voter IDs. We have seen with Cambridge Analytica the dangers of voter profiling. In Andhra Pradesh earlier this year, the Telugu Desam Party was accused of misusing Aadhaar and demographic data - including names, photographs, caste information, and family details - of 3.7 crore voters. Investigative media reports indicated that another 2 crore voters were deleted from the electoral rolls in Punjab through the misuse of stolen Aadhaar data.

Over 200 civil society organisations and concerned citizens endorsed the letter

Over 200 civil society organisations and concerned citizens have signed their name to a letter which demands that the Election Commission proactively seek dismissal of this petition.

Some of the notable names, among those who have endorsed the letter, include:

Political leaders such as Brinda Karat, Yashwant Sinha and Manoj Jha
Over twenty five former civil servants
Retired defence personnel Col Mathew Thomas and Wg Cdr Kartar Sainani
Those working on electoral issues and reform such as Kamal Kant Jaswal (Former Secretary, Department of Information Technology, GoI), Vipul Mudgal (Common Cause), Jagdeep Chhokar (Association for Democratic Reform) and Srinivas Kodali
Petitioners in the SC Aadhaar case: Kalyani Menon-Sen, Shantha Sinha, M. G. Devasahayam and Bezwada Wilson
Activists and social workers Syeda Hameed, Aruna Roy, Harsh Mander, Deep Joshi, and Nikhil Dey among numerous others
Academicians, for example, Uma Chakravarti, Jayati Ghosh, Virginius Xaxa, Jean Dreze, Sukhadeo Thorat, Satish Deshpande, Aditya Nigam, Achin Vanaik and Rajendran Narayanan
Jurists like G Haragopal (Visiting Professor, NLSIU, Bengaluru)
Journalists like Rajni Bakshi, Sucheta Dalal and P. Sainath
Artists including Nandita Das, Shyam Benegal, T. M. Krishna and Anand Patwardhan
The organisations Action India, JEEVIKA, IT for Change and the Internet Freedom Foundation

Rethink Aadhaar Newsletter July 2019 Vol I

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Celebrating Mr. Ramesh Kurhade’s fight against mandatory Aadhaar linking

When: Friday, 19 July 2019 Time: 5pm to 7pm

While the government is trying hard to crush every voice against Aadhaar, one person from Mumbai not only fought, but also won against the government's mandatory linking policy. Hear Mr Ramesh Kurhade of Mumbai Port Trust as he shares the story of his unwavering fight against Aadhaar.

A number of concerned citizens and NGOs have come together to felicitate Mr Kurhade in the hope that his experience will give courage to others. The felicitation and his talk will be followed by brief interventions from additional speakers: Dr. Anupam Saraph, Vickram Crishna, Raghu (aka godavar), Vidyut Gore, Elisha Ebenezer, and more.

Where: Moneylife Foundation Knowledge Centre, 304, 3rd Floor, Hind Service Industries Premises, Off. Veer Savarkar Marg, Near Shivaji Park Seaface, Dadar (W), Mumbai - 400028

Map Link: https://goo.gl/maps/nchPXrXqKBMCay1N9

RSVP: Shilpa at 022-49205000 or email foundation@moneylife.in or Call/SMS/ WhatsApp on +91-7045156415 (Please give your Name, Email ID & Contact number)

Read: Mumbai Mirror has published a profile of Mr. Kurhade.

What to do about Aadhaar linking with PAN, quoting Aadhaar in Income Tax returns?

The short answer: linking Aadhaar with PAN has become a legal requirement.

The cost of refusing to enrol in the Aadhaar program appears to be an invalid PAN card. Resistance to Aadhaar will not end with enrolment. We hope that it will strengthen the struggle for many of us who had earlier felt safe not being enrolled and will make the struggle even more imperative.

If you are looking for options to stay out of the system and are worried about the security and privacy risks of the Aadhaar project, we urge you to consult a lawyer. You could also seek legal advice on the potential penalties or other consequences of, for instance, a delayed tax return filing. It would be best to take an informed decision specific to your situation. In case you'd like us to connect you with a lawyer, please write to legal@rethinkaadhaar.in.

Aadhaar Amendments Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament

The Aadhaar Amendments Bill, 2019, was passed by the Lok Sabha on July 4, after a day-long debate which involved fiery critique of the Bill from MPs NK Premachandran (RPI), Mahua Moitra (TMC), Supriya Sule (NCP), Ritesh Pandey (BSP), Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM), among others. Subsequently, the Bill was passed by Rajya Sabha on July 8. The Bill is identical to the version passed by the Lok Sabha in January, and later promulgated as an Ordinance, although during its final passage the government also promised to include schemes paid out of the Consolidated Fund of states. Read our statement on the Bill here. You can also read the full discussion of the Bill in the Lok Sabha at MediaNama.

Rethink Aadhaar statement on Economic Survey

The government’s vision to collate comprehensive, exhaustive data about every citizen and making it available for commercial use by private entities as stated in the budget document the Economic Survey 2018-19 is quite alarming. Read our full statement.

Delhi HC asks ECI to consider plea on Aadhaar-Voter ID linking

A Delhi High Court bench headed by Chief Justice DN Patel directed the Election Commission of India (ECI) to consider a plea by BJP leader Ashwini Upadhyay seeking linking of Aadhaar number with Voter IDs. The petitioner contends this will facilitate an “e-voting system using fingerprint and face biometric” which will “lead to an increase in voting percentage” and prevent “prevent bogus or fabricated voting”. Rethink Aadhaar strongly opposes any such proposal for linking Aadhaar with Voter IDs.

Aadhaar in the news

Jaipur teens tampering with Aadhar details to watch ‘Kabir Singh’: https://www.thehindu.com/entertainment/movies/teens-tampering-with-aadhar-details-to-watch-kabir-singh/article28271056.ece
Pay Interest For Delaying Salary Of Employee Who Did Not Link Aadhaar: Bombay HC To Port Trust: https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/pay-interest-for-delaying-salary-of-mbt-employee-who-did-not-link-aadhar-145922
The Aadhaar Amendments Bill has reinstated many of the provisions of Section 57 of the original Aadhaar Act which was struck down by the Supreme Court in September 2018 as unconstitutional: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/aadhaar-amendment-bill-new-rules-uidai-5829226/
#MyBodyMyRights: Will Aadhar prevent you from getting an abortion? http://www.hidden-pockets.com/mybodymyrights-will-aadhar-prevent-you-from-getting-an-abortion/
The imposition of Aadhaar to avail benefits and subsidies “is nothing but the state’s arrogance towards the poor”, says INC MP from Koraput, Saptagiri Ulaka: https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/congresss-lone-mp-from-odisha-on-food-security-aadhaar-and-the-condition-of-his-party
Aadhaar Card Not A Valid Document For Travel To Nepal: NCDRC: https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/aadhar-card-not-a-valid-document-for-travel-to-nepal-ncdrc-read-order-146469
Aadhaar verification no more in use for driving license: https://www.livemint.com/news/india/aadhaar-verification-no-more-in-use-for-driving-license-1563251433918.html
Economic Survey has based Aadhaar impact on MGNREGS on false assumptions, say researchers: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/economic-survey-has-based-aadhaar-impact-on-mgnregs-on-false-assumptions-say-researchers/article28313214.ece
Madras HC seeks EPFO response on plea against mandatory Aadhaar-UAN linking: https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/plea-in-hc-against-linking-aadhaar-to-uan-to-avail-pf-pension-119070900224_1.html
TISS study: Aadhaar fraud rampant in Kalyana Lakshmi: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/tiss-study-aadhaar-fraud-rampant-in-kalyana-lakshmi/articleshow/70135322.cms
For whom is the Aadhaar Amendments Bill: only to please Telecom companies: https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/governance/for-whom-is-the-aadhaar-amendments-bill-reliance-jio-airtelvodafone-and-tata

Budgets Economic Survey Pushes For Interlinking And Selling Citizens Data For Private Purposes

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

We are alarmed and concerned at the government’s vision to collate comprehensive, exhaustive data about every citizen and making it available for commercial use by private entities as stated in the budget document the Economic Survey 2018-19 published on July 4. Chapter 4 of the Economic Survey (a budget document laid before parliament) Data “Of the People, By the People, For the People argues for expanding collection and interlinking of comprehensive data on citizens, violating Supreme Court judgments on privacy and Aadhaar. It makes a case for integrating citizens’ data for commercial purposes even when no legal framework provides for this. It assumes privacy concerns will be taken care of by a forthcoming data protection law which has in fact been pending on the drawing board for years.

Already, in the government’s coercive and callous interlinking of Aadhaar in existing databases, we have witnessed alarming data leaks that have had substantial financial implications and legal consequences for ordinary citizens. It makes blanket assertions that technology measures would protect privacy in the future, claiming “technology has largely kept pace to mitigate” (data leaks) when the government is yet to provide any redressal or compensation to those who have suffered from data leaks.

It states the example of how Telangana has integrated multiple points of information and data on thousands of its residents and their relatives in its ‘Samagra’ without stating how this was done in the absence of privacy and data protection laws. The document argues for using Aadhaar numbers to create a health registry to sell sensitive medical data to commercial entities for a profit. It argues “people can always opt out of divulging data to the government where possible”, but so far the government has put all its energies in coercing citizens to give their data, cutting them off from essential services if they do not provide data.

It erroneously claims that increased data collection and integrating databases will reduce inclusion errors and rectify exclusion errors. This is a wrong claim to make. In the past few years, both UPA and NDA governments have pushed for Aadhaar enrolment by claiming this will help improve welfare services. This has led to denial of wage payments, food grains, vital social security pensions to thousands of individuals, especially the elderly and those who work with their hands, who face faulty data entry, network errors, servers and network errors, and biometric authentication failures because of changes while working with their hands over time. Since 2017, the Right to Food Campaign has recorded more than 40 deaths when the most vulnerable got cut from any social security in the fault-ridden transition to Aadhaar. One such death was recorded in Jharkhand’s Latehar last month when an Adivasi farmer 65 year old Ramcharan Munda died after he was denied food rations for three months. The government has failed to act responsibly and provide any relief and voluntary alternatives for those facing such problems because of its manic focus on data linking. Yet, in this new document it again pushes for more of the same.

It is worrying that the budget document of the vision for the Indian economy once again states two different standards of privacy rights for India’s poor and rich. It declares: “care must also be taken to not impose the elite’s preference of privacy on the poor, who care for a better quality of living the most”, thus imposing its own assumptions that the poor can do with fewer privacy protections than the rich. It falsely pits welfare rights against privacy rights. Justice Chandrachud had warned against this in the Aadhaar judgement, noting: "The refrain that the poor need no civil and political rights and are concerned only with economic well being has been utilised through history to wreak the most egregious violations of human rights." In fact the vulnerable need stronger privacy rights at a time of heightened profiling of citizens based on their religion and caste for political purposes, as seen with the NRC in Assam, and lynchings all over the country. .

Further advocating for unchecked collecting and collating of data on citizens will only lead to further undermining of our rights, and to worse surveillance and data breaches.

For any responses, suggestions, please write to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in

Aadhaar Amendments Bill In Parliament Again Help Us Oppose The Bill

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Aadhaar Amendments Bill, 2019, was introduced in the Lok Sabha on Monday, June 24, and is listed for debate today (June 27). This Bill is identical to the Bill passed by the Lok Sabha earlier this year as well the subsequently promulgated Ordinance.

While the government claims the Amendments ensure compliance with the Supreme Court judgment, the Bill in effect seeks to bypass the judgment in, for instance, allowing commercial use of Aadhaar (supposedly on a voluntary basis) by amending other laws. The Bill also includes amendments to the Telegraph Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act allowing use of Aadhaar authentication for availing mobile and banking services - it is likely that other laws will be similarly amended in due time.

Rethink Aadhaar has been reaching out to several Members of Parliament (MPs) requesting them to demand that the Bill be sent to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, so as to ensure a thorough public consultation. Yet, while the government insists "Indians have accepted Aadhaar" - and enjoys numerical superiority in the Lok Sabha - we need to collectively raise our voices and denounce Aadhaar in the strongest terms, and ensure that our representatives echo us.

You can help:

By directly calling your MP - or any MP of your choice, using the contact details listed here.
By signing a petition addressed to the same MP.
By tagging your MP in a Twitter post. (Some sample tweets can be found here.)

We urge you to take action before 1pm today - Thursday, June 27.

Letter To Cbdt Protesting Pan Aadhaar Linking

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Friends,

While we continue to wait for a favorable review of the judgement upholding PAN-Aadhaar linking, many citizens are opposing this rule in the spirit of civil disobedience against enrolling in a project which poses a lifelong threat for one’s personal security. There is much evidence that raises serious concerns about potential loss of identity, fraud (including identity fraud), and privacy. This is apart from the deeply problematic nature of both the manner in which enrollments have happened and continue to happen.(including most recently a complaint by State Bank of India which has alleged misuse and wrongful generation of Aadhaar numbers. A report on January 29, 2019 explained the manner in which the fraud was being committed, raising concerns about fake numbers being generated by the project. More recently, on 26 February, 2019, the Times of India reported that the UIDAI had to launch a probe into a privacy breach and misuse of data of 3.7 crore voters in Andhra Pradesh.)

As we wait, collectively, we have prepared a letter draft addressed to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) , the division of the ministry which deals with collection of taxes, seeking confirmation on the safety of personal information and data protection of our information and for extending time for linking PAN with Aadhaar while review petitions are pending.

The letter(attached here) requests the CBDT to rescind the orders mandating linking PAN with Aadhaar or, in the alternative, extend the time for linking PAN with Aadhaar until sufficient safeguards are put in place to protect the rights and interests of tax payers.

We urge those among you concerned about the violation of your rights in this coercive enrolling in Aadhaar and linking of existing IDs to it, to use and share this draft letter widely, to use this send a letter to the CBDT by Speedpost and email. Do share scans of Speedpost receipts and email with us you do this so we can collate and share the numbers resisting this more widely and build further collective efforts.

The letter should be sent to:

The Chairman
Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT)
Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Revenue,
North Block, ITA II Division
New Delhi - 110001
The email address is: chairmancbdt@nic.in

TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER

The Chairman Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) Ministry of Finance, Dept. of Revenue, North Block, ITA II Division New Delhi - 110001

chairmancbdt@nic.in

Date:

Sir,

SUB: Seeking confirmation on the safety of personal information and data protection in the context of the Order dt. 30.06.2018 u/Sec 119 of the Income Tax Act extending time for linking PAN with Aadhaar

We are writing to you to request a reconsideration of your order dated 30.06.2018, passed under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Income Tax Act”) through which the Central Board of Direct Taxes (hereinafter referred to as the “CBDT”) has extended time for linking PAN with Aadhaar till 31.03.2019.

It is requested that your office rescind the orders mandating linking PAN with Aadhaar or, in the alternative, extend the time for linking PAN with Aadhaar until sufficient safeguards are put in place to protect the rights and interests of tax payers, including and especially the fundamental right to privacy which the Supreme Court has recognised as an intrinsic part of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution, and including the right to dignity.

In September 2018, the Supreme Court upheld section 139AA of the Income Tax Act which requires the linking of the Aadhaar number to income tax returns and PAN card. The majority judgment accepted the statement of counsel for the respondents that Aadhaar is an impeccable identity, that no duplicates exist, that it reflects the identity of each person accurately. On matters of security of data, the court only considered the UIDAI and accepted the powerpoint presentation made by the CEO of the UIDAI that it is secure. The majority judgment also acknowledged that there was no data protection law yet in place, and that that must be remedied.

Significantly, therefore, the court’s partial imprimatur to the Aadhaar programme, and to Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act, through its judgment dated 26.09.2018 (Puttaswamy II), also recognised the inviolability of the right to privacy. The judgment does not validate the methods employed in linking Aadhaar with PAN but merely holds such linking to be constitutionally valid subject to such linking being in conformity, among other things, with the various principles of privacy that the nine-judge bench of the court recognised unanimously in August 2017, in JusticeK.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I).

Since the date of the judgment, many events have transpired that raise questions about the Aadhaar project, and the validity of Aadhaar as a secure and robust identity. Some illustrative examples are set out below.

The State Bank of India has alleged misuse and wrongful generation of Aadhaar numbers. A report on January 29, 2019 explained the manner in which the fraud was being committed, raising concerns about fake numbers being generated by the project. State Bank of India, it may be recalled, has been directed by the UIDAI (as have other banks, see https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/banks-without-stipulated-number-of-Aadhaar-centres-will-face-rs-20000-fine-from-october/articleshow/60376996.cms) to set up enrolment centres in at least 10% of their branches, and to do a certain number of enrolments everyday on pain of penalty (https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/Aadhaar-authentication-13-banks-fined-face-penalties/article24835382.ece , August 31, 2018).

See https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/sbi-alleges-Aadhaar-data-misuse-uidai-rubbishes-charge/articleshow/67734688.cms

A single judge of the Calcutta High Court, in the matter of Debashis Nandy v. Union of India in judgment dated January 3, 2019, was confronted with a case where the father’s name had been falsely entered when demographic information was collected at the time of enrolment. His finding in the case is that the Supreme Court judgment does not deal with the authenticity of demographic data, and in fact, demographic information is unverified, and that “there is definitely something amiss with the Aadhaar enrolment process if important demographic information such as the name of the applicant’s father, as the case in hand, can be falsified and even go undetected.” The judgment records that “the Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that no verification is sought as regards such information and the application is processed on the basis of the bare information provided by the applicants in their application.” The ease with which false identities can be created is the central aspect of this judgment. See

https://drive.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-357113.pdf

This problem with the Aadhaar system has also been acknowledged by a Division Bench of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the matter of Smt Parvati Kumari v. State of UP in judgment dated January 9, 2019. In this case, the court held: “We clearly deduce from the above that the other information namely name, date of birth, gender and address as entered in the Aadhaar Card, is furnished by the Aadhaar applicant at the time of authentication/enrolment. Although, the regulations provide for the applicant to rely on a set of documents for giving information in regard to name, address and proof of date of birth, however, because the said information is merely given by the applicant, and is not authenticated by UIDAI at the time of authentication, the Aadhaar Card cannot be conclusive proof in regard to those entries.” The only connection that can be established, according to the High Court, is the biometric information collected and the Aadhaar number. See

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/aadhar-entries-not-conclusive-proofs-allahabad-hc-142428

In the meantime, biometric fraud has surfaced on several occasions. A recent incident is reported at

https://www.indiatimes.com/trending/wtf/hackers-use-Aadhaar-biometrics-to-rob-a-man-s-account-whose-job-is-to-issue-Aadhaar-cards-361274.html

and

https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/aadhar-biometrics-theft-case-police-arrests-victims-close-friend_in_5c5f2788e4b0eec79b23f356

The vulnerability of the UID data base, and of the various databases in which the number has been seeded, has been revealed. On January 25, 2019, it was reported that fake voter IDs had been created by Telengana Congress to make a point about the shortcomings in the voter registration system. “All one needs is to create a duplicate Aadhaar card of a person and use a house address which has an electricity bill. The photo and details can be sourced from Whatsapp or from social media accounts, it’s that simple. No one will verify if the Voter ID is genuine or fake,” explained the Congress worker who created the bogus card. See

https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/anyone-can-fake-it-telangana-congress-workers-forge-voter-ids-election-officers-95659

d, More recently, on 26 February, 2019, the Times of India reported that the UIDAI has launched a massive probe into a complaint filed regarding alleged privacy breach and misuse of data of 3.7 crore voters in Andhra Pr adesh. The problem has been exacerbated by the seeding of the Aadhaar number in various databases, including in this case the Smart Pulse Survey and the State Resident Data Hub, which contain demographic data in the UID database and in the electoral rolls. “The app has voter ID numbers, names, colour photos, booth-level information, family details, caste information and government schemes and amounts a voter gets as beneficiary. The app comes with all the information inbuilt and is extensively used by TDP activists”, the report says. It says that investigation is on to find out how the company, IT Grids (India) obtained family details and beneficiary data. See

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tdp-app-breached-data-of-3-7cr-voters-probe-begins/articleshow/68160839.cms

e. The vulnerability of the data in the Aadhaar system was acknowledged by the UIDAI in a press release in February 2018, when the “CEO, UIDAI advised people to be watchful for the protection of their privacy and recommended not to share their Aadhaar number or personal details to unauthorized agencies for getting it laminated, or printed on plastic card.” See

http://pib.nic.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1519253

This caution extends, as is now evident, more generally, and in situations beyond the control of the individual.

f. Most recently, a data breach is under investigation in Hyderabad, which reveals the vulnerability of systems that incorporate the Aadhaar number in their data base.

and related news.

It is a matter of record that the SRDH (State Resident Data Hubs) have been set up by collaboration between the UIDAI and state governments.

See https://archive.org/stream/UIDAISRDHStateAdoptionStrategy/UIDAI%20-%20SRDH%20-%20Institutional%20Framework_djvu.txt for the 2012 UIDAI document on the creation and updation of SRDH, which has been the basis of which various SRDHs have been created. See for instance

https://apit.ap.gov.in/?page_id=588

and

http://degs.org.in/UIDAI.aspx (Delhi)

and

https://www.karnataka.gov.in/Aadhaar/Pages/Karnataka-Resident-Data-Hub-(KRDH).aspx

and

https://osrdh.odisha.gov.in/srdhportal/LdapConfig.action

and

https://makkal.tn.gov.in/makkal/login,

For a summary of the risks of the SRDH system, see

g. A recent RTI reply from the UIDAI has revealed an astonishing fact: that the UIDAI does not have a Chief Information Security Officer. See

https://www.moneylife.in/article/Aadhaar-truth-uidai-never-appointed-a-chief-information-security-officer-reveals-rti/56267.html

h. Breaches of various databases holding Aadhaar numbers have been reported since the judgment, other than the Telengana breach cited above, and including

on 19 February, 2019, at https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/18/Aadhaar-indane-leak/ (Indane gas company leaks - it is estimated that over 6.7 million customers could be affected)

end January 2019, at https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/31/Aadhaar-data-leak/ (Jharkhand government web site)

at the World Economic Forum, the Global Risk Report 2019 named Aadhaar as having suffered multiple breaches, compromising over 1.1 billion people. See the report dated 19 February 2019 at

https://www.moneylife.in/article/Aadhaar-data-breach-largest-in-the-world-says-wefs-global-risk-report-and-avast/56384.html

Another report by Avast Software made a similar assessment. Both had Rachna Khaira’s investigative report for the Tribune for reference, but seem to have found reason to endorse it. The assessment also seems to point to `lax cybersecurity protocols’ as the possible reason for the breaches. That the UIDAI routinely denies leaks from its database, even when it has had to blacklist operatives, launch investigations, penalise connected persons, is part of the p

i. Since the judgment on September 26, 2018, information gathered from Fact Finding Reports and in the media shockingly reveals at least 12 further deaths where the poor have not been able to access their basic entitlements including ration and pension. This is despite the assurance given to the court by the Attorney General that “no deserving person would be denied the benefit of a scheme on the failure of authentication”. (at p.554 of the majority judgment). See for instance

https://www.firstpost.com/india/failure-of-a-biometric-machine-leaves-this-up-village-stranded-for-ration-5975641.html

In this case, it was a problem of connectivity, which is why a whole village found itself stranded.

j. There are further reports of the police demanding from housing societies “complete information of their residents” including details of their voter ID, PAN card, Aadhaar, phone number, vehicle number, email address, blood group, driving licence number, 2 passport size photographs and more. (By police notice from the office of the Police Inspector, KP Agarahara Police Station, Bangalore City, dated 28 January, 2019, No. KPAPS/CC/2019.)

The Regional Office in Bangalore of the EPFO continues to demand the Aadhaar number, even as recently as 7 February 2019, despite the Supreme Court judgment which renders this illegal.

This wide range of evidence has raised serious concerns about potential loss of identity, fraud including identity fraud, and privacy. This is apart from the deeply problematic nature of both the manner in which enrolments have happened and continue to happen (see the SBI complaint, supra).

In such a situation, there is ample ground to oppose the linking of the income tax returns and the PAN card to the Aadhaar number. In any event, such a move should be held off till the questions raised are answered and the vulnerabilities of the system and of the individual are satisfactorily dealt with.

We would also draw your attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court which accepted the logic of linking Aadhaar and PAN, but not while doing away with the right to privacy. The court accepted the government’s averment that it would serve a legitimate state aim, and so there can be inroads made into the right to privacy, if the doctrine of proportionality is met. There was already a law, but that law only mandated the linking of PAN and Aadhaar, and Aadhaar and income tax returns. It did not provide any manner of data protection. The government left it to the government to pass a Data Protection Law that would pass the test of protecting people’s rights and interests. That has not yet happened.

In its absence, we draw your attention to the report of the Group of Experts on Privacy constituted by the Planning Commission, under the chairmanship of Justice AP Shah, and whose report was presented to the government in October 2012. The report enunciated nine clear principles (“privacy principles).

These are

a requirement that the any data collector provide a simple notice of the information collected to all individuals, in clear and concise language, prior to the collection of such information;
that a data controller ought to give individuals a choice with regard to providing their personal information, and take individual consent only after providing notice of its information practices;
that only such information as is necessary for an identified purpose be collected;
that data collected ought to be adequate and relevant to the purposes for which they are processed;
that individuals ought to be allowed access to personal information about them held by the collecting authority;
that it be made mandatory that information collected is only disclosed to third parties after notice and informed consent is obtained;
that the collection and processing of the information is done in a manner that protects against loss, unauthorized access, destruction, use, storage, etc;
that a data processor ought to take all necessary steps to implement practices, procedures, policies and systems in a manner proportional to the scale, scope, and sensitivity to the data that is collected and processed; and nine, that clear mechanisms be put in place to implement privacy policies, including tools, training, and education; and external and internal audits.

For a more detailed reading of the report, see http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_privacy.pdf

You will agree with the conclusion of the report that it is of the utmost importance to acknowledge that data protection is not just about protecting data, but about protecting the person whose data it is.

These privacy principles have since been memorialised through the judgment of the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy I (the Privacy judgment), and the holding that the linking of Aadhaar with PAN is constitutionally valid is subject to the measures taken for the said purpose being compliant with these essential principles.

Parliament has not enacted such a law. When it is enacted, it will have to be tested to ensure it meets the standards set by the privacy judgment, which was rendered unanimously by a bench of nine judges.

Till then, and given

the state of demographic information in the UIDAI database
the wide range of places where the number has been linked/seeded
the regularity of data breaches
the absence of a Chief Information Security Officer in the UIDAI
the repeated cases of biometric failure and of biometric fraud
the probability of inorganic seeding, which takes consent away from the individual, and which must be struck down if any further seeding is to be allowed (see p.2 at https://pdsportal.nic.in/Files/Aadhar%20seeding%20guidelines.pdf)
the failure to delete the Aadhaar number from various databases where it has been wrongly seeded such as in banks and with mobile service providersdespite the judgment of the Supreme Court
the PAN number is required to be handed over to a multiplicity of agencies (15 at a quick count)

We request that you immediately suspend the linking of the Aadhaar number with the PAN card, and remove the requirement of providing the Aadhaar number while filing income tax returns till the problems stated above are addressed.

In addition, since as a data controller you are responsible for data protection, we are requesting you to kindly let us know

how the data will be stored
how the data will be/is being processed,
what security measures have been taken to prevent the breach of the data base, protect personal information and ensure that there is no unauthorised transfer
the purposes for which the Aadhaar number will be used, and what measures have been taken to ensure that it is not used for any other purpose
how you will detect that it has been used for a purpose other than that for which it is collected
how the breach of our data will be communicated to us
what action will be taken in the event of a breach
whose is the liability when there is a leak, transfer or inorganic seeding of the Aadhaar number
what is the extent, and forms of liability in the event that there is a data breach
which companies are involved in collecting, storing, processing and dealing with the data in any way, and what measures are in place to protect our data, and our privacy? This is especially important since there is no data protection law.

We also request you to respond to the various other queries raised in this missive.

Kindly make it convenient to send a response within 10 days, since the time for filing income tax returns is drawing close, and I wish to file my returns on time.

Yours sincerely,

Governments Aadhaar Ordinance For Commercial Use Is Another Fraud Upon The Constitution

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Hundreds Of Adivasi Farmers Protest Denial Of Foodgrain By Use Of Aadhaar In Public Distribution System

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Newsletter February 2019 A Call To Arms

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Pre-election push against Aadhaar: A Call to Arms

Some of you might already be clued in on what our politicians are planning for their election manifestos. In terms of Aadhaar, while there may not be any immediately positive indications, efforts are underway to push parties to take a stated stance to at least ensure that Aadhaar is purely a voluntary id similar to other Officially Valid Document(OVDs). However, we will need to push the demand through to all political parties we can possibly contact. A petition of demands has been drafted; please let us know latest by noon on Thursday, February 28, if you and/or your organization wish to be a signatory to this petition.

We will also need to conduct at least one on-ground countrywide agitation prior to the elections, which will be accompanied by circulating a status update on Aadhaar exclusions, leaks, and other critical failures of the project. The timeline for such a public agitation is the week of March 17-24 (i.e. either side of Holi; latest by end of March). Please send your name, city, and contact number to Raghu/godavar at 97177-49998 or godavar@gmail.com if you wish to participate in this push. Please also share your suggestions on how we can expand our impact. Do forward this message to those who you think will find it important, asking them to contact Raghu/godavar.

Supreme Court reiterates Aadhaar-PAN linking mandatory; deadline March 31 :(

In an order passed on Feb. 4, the Supreme Court reiterated that linking of Aadhaar and PAN is mandatory. Responding to the Union government's petition impugning the order in Shreya Sen, the Court said that filing of income tax returns for the assessment year 2019-2020 should comply with the September 2018 Aadhaar judgment which upheld Aadhaar-PAN linking.

As things currently stand, legally, one has to mandatorily obtain an Aadhaar number and link it with PAN by 31st March 2019. While we continue to hope for a favorable review of this order, we suggest that readers follow their discretion and/or seek legal advice should they not possess an Aadhaar number and/or not wish to link with their PAN. We also note that many citizens are opposing this order in the spirit of civil disobedience against enrolling a project which poses a lifelong threat for one’s personal security. Instead, they have chosen to face whatever fines or penalties might be imposed for failing to link Aadhaar with PAN or failing to quote it in their income tax return (which will not be due until July 31 at any rate).

Note: Our lawyers have advised that not linking Aadhaar to PAN could result in a fine of INR 10,000, besides a 2-year jail term. This, we feel, is still a lower cost than that arising from enrolling in the Aadhaar project which threatens our fundamental right to life and livelihood.

Workers in Varanasi district protest denial of rations due to e-POS issues

On Feb. 5, workers from 50 gram panchayats in the Cholapur and Chiraigaon blocks of Varanasi staged a dharna [Hindi Link] at the Tehsil headquarters protesting their exclusion from receiving PDS rations since November 2018 due to e-POS limitations. In their petition to the UP Chief Minister, members of MNREGA Mazdoor Union and Mahila Chetna Samiti Sangathan highlighted several issues with the ePOS machines, including delays in distribution due to weak or failing networks in far-flung villages resulting in long queues; deletion of ration cards and/or denial of rations if rations not procured for 3 months (common for workers migrating to cities with families); children forced to miss school waiting at ration shops for biometric authentication should their mothers’ biometric fail to get authenticated, etc. The Tehsil authorities have promised redressal of these grievances within 15 days, failing which the workers plan to stage a district-wide agitation. [Read the English version of the Press Note.]

Hundreds Of Labourers In Varanasi Protest Against Biometric Authentication For Food Rations

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

पाॅस मशीन के विरोध मे मजदूर पहुँचे तहसील पर

दिनांक 5/2/19 को पाॅस मशीन से राशन वितरण के विरोध मे मनरेगामजदूर यूनियन व महिला चेतना समिति संगठन के मजदूरो ने तहसील पर हुंकार भरी , जिसमे महिला चेतना समिति व मनरेगा संगठन के तत्वावधान मे 2 ब्लाक चोलापुर व चिरईगाॅव के 50 पंचायत सैकड़ों मजदूरों ने पिछले तीन महीने से राशन न मिलने या राशन वितरण मे कई तरह की समस्या आने पर तहसील का घेराव किया , जिसमें उनकी निम्नलिखित मांगे रही अभी तक पंचायतों मे ग्रामवासियों को कोटेदार से राशन मिलता रहा है ,कहीं कहीं राशन वितरण मे दिक्कते आती थी तो जिले स्तर पर इसका निस्तारण हो जाता था, नवम्बर 2018 से राशन वितरण पाॅस मशीन द्वारा किया जा रहा है । इस पाॅस मशीन से कई तरह की समस्या आ रही है । जैसे --
हम छोटे मजदूर , किसान है हम खेतो मे काम करते है जिससे हमारे हाथो के निशान बनते बिगडते है जिससे अंगूठे के निशान का मिलान नही होने पर राशन नही मिल रहा है, दूरदराज के गाँवो मे सरवर डाउन होने से नेटवर्क नही मिल रहा , नेटवर्क कमजोर होने के कारण वितरण व्यवस्था बाधित है राशन के लिए लम्बी लाईन लगानी पडती है , हम मजदूर साथी कई बार पुरा परिवार काम या मजदूरी करने के लिए शहरों की ओर पलायन करते है , अगर तीन माह तक राशन नही लिया तो कार्ड डिलिट हो जायेगा व राशन नही मिलेगा , महिला के अंगूठा न मिलने पर बच्चों को भी अंगूठे का मिलान हेतु घंटों लाईन मे लगने हेतु स्कूल की शिक्षा से वंचित करना पड़ रहा है , कई लोगों के तो आधार मे ही निशान नही मिलते वह राशन कैसे लेंगे , पंचायत की अन्य मजरों से दूरी दो से पाॅच किलोमीटर है।महिला मुखिया होने के कारण महिलाएं ही राशन लेने जायेंगी कई बार आना जाना घंटो लाइन मे लगने से उन्हें ही अधिक परेशानी हो रही है।आदि समस्याओं से सम्बन्धित ज्ञापन तहसील पर एस डी एम को महिला चेतना समिति से चमेला , रीता, आयशा, रेखा , व मनरेगा से गौतम , शीला ,रूख्शाना के अगुवाई मे दिया गया जिसपर अधिकारियों ने 15 दिन के अन्दर समस्या समाधान का आश्वासन दिया है यदि समस्या का हल नही होगा तो संगठनो द्वारा जिलास्तर फर विरोध प्रदर्शन किया जायेगा।जिसमें पुनम, नीति , कविता , सुबेदार , सोना , रामदुलार सहित सैकड़ों मजदूर साथियों की उपस्थिति रही।

Citizens Write To Vice President Prime Minister Regarding Aadhaar Amendments Bill And Dna Bill

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2018 (Aadhaar Amendments Bill) was passed by the Lok Sabha with very little debate and scrutiny. The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Regulation Bill, 2018 (DNA Bill) was similarly passed in the Lok Sabha with no amendments despite concerns raised and despite requests to refer the Bill to a Standing Committee. There are now suggestions that the government is likely to break from tradition and go beyond passing a Vote on Account in the upcoming Budget Session by listing the aforementioned bills for discussion and passing in the Rajya Sabha in the final session of this Parliament.

The Aadhaar Amendments Bill allows the use of the biometrics-linked 12-digit ID for commercial purposes, including banks and mobile services. This is in blatant violation of the Supreme Court judgment which prevented the use of Aadhaar by the private sector. There are also reports that Aadhaar may be linked to voter IDs. The DNA Bill allows for the creation of a widespread DNA database of Indian citizens, without specifying the purpose for which it may be used, how long it will be kept.

Over 260 organisations and concerned citizens across the spectrum of Indian society have written (read the letter) to the Vice President of India, who is also the Chairperson of the Rajya Sabha, and the Prime Minister demanding that both these bills be subjected to greater scrutiny by the Rajya Sabha by sending them to appropriate Parliamentary committees. Among the signatories are:

Petitioners in the Aadhaar case that was before the Supreme Court, such as Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, Shanta Sinha, Devasahayam M G, Dr. S. G. Vombatkere and others
Eminent jurists including Justice V. S. Dave (Retired High Court Judge and former Chairman of Rajasthan Law Commission), Indira Jaising (former Additional Solicitor General of India), Prof. G. Mohan Gopal (Former VC, National Law School University, Bangalore and Former Director, National Judicial Academy, Bhopal) and Professor G Haragopal (Visiting Professor, NLSIU, Bengaluru)
Around 40 former civil servants including Rahul Khullar, Former Chairman, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)
Politicians - Yogendra Yadav (Swaraj Abhiyan) and Raghavendra Rao (Secretary, Bhosari Vidhan Sabha, Aam Aadmi Party, PCMC, Pune)
Indian armed forces and veterans: Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat (former Chief of the Naval Staff of India)
Jayati Ghosh, Satish Deshpande, Aditya Nigam and several other academics
Journalists and writers (P. Sainath, Nityanand Jayaraman, Rohini Hensman and many others)
Various kinds of artists - filmmakers (Anand Patwardhan) and musicians (Charul Bharwada and Vinay Mahajan)
Trilochan Sastry and Jagdeep Chhokar (who are IIM professors and Founding members of the Association for Democratic Reforms), Anand Teltumbde (who has been a management professional) and Prof. Varun Arya (Formerly President, IIT Delhi Alumni Association & Secretary, IIM Ahmedabad Alumni Association)
Numerous activists and prominent members of civil society like Farah Naqvi, Deep Joshi, Ashish Kothari and Swami Agnivesh
Organisations / collectives: Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic Agriculture (ASHA), the National Center For Labour, INSAF, Citizens Forum for Mangalore Development, the Forum Against Oppression of Women, Mumbai and more

It is very important and urgent to get the message out to leaders of all political parties and MPs of the Rajya Sabha that these bills MUST be sent to the appropriate Parliamentary committees for expert testimony and citizen inputs. Bypassing such process pose a threat to citizens democratic rights.

Please tweet “Send the Aadhaar Amendment Bill and DNA Bill in the Rajya Sabha to the Select Committee” @MVenkaiahNaidu, @narendramodi, @RahulGandhi, @AIADMKOfficial, @MamataOfficial, @yadavakhilesh, @Naveen_Odisha, @NitishKumar, @ncbn, @trspartyonline and other leaders of political parties.

Government Violating Sc Orders By Introducing Amendments For Commercial Use Of Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The government’s doublespeak and constitutional fraud on Aadhaar, the 12-digit “unique” biometrics-linked identification number, continues. First, after passing the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits, and Services) Act as a Money Bill on the false grounds that Aadhaar enables welfare, it encouraged rampant commercial use of citizens' data. Now, when the Supreme Court has reined in Aadhaar by striking down Section 57 of the 2016 Act which permitted the use of Aadhaar by private entities, the government is amending laws to again allow private, commercial use of citizens' Aadhaar-related data.

The Union Government has listed for introduction in the Lok Sabha tomorrow (January 2, 2019) the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2018, in the Lok Sabha. There are serious concerns with this Bill as it violates Supreme Court orders as well as citizens' fundamental rights:

The Bill is in contravention of SC judgment - The Supreme Court in its judgment dated 26.09.2018 in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India (the Aadhaar judgment) in WP Civil No. 494 of 2012 explicitly prohibited use of Aadhaar by private parties by declaring Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, as unconstitutional.This section provided grounds for Aadhaar-based authentication by private entities as well. The present Bill proposes amendments to the Aadhaar Act, Telegraph Act and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act which will circumvent the SC judgment, and allow the continued use of Aadhaar-based e-KYC authentication by private entities for mobile and banking services, respectively.
Bill may allow private entities to continue to hold Aadhaar data in disregard of SC judgment - After the SC judgment, private entities are no longer allowed to maintain any Aadhaar-related data records whatsoever. While the petitioners have been trying to push for compliance on this, the government’s latest move may encourage the continued collection of citizens’ data through use of Aadhaar-based authentication violating the protections laid down by the Supreme Court.
Privacy and security concerns in Aadhaar remain unaddressed - When private entities were allowed use of Aadhaar-based e-KYC, there were several reports of fraudulent transactions and scamming of citizens’ personal data as well as their money. There is no indication that either the finance ministry or the UIDAI has attempted to address these security lapses in the Aadhaar ecosystem. Allowing and encouraging use of Aadhaar-based authentication by private entities will result in further scams and theft.
Bill lacks any stakeholder consultation - The Government has not undertaken a public consultation on the proposed amendments to the various laws. Any Bill on the issue of Aadhaar should not be merely rubber-stamped by Parliament; any proposed amendment must be fairly and thoroughly studied by the appropriate Parliamentary Standing Committee as well.
Government can try to bypass Rajya Sabha - The Rajya Sabha in March 2016 had voted to curtail private sector Aadhaar usage when it debated the original Aadhaar Act, but the government over-rode Upper House’s farsighted warnings through the Money Bill route. In the SC judgement, Justice Chandrachud termed this a “fraud on the Constitution.” We are concerned that the government may once again take the Money Bill route to bulldoze these amendments through Parliament despite the fact that the proposed amendments do not confirm to constitutional requirements of a Money Bill.

More Aadhaar Related Starvation Deaths Reported In Jharkhand

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Right to Food Campaign in Jharkhand reported the death of three more people from starvation after their ration cards were canceled due to not linking with Aadhaar. The full RFC update is below:

At least three more persons died of starvation in Jharkhand in the last 2 months. This takes the total number of hunger deaths in the state to 18, since September 2017. Among the most recent victims is 45-year old Kaleshwar Soren, who died of hunger and destitution on 11 November in Mahuatanr village of Jama block of Dumka district. A fact finding team of the Right to Food Campaign, Jharkhand found that the ration card of Kaleshwar’s family was cancelled as it was not linked with Aadhaar.

Press Statement On Supreme Court 5 Judge Bench Ruling On Aadhaar Challenges

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

More than six years after the first legal challenge to the Unique Identification project were filed in court, today the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar project. While four judges wrote upholding the validity of the Aadhaar project, one judge ruled that the Aadhaar project is unconstitutional and the database must be deleted.

The Aadhaar Act as drafted by the UIDAI and its consultants, years after the project was already in operation, was recognized as having multiple loopholes. It is significant that even the four who upheld the judgment the judgment read down several sections of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 and limited the unrestrained expansion of the Aadhaar project.

As per Justice Sikri’s judgment, Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for CBSE, NEET, JEE, UGC., school admissions, and secondary education as they are outside the purview of Section 7 and are not backed by any law.

Significantly, the concerns raised by citizens and several members of parliament on the use of Aadhaar by private entities were roundly addressed by the Supreme Court while striking down section 57 of the Aadhaar Act and declaring it as unconstitutional.

The lack of clarity on scope of curtailment of Section 57 means the legality of UID use by NPCI, a private non profit company as well as MicroATM, business correspondent usage of Aadhaar auth for #AePS is now in a grey zone.
The court stated Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for bank accounts and mobile linking as it is unconstitutional.

In one victory protecting the rights of children, it stated: “On attaining the age of majority, such children who are enrolled under Aadhaar with the consent of their parents, shall be given the option to exit from the Aadhaar project if they so choose in case they do not intend to avail the benefits of the scheme.”

The judgment further restricts the sharing of Aadhaar data with state agencies in the name of “national security” a term which is nowhere defined in the Constitution. The judgment gives residents a right to hearing on data sharing and allows for filing complaints against UIDAI if their data is breached, a remedy not available till now. In all these aspects, the court has found Aadhaar Act flawed.

However, we are shocked and disappointed that the Court failed to read down section 7 of the Aadhaar Act which allows for welfare to be made contingent on the production of Aadhaar. Justice Sikri’s judgment recoginises that welfare schemes have attained the status of fundamental rights. But the judgment led by Justice Sikri bizarrely chooses to see the Aadhaar Act as a “beneficial legislation” ignoring the hardship, exclusion and destruction of the lives of the poor due to the additional hurdle created by the Aadhaar technology. Right to Food has documented that 25 citizens have died in the last three years due to Aadhaar issues and glitches in crucial social support programmes. Rethink Aadhaar is disturbed by the assertion that the rights of those excluded from welfare due to Aadhaar are in a small minority, are an “unproven plea of some”, that must be balanced against the majority of those who have supposedly benefited from Aadhaar.

We expect the Union Government to immediately order the removal of Aadhaar data from the databases where it is no longer legal to hold them including telecom operators and banking databases.

Justice Chandrachud’s judgment is the judgment we would have hoped for as the majority. J. Chandrachud in his judgment concurs with parts of Justice Sikri’s judgment while dissenting with large parts of it. Justice Chandrachud recognized that the passage of the Aadhaar Act a Money Bill is completely invalid his judgment states that “it constitutes a fraud on the Constitution.” It states that “This debasement of a democratic institution [Rajya Sabha] cannot be allowed to pass. Institutions are crucial to democracy… The passage of the Aadhaar Act is an illegality.” His judgment states that the Aadhaar database should be deleted.

We salute the struggle of all those who have fought for so many years against the Aadhaar project and we know that this is beginning of the battle and our challenges. We have made history and we will do it again.

For any questions, email contact@rethinkaadhaar

Of 42 Hunger Deaths In 2017 2018 25 Deaths Related To Aadhaar Issues Rtf

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Hunger Deaths in 2015-18

News reports of “starvation deaths” have been coming in a steady trickle over the past few years. One particularly tragic episode was that of eleven-year old Santoshi Kumari in Jharkhand. She died one year ago, on 28 September, begging her mother for rice as she slipped into unconsciousness. It was later learnt that her family had lost their ration card because it had not been linked with Aadhaar (in mid-2017, the Jharkhand government mass-cancelled Aadhaar-less rations cards).

On the occasion of Santoshi’s death anniversary, we compiled the attached list of reported hunger deaths from 2015 onwards. By hunger death we mean that the victim died after prolonged hunger because there was no food or money in the house, and that, quite likely, he or she would have survived otherwise. This is a partial list, based on Google searches in the English and Hindi media.[1]

As many as 56 hunger deaths (at least) were reported in the last four years, of which 42 happened in 2017 and 2018. This is a telling reminder of the precarious living conditions of the Indian poor. Many of them depend critically on social security pensions and the public distribution system (PDS) for their survival. Denial of PDS rations or pensions accounts for most of the hunger deaths. Most of the victims are from disadvantaged groups, e.g. Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims.

Out of 42 hunger deaths in 2017 and 2018, a large majority (25) were related to Aadhaar. At least 18 of these deaths were directly due to Aadhaar (see the rows in yellow highlight and bold). Common reasons include losing one’s ration card or pension for lack of Aadhaar linking, and failure of Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA), which is compulsory – for practical purposes – in several states. Another 7 deaths were possibly related to Aadhaar (rows with only a yellow highlight). These are mainly cases where a person was denied PDS rations or a ration card for unspecified reasons, which are likely to be related to Aadhaar in some cases at least.

Reports of hunger deaths are particularly frequent in two states: Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh (16 cases each). In Jharkhand, ABBA is effectively compulsory in most ration shops. Uttar Pradesh has implemented the National Food Security Act in a belated and haphazard manner.

In a healthy democracy, hunger deaths would make headlines and become a matter of debate and action. Some of the cases reported here did receive some attention, but even those did not lead to the sort of sustained pressure that would force the government to do what it takes to prevent hunger deaths. Most of them barely made it to the “news ticker” of fast-paced breaking news. And despite growing evidence of the counter-productive role of ABBA in the PDS, the central government persists in its determination to make it compulsory across the country.

August 2018 Vol 2 Delinking Aadhaar Data Protection And More

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

0. a couple of cases where there has been an official rethink on the use of Aadhaar:

I. Wishing you had never linked Aadhaar to your bank account, and wishing you could delink?

Many people linked their Aadhaar numbers to their bank account under coercion and fear of losing access to their financial assets. However, for those now wondering how safe such linking, here is some hope - it is indeed possible to delink your Aadhaar and bank account! Download and complete this one-page form, and submit it to the manager at your bank branch. You could ensure you get SMS confirmation that Aadhaar has indeed been delinked!

II. CAN AADHAAR EXIST IN A DATA PROTECTION REGIME?

Aadhaar insufficiently cut to size by Srikrishna Committee recommendations; Rethink Aadhaar to participate in public consultation

The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), headed by Ravi Shankar Prasad, constituted a Committee of Experts to deliberate on a data protection framework for India on 31st July 2017, chaired by ex-Justice B N Srikrishna of the Supreme Court. Rethink Aadhaar had made submissions to this Committee. Almost a year after it was constituted, the Committee submitted its report and a draft data protection bill on 27th July 2018. The report is 213 pages in all (including annexures and an appendix) and the bill is 67 pages long (including prescribed amendments to other existing Acts in order to ensure no conflict with the proposed bill). The bill has been published solely in English and no other language. The Committee has invited comments with the last date of submission being 10th September.

The report is unsatisfactory respect to Aadhaar, unsurprising given the Committee was stacked with people who have publicly espoused views in support of Aadhaar. The recommendations envisage the UIDAI in a regulatory role (like TRAI, SEBI, etc), which is unacceptable because the UIDAI is also the implementing agency. The Committee effectively suggests that the UIDAI regulate itself. The track record of the UIDAI so far inspires little confidence that they will do a good job in self-regulation. The Committee also recommends that individuals should be able to approach the Data Protection Authority (DPA) with grievances against the UIDAI. It must be remembered that, as per the current Aadhaar Act in force (the constitutionality of which has being challenged in the Supreme Court, with the judgment pending), anybody with a grievance against the Aadhaar Act, 2016, has to go to the UIDAI itself for redressal!

The report takes into account Virtual IDs (VIDs) and offline verification even though the report itself says, "there is no statutory backing for such announcements as on date and it is unclear as to how they are to be effectively implemented." Further, after accounting for VIDs, it still allows for certain entities to access the Aadhaar number itself for functioning. This defeats the purpose of creating VIDs if certain entities can still combine databases using their access to the Aadhaar number. If VIDs are being advocated, they must be made applicable in all cases without exception. Short of destroying the Aadhaar, the next best thing to ensure inability to combine databases for profiling might be to use VIDs everywhere without exception. But it must be noted here that even if Virtual IDs are used everywhere all-the-time thereby making it quite difficult for most people to combine databases, the UIDAI itself will still have the metadata of authentication logs and anyone with that data will still technically have the capability to profile Aadhaar users.

The proposed offline verification technology using QR codes could be applied to any and all other IDs to ensure their genuineness thereby removing the need for one more ID such as Aadhaar. If no Aadhaar number or biometrics is being used in this mechanism, then what is the need for Aadhaar itself?

The draft of the Data Protection bill sets a high bar in certain cases, such as:

Section 12 (2) says that consent (to sharing data) must be capable of being withdrawn. This would imply that those who have Aadhaar and wish to now opt-out should be able to do so.
Section 12 (3) says that provision of any service shall not be made conditional to processing of data not necessary for that purpose. This could be read to mean that Aadhaar should not be mandatory.

This high bar is then seemingly watered down in the case of Aadhaar as following:

Section 13 (2) will allow the state to authorise by law processing of personal data for provision of services and benefits or issuance of certifications, licenses or permits by the state to the citizen. Although this seems reasonable enough the next point makes the exemption for government services even more broad in the case of Aadhaar.
Section 19 seeks to allow processing of sensitive personal data (which is what Aadhaar numbers would be classified as under this bill) if it is “strictly necessary” for the provision of services and benefits authorised by law. This seems to be allowing the state an exception in the case of Aadhaar to make it mandatory by law and thereby impractical to opt-out.
Curiously, although Section 12 (3) can be thought to imply that Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for any service, the bill also states that the person withdrawing consent (and thereby opting out of Aadhaar) would be responsible for implications of withdrawal of consent. One wonders if this means that the individual withdrawing consent would then be held responsible if the government then denies any service on this account.

Other provisions state that personal data breaches (which the report acknowledges have been rampant in Aadhaar) will have to be reported to the Data Protection Authority (DPA) which will then determine if the individual(s) whose data has been compromised and the public at large are to be informed of the breach or not. One would imagine that all breaches should be reported to at least the individual(s) affected by default.

The report says, "The right to object to processing; right to object to direct marketing, right to object to decisions based on solely automated processing, and the right to restrict processing need not be provided in the law". Since one of possible commercial uses of Aadhaar (because, supposedly ‘data is the new oil’) is for such targeted marketing and making decisions that affect individuals by analysing ‘big data’, it is sad that the Committee recommended against providing safeguards against this in the law.

It might appear that Committee has tried its best to save Aadhaar. Media reports also reinforce this apprehension. Two notes of dissent were published in the report. Ms. Rama Vedashree says, “In addition to the above-mentioned points, the report under chapter 7 and the associated appendix, suggests sweeping amendments to the Aadhaar Act; these need a thorough review. I suggest a separate public consultation exercise by the government to examine these amendments.” Prof. Rishikesha T Krishnan of IIM Indore noted that “[t]he observations and recommendations regarding the Aadhaar Act are outside the scope of the committee’s work.” Ironic, considering Aadhaar is one of the primary factors that led to the constitution of the Committee in the first place.

Nandan Nilekani (former Chairperson of the UIDAI) later suggested that the Supreme Court bench to decide on the constitutionality of Aadhaar should look at this Committee’s report. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, however, said, “I do not think that is required.”

Going forward we hope that the government will give due regard to the pre-legislative process adopted in 2014 and have meaningful consultations with respect to the proposed data protection bill and the amendments to the Aadhaar Act 2016. Currently, the government has sought feedback on the recommendations of the Srikrishna Committee. Although the pre-legislative process clearly states that the “summary of feedback/comments received from the public/other stakeholders should also be placed on the website of the Department/Ministry concerned” MeitY has refused to share this information more than once. Justice Srikrishna justified this secrecy by comparing the process of drafting a law to taking a bath!

III. “They have Bill Gates, we have Snowden!”

Whistleblower Edward Snowden fired his latest salvo at the UIDAI and Aadhaar emphasizing the potential for a civil death due to the pervasiveness of Aadhaar. Speaking on video at a journalism event, Snowden said that the UIDAI had created a mass surveillance system with Aadhaar. Watch the full video interview on Moneylife.

Given the support Aadhaar has received from the likes of Bill Gates, Snowden's comments are a shot in the arm for everyone agitating against Aadhaar. We continue to hope that such international criticism of Aadhaar will force some accountability.

IV. Face authentication: UIDAI’s latest “gimmick”?

While the very fate of Aadhaar is pending in the Supreme Court, while India is yet to establish a data protection regime, the latest measure mandating face recognition in addition to the existing fingerprint or iris (biometric) authentication is, as Yogesh Sapkale points out in Moneylife, only the latest in the series of gimmicks. These steps follow the circular on face recognition published by the UIDAI on 15th January. The circular states that all Aadhaar User Agencies and Registered Device providers must comply or face action under section 42 and 43 of the aadhaar Act, 2016. As things stand, the UIDAI seems intent on rolling out face authentication on Sep. 15, but is yet to publish any notification on the same.

A scathing editorial by the Times of India notes “In what is implicit acceptance of exclusion errors, Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has begun face recognition for Aadhaar authentication. UIDAI circulars since January harp on the need to make Aadhaar authentication “more inclusive” by performing facial recognition in addition to fingerprint/iris scans. In April, UIDAI told Supreme Court that authentication failure rates were 6% for fingerprint scan and 8.54% for iris scans. In July 2018, there were 71 crore fingerprint and 1.6 crore iris authentications indicating a whopping 4 crore fingerprint authentication failures last month.

These failures could have happened to people accessing rations or purchasing new SIM cards. Aadhaar was initially pitched as an efficient way of delivering welfare. But now, like Leviathan, it is extending its empire everywhere. Limiting Aadhaar to welfare and fixing the glitches must precede overreach. The trust quotient with Aadhaar is falling. Earlier, we were told fingerprints are almost foolproof but then iris scanners were introduced. Goalposts keep changing all the time. Or is it Aadhaar that is floundering?”

V. Rajasthan Govt. adds more fuel to the Aadhaar-for-surveillance fire

Caravan Magazine reported that, “A 30-year-old who tried to apply for the post of a librarian with the Rajasthan government this July was shocked when the state’s information technology department asked for access to his Twitter, Facebook or Gmail accounts as a pre-condition for the application. If he did not wish to share his social media information, the government’s web portal for job applications—Rajasthan Single Sign On, or RSSO—said, he would have to provide both his Aadhaar number and the biometric data registered with the Unique Identification Authority of India.”

The screenshot below illustrates the unfettered access the RSSO app demands of users.

VI. Ministry of Corporate Affairs clarifies: Aadhaar NOT mandatory for directors of companies

The notification dated 5th July 2018 is available here. The clarification issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs is recorded in the letter issued by the Institute of Company Secretaries

It appears that providing Aadhaar might still be mandatory for those directors who are already enrolled. Business Standard reports Angry directors mull legal action as Aadhaar is made mandatory.

VII. UIDAI’s use of advertisements

UIDAI’s use of advertisements was analysed in The Wire. Anandita Thakur and Karan Saini write “It is unsurprising, therefore, that the advertisements the UIDAI has commissioned over the last few years come from a moralistic high-ground, where nothing is wrong in Aadhaar-land and everything works as it’s supposed to. As we show below, these advertisements masquerade under the guise of serving a public good while conveniently sidestepping legitimate concerns regarding failures of the project.” The authors point out “The question arises, do these advertisements fulfill the purpose of serving a public good, or are they merely attempts at public-service-propaganda being paid for by taxpayer money? (Rs 30 crore was spent for an ‘image makeover’ of Aadhaar in the fiscal year 2014)”

VIII. Digital Security Tools and Tactics

Giving the increasing concerns around data security, we found Security in a Box useful. Let us know if you have come across any other tools and information we can learn from!

June July Updates

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Update Amended to add

Live Law reported that assesses can now file their income tax returns online without the Aadhaar enrolment number as the Delhi High Court, while providing the relief to two petitioners, asked the Central Board of Direct Taxes to create a platform for people to file returns without Adhaar till the deadline of March 31, 2019 for PAN-Aadhar linkage. A bench of Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice A K Chawla allowed petitioners Shreya Sen and one other to file their income tax return online without the Aadhaar. Read the order of the Delhi High court dated 24.07.2018.

Similarly, on 24.07.2018, the Madras High Court also allowed 9 petitioners to file their taxes manually without submitting Aadhaar numbers. Bar and Bench reported.

Is Aadhaar mandatory? What is it mandatory for?

1. The government has repeatedly asserted that Aadhaar is not mandatory. The Aadhaar enrollment form itself states that Aadhaar is "free and voluntary".

2. While there are various rules/notifications making Aadhaar linking in practice mandatory within fixed deadlines, all these deadlines have been extended, with some notifications nullified.

a) For instance, the deadline for linking PAN and Aadhaar has been extended to 31st March 2019 - the relevant CBDT Order was published on LiveLaw. On the other hand, the Income Tax Dept. continues to insist on inclusion of Aadhaar in IT returns - despite the Supreme Court direction in Binoy Visvam making production of or enrollment for Aadhaar for this purpose strictly voluntary. There are, thankfully, “easy” workarounds - see our section below for more details.

b) The 13th March order of the Supreme Court of India states that mobile and financial services need not be linked with Aadhaar until the final judgment in the Aadhaar matters is announced by the SC’s Constitution Bench. While Aadhaar continues to be mandatory for opening new bank accounts, per the RBI’s Master Directions (updated in July 2018), the account holder has 6 months within which to link their Aadhaar. [Note: We understand that banks are demanding immediate production of Aadhaar or enrolment number. We urge that customers request written proof of such requirement failing which they should escalate the matter to the bank managers and further to the banking ombudsman.]

3. The Aadhaar scheme is currently under challenge in the Supreme Court of India and its legitimacy itself is in question. The Supreme Court is likely to curb the project: in the absence of any judgment in the case, the matter remains pending and sub judice during which time Aadhaar cannot be mandatory for availing any service or subsidy or benefit, per the SC’s earlier orders.

Are you unable to file your Income Tax return without an Aadhaar?

For most salaried employees, the process of filing Income Tax returns is fairly “automated” - once the employer supplies the Form 16, you confirm the details align with the TRACES portal record. Subsequently, you use the NetBanking-based tax service feature of your salary account (or other account already used for previous Income Tax returns) to allow you to file “e-verified” returns, usually ITR-1 (aka Sahaj). Since July 2017, the Income Tax Department has required taxpayers to provide their Aadhaar number although the form fiendishly does not indicate that the Aadhaar is mandatory. This is not doubt frustrating, especially if you do not possess an Aadhaar nor have any intention of enrolling for it.

We have heard that the simplest hack is based on the recognition that the form does not actually “verify” the authenticity of the Aadhaar - i.e. there is no “Yes/No” authentication being performed, even during the processing of the returns. All that the form does, reportedly, is execute the Verhoeff algorithm to determine if the checksum - the 12th digit of the “Aadhaar” - is valid, thus validating the entire 12-digit number. Therefore, apparently, as long as you enter a twelve digit number that is likely to be an Aadhaar, you are good to go!

Last year, several individuals filed their returns using 12 zeroes as their Aadhaar - fact brought up by Senior Advocate Arvind Datar during the Aadhaar hearings. We have been told that the Income Tax Department has wised up and no longer recognizes 12 zeroes as a valid Aadhaar number. There are other numbers (11 1s and a 5, for instance) that are purportedly doing the rounds which are said to serve the purpose just as well. Although many people are using such Verhoeff compliant numbers, we advise verifying through the UIDAI portal whether the Aadhaar actually exists lest you get another person into trouble!

There are reportedly other workarounds as well - using a “valid” (but not authentic) enrollment id (rather than Aadhaar), and choosing to verify your returns by post, rather than by electronic means are two. Our recommended methods, however, are other alternatives including (i) waiting for the SC judgment and paying a late filing fee than provide any Aadhaar information whatsoever and (ii) filing a writ petition in the local High Court demanding that the IT Dept allow you to file your returns without an Aadhaar. The latter method has been adopted by various groups across India, among whom are some of the petitioners in the recently concluded Aadhaar hearings.

Hunger Deaths Continue

The Right to Food Campaign on 21.06.2018 held a press conference in Ranchi calling out the governance failure in Jharkhand that has lead to a spate of starvation deaths over the past year. Presenting details of 12 starvation deaths, the Campaign noted that 7 of these cases were directly related to Aadhaar-enabled exclusion.

Reports indicate that three persons have died during the month of June.

The reports highlight the fact that contrary to all the claims of enhancing efficiency in welfare, Aadhaar has no role to play in facilitating inclusion, For instance, Chintaman Malhar, 40, died of starvation as he had no food to eat in his makeshift shelter. His son Videsh claimed that his father was hungry for the last few days and collapsed while repairing the hut in the scorching heat on Thursday. He alleged that in spite of having Aadhar cards, they have not been issued ration card so far. For years, two successive governments at the center have portrayed Aadhaar as important to improve inclusion into government schemes. But simply having an Aadhaar does not lead to any greater inclusion as several schemes continue to have own quotas and cut-offs. While the requirement to have an Aadhaar for food schemes, and to give biometric authentication each time adds more hoops to cross to get grains and pensions on time.

On 13th July a protest was organised at the Jharkhand State Bhawan, New Delhi by the Right to Food Campaign. The Campaign submitted a memorandum to the resident commissioner which highlighted the ongoing issues related to the Public Distribution System in Jharkhand and the various attacks on the Right to Life. The memorandum also demanded the delinking of Aadhaar from all public services.

How much more discriminatory can it get?

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

How much more discriminatory can it get?

Minister of State for Personnel, Jitendra Singh recently clarified that Aaadhar will not be mandatory for retired central government employees to avail of their pension. This is a laudable and sound decision. Only , by not extending the same courtesy, or option to the beneficiaries of the pension schemes of the NSAP smacks of discrimination, callousness, and cruelty with some of the most vulnerable citizens of India. They have already been reeling under the exclusion caused by the mandatory Aadhaar payment system, and have the additional disadvantage of being excluded due to social and economic circumstances. This discriminatory treatment is only greater validation of the widely held belief that this government has no concern for the poor. Even the attitude that this ridiculously small pension amount is a welfare measure, and not an entitlement can only come from a refusal to acknowledge the immense contribution of the working people to the building and development of this country. While the unwillingness to provide a decent amount as pension is bad enough, the decision to not extend to them the benefit being given to retired government employees, is beyond justification.

Both groups comprise the elderly, so what sets them apart and why are there two sets of rules that apply to them? While both sets of people have served the country in different capacities, it is only government ‘employees’ who are entitled to pensions. All the other masses of informal workers who have served the country in actually building roads and fancy airports, all the farmers and farm labourers who grow food crops, the cleaners who provide services are not entitled to pensions. What they get is referred to as ‘social assistance’, and is labelled as welfare. Their precarious existence throughout their working life dogs them in old age as well. Even the meagre social assistance of Rs.200 per month, sometimes matched or topped up by the state governments, is certainly not enough to live on. The pensions of the government employees on the other hand, amount to an average of half the salary drawn when they demit office and allow for periodic increases to keep pace with the cost of living.

Rethink Aadhaar Campaign Update On The Uid Hearing In The Supreme Court

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench concluded its final hearings of the matters challenging the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar project on Thursday, May 10, and reserved its judgment. Reservation of judgment is routine and means that the bench will take some time to give its final judgment. We expect the judgment sometime around July - August, after the Supreme Court’s summer recess. In the more than four-month long final hearings of the Aadhaar matters by the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench, the petitioner’s lawyers covered the many criticisms of the Aadhaar project. Documents and submissions submitted in Court can be found here and present a repository of valuable, historic documents.

This past year, conversation around the Unique Identification (UID) or Aadhaar has grown significantly largely because the government coercively pushed Aadhaar into every aspect of residents’ lives. Partly in response, people began engaging with concerted social and mass media campaigns, live tweeting of court proceedings, and academic research and writing about the project.

In 2016, some of us came together to formulate a response to the Aadhaar onslaught and attempted to organise resources to challenge Aadhaar. We also worked to raise awareness and developed resources to help others understand - and critique - the project. We thought we would be focused on both “welfare and privacy” - two worlds that did not seem particularly connected until the UID project attacked our rights in both spheres. Some of us loosely began calling for “Rethink Aadhaar” (or “no2UID”). Since then we have supported public hearings, conducted signature campaigns, and had conversations on Aadhaar in public places including outside the UIDAI regional office in New Delhi, and at India Gate. During this time of campaigning, most significantly, the Supreme Court affirmed our fundamental right to privacy. In this time we also became a proxy grievance redressal centre for UIDAI with people calling us from across the country to help them with filing taxes, getting mobile phone connections, scholarships, etc without Aadhaar!

For many of us, the destruction of welfare accompanied by bogus claims of savings deserved criticism and called for a rethinking of the UID project. In Court and outside, the response of the State has been that welfare is a burden not a responsibility on the State, and the barter of our fundamental right to privacy is an inevitable part of the social contract. We have fought against this (mis)conception of welfare, and our own understanding of the idea of privacy and its intrinsic link to liberty and freedom has expanded and deepened.

The Aadhaar project has needed welfare schemes to spread itself, and welfare suffers because of it. Having made Aadhaar mandatory to access any government service or entitlement, the State has managed to get Aadhaar numbers seeded into every database creating a gold mine of data that can potentially enable 360º surveillance. We have been told, “Data is the new oil”. In the age of Cambridge Analytica and breaches in the famed Social Security Number (SSN) database in the US, it is clear that no database, whether maintained privately or by government, is truly secure. That a data protection regime is being created in India in a secretive, opaque manner with the active participation of Aadhaar officials only compounds matter further.

Rti Reveals No Evidence To Back Claims Of 80000 Bogus Teachers Detected Through Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

In January 2018, while releasing the AISHE 2017-18, HRD Minister Shri Prakash Javdekar said that 80,000 bogus teachers had been detected through use of Aadhaar. Watch the video below, starting at 9:55 mins into the video.

Aadhaar Related Privacy Concerns

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar-related privacy concerns tend to get confused and mixed up. The main concerns are as outlined in this post.

Reminder: Under the Aadhaar Act, “identity information” consists of Aadhaar number, biometric information and demographic information. “Biometric information”, as of now, consists of fingerprints, iris scan and photograph, but its scope can be expanded at UIDAI’s discretion. “Demographic information” refers to demographic details (name, date of birth, address etc.) collected at the time of Aadhaar enrolment. The term “personal information”, not used in the Aadhaar Act (except in Section 30) can be understood in more general terms as any information of a private nature.

Confidentiality of “core biometrics”

The core biometrics (as of now, fingerprints and iris scan) are supposed to be safely stored in the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) and not shared with anyone. Some IT experts, however, believe that it is only a matter of time until the CIDR is hacked. That would be a serious breach: if your biometrics are stolen, you would be vulnerable to identity fraud for life. Further, fingerprints are easy to clone or steal outside the CIDR (as Nandan Nilekani himself said put it to a Financial Times reporter, “I can steal your fingerprint off your glass”). That, too presents a threat of identity fraud, given the numerous uses of biometrics in the proposed Aadhaar ecosystem.

Confidentiality of Aadhaar numbers

Aadhaar numbers are not supposed to be “displayed or posted publicly” (Aadhaar Act, Section 29(4)). However, this has happened many times, and keeps happening. When Aadhaar numbers are displayed along with other sensitive information such as bank account numbers, it makes the victims vulnerable to various types of fraud.

Wide sharing of demographic information

In the draft of the Aadhaar Act (the “NIDAI Bill 2010”), demographic information collected at the time of Aadhaar enrolment was supposed to be confidential – authentication only consisted of a “yes/no” response to a query whether a person’s biometrics matched the Aadhaar number being submitted. The Aadhaar Act, however, now allows demographic information to be shared with the requesting entity (Section 8). Further, there is very little protection against this information being shared or misused by the requesting entity, except for a weak “consent” clause whereby this entity is supposed to use that information only for the purpose to which the person has consented at the time of authentication. This is just a cosmetic safeguard. In effect, demographic information is up for grabs. The wide dissemination of demographic information will facilitate large-scale mining of personal information by private businesses. It is well known that private businesses already thrive on this type of information for numerous purposes, from targeted advertisement and credit rating to manipulating elections (the recent Cambridge-Analytica and Facebook affairs are just the tip of that mountain). Aadhaar is likely to take the mining of personal information – not just demographic information – to new levels. As someone put it in an insightful tweet, “data is the new oil and Aadhaar is the drill”.

Truth Of Authentication Failures On Ground

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Interim Order issued by the Supreme Court on 13th March come as a grave disappointment, given the large scale exclusion and cases of starvation deaths reported due to ABBA (Aadhaar Based Biometric Authentication), from the poorest districts of the country. The deadline was not relaxed for notifications under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 that practically make it a requirement to link Aadhaar for people to continue to have access to 139 crucial welfare schemes, several of which are citizens’ legal rights.

Supreme Court Order On Aadhaar A Blow To Welfare

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Statement by Right To Rood Campaign on the Supreme Court's Interim Order

The Right to Food Campaign is deeply disappointed by the 13 March 2018 Supreme Court order which extends the deadline for Aadhaar linking of facilities such as bank accounts and SIM cards, but permits the continued imposition of Aadhaar on social services and entitlements such as the public distribution system (PDS), the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and social security pensions. This order perpetuates a long-standing double standard, whereby the hardships experienced by privileged classes due to Aadhaar being made mandatory are being addressed while much greater hardships endured by poor people are ignored.

From September 2017 to January 2018, at least ten persons across three states died of starvation due to reasons directly connected with Aadhaar. These persons were denied their legal entitlements to ration/pension either because their ration card was not linked with Aadhaar or because of failures in Aadhaar-based biometric authentication.

In a recent public hearing in Delhi, more than 400 people from different districts and marginalised communities of the national capital testified about their inability to access their legal entitlements of rations and pensions due to mandatory linking of Aadhaar. Last year, in a similar public hearing in Bengaluru, people from across Karnataka shared the various problems they were facing in accessing social security entitlements, rations as well as health services.

In 2017, according to data put out by state food departments, in Rajasthan 33 lakh families were unable to access their Public Distribution System (PDS) ration entitlement each month due to the linkage of the PDS with Aadhaar. Similarly, in Jharkhand, 25 lakh families were deprived of their grain entitlements on a monthly basis. Even in areas (e.g., Ranchi District) where the integration had been in place for over a year, the rate of non-transacting households was high.

The damage caused by Aadhaar is not limited to the PDS. Recipients of social security payments, such as NREGA workers, social security pensioners and scholarship holders, are also suffering due to this application. Many such payments get credited in others’ accounts due to errors in Aadhaar seeding. People’s pensions have been stopped because their Aadhaar numbers are not seeded, or cannot be seeded; in some cases, old people whose biometrics do not match are also denied their entitlements (rations, pensions, etc). In one village in Badauli block, Sarguja District, Chhattisgarh 124 old people were not able to access their old age pensions as the village did not have network connectivity. Such denials of entitlements are in fact in violation of the right to life and must be penalised.

Despite some token safeguards being introduced recently in some of welfare schemes in response to Aadhaar-related starvation deaths and other tragedies, in practice Aadhaar linkage and (in some cases) even Aadhaar-based biometric authentication are still compulsory for a wide range of welfare schemes and basic entitlements. The exclusion problems created by this compulsion have been abundantly documented in a long series of media reports, statistical analyses, public hearings, testimonies, videos, tweets, and other records.

Aadhaar is unable to reduce “quantity fraud” – the most important form of leakage from welfare programmes. Also, many other reforms that predate the integration of welfare programmes with Aadhaar have succeeded to reduce corruption from these programmes. Nevertheless, the government persists in its obsessive imposition of Aadhaar on every possible scheme. Instead of acknowledging the very limited role of Aadhaar in improving welfare but the widespread damage caused by this integration, it fabricates and propagates its own evidence of alleged Aadhaar-enabled savings to defuse the opposition.

The Right to Food Campaign feels that by putting all the focus on Aadhaar, the government is distracting attention from the real reforms required in these programmes –increase in the quantum of support through greater allocation of resources, streamlining of delivery mechanisms and activating systems for transparency, accountability and grievance redress. For example, there is an urgent need to universalise the PDS, introduce pulses and oil in it, introduce eggs and other nutritious items in the midday meals and anganwadi programmes, increase in the rates of NREGA wages, social security pensions and maternity entitlements and timely payment of these transfers, and so on. We demand that all the notifications linking Aadhaar with welfare programmes (PDS, NREGA, social security pensions, midday meals, , anganwadi services, maternity entitlements etc) be immediately withdrawn.

For further information, please contact the Dipa Sinha (9650434777) or Kavita Srivastava (9351562965) – co-convenors of the Steering Committee of the Right to Food Campaign or write at rtfcindia@gmail.com.

Leavng The Most Vulnerable Out

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Statement by Rethink Aadhaar on the Supreme Court's Interim Order

The Interim Order issued by the Supreme Court today has come as a grave disappointment, given the large scale exclusion and cases of starvation deaths reported due to Aadhaar, the biometrics-linked resident ID, from the poorest districts of the country.

The Court on Tuesday extended the deadline for linking Aadhaar only for banking and mobile services, for which the Aadhaar linking deadline so far was coming up on March 31, 2018.

It is expected that with respect to PAN linking, the previous orders from June 2017 will apply.

Worryingly, in line with a request by the Attorney General in court today, the deadline was not relaxed for notifications under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 that practically make it a requirement to link Aadhaar for people to continue to have access to 139 crucial welfare schemes, several of which are citizens’ legal rights.

These include a essential services such as mid-day meals for children, food subsidies under the National Food Security Act, the Right to Education for children upto 14 years, disability, widows’ and old age pensions, scholarships for Dalit and Adivasi students, teachers’ and health workers’ stipends, maternity benefits under Janani Suraksha Yojana, and a wide range of welfare schemes.

Though today’s orders say that previous orders remain in force that provide exemptions for food security benefits when biometric authentication fails, the evidence is that these orders from October and December have been completely ignored by government departments, with UIDAI, the agency managing the database, continuing to push for making Aadhaar mandatory in every aspect of life, and forcing seeding, linking Aadhaar numbers across databases, violating citizens’ right to privacy and security. These circulars on which today’s court order refers to have remained ineffective and failed to alleviate our distress on the ground when Aadhaar authentication regularly fails.

Today’s order says the deadline for mobile and bank linking have been extended till the final judgement of the court. As such no time can be prescribed, but one indicative date may be October 2, when the current Chief Justice of India’s tenure ends.

The petitioners’ advocates will now push for these Section 7 notifications to be covered under the indefinite extension as well, and not limit relief only for bank and mobile customers.

Despite Aadhaar being presented as a voluntary scheme since 2009, two successive prime ministers have forced citizens to submit their biometrics to access essential services. They have done this by making the most basic services for vulnerable citizens available only to those who pass the biometric authentication test, armtwisting citizens to enroll in the database operated without any legal framework while the data was collected.

Today’s order has failed to provide the most vulnerable citizens of the country protection or relief from disruption of the legal right and access to even basic social services.

Tyranny Of Aadhaar Newsletter March 2018 Edition Volume 1

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Tyranny of Aadhaar newsletter brings you the real state of Aadhaar roll-out and how it affects crores of Indians across states. So far, the only real beneficiary of Aadhaar is: the State & Corporates, not the citizens. We share relevant data, and findings from the ground on experience of citizens in the Aadhaar project to sift through the false claims made about the biometrics project.

Tyranny Of Aadhaar Newsletter Feb 18 Volume 1

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Sc Asks Whether Aadhaar Biometric Data Collected Between 2009 2016 Should Be Destroyed

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Constitution Bench hearings on Aadhaar begin:

SC asks whether biometric data collected between 2009-2016 should be destroyed

After about seven years since the first challenges to the Aadhaar project, on Wednesday, a Constitution bench began hearing the arguments to decide the legal validity of the project.

Why the long wait

In 2015, while defending the Aadhaar project, the Attorney General had argued that citizens have no fundamental right to privacy in India. In November 2017, after a two-year-long wait, the 9-judge Constitution Bench delivered a historic judgement affirming the fundamental right to privacy enshrined in India’s Constitution. Two months on, a five-judge Constitution Bench, comprising the CJI Dipak Misra and Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice AK Sikri, Justice AM Khanwilkar, and Justice Ashok Bhushan, began hearings today to decide on the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar scheme.

What happened in the hearing

At the start of the hearing, the Attorney General asked that fixed time be allotted to each of the lawyers arguing on both sides. Senior advocate Shyam Divan said the entire project needs to be examined, and its notifications examined. The Chief Justice of India also agreed that time for arguments cannot be limited in this fashion in this matter.

Divan began proceedings for the petitioners by recounting the history of the project. His opening statement can be found here.

Briefly, the salient points in the opening statements include:

No democratic society has adopted a programme that is similar in its command and sweep.
The government seeks to tether every resident of India to an electronic leash.
At its core, Aadhaar alters the relationship between the citizen and the State and diminishes the status of the citizen.
The State is empowered with a ‘switch’ by which it can cause the civil death of an individual.

When Mr. Divan described the illegality of biometric data collection prior to the promulgation of the Aadhaar Act in 2016, Justice Sikri interjected to ask whether Mr. Divan was saying the data collected from 2009-2016 would have to be destroyed. Chief Justice Mishra too questioned whether data collected in infringement of a fundamental right should be destroyed. Mr. Divan stated that it would.

It is also crucial to remember that in 2015, when petitioners had pointed to long delays in the case hearings even as government was rushing and coercing enrolment, Justice Chelameswar had explicitly stated that the court could not allow the government to present a fait accompli.

Another important interjection was made on the question of the passage of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill, bypassing one house of parliament where the government lacked a majority.

On the CJI quoting his earlier judgment on not discussing the Money Bill issue, Senior Advocates P. Chidambaram and Arvind Datar pointed out the contradiction to two previous Constitution Bench judgments. The current bench will thus also have to decide on the validity of the Aadhaar Act’s passage as a Money Bill.

Further, Mr. Divan pointed out that the 2016 Act was identical to the 2010 National Identity NIDAI Bill which had been rejected by a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance in 2011. Mr. Divan submitted that the 2016 Bill had not been examined by any such committee, making its being passed as a Money Bill questionable

Mumbai Public Meeting Breakaadhaachains

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai

Rajasthan Breakaadhaarchains Protest In Jaipur

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

आधार नहीं सुधार चाहिए

संविधान में दी गई स्वतंत्रता के मूल अधिकार का उल्लंघन हैआधार- प्रेमकृष्ण शर्मा

जयपुर 16 जनवरी,

जयपुर शहर के गाँधी सर्कल पर आधार के खिलाफ प्रदर्शन में आधार नहीं अधिकार दो, आधार नहीं अनाज चाहिए, आधार धोखा है, आधार की अनिवार्यता बंद करो जैसे नारे लगे. सरकार द्वारा आधार को व्यक्ति के जीवन में हर जगह पर अनिवार्य बना दिए जाने की बजह से गरीबों और वंचितों का जीवन बहुत ही दूभर हो गया है. विभिन्न संगठनों के साथियों ने गाँधी सर्कल पर जोरदार प्रदर्शन किया और हमारे साथ पारदर्शिता के नाम पर जो धोखा किया जा रहा है उसे उजागर किया। । गाँधी सर्कल पर प्रदर्शन में आये लोगों को संबोधित करते हुए मजदूर संगठनों के साथी हरिकेश बुगालिया ने कहा कि गुजरात की धरती से एक गाँधी जी उठे जिन्होंने विदेशियों से देश को आज़ाद कराया और उसी धरती से उठे हमारे देश के प्रधानमंत्री नरेन्द्र मोदी ने विदेशी और कॉर्पोरेटस को देश को बेच दिया हैचाहे वह भारत में विदेशी निवेश की बात हो या आधार कार्ड को अनिवार्य करके लोगों की निजी सूचनाओं को कॉर्पोरेट को देकर. प्रदर्शन में सामिल सभी लोगों ने आधार कार्ड को देश और हमारे देश के नागरिकों के लिए खतरा बताया क्योंकि आज यदि किस व्यक्ति का आधार कार्ड डिलीट हो जाये या उसका कार्ड काम नहीं करे तो वह मध्यान्ह भोजन से लेकर किसी भी छात्रवृत्ति एवं किसी भी सरकारी पद के लिए आवेदन तक नहीं कर सकते हैं.

प्रदर्शन से पहले आधार (आधारकार्ड की अनिवार्यता) की राजनीति और उसके पीछे सरकार की मंशा को विनोबा ज्ञान मंदिर में एक बैठक आयोजित की गई जिसमें विभिन्न सामाजिक और छात्र संगठनों के प्रतिनिधियों और देश के विभिन्न विश्विद्यालयों के छात्रों ने हिस्सा लिया. बैठक में शुरुआत में सूचना एवं रोज़गार अधिकार अभियान से जुड़े मुकेश निर्वासित ने आधार की राजनीती और उससे गरीबों और वंचितों को होने वाली परेशानियों के साथ-2 आधार के बारे में युवाओं के बीच जो झूंठ फैलाया जा रहा है कि आधार बजह से देश में काला धन बाहर आ जायेगा और इस देश के अमीरों और पूंजीपतियों के साथ साथ भ्रष्टाचारियों को पकड़ा जा सकेगा पर तथ्यात्मक बातें रखी गईं. उच्च और उच्चतम न्यायालय के बरिष्ठ वकील और मानवाधिकार संगठन पीयूंसीएल से जुड़े प्रेमकृष्ण शर्मा ने कहा कि ये संविधान में दी गई स्वतंत्रता के मूल अधिकार का उल्लंघन है इसका हमें हर हालत में विरोध करना चाहिए. उन्होंने अपना स्वयं का उदहारण देते हुए बताया कि आज से 6 वर्ष पहले मेरा आधार कार्ड तो बन गया लेकिन अब मुझे मेरा पासपोर्ट का नवीनीकरण कराना तो आधार मेरे अंगूठे और अँगुलियों के निशान रीड ही नहीं कर रहा है इसलिए मुझे इसके लिए सर्वोच्च न्यायालय में जाना पड़ा है.

Charges Against Government Of Jharkhand And Uidai

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Right to Food Campaign, Jharkhand

15th January 2018

Charges against Government of Jharkhand and Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI)

The last few months have seen the cruel starvation deaths of at least four residents of Jharkhand - Santoshi Kumari, Ruplal Marandi, Premani Kunwar and Etwariya Devi. This is a direct result of the actions and inactions of the Government of Jharkhand and UIDAI.

Clear evidence has been put forward that these deaths were due to the stopping of their legally entitled rations and old-age pensions because of Aadhaar related issues.
Further, Government of Jharkhand repeatedly ignored evidence that the mandatory linking of Aadhaar to welfare entitlements causes exclusion of the most vulnerable citizens and denies citizens their legal rights to food and old age pensions.
Moreover, the UIDAI has refused to take any action against those responsible for scores of violations of people’s legal entitlements to social welfare due to Aadhaar.
Finally, this exclusion has been deceitfully projected to the public, Parliament and Supreme Court of India by dressing these cases of Aadhaar-driven exclusion as deletions of “fake persons” and “savings” of public funds.

In light of the above, the Government of Jharkhand (GoJ) and UIDAI should surely be charged for criminal negligence leading to death, and for the criminal offence of dishonesty and an intention to deceive. Moreover, they have freely violated several legislations of the country without any consequences (Annexe 1). The attached timeline clearly lays out the pattern of negligence and dishonesty, and a lack of honouring the rights based legislations of NFSA and MGNREGA.

January 12 Month Of Action Against Aadhaar Begins

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar Writes To Home Affairs Committee On Security Issues Of Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

This week’s stellar investigation by the Tribune, Chandigarh has definitively exposed the fragility of the security of the UID project. Activists, scholars, experts and academics have been warning of the insecurity of the Aadhaar database since its inception.

Following the Supreme Court's landmark judgment upholding privacy as a Fundamental Right, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs decided to review the Aadhaar project based on the historic recognition of the tenets of privacy and security. As per news reports, officials of Home Affairs Ministry and UIDAI addressed concerns raised the Committee.

Rethink Aaadhar wrote to the Chairperson and Members of the committee on the 15th November, 2017 and 14th December, 2017. We raised several concerns including those related to privacy, security and data breaches.

Our letters are attached along with a simple presentation of issues sent to the Committee.

The Ground Realities Of Aadhaar Ration Card Linking In Jharkhand

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Ration card linking in Jharkhand is leading to hunger deaths: there is no process to verify if genuine or false beneficiary is being canceled.

Wait Till Next Week Before You Decide On Linking Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

It has been 849 days since the Indian Supreme Court decided to set up a Constitution Bench to examine if Aadhaar project violates Indian Constitution. Every day that the court delays in deciding on this matter, there are more instances of people suffering because Aadhaar has been made ‘mandatorily voluntary’. Since the matter didn’t get listed in the Supreme Court on its own, there was a mentioning by the lawyers today morning in the court of the Chief Justice of India.

Aadhaar Project Violates Vital Principles On Data Collection

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar cautiously welcomes the Sri Krishna Committee White Paper which has been shared for public comments and inputs. This marks an important first step in a more transparent and accountable pre-legislative process.

Rethink Aadhaar wrote to the Srikrishna committee on the 5 November 2017 expressing its concern with the constitution of the committee. 22 concerned citizens from across the country signed this letter including, ex-Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, AP Shah, former Chief Information Commissioner Wajahat Habibullah, Privacy Petitioners, Maj Gen (retd) SG Vombatkere, Prof Anupam Saraph and Aruna Roy, Senior Advocates Prashant Bhushan and Indira Jaising, former Governor Gopalkrishna Gandhi, Prof Tarlochan Sastry and Prof Jagdeep Chokkhar of the Association for Democratic Reforms among several Information activists.

The Srikrishna committee was constituted on 31 July 2017 to identify issues related to data protection and to formulate a Data Protection Bill.

Our earlier letter highlighted the fact that the Committee the present composition of the committee is problematic insofar as all its members, except Justice Srikrishna, have pronounced professional and personal views in support of the Aadhaar program and its extension into areas that it was not designed for.

We are disappointed that the composition of the committee remains unchanged.

Experts who have expressed independent and critical views on Aadhaar have not been co-opted by the committee. This could still be possible in the future and we hope the Committee will keep this in mind.

A mandatory and coercive Aadhaar project has led to millions of Indian citizens being enrolled into the world’s largest biometric identification project.

Issues of surveillance, welfare, national security, and Private companies and their access to this data is becoming crucial. Massive data collection proliferates unregulated.

Citizens Reject Aadhaar Initiate Opt Out

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

After our last update of November 9, we have received several messages an emails in support of more citizen action against Aadhaar's coercion and exclusion.

Now, we present three ways in which you can take action, and make a difference

1. On November 11, tomorrow at 11 am, Join #NoAadhaar#NoMobile #SwitchOff mobiles for 30 minutes #AadhaarFree #NoMobile30
Switch off your mobile phone for 30 minutes at 11am on 11/11
And let's repeat EVERY DAY for the next 30 days.
Don't forget to send an SMS or mail to your service provider to tell them why you're doing this.
Draft template to send to your mobile service providers, and their email IDs are provided here:

https://rethinkaadhaar.in/blog/2017/11/9/join-noaadhaarnomobile-november

2. Add your voice to the "Opt-out from Aadhaar" Campaign. https://rethinkaadhaar.in/take-action/

3. Petition Chief Justice of India, by signing here https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Chife_Justice_of_India_Stop_Mandatory_Aadhaar_for_services/

Join Noaadhaarnomobile November

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Switch off your mobiles
at 11 am on 11/11

#NoMobile #NoAaadhar
Earlier this year, the government ordered us to link our mobile connections to our Aadhaar numbers or have our mobile connections cut off.

NO hesitation in jumping the gun even as the legal challenge to Aadhaar comes up for hearing in the Supreme Court!

NO qualms against violating our Constitutional right to privacy!

NO concern that telecom operators will use our data for commercial purposes!

NO protection from use of personal data for targeting and profiling!

The government can behave like this because it thinks that we citizens will not push back.
Let's show them they're wrong.

LET'S TELL THEM WE ARE NOT FOR SALE.

Join #NoAadhaar#NoMobile

Switch off your mobile phone for 30 minutes at 11am on 11/11

And let's repeat EVERY DAY for the next 30 days.

And don't forget to send an SMS or mail to your service provider to tell them why you're doing this.

#NoMobile30 #SwitchOff

Citizens Reject Aadhaar Initiate Opt Out Campaigns

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Government recently claimed in the Supreme Court that 118 crore Indians would be hurt if the Court passed an order against Aadhaar. What this claims ignores is that people have been coerced to enroll for and “seed” or link Aadhaar to various schemes. The consequences of such coercion are terrible - the death of 11-year old Santoshi Kumari from starvation in Jharkhand, for instance, after the local ration dealer cancelled her family’s ration card for not “seeding” (or linking) it with their Aadhaar number. Every single day, we receive e-mails and SMS messages from banks and mobile service companies demanding we link Aadhaar or have our account frozen/suspended!

Government's false stand in court on Aadhaar have spurred new Opt Out, Delink Aadhaar campaigns, calling the bluff on the government’s claim.

The claim ignores the repeated coercion thanks to which these 118 crore Indians have an Aadhaar. Many such citizens are now demanding to opt out of the Aadhaar ecosystem or delink their Aadhaar from various services
Within five days of its launch, over 1,200 people in Meghalaya alone have signed a petition asking to opt out of Aadhaar altogether
Rethink Aadhaar’s “Delink Aadhaar” campaign, similar to the campaign in Meghalaya, has received more than 2,300 responses from people wanting to either delink their Aadhaar or opt-out of Aadhaar altogether
Calls for opting-out on Twitter alone have been seen more than two lakh times, and have gathered more than 8000 engagements in the past month
Two online petitions, one demanding that mandatory linking of Aadhaar be stopped, and the one asking people to Say No to Aadhaar, have together received over 1,100 signatures
Last but not least, the government’s claim ignores the dangers of a single ID with dubious security measures, now being widely exposed

The claims with respect to support for Aadhaar is similar to the government repeatedly making highly overstated claims about savings from welfare programs linked to Aadhaar, repeatedly exposed by independent researchers. Some examples of the problems faced since Aadhaar linking began:

Fefi Devi says she enrolled in Aadhaar but the machine does not recognise her fingerprints. After Aadhaar was made mandatory, she can no longer get her pension in the village, and has to now travel 10 kilometers spending Rs 150 for getting her Rs 500 pension

Sc Orders Banks Telcos To Inform Customers Of Last Date For Linking Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Today, the Supreme Court tagged the four new petitions brought before it with the other pending Aadhaar cases. All the petitions will be heard by a Constitution Bench, possibly by end of November. The Court assured the petitioners that if the matter is not heard at the end of November, it would consider issuing interim orders to stay the linking of Aadhaar with bank accounts and mobile services. For now, it issued directions that messages from telcos and bank accounts must specify the deadline for linking Aadhaar, which remain unchanged as December 31 for bank accounts and Feb 6 for mobile services.

Some media reports suggest that the deadlines have been extended. This is not the case. The confusion arises from an affidavit submitted by the government to the Supreme Court where the government stated that the deadline for linking bank accounts may be extended but has issued no instruction or notification to that effect.

Senior advocates representing the petitioners brought to the Court’s attention that telcos and banks were sending threatening messages on a daily basis. The Attorney-General claimed that these were only oral assertions by the petitioners, to which Justice Sikri replied "We all know what's happening, we are getting these messages too." We hope that the honourable judges will pull up the government for similarly misrepresenting the ground realities of Aadhaar-linked welfare programmes. In Jharkhand alone, the failure of the Aadhaar-PDS ecosystem has resulted in two starvation deaths, as reported recently.

Rethink Aadhaar Demands An Immediate End To The Linkage And Use Of Aadhaar And Biometric Authentication

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

There have been reports coming in of starvation deaths because people are not being able to access their ration entitlements due to failure to link with and authenticate using Aadhaar. Some of these reports can be found in the update from the Right to Food Campaign at the end of this mail. The State of Aadhaar Report 2016-17 shows that failure rates, after multiple attempts, vary between 7% and 17%. Their subsequently updated figures from here is reproduced below. Other reports show failure rates as high as 66% This is unacceptably high and, translated in to absolute numbers, the number beneficiaries being excluded is in the order of crores across the nation. Please also see this documentary to hear voices from the ground about how Aadhaar is playing with peoples lives without any accountability.

Following these developments, the Department of Food & Public Distribution issued an order (attached with this mail) stating, "all field functionaries in the State may be instructed to ensure that no instance of denial of food grains or deletion of names of family from the Ration Card database only on the ground of non possession of Aadhaar takes place and strict action is taken by State / UT Governments for denial of benefits".

Additionally, there have been reports of denial of healthcare services for lack of Aadhaar against which a statement was issued that also highlighted concerns of privacy of medical history and its linkage to Aadhaar. It can be found here.

Further, a "gang that was involved in counterfeiting Aadhaar cards, hailed for their bulletproof biometric features at the centre of the government's push for reforms in welfare, taxation and communications", put paid to the claim that it is "robust enough to eliminate ... fake identities". Earlier this year, we also learned how "impersonation by illegally storing Aadhaar biometric data" is possible raising serious questions about the security behind the "state-of-the-art digital and online Id" and "one of the key pillars of the ‘Digital India’".

Given the state of Aadhaar, Rethink Aadhaar demands an immediate end to the linkage and use of Aadhaar and biometric authentication to access government services and entitlements.

The latest update from the Right to Food Campaign (which has been edited to include only Aadhaar related updates) is following. We would like to thank Aysha of the Right to Food Campaign (copied on this mail) for this compilation.

Hume Aadhaar Nahi Sudhar Chahiye Mnerega Workers At A Nation Wide Protest

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Aadhaar Act, 2016 as it says is supposed to be for the “targeted delivery of financial and other subsidies, benefits and services.” But the ground reality tells us a different story.

Thousands of MNEREGA workers gathered at Jantar Mantar for five days from 11th September to 15th September 2017 to express their frustration over lack of wages, no ration, and poor maternity benefits.

They revealed that Anganwaadi workers had not been receiving wages for the past 6 months. They have no food to eat. How are they supposed to work in such poor conditions?

One woman expressed that the villagers haven’t been receiving ration for the past 2 and a half years. They are not even getting kerosene to cook their food. After the introduction of Aadhaar, their living conditions have gotten miserable. She said, “Aadhaar ke wajah se hume bahut dikaat ho rahi hai. Ration nahi milta, hum majdoori karne waale hai” (We have been facing a lot of problems because of Aadhaar. We who do manual labour can no longer get ration under the PDS system, to sustain our families).

Another woman said that they all have had to pay Rs. 100 each to make the Aadhaar number card which is supposed to be free of cost. They have had to pay more money to add their children’s names to the cards to avail benefits.

Tukaram Malawe from the Dalit Adivasi Jagrati Sangathan in Badwani, Madhya Pradesh said that women workers have not been able to avail maternity benefits under the Janani Suraksha Yojna after Aadhaar has been made mandatory to avail these services.

One pregnant woman worker reached the hospital at midnight in excruciating labour pain and she was asked to produce her Aadhaar card first. There was no means of commute in the night and with a lot of difficulty her husband went home to get the card.

No Ambulance For Pregnant Women Without Aadhaar Say Mnrega Workers From Mp

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On the third day of the NREGA Sangharsh Morcha hundreds of MNREGA rural workers gathered at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi spoke of the varied problems they are facing due to Aadhaar, a biometrics linked ID, being made mandatory to continue getting essential services.

Concerned Citizens Call For Independent Audit Of Aadhaar Database

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

In a shocking security breach of Aadhaar, India’s biometric ID project for residents, the police have arrested 10 men in Uttar Pradesh in North India for successfully creating fake biometrics identities in the Aadhaar database, by cloning fingerprints.

On September 11, the Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force caught a 10-member gang who have been impersonating the credentials of certified Aadhaar operators both by faking the operators’ fingerprints using photopolymer resin, and by illegally cracking open enrollment software of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).

As per news reports, the criminal gang lifted the fingerprints of the operators sub-contracted by the UIDAI, printing the fingerprints on a butter paper. Additionally, they illegally used a software vulnerability to bypass the iris authentication check established by the government. Such a breach would allow any one to send enrollment packets into the Central Identities Data Repository, where all biometrics and demographics data of Indian residents are stored.

News reports indicate the revenue model of this latest theft was abased on selling kits of software, and fingerprints at Rs 5,000 each, which allowed people to run fake enrollment agencies.

The police team claimed in raids, they found “38 cloned fingerprints on paper, 46 cloned fingerprints made of a chemical, 12 mobile phones, two Aadhaar finger scanners, two retina scanners, eight rubber stamps, 18 Aadhaar cards”, according to an Indian Express report. The investigation is still on, and Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force have said the network operating the latest Aadhaar scam may extend to several states.

We demand that the UIDAI:

Immediately halt coerced enrollment, linking of services and existing IDs to Aadhaar; withdraw of all notifications issues under section 7 of Aadhaar Act mandating Aadhaar for essential services
Independent audit of Aadhaar database, by a public agency with public representation
That UIDAI immediately notify and compensate unsuspecting residents whose personal biometrics data may have been compromised at these fake enrollment centers
UIDAI make public the records of when did the details of the Uttar Pradesh STF police investigation and raids first come to light, for how long and in how many states have such security breaches been found so far
UIDAI must explain to Standing Committee on Home Affairs how many instances of breach / attempt to breach of Aadhaar database has been notified to UIDAI and what has been the action taken by UIDAI in all such cases?

What this latest breach means

The latest incident is a shocking breach of public trust. The government claims Aadhaar is more foolproof than any existing Proof of Identity and Proof of Address documents because it is accompanied by biometrics.

As per the UIDAI, only authorized agents can do enrollment, and all enrollment must be validated by the operator's finger print and iris along, with their Aadhaar number. This breach shows a poor process of approving who could be doing the enrollments as unaudited and unverified enrollments entered the CIDR central database. This attack shows the government’s claims to be false and makes approved enrollments in the CIDR made via these compromised operator accounts worthless.

In this latest security breach, the criminal gang had successfully cracked open the enrollment software. Official statements and news reports on silent on how this was done. The result was that they were able to send enrollments into CIDR by impersonating the credentials of certified operators.

The latest incident shows the UIDAI is unable to guarantee the veracity of data in the Aadhaar repository. It has failed to guarantee the security of residents’ identity information, including core biometrics which cannot be replaced. Experts have also warned that if a fingerprint can be faked on a high resolution scanner used during enrollment, it can definitely be faked on the low resolution scanners used during authentication.

Aadhaar-based biometric scams, identity theft are now a real risk for the poor, especially those with less access to digital literacy.

Delhi Hc Appointed Commissioner Records Exclusion From Food Rations Due To Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi High Court directs Delhi government to operationalize transparency, grievance redress and accountability provisions of National Food Security Act, says no deserving person should be left out of the ambit of food security.

In a landmark hearing today, a bench of the Delhi High Court comprising Chief Justice Geeta Mittal & Justice C. Hari Shankar said that were appalled to note that the Delhi government had failed to promulgate rules under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) including those related to transparency, grievance redress and accountability provisions despite passage of more than 3 years since the enactment of the law. The Court directed the government to frame Rules and operationalise all provisions of the law in a time-bound manner to ensure proper functioning of ration shops in Delhi. Rules under the law are required to be framed by the State government, but till date the Delhi government had not promulgated any rules.

These directions came in an ongoing case filed by the Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan against Aadhaar being made mandatory for receiving ration under the National Food Security Act. The High Court said that no deserving and eligible person should be left out of the ambit of food security. Several affidavits were filed by people testifying how either they themselves or members of their family were excluded from the National Food Security Act as they did not possess Aadhaar at the time when ration cards were made. The Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan informed the court that it had identified many more cases of exclusions of the most marginalised sections of society- homeless, transgenders, residents of slums etc.- due to Aadhaar being a mandatory condition for accessing rations. Download report here.

In the last hearing the Court had appointed Mr. Zoheb Hossain (advocate) to act as a commissioner of the court and meet with people who are being excluded from food security due to Aadhaar and also visit the shops where Aadhaar enabled Point of Sale (POS) devices were installed. The report of the Commissioner recorded the problems faced by people due to Aadhaar being mandatory and also the problems in areas where Aadhaar based biometric authentication through Point of Sale (POS) device was made mandatory for receiving food entitlements from ration shops. It is the first time that a report by an independent person appointed by the court has confirmed that making Aadhaar mandatory for receiving ration has led to exclusions. In fact even the response filed by the Delhi government admitted that there were problems in the delivery of ration using Point of Sale devices- like network coverage, lack of electricity, biometric failures etc.,- due to which the government had to allow manual distribution of rations.

The commissioner’s report also highlights that Aadhaar in itself cannot resolve all the issues plaguing the public distribution system. When the commissioner visited the ration shops to examine the problems due to POS devices, the shops were found to be closed during working hours. The Commissioner had to call up the Food Department officials in order to get the ration shops to open. The High Court noted that poor functioning of ration shops is a key problem which hinders peoples’ ability to access rations.

Supreme Court Affirms The Right To Privacy As A Fundamental Right

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

We welcome the judgment of the Supreme Court affirming the Right to Privacy as a fundamental right. This is a historic day.

This judgment comes to us after a reference in the Aadhaar cases starting in in 2012 where the Union Government in August 2015 argued that the fundamental right to privacy does not exist under the Constitution. Since then the government and UIDAI, the agency managing the Aadhaar database, have consistently argued in Court that Indians have no fundamental privacy and that privacy is a concern only of the elite. These pernicious arguments have finally been laid to rest.

The unanimous judgment unequivocally recognises the fundamental right to privacy. Today, the majority judgment states what should never have been in doubt that the people of this country have the fundamental right to privacy, whether rich or poor. There can be no waiver of fundamental rights under any circumstances.

The judgment recognises the efforts of the government to formulate a data protection law. Any law, including a data protection law, that might be formulated will have to make sure that it protects the people's right to privacy. Any policy can be tested on whether it breaches the right to privacy.

The Union Government had attempted to subvert the Aadhaar matters by referring it to a 9 judge bench of the Supreme Court. Now that the Supreme Court has taken a decision in favour of the petitioners, this means that the field is clear for the Aadhaar now to finally resume hearing by a smaller bench.

We welcome an early hearing of the Aadhaar petitions.

The State has been put on notice that it must protect our right to privacy.

Explainer What Is The Right To Privacy Judgement All About

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

When is the judgement expected?

The Right to Privacy judgement is expected today, after a wait of over two years, or 744 days. See timeline of orders.

How did we get here?

In 2015, Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi while defending the Aadhaar project that seeks to assign every resident a biometric ID, argued that Indians have no right to privacy under the Indian Constitution. This shocked observers and legal experts. The government’s claim would set back the privacy debate by over 50 years.
Over decades, the Supreme Court has in its judgements read the right to privacy into the Constitution. The highest court in doing so had recognised that without a right to privacy, the right to liberty and freedom of expression cannot survive. The government’s claim threatened our basic rights.

So this case is not about Aadhaar but it still is?

Yes, today’s judgement is specifically on if there is a right to privacy under the Indian Constitution. A bench of nine judges including the Chief Justice of India, Justice Khehar, Justices Jasti Chelameswar, SA Bobde, RK Agarwal, Rohinton Nariman, AM Sapre, DY Chandrachud, SK Kaul and S Abdul Nazeer will give their verdict on right to privacy. After this is decided, a smaller bench will take a final call on the Aadhaar project.

In the interim period of two years of a wait for the Right to Privacy judgement, the Government of India has blatantly violated the prior orders of the Court restraining the use and expansion of Aadhaar. It has linked and made Aadhaar mandatory for filing taxes, operating bank accounts, for children’s schemes to get school lunches, scholarships, taking exams, stipends for the disabled, causing immense hardship to ordinary citizens.

As it has since its start, the Aadhaar project has run ahead of the law. The government has tried to force people to enrol citizens to enroll in the project and cited the enrolment numbers as justification for continuing the project, with no respect for citizens’ legal rights, and their consent.

What is the big deal about privacy?

Privacy is the basis of the freedom to dissent. With unfettered surveillance, every time you disagree with the state, they can take advantage of the huge imbalance of information between them and you. They can put you under pressure to concede or use information that you did not even know they possessed to embattle you in court. And their story need not be true. The availability of mass data does not automatically reveal the truth. The truth has to be extracted from it. The details of your phone calls, movements, purchases, demographics and social interactions can be used to construct any number of different truths.

Aadhaar links multiple databases, and the Aadhaar database stores your “meta-data” authentication records, which can reveal the fine details of whom you interact with, where you travel, which organisation you donate to, which hospital you visit, building a 360 degree profile of you.

If Aadhaar is “deactivated”, it can threaten to cut off a citizen from essential services. The mere existence of such an infrastructure will stifle dissent. How comfortable are you with that?

Don't be an Aadhaar Adarsh Balak, fight for your privacy!

Get Ready For The Right To Privacy Judgement By The Supreme Court

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Tomorrow the Supreme Court of India will decide whether or not Indian citizens have a fundamental right to privacy. This historic decision will have far reaching consequences. A bench of nine judges including the Chief Justice of India, Justice Khehar, Justices Jasti Chelameswar, SA Bobde, RK Agarwal, Rohinton Nariman, AM Sapre, DY Chandrachud, SK Kaul and S Abdul Nazeer have heard the case.

The 9-judge bench deciding this was constituted in August 2015 following a reference made in the Aadhaar/UID case (Puttuswamy & Anr WP Civil No. 494 of 2012) almost 2 years ago. Petitioners, activists, academics and lawyers skeptical of the Aadhaar project have been waiting since then for the resolution of the question of whether or not a fundamental right to privacy will be recognized by the Supreme Court. In the interim period, the Government of India blatantly violated the prior orders of the Court restraining the use and expansion of Aadhaar. As the project has grown, so has awareness of its multiple shortcomings and of the threat it poses to the security and welfare of the country.

It is important to remember that the Union of India has repeatedly in its arguments pressed and submitted that no fundamental right to privacy exists. It has in the course of these, and earlier hearings, almost ludicrously, denied the existence of people’s rights over their own bodies.

We have faith and hope that the highest Court of this land will in its wisdom recognize the fundamental right to privacy tomorrow. But whatever the decision of the Court, this means that the Aadhaar matters will finally resume normal hearing.

Evidence is mounting of exclusion, devastation of welfare programs, inadequacy of legal protections, the threat of mass surveillance and the weakening of national security. The decision tomorrow means that we must be prepared to increase awareness and bring the Court’s attention to the massive violation of people’s rights that is the Aadhaar project.

Responce To Various Issues Raised By Ceo Uidai

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

On 8th Aug, 2017, a press conference was organized in Delhi by Satark Nagrik Sangathan, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, Right to Food Campaign and Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan to expose the claims of the Government about the benefits of Aadhaar. During the recently concluded hearings on privacy in the Supreme Court, the government made tall claims about Aadhaar ensuring food security for millions of people. The Prime Minister in February 2017, in Parliament, stated that the use of Aadhaar and technology had helped weed out 3.95 crore bogus ration cards. However, experience on the ground and information accessed under the RTI Act shows that such claims are not backed by evidence.

In response to the press conference, the media reported Dr. Ajay Bhushan Pandey, CEO UIDAI, as saying that the findings “arise from a skewed approach” and “misinterpretations”. Further, it was reported that according to him, “to claim that Aadhaar is responsible for denial is a misconstrued fact presented with malafide intent”.

Anjali Bhardwaj, Nikhil Dey, Dipa Sinha & Amrita Johri have written to Dr. Ajay Bhushan Pandey, replying to the various issues raised by him. The contents of the letter are below and can be downloaded here.

Call For Interns

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

We are looking for an intern who will work on Rethink Aadhaar’s communications and outreach efforts, as well as monitoring developments and news on the Aadhaar project, which is now the world’s largest biometrics database.

The person will be mentored and guided by several Rethink Aadhaar campaign members, who work in areas of law, social policy, economics research, and advocacy.

Deadline
The target start date for the internship is September 2017 – so apply soon!

Interns can expect to undertake the following responsibilities:

Track developments related to Aadhaar project in parliament and state legislature discussions, public records, government notifications
Follow ongoing Right to Privacy, and Aadhaar legal challenge hearings in the Supreme Court
Visit Aadhaar enrolment centers, other facilities, fair price shops, to research and document facts on Aadhaar enrolment and authentication through articles, blogposts, short videos
Assist in the drafting of press releases in English/Hindi, and performing other related duties as required including the Rethink Aadhaar campaign’s social media presence

Some of the benefits of interning at Rethink Aadhaar include:

Develop research and organization skills
Deeper understanding of the communications and policy environment on Aadhaar project
Grow a network and get familiar with the policy and advocacy space in New Delhi.
Work in a motivated group of individuals in a campaign who share data, and findings from the ground on experience of citizens in the Aadhaar project

Qualifications

Ideally, candidates are recent graduates or students of Law, Communications, Journalism, International Relations, Public Policy, Economics, Political Science, Sociology, or related fields. This is a great opportunity for someone who’s looking for experience to understand how legal and parliamentary research is done, as well as the work of grassroots campaigns in the social policy space.

While a legal background is not required, a working knowledge of legal debate over and background of Aadhaar project is highly favourable
A genuine interest in human rights, social policy, field research
Good written communication skills
Motivated to work and learn

Location

The internship will be in New Delhi. We will try to provide office space as and when required, but we are counting on your interest and motivation to get work done at home

Time Commitment and Terms

This position will start in September 2017. The duration of the position will be two months, and can be extended
It is open to candidates finishing studies, who need a flexible schedule
The internship will not be remunerated, but we will provide support for any travel related to research or documentation on Aadhaar scheme’s implementation
We will try provide need-based stipends

Application Requirements

To apply, send a copy of your CV and a brief cover letter explaining your interest and qualifications for the position, and one reference to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in. Please use “Internship Application– [Your Name]” as the subject line.

Women, Adivasi, Dalit individuals are encouraged to apply.

The Tyranny Of Aadhaar Newsletter Aug 2017

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Here is the Aug edition of the Tyranny of Aadhaar newsletter, bringing you the real state of Aadhaar roll-out and how it affects crores of Indians across states. So far, the only real beneficiary of Aadhaar is: the State & Corporates, not the citizens. We share relevant data, and findings from the ground on experience of citizens in the Aadhaar project to sift through the false claims made about the biometrics project. Join us in demanding freedom from this new form of digital slavery 70 years after we won Independence.

LEGAL STATUS OF AADHAAR UP IN THE AIR

Press Conference On 8Th Aug 2017 To Expose Gois False Claims About Benefits Of Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Press release, 8th Aug, 2017

A press conference was held on 8th August 2017 to question the claims of the government about savings due to Aadhaar and about the benefits of Aadhaar in welfare programs and schemes.

On February 7, 2017, the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha stated that use of Aadhaar and technology led to the discovery of nearly 4 crore (3 crore 95 lakhs) bogus ration cards. Since no details of these 3.95 crore ration cards was available online, an RTI application was filed by Anjali Bhardwaj to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) seeking state-wise break-up of the 3.95 crore bogus rations cards and the names and addresses of all those whose cards were cancelled. The PMO transferred the RTI application to Department of Food & Public Distribution (DFPD). DFPD replied stating that information about the state-wise number of bogus ration cards was available on their website. On the website of the DFPD, a file titled “Deletion of bogus ration cards by States/UTs” is available. This file provides the state-wise “Statement showing the number of bogus/ineligible rations cards deleted by the State/UT Governments with effect from July 2006 onwards” and was “Updated on 16.02.2016”. Anjali Bhardwaj said that the file on the website of the Ministry is not related to the statement of the PM as it neither pertains to the time period mentioned by the PM nor does it state that the cards were found to be bogus due to technology or Aadhaar. Further, the figures provided in the file do not match with the figures stated by the PM.

With respect to the question dealing with the names and addresses of those whose cards were cancelled, the RTI application was transferred to all the State/UT governments by the Department of Food & Public Distribution (DFPD). Till date 25 states/UTs have sent letters/replies to the RTI application which was transferred to them. 13 states have replied stating that there are no bogus ration cards. For details of the responses received from states, please see the folder attached.

Therefore, despite the passage of more than 5 months since seeking information under the RTI Act the government has not been able to provide information/ evidence on the basis of which the PM made the statement in the Lok Sabha. While the video of the proceedings and the uncorrected record of Lok Sabha of 7th February 2017 mentions the number of bogus ration cards as nearly 4 crore, meaning 3 crore 95 lakhs, the corrected version of the debate states 4 crore, meaning 2 crore 33 lakhs. It is not clear why the content of the PM’s speech has been changed as the video clearly shows the figure as being- 4 crore, meaning 3 crore 95 lakhs bogus ration cards.

Similarly, recently the media quoted government officials as stating that 1 crore fake job cards had been found during the process of cleaning up by seeding with Aadhaar etc. Jean Dreze filed an RTI application which showed that so-called “fake” and “duplicate” job cards account for less than 13% of all deletions in 2016-7 which were 94 lakh. Other deletions were on account of a change in address, mistakes on job cards, people who wanted to surrender their job card etc. Bearing in mind that there are more than 12 crore job cards in the country, according to official data, duplicate and fake job cards account for barely 1 per cent of all job cards according to this tally.

The speakers demanded that the government must provide the evidence and basis of all such statements as eventually such figures inform policy decisions and public discourse. Nikhil Dey pointed out that in Rajasthan when the government cancelled the pension of more than 10 lakh beneficiaries claiming that these had been weeded out through various reforms including Aadhaar, on ground verification showed the hollowness the claims. In Bhim block, the government had shown that 2900 beneficiaries had been weeded out as they had died, however, a door to door verification showed that more than 1300 of these people classified as dead were in fact alive and were being denied their pensions. He said that this showed the callousness of the administration and exposed why it was urgent that the data be made public so that people can verify it.

The speakers also stated that if the claims of such large scale corruption being weeded out through Aadhaar were indeed true, then the government must also show how many FIRs have been filed till date and what action has been taken against government officials with whose collusion all these bogus cards were made.

The speakers strongly contested the claims of the government that Aadhaar was ensuring food security for millions of people.

Nikhil Dey cited the official data of the Rajasthan government which shows that since September 2016, when Aadhaar biometric authentication was made mandatory in the state, over 25 per cent of ration card holders have been unable to draw their rations. That amounts to 25 lakh families, or more than a crore of the most vulnerable people. The removal of the manual override mechanism, which could be used when biometric authentication failed, has resulted in an additional 5 lakh families being excluded in April and May 2017.

Governments Claim That Only Wrong Doers Need Privacy Shocks The Court

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

A Summary of the Final Day of the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench Hearing

The 9-Judge Constitution Bench concluded hearings to settle the question of whether there exists a fundamental right to privacy in India. The bench has reserved its judgment over whether privacy is a fundamental right in India. The judgment is expected in the next four weeks.

The government’s counsels again insisted that the Supreme Court should not recognise privacy as a fundamental right. They repeated arguments that privacy is an elite concept, that privacy interests are being only canvassed by a minority of wealthy citizens, and even that only wrong-doers were asking for privacy rights. Counsel for State of Gujarat Rakesh Dwivedi began arguing that privacy is an abstract concept. He referred to how, for medical treatment, it could be waived. At one point, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud asked if recognising a fundamental right to privacy would diminish India's stature as a “knowledge economy” and an economic powerhouse. (The same has also sometimes been asserted by the Aadhaar project’s proponents who have argued “Data is the new oil”, raising questions if citizens’ biometric data provided to government without any real choice should be harvested for commercial use.)

Advocate Gopal Shankaranarayanan, appearing for think-tank Centre for Civil Society argued that if privacy was deemed a fundamental right, it could not be waived and this would be impractical. Lastly, Arghya Sengupta, of think-tank Vidhi Center for Legal Policy, represented the State of Haryana, and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, claiming that no new jurisprudence was required as existing right to liberty sufficiently covered privacy on a case to case basis.

A number of senior lawyers with an illustrious record then gave a strong rejoinder to the Government of India, arguing that privacy is a fundamental right. They emphasised that in the 70th year of our Independence, it was extremely regressive of the Government of India to claim that citizens have no fundamental right to privacy. The senior advocates argued for the fundamental right to privacy, irrespective of whether a citizen is rich or poor. They cited examples from Canada, South Africa, and other countries where privacy is recognised as a fundamental right.

Govt Claims That Right To Privacy Will Make The Poor Suffer

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

A Summary of Day 5 of the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench Hearing

The 9-Judge Constitution Bench continued hearing the arguments of the Government of India to settle the question of whether there exists a fundamental right to privacy in India. In August 2015, the Government of India denied that a fundamental right to privacy exists in India in the ongoing Aadhaar case. After the 9-judge bench finishes hearings on the limited question of whether Indians have a fundamental right to privacy, a 5-judge bench is then expected to rule on whether the Aadhaar scheme violates such a fundamental right and will thereby decide the fate of the Aadhaar project.

On Tuesday, counsel for Maharashtra CA Sundaram continued to argue for the state that the framers of the Constitution did not include right to privacy as a fundamental right. He claimed that since the framers excluded it, the court could not now read this into the Constitution. Justice Chandrachud objected it was not fair to say that there was a categorical exclusion of privacy by the framers of the Constitution.

The Additional Solicitor General Tushar Mehta then continued on the same lines. He also repeatedly also stressed that the court should not lay down any fundamental right to privacy as only Parliament can make law on the subject. He also provided a list of countries that do not provide a fundamental right to privacy which included China, Israel and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He even included countries that do not even have a Bill of Rights or any written constitution.

The ASG also submitted before court that a government committee has been constituted for framing a right to privacy. The letter is signed off by the Cyber Law and Aadhaar officer at MEITY. The Rethink Aadhaar campaign notes the composition of the committee with concern and holds a reasonable apprehension that this may be an exercise to accommodate concerns around Aadhaar.

The ASG on Tuesday again cited the PUCL versus Union of India Right to Food case and argued that Aadhaar is intended to reform the public distribution system. But the Right to Food Campaign has strongly opposed use of Aadhaar in nutrition schemes such as ration and mid day meals, and has even challenged government making Aadhaar mandatory for food rations in Delhi High Court and Karnataka High Court.

Mehta again and again termed that privacy was a "perceived" right, and one which concerns only the elite.The ASG claimed if privacy is a fundamental right, then it will have a huge impact on “good governance through Aadhaar”, and the poorest of the poor would suffer if a “perceived” right to privacy is recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court!

Government Of India Ties Itself In Knots In Righttoprivacy Case

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

A Summary of Day 4 of the Nine-Judge Constitution Bench Hearing

On Thursday, arguing for the Union, the Attorney-General K.K, Venugopal began with reading out US Supreme Court decisions arguing that “informational privacy” can never be a fundamental right. In the discussion, Justice DY Chandrachud countered this position saying America lagged behind Europe in protecting informational privacy. In response, the Attorney-General reiterated that the right to privacy could not be determined without taking into account cultural and environmental norms, which he held the US courts had done, and that India should not imitate foreign jurisprudence.

Justice Chandrachud expressed the need to determine what kind of data gets protection under privacy laws, which in turn brought up the question of balancing compelling state interest and legitimate state interest. To the AG’s subsequent argument for the consideration of legitimate state interest (with which Justice Chandrachud and Nariman did not agree), Justice Chandrachud underlined the need for robust data security mechanisms.

Subsequently, the Additional Solicitor-General Tushar Mehta read out provisions from the Aadhaar Act. 2016, dealing with information sharing. Justice Nariman asked if the discussion on privacy interests in the Aadhaar Act suggested a legal recognition of privacy. Choosing not to answer that directly, the ASG sought to assure the court that the Act protected both privacy and data.

Attorney-General K.K. Venugopal, however, jumped in with the claim that protecting privacy through a legislative Act meant that there was no fundamental right to privacy. He reiterated that if there was a fundamental right to privacy it could not be claimed in relation to Aadhaar.

In conclusion, he revisited the two cases at the heart of the Constitution Bench hearing - M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh- and emphasized that the majority views in these should be upheld.

Right To Privacy Not Absolute In A Developing Economy Like India Government

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The 9-Judge constitution bench resumed hearings to settle the question on whether there exists a fundamental right to privacy in India. This bench in the words of Justice Nariman “..will decide the issue once and for all for conceptual clarity for the nation.” In an important development, several states decided to join the issue on the side of the petitioners and argued that there does exist a fundamental right to privacy in India.

Background
First, a recap. Last week, a large number of lawyers with an illustrious record argued for privacy as a fundamental right. This included Soli Sorabjee, Anand Grover, Arvind Datar, Meenakshi Arora, S Poovayya. Senior advocate Shyam Divan who argued in the PAN-Aadhaar case that Aadhaar was like an “electronic leash” on the people also appeared for the petitioners.

The government’s contention – riding on the back of the Kharak Singh judgement - which had raised the question on privacy as a fundamental right in the first place did not seem to convince the bench. There have been 40 judgements since then reiterating the right to privacy.

In fact, the government has itself, in its earlier submissions in the Aadhaar matter, not contested privacy as a fundamental right. In fact, Finance Minister Mr. Jaitley has said so on the floor of the House. Further, in the Whatsapp case, the government has this week argued for the right to privacy!

Right To Privacy Hearing Day 2

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

*Privacy crucial in digital age*

A democracy cannot exist without the Right to Privacy

A Summary of Day 2 of the Nine Judge Constitution Bench Hearing

The bench of nine SC judges continued hearing arguments for a second day, to settle the question of whether Indian citizens have a fundamental right to privacy, in the ongoing Aadhaar case. Several petitioners had questioned whether the government can mandatorily link the 12-digit, biometrics linked UID number to government services, and make it compulsory to enroll in the biometrics database.

Senior advocate Arvind Datar reiterating that any right to privacy cannot be solely located under any one article of the Indian Constitution. Given the judges’ questions on defining the contours of the right to privacy, Datar laid emphasis on deciding the test of right to privacy on a case-by-case basis.

Senior advocate Anand Grover then reiterated that the right to privacy must be given a flexible meaning. He referred to the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, specifically Section 2(f) to suggest that international human rights law had been read into Indian law. Locating dignity within Article 21, he said privacy must be cultivated from dignity. He highlighted the hyphenation of “privacy-dignity claims”, quoting from the 1975 order in Govind vs State of MP: “there can be no doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care.”

Privacy Is A Fundamental Right

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Today, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court presided over by Chief Justice of India J.S. Khehar heard a bunch of petitions today challenging Aadhaar, a biometrics-linked residents ID, on different grounds, including those related to right to privacy.

They decided to constitute a nine-judge bench to decide on the issue of whether we enjoy a right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India.

Aadhaar Urgent

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Supreme Court on Friday, July 7 heard applications for interim relief to stay notifications which make Unique Identification Number or Aadhaar, a biometrics-linked identity number for residents, mandatory for availing any benefits and entitlements. The applications are by the same petitioners whose challenge against the constitutionality of the Aadhaar Act is pending before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.

The notifications make Aadhaar mandatory for a number of schemes, including for children to get hot cooked meals, several scholarships for disabled students and students in SC. ST, OBC categories, schemes for relief for women rescued from trafficking, bonded labourers, and relief for Bhopal gas leak victims. The notifications make possession of an Aadhaar number, or proof of enrolment in Aadhaar database, mandatory.

Petitioners have prayed that imposing enrolment in Aadhaar as a pre-condition for availing social benefits violates the fundamental rights of citizens. It is causing denial of benefits to persons who are otherwise legally entitled to the benefits, at enrolment stages, as well as when they face biometric rejection, data errors, network errors, and other problems.

The hearing began with the senior counsel for the petitioners Shyam Divan taking the Bench through the earlier orders of the Supreme Court including those of 11th August 2015 and the 15th Oct 2015 which clearly stated that Aadhaar shall be purely voluntary. Divan emphasised that the case deals with a vital constitutional question as allowing Aadhaar project to go ahead unchecked in the manner, seeking linking aadhaar to almost every transaction and aspect in life, is effectively reducing the citizen into a 12-digit number and transforming the country into a concentration camp for the citizens.

The Court was of the view that given that the entire matter was before a Constitution Bench (it is now 696 days since a constitution bench was asked to me formed to finally decide on Aadhaar matter), and that the litigation on Aadhaar has been lingering on for years, the correct course would be for both the parties i.e. the petitioners and the government to jointly mention before and impress upon the Chief Justice to constitute a Constitutional Bench to finally dispose of the entire batch of petitions. Attorney-General K.K. Venugopal who was present in Court agreed to join Divan for a mentioning before the CJI early next week for that purpose.

The Bench also indicated that in the eventuality of CJI not being able to form a Constitution bench, petitioners may come back to the court and argue for interim relief.

These applications were earlier heard on 9th May and then on 27th June by a vacation bench consisting of Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Navin Sinha. July 7 hearing was before a special three judge bench headed by Justice Chelameswar sitting with Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Sinha. Justice Chelameswar also headed the bench that passed the order dated 11th August 2015 that referred the batch of petitions challenging Aadhaar project to a constitution bench as it felt it required a definitive pronouncement on, among other issues, the issue of the existence and scope of a fundamental right to privacy under the Constitution of India.

The Friday’s hearing marks the first time that the government has agreed to mention before the CJI to constitute a larger bench to finally hear the constitutional challenge to the project and the Aadhaar Act. In October 2015, government had mentioned before the then CJI Dattu to get the Constitution Bench only to hear and decide their applications for modifying the 11th August order.

------------
How Aadhaar causes exclusion: WATCH How residents face exclusion at the UIDAI regional office in Delhi

Further readings:
Read the rejoinder by petitioners against the counter affidavit filed by the State on Aadhaar. It's not just the savings numbers that have been cooked up, but the actual enrollment figures as well.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1zazrrJPMWfaTNLQUJBVU9sT2tMZ0NPRVlCY19BNkJiRG9V/view

Govt. stats on Aadhaar coverage "puffery", includes dead, petitioners tell SC

#Aadhaar: AG KK Venugopal objects to Shyam Divan's concentration camp argument

Who Is Opposing the Aadhaar Project?

Update From The Hearing On Govt Notifications Making Aadhaar Mandatory

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Aadhaar matter (Shantha Sinha & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors) was listed before a vacation bench of Justice Khanwilkar and Justice Navin Sinha today. Applications to stay notifications issued under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act were before the Court. There are over a hundred such notifications, among them are notifications making Aadhaar mandatory for accessing benefits under mid-day meal scheme, benefits due to rescued bonded labourers, benefits due to victims of Bhopal gas leak, benefits due to girls rescued from human trafficking, benefits under PDS/NFSA etc.

Senior Advocate, Shyam Divan appeared for petitioners. The Union’s representation was led by ASG Tushar Mehta.

As the hearing began, the Union raised a preliminary point about a strong rejoinder by the Petitioners that requires a sur-rejoinder and sought time till next week to file the same. It was mentioned that the grave urgency that had arisen to keep the hearing today no longer exists as there has been an extension granted until Sep 30 for people to get Aadhaar for various notifications.

Sr Counsel for the Petitioner agreed for the adjournment in principle but wanted an ad-interim order clarifying that no person shall be deprived of any benefits till the next date of hearing until then. The Bench was of the view that the Petitioner's concerns are already covered by Para 90 and 94 of the judgment in Aadhaar-PAN case dated 09.06.2017 and that no further clarification was required.

Mr. Divan read out the previous orders of the Court as well as the judgment dated 09.06.2017 and mentioned that the interpretation of Section 7 has been left open by the Court. The Union responded saying the earlier orders were passed when the project was still a scheme and did not have a statutory basis, but the position has now changed and the project is now governed by the provisions of the Act.

There was an exchange between the Bench and Mr. Divan around what is the need for a further order till the next date of hearing as the operative part of the judgment in PAN case covered that no person shall be deprived and Mr. Divan pointed out that the extension to September 30 operated only qua people who had not enrolled for Aadhaar and not for those who had enrolled but could not link, or do not want to link or that the authentication does not work etc. and that all the petitioners want is an extension of deadline for all classes of people.

The Bench also queried Mr. Divan as to whether there are any deprived people before the Court, to which Mr. Divan responded saying that the deadline is still not over and we will have lot of people coming up in the next weeks as the deadline of June 30 gets over for various schemes.

The Bench however, refused any further clarificatory order and opined that the judgment in the PAN case was sufficient for the moment. Nor did Union of India want to make any further statement on not depriving people of any benefits till the next date of hearing and stuck to its stand that the notification including the one extending to 30th September would be followed in letter and spirit.

The next hearing will be on the 7th of July.

Petitioners Rejoinder To Government Making Aadhaar Mandatory In Mid Day Meals Welfare Schemes

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Read the rejoinder by petitioners Shanta Sinha (political scientist, anti-child labour activist and padma sri winner) and Kalyani Menon-Sen (noted feminist activist) against the counter affidavit filed by the State on Aadhaar. It's not just the savings numbers that have been cooked up, but several other claims as well.

Uploaded here.

On Legal Issues Websites:
https://barandbench.com/aadhaar-115-crore-supreme-court/

http://www.livelaw.in/centre-exaggerating-aadhaar-enrolment-figures-benefits-petitioner-tells-sc-read-rejoinder-affidavit/

Delhi High Court Expresses Concern About People Not Being Able To Access Their Rations Due To Aadhaar Glitches

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Court asks lawyer representing UIDAI to visit ration shops to understand problems faced by ration card holders

The Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan has filed a case in the Delhi High Court against Aadhaar being made mandatory for receiving ration under the National Food Security Act. The matter was heard today, on May 25, by a bench of the Acting Chief Justice Geeta Mittal and Justice C. Hari Shankar.

The Government of India advocate wanted the petition to be dismissed as similar petitions are pending before the Supreme Court but the judges declined the request saying the powers under Article 226, which deals with powers of the High Courts, are broader.

It was highlighted by Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan (DRRAA) that Aadhaar is leading to exclusion in two ways

It has been made mandatory for applying for a ration card- this has led to large scale exclusions as those families which did not have Aadhaar number, have not got ration cards. Also, in many families, at the time when ration cards were being made in Delhi those members who did not have Aadhaar were not added to the ration cards. As under the National Food Security Act (NFSA), 5 kg of foodgrains per person is given, or for all the people listed on the ration card, many families are unable to access their full entitlements of ration.
In 2015, the Delhi government initiated a pilot in 42 ration shops of delivering rations through Aadhaar enabled POS (Point of Sale) device.

Despite evidence of these Point of Sale devices not functioning -- because of recurring problems of network coverage, biometric failures and rejection of even genuine beneficiaries, the government is still insisting on making biometric authentication mandatory for all shops, causing exclusion of and hardship to genuine card holder in this system.

After hearing the problems faced by people, the Court has appointed Mr. Zoheb Hossain (advocate representing the UIDAI) to act as a commissioner of the court and meet with ration card holders who are being excluded from food security due to Aadhaar, and also visit the shops where POS devices were installed.

He was requested to report back to the court on the problems being faced by people who are being denied their ration entitlements due to Aadhaar.

A Report done by the Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan (DRRAA) on the implementation of transparency, grievance redress and accountability provisions of the National Food Security Act in Delhi can be accessed at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3oQ77E3KGKBcmtZSDNKTHo3dkU/view?usp=sharing

Videos showing problems with POS devices in Delhi can be accessed at- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVSVqbW6dP0&list=PLdHEUXbHHVe30wNaeZqdb04XyJ5j3_ehc

For more details, contact:
Anjali Bhardwaj, Amrita Johri, Koninika Ray & Dipa Sinha 9810273984 (for the Delhi Rozi Roti Adhikar Abhiyan)

Sc There Is Urgency In Hearing Challenges To Notifications Making Aadhaar Mandatory In Social Benefits Schemes

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Supreme Court on Tuesday heard an important constitutional challenge against 18 notifications which have made Aadhaar mandatory for availing any benefits and entitlements.

These include notifications making Aadhaar mandatory for hot cooked meals, several scholarships for disabled students and students in SC. ST, OBC categories, schemes for women rescued from trafficking, bonded labourers, and relief for Bhopal gas leak victims.

The notifications which make possession of an Aadhaar number, or proof of enrolment in Aadhaar database, mandatory which would have resulted in denial of benefits to persons who are otherwise legally entitled to the benefits.

The petitioners, Shanta Sinha, former chairperson of the National Commission for Protection for Child Rights, and an activist campaigning against child labour and human rights activist Kalyani Menon Sen prayed that imposing enroling in Aadhaar as a pre-condition for availing social benefits violates the fundamental rights of citizens. Senior advocate Shyam Divan appeared for the petitioners.

Considering the grave and important issues which had been raised in the petition, Justice AK Sikri and AK Bhushan tagged this petition with the earlier petition challenging the Aadhaar Act, 2016, already pending in court.

The SC also in its orders recorded the submission that there is urgency in the case since the several notifications become effective by June 30.

The bench also indicated that as the matter was already pending for constitution of a bench to determine the validity of the aadhaar scheme and Aadhaar Act , the petitioner may mention this matter again to the Honorable Chief Justice.

As per the notifications of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Bhopal gas victims will not be able to seek relief — including compensation for death, permanent disability, cancer, renal failure, permanent or temporary disability — unless they submit an Aadhaar or an enrollment proof. In another notification by the Ministry of Labour and Employment without an Aadhaar number or Aadhaar enrollment slip, workers rescued from bonded labour, will not get any cash or non-cash assistance unless they show an Aadhaar number by June 30, 2017.

The petitioners have pointed out that since June 30 is the deadline for enrolment, it is important that the case is heard at the earliest.

The petitioners have stated that making Aadhaar mandatory in mid-day meal scheme, scholarship schemes availed by children below the age of 18, and disabled persons implies that the, “State is securing bio-metric and demographic data even before the age of consent in so far as children are concerned…..it is irrational and per se unconstitutional for the government to insist on Aadhaar as mandatory pre-condition for availing hot cooked meals under the mid-day meal scheme.”

Also, “making Aadhaar mandatory for the Ujjwala Scheme which provides for rehabilitation of victims of trafficking or commercial sexual exploitation and for Bhopal Gas Tragedy victims to claim compensation goes against the very objects of the said schemes.” The petitioners had made a slew of prayers, including a plea to strike down the Act as unconstitutional.

The orders of the SC are expected to be available on the Supreme Court website by late evening today.

For further information, write to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in

Untitled

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Last month, through an amendment to the Income Tax Act, Parliament made it compulsory for all taxpayers to quote their Aadhaar numbers while filing their return of income (or while applying for a new PAN number). Under the new Section 139AA of the IT Act, the consequence of not complying with this was an invalidation of the individual’s PAN number. This, in turn, would have a number of serious consequences, affecting an individual’s ability to pay her taxes, as well as being blocked from undertaking a number of transactions (such as buying a motor vehicle, or opening a bank account), all of which require a PAN number. In short, Section 139AA effectively required tax-paying individuals to get an Aadhaar Card, on the pain of visiting severe disabilities upon them in case of non-compliance.

On this blog, we have covered some of the constitutional problems with the Aadhaar scheme (which involves the taking of an individual’s biometric details, iris scan, and demographic information, ostensibly for the purpose of better authentication), the government’s conduct in having the Aadhaar Act passed as a money bill, and the Supreme Court’s continuous evasion of the issue by refusing to hear the pending constitutional challenges. Readers will recall the following facts: on 11th August 2015, when Aadhaar was still an executive scheme, three judges of the Supreme Court had referred the constitutional challenge to a larger bench, on the basis that the constitutional status of the fundamental right to privacy was in some doubt; in the meantime, the Court stipulated that Aadhaar could not be made mandatory for welfare schemes. The Constitution Bench assembled once more in October 2015 to modify that order in some respects. After that, the case has not been heard. In the meantime, Parliament passed the Aadhaar Act, which authorised the State to make Aadhaar mandatory for availing of certain benefits or subsidies. Since the passage of the Aadhaar Act, Aadhaar has been made mandatory for a wide range of goods and services, including midday meals. It is in this context that Section 139AA of the IT Act came into being: a statutory amendment that sought to (effectively) make Aadhaar compulsory for taxpayers.

Section 139AA was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Petitioners, led by senior counsel Arvind P. Datar and Shyam Divan, argued their case before a two-judge bench, over three days, followed by two days of arguments by the Union of India. Mr Datar is due to reply tomorrow, after which the hearing will conclude.

In this post, I will attempt to summarise and contextualise the key points of challenge.

Privacy Not Argued

If a case comes to the Supreme Court where the issues involved are substantially similar to another case that is already pending, the Court “tags” the latter case with the former, and hears the two together. This created a threshold problem for the Petitioners. The constitutional problems with Aadhaar remained the same, whether it was a challenge to the Aadhaar Act itself, or to the Income Tax Act making Aadhaar mandatory to file returns: basically, an alleged violation of the right to privacy. However, that question had been referred to a larger bench on 11th August 2015, and had not yet been heard. Consequently, it was a “pending case”, and according to convention, the Court hearing the challenge to the Income Tax Act would be obliged to “tag” it with the pending proceedings before the larger bench. So Petitioners had a choice: insist on their right to argue privacy, and have the case “tagged” with the pending challenge; or give up the argument on privacy, and attempt to convince the Court that Section 139AA was unconstitutional on other grounds.

Perhaps in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has effectively buried the Aadhaar challenge (three successive Chief Justices have refused to list it for hearing, despite multiple “oral mentionings” asking them to do so), Petitioners chose to go ahead with the challenge to S. 139AA without arguing privacy. This was made clear at the beginning of the hearing by Justice Sikri, who pointed out that there was no stay on Aadhaar in the case pending before the larger bench; at this, both Mr Datar and Mr Divan agreed that they would only argue the 139AA challenge on other grounds.

While Justice Sikri, sitting as part of a two-judge bench, was entirely correct in what he said (indeed, there was nothing else he could have said), the Supreme Court’s institutional disingenuousness here needs to be called out very clearly: as I have detailed in my post on judicial evasion, the constitutional challenge to Aadhaar Act has been pending for one year and eight months, with the Court – or rather, the Chief Justice – simply refusing to constitute the bench to hear it. In the meantime, the government has gone full steam ahead to create a fait accompli situation where the challenge becomes academic. Section 139AA is part of that broader program. By not allowing Petitioners to argue privacy on the ground that it was part of a pending challenge in which no stay had been granted because it had simply never been heard, the Court was – effectively – using its own refusal to hear the case as a reason to make the Petitioners fight this battle with one arm tied behind their backs!

The Arguments of Mr Arvind P. Datar

No Indirect Overruling of Judicial Orders

Mr. Arvind Datar’s first argument was that Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act amounted to an indirect legislative overruling of prior judicial orders stipulating that Aadhaar could only be voluntary. While Mr Datar conceded that Parliament was entitled to overrule a judicial decision or order by legislating to take away its very basis, he drew a distinction between direct overruling (by taking away the basis of a court order), and indirect overruling (the latter, he argued, was impermissible). Relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak vs Union of India, Indian Aluminium Co vs State of Kerala, and Janapada Sabha Chindwara vs Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd, he argued that, in the present case, had Parliament simply passed a law mandating that every individual must have an Aadhaar Number, that would have been a legitimate response to the Court’s orders; however, while the Aadhaar Act continued to insist that getting Aadhaar was voluntary, Parliament had chosen to make it mandatory in a backdoor fashion, by inserting penal consequences for not having Aadhaar in the Income Tax Act. And in case of any doubt, “we should adopt an interpretation which upholds… rights.”

Article 14

Mr Datar argued that Section 139AA violated Article 14 of the Constitution because it drew an arbitrary distinction between assessees who were individuals (and therefore compelled to get an Aadhaar Card), and non-individual assessees (such as an HUF, or a company). If the objective of introducing Section 139AA was to use Aadhaar to check black money and fraud (which the Union claimed that it was), then the distinction between individual and non-individual taxpayers bore no rational nexus to the objective, and fell foul of Article 14. T

The bench asked the natural question: given that non-individuals could not, by definition, obtain Aadhaar cards, wasn’t an Article 14 challenge misconceived to start with? In other words, the Aadhaar Card requirement was a way to check black money and fraud specifically by individual assessees. To this, Mr Datar responded by arguing that there were twelve categories of assessees under the Income Tax Act. Section 139AA picked out one class (individuals), and imposed a burden upon them. This act of disadvantaging one class could only be justified under Article 14 if it had a rational nexus with a legitimate goal; but given that black money and fraudulent transactions were not only crimes committed by individuals, there was no rational nexus between the objective and the act of singling out individuals and making them suffer.

Mr Datar also argued that there was no evidence to show that compulsory Aadhaar would actually fulfil the goal of eliminating black money and preventing fraud (or “shell companies”). In fact, the UIDAI’s own statistics showed that there were likely many duplicate Aadhaar Cards; on the other hand, only 0.4% of all PAN Cards had been shown to be duplicate. Consequently, the State had no evidence to show that a shift from PAN to PAN + Aadhaar would actually serve the goal of eliminating black money and fraud.

Article 19(1)(g)

Mr Datar argued that an individual without a PAN Card was prohibited from engaging in many transactions that were absolutely basic to life in contemporary society. These included buying or selling a motor vehicle and opening a bank account. A cancelled PAN effectively amounted to a “civil death”. It was, therefore, a violation of the freedom “to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business”, guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Once it was established that Article 19(1)(g) had been infringed, the burden shifted to the State to show that, under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, the restriction was reasonable, and in the public interest. In Modern Dental College vs State of M.P., a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had held that the correct test to apply under Article 19(6) was the test of proportionality. In a judgment authored by Justice Sikri himself, the Court held that “proportionality” involved a showing that the means chosen to achieve the “public interest” goal were themselves narrowly tailored; that is, Article 19(6) could not save a statute if it could be shown that some other method, which infringed rights to a lesser degree, could achieve the same goal. Mr Datar argued that – once again – in view of the fact that only 0.4% of all PAN Cards were found to be duplicate, and in view of Aadhaar’s own, widely publicised failings (using the UIDAI’s own data), it could not be argued that compulsory Aadhaar was a “proportionate” restriction upon the right under Article 19(1)(g).

Colourable Exercise of Power

Mr Datar concluded by arguing that Section 139AA amounted to a colourable exercise of legislative power. Solemn undertakings had been given by the Union of India to the Supreme Court that Aadhaar would remain voluntary. Aadhaar remained voluntary under the parent statute (the Aadhaar Act), but there was now a back-door attempt to make it mandatory through the Income Tax Act. In fact, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Aadhaar Act themselves made no mention of black money or fraud; Mr Datar argued that if Aadhaar was to be used for that purpose, then surely there would have been some indication of that in the parent statute. All these factors combined pointed to a clear colourable exercise of power. Mr Datar submitted that Section 139AA should accordingly be struck down as unconstitutional.

The Arguments of Mr Shyam Divan

Collision Between the Aadhaar Act and the Income Tax Act

Mr Shyam Divan argued that there was a “collision” between the Aadhaar Act and the Income Tax Act. The former made it clear that Aadhaar was to be a voluntary scheme. While the Government could make it mandatory for the purposes of availing of subsidies, it could not compel people to get an Aadhaar Number, simpliciter. The Income Tax Amendment, however, effectively compelled people to part with their biometric information and iris scans, on the pain of penal consequences. In other words, Section 139AA made mandatory what the Aadhaar Act guaranteed would be voluntary.

In response to the Bench’s observation, that surely it was open to Parliament to create two different statutory regimes – one in which Aadhaar was voluntary, and the other in which it was made mandatory for the purposes of paying Income Tax – Mr Divan argued that the Aadhaar Act and Section 139AA could not be viewed in isolation in such a manner. The Aadhaar Act was the parent statute: and everything in the Aadhaar Act suggested that, from the moment of enrolment, it was a purely voluntary exercise. Now, you could not engraft a scheme whose very basis was voluntariness and free consent, into the Income Tax Act, and make it mandatory. It was in that sense that the procedures under the Aadhaar Act and the Income Tax Act were “in collision”. Mr Divan therefore invited the Bench to read down Section 139AA of the IT Act by interpreting the word “shall” as “may”; or, in other words, convert the mandatory requirement under 139AA into voluntariness, in order to bring the Aadhaar Act and Section 139AA into harmony.

Article 14

Mr Divan’s case under Article 14 was different in important respects from Mr Datar’s. While Mr Datar had drawn a distinction between individual and non-individual assessees, Mr Divan drew a distinction between individual assessees who consented to getting an Aadhaar Card, and other individual assessees who didn’t. He argued that Section 139AA drew a distinction within this homogenous class of persons, and disadvantaged the latter. Now, in view of his previous submission – that the parent Aadhaar Act made it clear that Aadhaar was voluntary – drawing a distinction between those who had chosen to get an Aadhaar Card, and those who would now be required to get an Aadhaar Card to pay their taxes, and placing a burden upon the latter – constituted ex facie discrimination. In other words, the statute’s very purpose was discriminatory, on its face (which, according to the judgment of the Supreme Court striking down S. 6 of the DSPE Act, was impermissible). Hence, there was no need to go into questions of classification and nexus: the amendment was presumptively unconstitutional under Article 14.

Bodily Integrity

Mr Divan argued that biometric information and iris scans belonged to the individual. They were, effectively, part of the individual’s body. He cited a range of thinkers, from Hobbes and Locke on the one hand, to Salmond and Rawls on the other, to argue for the individual’s absolute ownership of her body, and her right to bodily integrity under Article 21 of the Constitution. What, he asked, did Article 21 protect, if it did not protect the body?

Justice Bhushan pointed out that at the time of issuing a passport, similar information was taken from the individual. Mr Divan argued, however, that while it was permissible to take such information for limited and narrow purposes (for instance, for the purposes of identifying an individual in case of an emergency while she was abroad), and where there was a compelling State interest, those conditions were not satisfied in the present case. Mr Divan also invoked the 1920 Identification of Prisoners Act to argue that even in pre-Constitutional, colonial statutes, information that had to do with the body was collected only in very specific circumstances, and only for a very narrow set of purposes, where it was absolutely necessary to do so. Even a refusal would only lead to an adverse inference. That manner of necessity had not been demonstrated in the present case – especially in light of the fact that Aadhaar was suffering from numerous problems of duplication and public leakages (instances of which were cited to the Court).

In sum, Mr Divan argued that fingerprints and iris scans belonged to the individual, as integral parts of her body. They could not be “nationalised” or “expropriated” by the State without express consent, unless there was a compelling State interest, and the infringement was narrowly tailored. The argument of compelling State interest and narrow tailoring may justify, for instance, the taking of DNA or blood samples in certain limited circumstances (this was in response to a question from Justice Bhushan), but certainly did not permit the kind of 24/7 tracking system established by Aadhaar. What Aadhaar was doing, Mr Divan argued, was fundamentally changing the nature of the relationship between the individual and the State; it was shifting the balance of power between individual and State to the extent that it ended up betraying the promise of the Constitution to establish “limited government”. The Constitution, he argued, was not a “charter of servitude“; it envisaged free individuals, whose bodies could not be invaded without their express consent. He relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, NALSA vs Union of India and Aruna Shanbaug vs Union of India, to highlight the importance of bodily integrity under Article 21 and the constitutional scheme.

Personal Autonomy and Informational Self-Determination

Mr Divan argued that in the digital age, the right to informational self-determination had become a crucial facet of the right to personal autonomy, and was protected under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The principle of informational self-determination – which had its origins in German constitutional doctrine, with the Population Census Case, and had now been accepted in both Canadian and South African Constitutional law – stipulated that an individual had the right to limit what she put out to the world about herself. Its basis was not privacy, but the principles of dignity and personal autonomy, both of which were long recognised under Indian constitutional doctrine. Informational self-determination was essential for the free development of the individual. Moreover, it was not simply an individual right: likewise, the free development of the individual was essential to constitute a free and democratic society, and a free and democratic communicative order.

In the case of Aadhaar, Mr Divan argued, the principle of informational self-determination was specifically compromised because data was required to be handed over to private parties. These private parties’ only accountability was in the form of a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the government; there were minimal data protection safeguards imposed upon them, and indeed, 34,000 such independent operators had been blacklisted by the government. In fact, the MoU’s allowed the registrars of these entities to retain biometric data with them, something that could have potentially devastating consequences. In sum, compelling the handing over of personal data to private parties with such minimal safeguards over their functioning amounted to “a complete destruction of personal autonomy [and] a debasement of… [the] right to informational self-determination.”

Compelled Speech

Mr Divan then argued that compelled extraction of demographic information in Aadhaar – and even more, compelled extraction of biometric data and iris scans – effectively amounted to compelled speech, which was an infringement of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In the case of Bijoe Emmanuel vs State of Kerala, the Article 19(1)(a) rights of Jehovahs Witnesses to not be compelled to sing the national anthem had been recognised by the Supreme Court. The Jehovahs’ Witnesses, argued Mr Divan, were willing to stand up and respect the national anthem, but not to sing it; similarly, non-Aadhaar tax payers were willing to respect the law of the land and pay their taxes – only not by parting with their biometric and demographic information.

Proportionality

Mr Divan reiterated Mr Datar’s argument that, in view of the Government’s own data that only 0.4% of PAN Cards were duplicates, this move was simply disproportionate.

Legislative Competence

Mr Divan argued that there was no legislative entry in the Seventh Schedule that allowed for a right of “eminent domain” over the individual body. Consequently, the State was barred from “nationalising” the individual’s fingerprints and biometric data, except in the narrowest of circumstances. At best, the State could act as a “trustee”, or a “fiduciary”, of a person’s property in themselves. It could not compel beneficiaries to permanently part with it, especially in view of the fact that giving up one’s fingerprints and iris scans was a permanent act. Under the Constitution, the State could not simply take that data and store it in a centralised database.

Conclusion

Mr Divan ended by arguing that Section 139AA had serious impacts on the freedom of trade and commerce, the freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom of association (one could hardly form associations without a bank account). He argued that what the Union of India was doing was effectively a bait-and-swith, in the mould of Humpty Dumpty in Alice Through the Looking Glass, who had stated that a word meant exactly what he said it meant: the Union was doing something similar with the “mandatory voluntary” nature of Aadhaar.

In view of all of that, he requested the Court to strike down or read down the Section. However, he had an alternative prayer as well: in case the Court felt that the privacy and non-privacy issues in the case were inseparable, then they could refer and “tag” the case with the pending hearing; however, in view of the fact that the situation would become irreversible after July 1 (the day the amendment would come into effect), at the very least, he requested the Court to stay the provision, or prohibit coercive action by the State to implement it, until the final decision. All the previous orders of the Court had recognised the gravity of the situation, and protected status quo.

—

(Disclosure: The author assisted Mr Datar in the constitutional challenge before the Court.)

This post first appeared on lawyer Gautam Bhatia's blog.

Anyone Could Have Been Issued A Duplicate Aadhaar Card In My Childs Name Is Worrying

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

In the past few months, there have been several reports citing security flaws in Aadhaar. There are also reports on Aadhaar numbers being displayed publicly, along with mobile phone numbers, financial details, which could expose citizens to fraud, including by use of such details to generate fake "Aadhaar cards", which is just a colour printout of one's Aadhaar information.

K Sudha, a senior activist with Human Rights Forum, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh shared the following incident to share her experience with poor security of Aadhaar, and how easily the "Aadhaar card", could be misused.

My daughter lost her "Aadhaar card" recently. She did not save her Aadhaar card number nor did she have a photocopy of it. The mobile number that she mentioned in the Aadhaar card is also no longer accessible.
We approached Karvy consultants who said that it will not be possible for them to trace and generate a duplicate Aadhaar card without the number. But they suggested that Meeseva Kendras (an e-governance portal in Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana) might be able to trace it. So I approached a Meeseva Kendra in Visakhapatnam.
I told the above details to the Meeseva operator. He asked me to state my daughter's name and the pin code mentioned in the Aadhaar card. He took my mobile number. A One Time Password was generated and sent to my number. He could trace it and issue a duplicate. He charged Rs 100/- for this service. For this, he did not give a receipt.

What we are concerned about it that if I can get the duplicate Aadhaar card on her behalf by simply stating her Aadhaar number and pin code, anybody can do it. The operator did not even seek my ID proof or any documents which would establish my relationship with my daughter. He didn't even bother to cross check my credentials while issuing the duplicate Aadhaar card. The fact that anybody could get my daughter's duplicate Aadhaar card is quite disquieting.

K Sudha,
Human Rights Forum (HRF).
Visakhapatnam

Senior Advocate Datar Aadhaar Is Like Building A Bridge And Then Looking For A River It Is Hunting For Problems To Make Itself Relevant

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Senior Advocate Datar: "Aadhaar is like building a bridge and then looking for a river. It is hunting for problems to make itself relevant."

Senior Advocate Arvind Datar’s fiery rebuttal began today in the Aadhaar-PAN(Permanent Account Number) linkage case. Datar, who is representing CPI's senior leader Binoy Viswam. argued that the earlier orders of the Supreme Court that Aadhaarcannont be made mandatory continue to hold weight. The Union and all states were before the Court when these orders were passed. The Attorney General (AG) had even given an undertaking to the Court stating that Aadhaar would be voluntary.

Justice Sikri said the Act would shave to be tested for its basis. Datar agreed that this was a new kind of case placed before the Court for the first time. Justice Bhushan said, "The scheme has now become an Act". Datar explained that when the Supreme Court had given its orders Parliament could only overrule judicial orders in a manner known to law - that is, by taking away their basis. A Supreme Court directive or judgment is sacrosanct, unless set aside by a process known to law. Datar said that there was a clear collision between the Aadhaar Act and the Income Tax Act, and "if both Acts are allowed to stand the results would be absurd."

Datar explained that the government had failed to show how the stated objective of curtailing black money is possible by linking Aadhaar and PAN. On the Attorney General’s (AG) argument that Aadhaar was needed to fight black money and terrorism, Datar said "Anybody with any common sense would ask, how will Aadhaar check black money? Aadhaar was sold as a panacea for all ills - black money, terrorism, leakage etc. like herbal medicine", but, he noted, "Aadhaar is like having built a bridge and looking for a river. It is hunting for problems to make itself relevant."

On the AGs argument on Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FATCA), Datar said that nothing in FATCA created a requirement for Aadhaar. He was interrupted by government's counsel Arghya Sengupta who stated "the problem is that if we give the United States duplicate PANs, it becomes an embarrassment." Mr. Datar responded that this had nothing to do with the stated objective of of 139AA.

Senior advocate Arvind Datar cited the figure of only 0.04% of PAN cards being duplicates. He asked whether the government had done any study before introducing 139AA. He said "for 0.4% duplicates, 99.6% must seed their Aadhaar with PAN. Is that reasonable restriction under Article 19(6)?" He argued that without a PAN card, people's economic lives would come to a standstill, and that interests (the ability to do business versus duplicate PAN cards ) had to be balanced.

He said that the government was slowly attempting to make Aadhaar mandatory when claimed it was voluntary. This was a case of extreme and far reaching consequences. Mr. Datar said "The AG says, 99% have got it. What's your problem? That argument is the death knell of individual rights and democracy." Quoting William O. Douglas, Senior Advocate Datar said "As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the air – however slight – lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.” "Darkness does not come all at once. It is in the twilight that we must be most vigilant, or we are lost." He asked "are fundamental rights the playthings of the majority?"

Finally, Datar submitted that the Court must strike down 139AA or read it down and in case the Court decides to refer the case it should stay 139AA. Mr. Salman Khurshid also appeared for the petitioners and made brief submissions about human dignity and state control over the body.

The judgment has been reserved and no date has been given yet for the orders of the Court.

For more information, email contact@rethinkaadhaar.in

Statements on previous hearings at: https://rethinkaadhaar.in/blog/

Shyam Divan Advocate For Petitioners Aadhaar Is Purely Voluntary

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

At the latest hearing on Aadhaar in the Supreme Court today, Arghya Sengupta of Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy who was arguing on behalf of the Government started with two broad arguments for the Union of India and UIDAI: (1) That proportionality could not be read into Article 14, and (2) The idea of informational self-determination was equivalent to privacy and privacy was referred to a larger bench.

He countered the proportionality arguments by citing judgments from the UK.

He said that a statute could not be struck down for disproportionate penalty because penalty could be decided by the wisdom of Parliament.

Sengupta said that the object of this amendment is to fight corruption but no legislative order can completely solve the problem 100%. Sengupta said the object of the amendment is not to discriminate between those who have Aadhaar and those who don't but rather to weed out fake PAN cards.

He then argued that informational self-determination is not absolute even in Germany, where there is informational self determination (mentioned by Dpetitioners ;lawyers Divan in earlier hearings) and it could not be read into Indian law and that it could only be understood to be a party of privacy.

Justice Sikri then observed that the right to be left alone is a question of a person’s own life. The question lay in whether in a tax regime you could exercise your right and say that you would pay taxes in the manner you chose to. Sengupta responded by quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Taxes are the price we pay for civilised society", he said. Sengupta admitted that there were technical difficulties and errors in the UID system, but maintained that biometrics is the best technology in existence at present.

Zoheb Hussain appearing for the UIDAI said there is a distinction between protected and unprotected speech and that distinction will always be maintained. Every action is not speech. Enrolment for Aadhaar does not amount to exercising the right to free speech. He argued that the object of the amendment was to fight black money, increase tax collection and therefore reduce inequality. The object could not be said to be discriminatory because it was in furtherance of equality.

Petitioners' lawyers response

Senior Advocate Shyam Divan appearing for the petitioners Dalit activist Bezwada Wilson and retired Major General SG Vombatkare responded to these arguments. He began by establishing again the credentials of the petitioners. He said "It is being alleged that I am a hermit who wants to live in the Himalayas." In fact the petitioners are a decorated Major General in the Army and the other, a Magsaysay Award winner for his work with the Safai Karamchari Andolan. "The petitioners live robust lives and are contributors to society."

He said that the concern raised about Aadhaar was not an elite concern, rather that it was a concern of civil liberties, affecting all citizens. "The citizens of what we regard to be a free country are being mandated to be fingerprinted."

Mr. Divan went on to explain that there is contradiction when "Aadhaar is voluntary but PAN is mandatory." The Income Tax Act makes PAN mandatory and the lack of PAN leads to penal consequences. Aadhaar is completely voluntary. The Aadhaar enrolment form says that Aadhaar is free and voluntary, Section 3 of the Aadhaar Act says that a resident is entitled to get an Aadhaar number, several advertisements in which the UIDAI itself said that Aadhaar was voluntary, Divan pointed out.

Subsequent provisions specify that residents must be informed how their data will be used, he said. Every requesting agency under the Act must ask for the consent of the individual Aadhaar number holder, as per the Aadhar Act, then consent and information required under the Act can only exist if Aadhaar is voluntary. Divan said , "It is untenable to claim that Aadhaar can be made mandatory when the statute says that it is voluntary."

Mr. Divan cited a definition of fraud laid down in a judgment and asked whether UIDAI was committing a fraud on the public at large. He said that an institution of the government could not commit fraud on the public and so the only conclusion could be that Aadhaar is voluntary.

He explained that the object of 139AA was discriminatory because it discriminated between those who chose to give up their biometrics and those who didn't, in order to pay their taxes. Some people chose Aadhaar but PAN is not replaced by Aadhaar.

Mr. Divan cited a news report from the same day where a newborn child was given a UID number before he was given a name because, without UID, he was not able to get a birth certificate. Mr. Divan asked "Can you have a system where a child is tagged and numbered before he has a name? Can you have a system of surveillance? It will destroy all political choice."

The UID project violates Article 19(1)(a) because it requires individuals to give my most sensitive information – not to the Government of India – but to unknown third party enrolling agencies, Divan added.

On the Union’s argument that fingerprints are collected under the Registration Act, he explained that to buy property, fingerprints were given on paper in a process totally distinct from giving fingerprints to a central database where they could be repeatedly authenticated. He said that there might be some instances where invasion of the body might occur (e.g., hospital procedures or wearing helmets, seat belts), but all these actions are protective in nature and to protect the body.

Finally, he showed the Court a reply to an RTI where the UIDAI admitted that only 0.03% of people who had enrolled in Aadhaar had no other form of identity before. He also pointed out that in another RTI query the UIDAI admitted that 1 lakh Aadhaar numbers had been cancelled due to duplication.

Mr. Datar began his rebuttal by stating that the basic argument being made by the Union and UIDAI was "What is your problem?" Mr. Datar said "But one must remember civil rights movement started with a woman made to sit at the back of the bus. No one told her not to make it a big deal." He argued strongly that condoning the violation of the interim orders of the Supreme Court in the earlier batch of petitions would have grave consequences for the rule of law.

Mr. Datar will complete his submissions tomorrow, May 4.

For more information, email contact@rethinkaadhaar.in , or call Praavita: 98688 69900

Attorney General On Aadhaar And What He Overlooked

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Attorney General on Aadhaar: “You want to be forgotten. But the State doesn't want to forget you.”

At today's hearing on Aadhaar in the Supreme Court, the Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi responded to the arguments made by the petitioners. He claimed there were only two ways to challenge an enactment of Parliament - first whether parliament has the power to make such a law and second whether the law infringes the Constitution. He said the petitioners had no right to argue privacy.

He claimed that the object of introducing Aadhaar was to stop black money and terrorism. The AG argued that giving fingerprints to the Aadhaar database was acceptable as we in any case give our fingerprints for buying property, visas, give our photos for rations and make driving licenses. He said the petitioners cannot claim they don't have passports or phones.

Justice Sikri interrupted to clarify that these were voluntary services.

The AG said: "What is privacy. You don't have a house, you don't live the way you project. You cannot say you want live in a vacuum. I have transgressed to show that the concept of bodily integrity is bogus." He explained that abortion was regulated and prohibited under certain circumstances laid down by law.

AG argued that PAN was a doubtful document made on the basis of localised documents which could be duplicated. (In fact, PAN is a valid document of identity proof to obtain an Aadhaar card.) The PAN card, he said, was suspect because of fraud, tax evasion and black money used for drugs and terror. He said Aadhaar could not be faked and it was the most secure ID.

The AG argued that PAN-Aadhaar linking was being made mandatory to fulfil international obligations under FACTA which obliged the government to share information on foreign citizens in India with their own governments. "If we do not have a robust system how can we give details. We have obligations to the world."

He also said that aadhaar was necessary and that it had been introduced for the purpose of delivering benefits including the food rations in Public Distribution System and MNREGA, and that the government could nevertheless use Aadhaar for anything it wished to. Further, he claimed that the government had saved Rs. 50,000 crore. (This savings figure has been disputed by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s office as well as several researchers and economists, who claim that the bulk of the savings came from a reduction in international prices.)

In response to the Jharkhand leaks the AG said the central government and the UIDAI were not responsible rather the state
government was. Leaks from the central government (e.g., Swachch Bharat Mission) were not mentioned. In another first the Government admitted that Aadhaar is mandatory as provided for by section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, though it has claimed several times in court and parliament over past six years that enrolment is and will be voluntary.

The AG said that the right not to have bodily intrusion is not absolute. In the case of criminal matters, criminals have to surrender their fingerprints. The AG said "I am not saying everyone is accused but we need identification." In response Justice Sikri said "you cannot raise the spectre of crime to say that we will treat everyone as an accused. The liberty of individuals is to be maintained. We live in a society and we have to live with dignity." You cannot stretch this theory to that extreme. Isn't there a balance between dignity and state interests?” Justice Sikri told the AG. These were among several interjections from Justice Sikri.

When AG argued, the right to your body is restricted by the State, this is Rousseau's Social Contract, citing that there are breath checks for drunk driving, Justice Sikri pointed out, that these examples were not apt, because in those instances, the restrictions are reasonable.

The hearing will continue tomorrow, May 3.

For more information, email contact@rethinkaadhaar.in , or call Praavita: 98688 69900

Press Release Aadhaars Compelled Free Consent Is A Contradiction In Terms

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Two writ petitions challenging the latest amendment to the Income Tax Act are being heard at the Supreme Court by a bench comprising of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan.
The amendment in question introduces Section 139AA that makes submission of one's Aadhaar/UID -- a 12-digit biometrics-based identity number for residents -- mandatory when filing of income tax returns and obtaining and retaining the Permanent Account Number (PAN), both of which will be implemented from July 01, 2017 onwards.
Thus, the amendment makes it a penal offence to not enrol for Aadhaar/Unique Identity Number if one is an income tax payer in India.

"Self Determination"
Today, on April 28, arguments began with the idea of ‘informational self determination". Informational self-determination was developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court which articulated it as: “the authority of the individual to decide himself, on the basis of the idea of self-determination, when and within what limits information about his private life should be communicated to others.”

The case for privacy protection in the Aadhaar Act is often made by citing the fact that core biometric information (s. 2 (j) fingerprints and biometrics or such other biological attribute of an individual as may be specified by regulation) cannot be shared by anyone. However, once you submit your fingerprints and iris scan to the UIDAI, under the Aadhaar Act, you yourself can never access your own information (proviso to s.28 and s.29). Thus, there is no question of self-determination here because when one gives up your biometrics to the UIDAI, one truly gives them up.

Senior advocate Shyam Divan distinguished informational self determination from the Right to Privacy and explained that informational self-determination had its basis in the liberty and freedom of an individual. He said “the individual decides about their data. Not the government and not the data banks".

He argued that the State lacked the legislative competence to nationalise a person’s own fingerprints. He said “if the State can have control over your body to this extent, taking your data and centralising it, that reduces us to vassals.”

He informed the court that children are being compelled to enrol into the Aadhaar system before they reach the age of free consent. Parents across the country have been coerced into attempting to enrol their children into Aadhaar because their food and schooling was made contingent on the production of Aadhaar numbers or enrolling into the database.

The relationship between the citizen and the UIDAI is that of a trusteeship / fiduciary relationship and that no law can compel a beneficiary to entrust his data with a body that beneficiary does not actually trust. Divan told the court that biometric data collection was carried out by private enrollment agents whose relationship with the UIDAI is governed by a Memorandrum of Understanding. The Handbook prepared by UIDAI for Registrars specifies that registrars may retain biometric information with them, and also allows them to have their own security protocols etc which is an abdication of responsibility of sorts. Further, the UIDAI themselves warn the registrars – who may be banks, private companies like HDFC etc, that they are to hold the data in a fiduciary capacity. Retention of biometrics poses certain dangers. E.g., one an change my password but not my fingerprints.

"State cannot compel me to speak by making me part with my most sensitive information to private parties"

Divan argued that the Aadhaar programme violates article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution which guarantees the citizens of India the right to freedom of speech and expression and is a cornerstone of the democratic character of the state. He siad “surely they cannot compel me to speak by making me part with my most sensitive information to private parties.”

Making Aadhaar mandatory for PAN the government violates the principle of proportionality. According to data from a parliament question, a miniscule fraction (0.4%) of PANs are duplicate. The mandatory link of Aadhaar to PAN places an enormous disproportionate burden on people. Even those who have aadhaar are facing enormous problems linking their PAN cards for a variety of reasons including mismatch in names. To solve this problem, people will be required to either get new PAN cards or attempt the arduous process of correcting their Aadhaar details.

Given that the decision of the Court would have far reaching impact and that the deadline for Aadhaar PAN linking of July 1st was fast approaching, he asked the bench to prevent this coercive action of the State.

Counsels for the third petitioner led by Mr. Anando Mukherjee, argued that there was a clash between the Aadhaar Act and the Income Tax Act. They explained that the Aadhaar Act allowed collection and storage of demographic information that specifically excluded “income” in its definition and that by linking PAN and Aadhaar, the Union was trying to do indirectly what they could not do directly under the Aadhaar Act.

As the problems with the Aadhaar project are brought further into the light of day, there is an urgent need to rethink Aadhaar and to rethink the basis, intent, constitutionality and workability of this ever-expanding project.

Press Release The Constitution Is Not A Charter Of Servitude Argues Advocate Shyam Divan

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

"How can you engraft a provision into the Income Tax Act making Aadhaar mandatory when the Aadhaar Act itself makes Aadhaar purely voluntary," argued Mr Shyam Divan, lawyer for petitioners

Two writ petitions challenging the latest amendment to the Income Tax Act are being heard at the Supreme Court by a bench comprising of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan.

The amendment in question introduces Section 139AA that makes submission of one's Aadhaar/UID --- a 12-digit biometrics-based identity number for residents --- mandatory when filing of income tax returns and obtaining and retaining the Permanent Account Number (PAN), both of which will be implemented from July 01, 2017 onwards.
Thus, the amendment makes it a penal offence to not enrol for Aadhaar/Unique Identity Number if one is an income tax payer in India.

The first petition was filed by CPI Leader Binoy Viswam, who is represented by Senior Advocate Aravind Datar, and the second one was filed by retired Major General Sudhir Vombatkere and Dalit activist Bezwada Wilson, who are represented by Senior Advocate Shyam Divan. Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi, and others are representing for Union of India and UIDAI.

Today, on April 27, senior Advocate Shyam Divan argued the matter highlighting major problems with the Aadhaar project and spoke of seminal issues vital to the nature of relationship between the citizen and the state.

He covered bodily integrity, discrimination, personal autonomy and choice in the context of Aadhaar being made mandatory for PAN cards.

He explained that the petitioners in this case are conscientious objectors to the Aadhaar project. They are law abiding citizens who wish to pay tax, but do not wish to get Aadhaar. There are many like them.

Further, the amendment to the Income Tax Act discriminates between those who have Aadhaar and those who do not want to get Aadhaar. Both classes of people want to pay taxes but those who do not wish to get Aadhaar will face penal consequences. The government's move violates Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality.

Aadhaar acts as an "electronic leash" and creates the potential for constant and continuous surveillance, he argued.

The Aadhaar project itself has been riddled with scandals. Divan read out a list of government websites that are leaking Aadhaar numbers and financial details of individuals.

We have seen massive data leaks across 12 government websites including the Jharkhand Directorate of Social Security which displayed the Aadhaar numbers and bank account numbers of over a million pensioners. 34,000 private enrolment agencies were blacklisted by the UIDAI itself.

In such a situation people are compelled to enrol through various manipulative coercive exercises of this government when it links vital services to this biometrics-linked number when the Aadhaar Act makes Aadhar purely voluntary. The Aadhaar Enrolment Form itself states that Aadhaar is consensual and voluntary.

Divan pointed out that citizens in Rajasthan had been denied food rations because of Aadhaar biometric failures. He questioned if we lived in a State where citizens are denied will be denied ration because of Aadhaar failures. Shockingly, children and even new-born babies are being forced to enroll in Aadhaar. (The government is forcing parents, and it has made essential to have Aadhaar even in children's schemes such as school education and mid-day meal lunches before the age of free consent). Consent must be free and informed.

Mr. Divan explained what was at stake in this matter. He said that since the matter was referred three Chief Justices had not been able to constitute a bench to hear the question of whether privacy is a fundamental right. In the interim there could not be a fait accompli situation.

Issues of civil liberties

The Aadhaar project alters the relationship between the State and the individual. It is an issue of civil liberty, Mr Divan argued.

The Attorney interrupted these arguments and asserted that the right to privacy could not be argued. Justice Sikri said that Mr. Divan was only explaining the context of the matter.

The Aadhaar Act itself does not allow Aadhaar to be made mandatory. Section 3 creates a right that entitles citizens to get Aadhaar but there is no duty to obtain an Aadhaar number. "How can you engraft a provision into the Income Tax Act making it mandatory when the Aadhaar Act itself makes Aadhaar purely voluntary," said Mr Divan.

Mr. Divan returned to the question of bodily integrity. He said "my fingerprints and iris are mine and my own. As far as I am concerned, the State cannot take away my body. This imperils my life."

He cited judgments and jurisprudence literature that "others cannot act in a way that subjects my body to their interests". He explained bodily integrity in the context of the intrinsic wrongfulness of slavery which takes away the body and liberty. The use of a person's body can only be for their own objects.

When asked whether this argument would apply to passports, Mr. Divan responded that biometric collection could only apply to a narrow limited situation, such as passports, or identification of prisoners. Biometrics could not be collected wholesale and stored in a central depository. He said that the Aadhaar programme went against the concept of limited government.

He said that regular routine activities including buying a car, selling property, opening a savings account, would become contingent on the provision of biometric linked information. He said, "how can someone ask for fingerprints for carrying out routine activities."

The bench asked whether this argument would apply to the mandatory provision of PAN as well. Mr. Divan explained that PAN cards are not intrusive of our bodies whereas Aadhaar is.

Mr. Divan said "this is the kind of case where we have to read the Preamble to the Constitution". In reading the Preamble he emphasised that the people of India give the Constitution to ourselves. "The Constitution of India is not a Charter of Servitude"

The Aadhaar project is unworkable, unreasonable, void, colourable and discriminatory.

Mr. Divan's arguments will conclude tomorrow after 2pm. The Attorney General will reply to these arguments next Tuesday.

For more information, email contact@rethinkaadhaar.in

For signing up for Rethink Aadhaar mailing list, please click:

https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/rethink-aadhaar

Twitter: @No2UID
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/no2uid/

Press Release Linking Of Aadhaar To Pan Stands On Weak Legal Ground

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Two writ petitions challenging the latest amendment to the Income Tax Act were heard on Wednesday at the Supreme Court by a bench comprising of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan. The amendment in question introduces Section 139AA that makes submission of one's Aadhaar/UID number, an identity number linked to biometrics, mandatory when filing of income tax returns and obtaining and retaining the Permanent Account Number (PAN), both of which will be implemented from July 01, 2017 onwards.
Thus, the amendment makes it a penal offence to not enrol for Aadhaar/Unique Identity Number if one is an income tax payer in India.

The first petition was filed by CPI Leader Binoy Viswam, who is represented by Senior Advocate Aravind Datar, and the second one was filed by Sudhir Vombatkere and Bezwada Wilson, who are represented by Senior Advocate Shyam Divan. Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi, Harish Salve, and others are representing for Union of India and UIDAI.

On Wednesday, the bench began by stating that the Constitutional challenge to Aadhaar was yet to be heard. The counsels for the petitioners immediately said that arguments would be made without covering the Right to Privacy. The bench said that they had been thinking of tagging the matter.

For over a year the Supreme Court has refused to constitute a bench to hear the Aadhaar matter and the government has continued on in flagrant violation of the orders of the Court. The Aadhaar project has been riddled with controversies in the last few months.

Massive data leaks and fraud have been recorded and brought into the public domain. In these conditions citizens have little recourse. Arguments nevertheless commenced.

Senior Advocate Arvind Datar began by discussing how the mandatory linking of PAN to Aadhaar violated article 14 and article 19(1)(g). He further argued that even the Aadhaar Act did not allow for Aadhaar being made mandatory. In this context how could the govt amend another law to make it mandatory?

He pointed out that the proviso to s.139AA said that all PAN cards would be deemed to be invalid as if the person had never applied for PAN. The govt. clarified that it would not be retrospectively applicable. Mr. Datar stated that the amendment violates article 14 and is arbitrary in nature. He cited judgments in support of the proposition that laws can be struck down on the grounds of arbitrariness.

Senior Advocate Shyam Divan began by explaining the context of the petitions. He said that even though privacy was not in question the bench should be aware of what was at stake. He said "what is it that we are fighting for? My fingerprints and iris are mine and under my control. Not even the great Republic of India can force me to part from my body. There is no bargain the the Constitution of India that allows the government to say give me your fingerprints."

Mr. Divan explained that even if privacy was not in question - surveillance, profiling and seeding (putting Aadhaar in multiple databases) was.

He explained the enrolment process which is carried out by private agents who collect and store biometric data. 34,000 enrolment agencies have been blacklisted.

He also showed the court the Aadhaar enrolment form prior to 2016 under which lakhs had enrolled where people had to give their consent to the UIDAI which could arbitrarily share their data with third parties.

The matter will be heard again tomorrow.

For more information, email contact@rethinkaadhaar.in , or call Praavita: 98688 69900

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

23 सितम्बर 2013
[ जब तक संवैधानिक पीठ इस बारे में कोइ अंतिम सुनवाई न करे तब तक ] “ किसी भी व्यक्ति को आधार कार्ड नहीं होने के कारण परेशानी न हो भले ही किसी प्राधिकरण द्वारा इसे अनिवार्य करने का कोइ आदेश जारी किया गया हो ”

24 मार्च 2014
“.......किसी भी व्यक्ति को आधार नंबर नहीं होने के कारण किसी भी सेवा से वंचित नहीं किया जाएगा. सभी प्राधिकरण को यह निर्देश दिया जाता है कि वे फॉर्म्स, सर्कुलर्स और अन्य ऐसी चीज़ों में ऐसा बदलाव लायें कि आधार नंबर अनिवार्य न हो ताकि कोर्ट द्वारा पारित अंतरिम आदेश का पालन किया जा सके.”

16 मार्च 2015
“....हम उम्मीद करते हैं कि केंद्र और राज्य सरकार तथा उसके सभी अधिकारी कोर्ट द्वारा 23 सितम्बर 2013 को पारित आदेश का पालन करेंगे ”

11 अगस्त 2015
“भारत सरकार इलेक्ट्रौनिक और प्रिंट मीडिया ,जिसमे रेडियों और टेलीविजन शामिल हैं, द्वारा इस बात का व्यापक प्रचार प्रसार करेगी कि एक नागरिक के लिए आधार कार्ड प्राप्त करना अनिवार्य नहीं है ”
किसी भी सेवा के लाभ के लिए आधार कार्ड प्रस्तूत करना शर्त नहीं होगी
[ पी.डी.एस और एल.पी.जी में छुट] “ जवाबदाता द्वारा पी.डी.एस योजना खासकर खाद्यान्न इत्यादि और इंधन तेल जैसे केरोसीन के वितरण को छोड़कर किसी अन्य योजना के लिए आधार कार्ड का इस्तेमाल नहीं किया जाएगा
आधार कार्ड निर्गत करते वक़्त भारतीय विशिष्ट पहचान प्राधिकरण [UIDAI] द्वारा किसी व्यक्ति के बारे में प्राप्त सूचना का इस्तेमाल किसी अन्य उद्देश्य के लिए नहीं होगा, ऐसे आपराधिक मामलों को छोड़कर जिसके तहकीकात के लिए कोर्ट द्वारा कोइ आदेश दिया गया हो.

15 अक्तूबर 2015
[ नरेगा, राष्ट्रीय सामाजिक सहायता कार्यक्रम,जन धन योजना, ई.पी.एफ.ओ- में भी आधार इस्तेमाल की छुट]

हम भारत सरकार को यह आदेश देते हैं कि वह इस कोर्ट द्वारा 23/9/2013 से पारित आदेशों का कड़ाई से पालन करे
हम यह भी स्पष्ट करना चाहेंगे कि आधार कार्ड योजना पूरी तरह से वैकल्पिक है और इसे तब तक अनिवार्य नहीं बनाया जा सकता जब तक कि कोर्ट द्वारा इस बारे में कोइ अंतिम निर्णय नहीं दिया जाए

14 सितम्बर 2016
[ 15 अक्टूबर 2015 के आदेश को दोहराते हुए कोर्ट ने भारत सरकार द्वारा राज्यों को जारी किये गए उस आदेश को निरस्त कर दिया जिसमें विभिन्न छात्रवृतियों के लिए आधार को अनिवार्य किया गया है ]

अंतिम आदेश खासकर महत्वपूर्ण है क्योंकि यह आधार अधिनयम लागू होने के बावजूद पुराने आदेश को दोहराता है.

--- By Dheeraj Kumar, Right to Food, Jharkhand.

Some Of The Poorest In Chhattisgarh Cannot Get Pensions After Aadhaar Glitches

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Due to failure of recognition by machine, 7 pensioners didn’t get their pension after introduction of biometric machine in Kardana village of Chhattisgarh.

Kardana village is situated in Sarguja district of Chhattisgarh -- one of India's poorest districts. The villages is under Batauli block, around 60 km from district headquarter Ambikapur and 12 km from Batauli. The village is surrounded by hills and inhabited by Adivasis including Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs), of which there are 223 households and a population of 946. There are 195 pensioners living in the village, who get small pension amounts every month under categories of old age pension, widow pensions, disabilities pension.
There are no bank branches in village neither does it have mobile connectivity. For any nearest connectivity they have to go 9 km to Chiranga village across the hill.
To avail the pension scheme beneficiaries were told to open their account in Union Bank of India which has only one branch in district that too in Ambikapur 60 km from Kardana village.

Why The Government Is Wrong To Claim It Is Legal To Force Citizens To Link Aadhaar To Pan

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Supreme Court is set to hear an important challenge on Wednesday, April 26 on linking of Aadhaar, a 12-digit biometrics based identity number to the Permanent Account Number(PAN), used for filing income tax.

On Friday, April 21, two writ petitions challenging the latest amendment to the Income Tax Act were heard at the Supreme Court by a bench comprising of Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan. The amendment in question introduces Section 139AA that makes submission of one's Aadhaar/UID number mandatory when filing of income tax returns and obtaining and retaining the Permanent Account Number (PAN), both of which will be implemented from July 01, 2017 onwards.
Thus, the amendment makes it a penal offence to not enrol for Aadhaar/Unique Identity Number if one is an income tax payer in India.

During the arguments, Justice Sikri asked the Attorney General as to how the Union Government can force someone to enrol for Aadhaar/UID numbers when there are interim orders of the court in the case. (These SC orders say Aadhaar can only be used on a voluntary basis, that no one can be denied a service they are otherwise entitled to just because they do not have an Aadhaar number, and the matter is pending after it was referred to a Constitution bench.)

In response, the Attorney General advanced three arguments in support of the Income Act Tax amendment:

1. That the interim orders issued by the Supreme Court were made prior to the coming of the Aadhaar Act 2016 and because the basis of those orders were absence of legislation, those orders no longer hold the field.

2. That the Supreme Court has endorsed mandatory use of Aadhaar/UID for SIM card verification in the February 06, 2017 order given in the Lokniti Foundation Vs Union of India and Anr case.

3. That the Supreme Court's oral comments on March 27, 2017 has indicated that Aadhaar/UID may not be made mandatory for accessing welfare services but can be made mandatory for other purposes.

However, none of these arguments are valid.

1. The Aadhaar Act 2016 was published on March 26, 2016 [1]. The most recent order prohibiting making of Aadhaar/UID mandatory for access to any government programmes and services was issued by the Supreme Court on September 14, 2016 [2]. In this order, Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel directed that making submission of Aadhaar/UID number for applying for a government scheme is "contrary to the interim order passed by the Constitution Bench and therefore, to that extent they are not tenable in law" [Ibid.]. Thus, even after the Aadhaar Act was passed, the Supreme Court had reiterated its earlier orders on Aadhaar and these still stand.

2. The order given by Supreme Court on February 06, 2017 in the Lokniti Foundation Vs Union of India and Anr case quotes the Attorney General himself informing the Supreme Court that the government "has launched Aadhaar based E-KYC for issuing mobile connections on 16th August, 2016" and that "[currently] Aadhaar card or biometric authentication is not mandatory for obtaining a new telephone connection" [3]. Nowhere in the order does the Supreme Court endorses the acceptability or desiability of making Aadhaar/UID mandatory for obtaining and using SIM cards in India.

3.The Supreme Court's oral comments on March 27, 2017 were a short discussion during a 'mentioning'. That day, there was a brief exchange between thebench and advocate Shyam Divan, as the bench was trying to understand the court’s earlier orders. This verbal exchange included some remarks by the Chief Justice of India on whether the October 15, 2015 order perhaps only applied to social welfare and benefit schemes and did not apply to other activities like I-T filings. Many media organisations including the Press Trust of India (PTI), wrongly reported these remarks as definitive observations amounting to judicial orders, which is incorrect.

The court nowhere said that the UID can be asked for other services. Anyone who knows court proceedings knows that the court could not have made any such order. One, because it was a `mentioning' that was underway, and that was only to fix a date, and such an order cannot be passed without hearing the parties to the case, and two, the October 15, 2015 order was by a 5-judge bench, and 3 judges cannot revise/rewrite/override that order.

Further, before tomorrow's hearing it is important to remember that the Supreme Court has previously noted in its orders that:

1. "The Union of India shall give wide publicity in the electronic and print media including radio and television networks that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card" [4].

2. "The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;" [Ibid.].

3. "The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card will not be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme;" [Ibid.].

/There is no evidence of any of these directives being implemented or adhered to by the Union of India./

The Rethink Aadhaar team awaits the judgement of the honourable judges on this case.

The next hearing is to take place on Wednesday, April 26, 2017, morning. Please send your reporters/correspondents to attend and report on this important hearing.

References

[1] Source: https://uidai.gov.in/images/targeted_delivery_of_financial_and_other_subsidies_benefits_and_services_13072016.pdf.

[2] Source: https://github.com/rethinkaadhaar/docs/blob/master/Court%20Orders/SC_2016.09.14_Order.pdf.

[3] Source: https://github.com/rethinkaadhaar/docs/blob/master/Court%20Orders/SC_Lokniti_2017.02.06.pdf.

[4] Source: https://github.com/rethinkaadhaar/docs/blob/master/Court%20Orders/SC_2015.08.11_Proceedings%2BOrder.pdf.

For further information, write to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in.

Further reading:

https://rethinkaadhaar.in/blog/2017/3/31/legal-did-sc-allow-aadhaar-in-income-tax-pan-no

Extracts From Supreme Court Orders On Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

September 23, 2013
[Until final hearing of the Constitution Bench] “…no person should suffer fornotgetting the Adhaar card inspite of the fact that some authority hadissued a circular making it mandatory”.

November 26, 2013

[States/UTs impleaded.]

March 24, 2014

“… no person shall be deprived of any service for want of Aadhaar number in case he/she is otherwise eligible/entitled. All the authorities are directed to modify their forms/ circulars/ likes so as not to compulsorily require the Aadhaar number in order to meet the requirement of the interim order passed by this Court forthwith.”

March 16, 2015

“… we expect that both the Union of India and States and all their functionaries should adhere to the Order passed by this Court on 23rd September, 2013.”

August 11, 2015

“1. The Union of India shall give wide publicity in the electronic and print media including radio and television networks that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an Aadhaar card;

2. The production of an Aadhaar card will not be condition for any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;

3. [PDS and LPG exemptions] “will not be used by the respondent for any purpose other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card may also be used for the purpose of the LPG Distribution Scheme”

4. The information about an individual obtained by the Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any purpose, save as above, except as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.”

October 15, 2015

[Further exemptions for NREGA, NSAP, JDY, EPFO – see attached snapshot.]

“We impress upon the Union of India that it shall strictly follow all the earlier orders passed by this Court commencing from 23.09.2013.

We will also make it clear that the Aadhaar card scheme is purely voluntary and it cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this Court one way or the other.”

September 14, 2016

[Reaffirming the 15/10/15 order, the Court struck down directions from the Union of India to the states making Aadhaar mandatory for various scholarships.]

The last order is particularly significant as it reaffirms earlier orders even after the Aadhaar Act.

In The Rajya Sabha Today What Sterilisation Was To The Emergency Aadhaar Seeding Is Becoming To Your Government

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Nahi Aahaar Do Satyagrah From April 9

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Right to Food, Jharkhand is going on hunger strike from April 9 against Jharkhand government's unconstitutional order to make Aadhar mandatory in Public Distribution System foodgrains.

For more details, contact: rtfcjharkhand@gmail.com

"राशन कार्ड के लिए आधार अनिवार्य करने के खिलाफ 9 अप्रैल से "आधार नहीं आहार दो सत्याग्रह"

राशन कार्ड के लिए आधार अनिवार्य कर झारखंड सरकार ने संविधान व सुप्रीम कोर्ट के आदेश का उल्लंघन किया है.भोजन का अधिकार अभियान, झारखंड से जुड़े सामाजिक कार्यकर्ता राज्य सरकार के इस फैसले के खिलाफ 9 अप्रैल से राजभवन, रांची के सामने अनशन पर बैठकर "आधार नहीं आहार दो सत्याग्रह" की शुरुआत करेंगे.

ज्ञातव्य हो कि 27 मार्च को सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने यह आदेश जारी किया था कि सरकार अपने कल्याणकारी योजनाओं का लाभ देने के लिए आधार को अनिवार्य नहीं बना सकती. अर्थात सरकार वृद्धा पेंशन, राशन या अन्य किसी तरह की कल्याणकारी योजनाओं का लाभ देने के मामले यह नहीं कह सकती कि ये लाभ इसलिए नहीं मिलेंगे, क्योंकि लाभुक के पास आधार कार्ड नहीं है.

लेकिन सुप्रीम कोर्ट के आदेश का उललंघन कर 27 मार्च को ही झारखंड सरकार ने यह आदेश जारी किया कि 5 अप्रैल के बाद बिना आधार वाले कार्ड धारियों को राशन नहीं मिलेगा. अभियान मानता है कि राज्य सरकार का यह आदेश सुप्रीम कोर्ट व संविधान का उलंघन है और लोगों के भोजन के हक़ पर हमला है.

अभियान मांग करता है कि राज्य सरकार अपना निर्णय वापस ले अन्यथा अभियान के सदस्य सरकार के इस निर्णय के खिलाफ 9 अप्रैल से राजभवन के सामने अनशन पर बैठेंगे.

भोजन का अधिकार अभियान, झारखण्ड | rtfcjharkhand@gmail.com

Legal Did Sc Allow Aadhaar In Income Tax Pan No

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Some newspapers have reported erroneously that the Supreme Court on March 27 directed that the government can ask for the UID for Income Tax and PAN card; this is misinformation.

For one, what transpired happened during a `mentioning', that is, where the lawyer mentioned the matter only to the court to ask that the matter actually be listed and heard on April 3. Earlier the case was listed for March 27, but then it got shifted in the list to April 3. The lawyer took the matter to court to ask the court that there should be no further delay, and that it should be heard on the April 3.

The court turned down the request for such an assurance.

While doing that, the court looked at para 5 of the order of the 5-judge bench in its order dated 15th October 2015, where it said that even when it is used in Public Distribution System(PDS), NREGA, pensions, LPG, Jan Dhan Yojana(JDY) and provident fund, it cannot be made mandatory.

That is it.

The court nowhere said that the UID can be asked for other services.

Anyone who knows court proceedings knows that the court could not have made any such order,

One, because it was a `mentioning' that was underway, and that was only to fix a date, and such an order cannot be passed without hearing the parties to the case, and

Two, the October 15, 2015 order was by a 5-judge bench, and 3 judges cannot revise/rewrite/override that order.

For public information, the October 15, 2015 order OF Supreme Court said:

The UID can be used in six services: PDS, LPG, NREGA, JDY, EPFO, pensions such as disability, widow, old age pensions which are seen as services provided by the state.
Even in these services, its use "is purely voluntary, and cannot be made mandatory till the matter is finally decided by this court one way or the other".
The UID number cannot be used in any other service. It is not a matter of whether it is voluntary or mandatory. It cannot be used at all.
All earlier orders from the first order of the court on September 23, 2013, when it directed that no one can be denied any service only because they do not have a UID card or number, shall be `strictly followed'. That includes the order dated August 11, 2015, which, among other things says that enrolment is not mandatory (which makes their notifications saying that those who do not have a UID number should be shepherded to the enrolment station is in contempt of court).

On October 15, 2015, the 5 judge bench heard a series of applications for expansion of the use of the number, including the TRAI that came to court saying that they could deal with terrorism if they were able to use the UID number for giving and checking Sim cards. The 5 judge bench refused this use. This refusal by the 5 judge bench was suppressed by the Attorney General when he told the court in a matter taken to court by Lokniti, an NGO, that they intended to make sim cards secure by having it checked against the UID. The court reproduced this submission and disposed of the matter. This has been read by some part of the press as an order by the court that sim cards should be checked against the UID, which is inaccurate. This did, however, mean that the court did not object to such use. That was a 3 judge bench, and could not have overridden a 5 judge bench. This happened because the Attorney-General did not inform the court, and since it was not a UID matter that was being heard, there was no one challenging the UID project who could have pointed this out to the court. This is what is called an order -per incuriam' (i.e. being in disregard of the facts or the law, in this case because they were kept in the dark about what had happened before the 5 judge bench.)

So, the government attempt to make UID mandatory for income tax and PAN card is in contempt of court. Not just making it mandatory, but even using the UID in these fields is in contempt.

The reason the court so restrained the court is because it had seen the various dimensions of the project that made up the challenge before it, including

surveillance
profiling
tagging
tracking
insecurity of the data base
national security issues, posed both by the creation of such data bases, and because of the companies involved which includes L-1 Identity Solutions, Morpho and Accenture, which have close connections to the intelligence establishments of foreign governments.
lawlessness
the use by private actors, and
importantly, the denial of the right to privacy of the people that the government had asserted before them. Like the court said: without the right to privacy, "the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, and more particularly the right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality."

That is why they said that their order would be till the court has heard and decided these matters - not till passage of a law or any other such circumstance.

By Dr Usha Ramanathan

Further reading:

A shaky Aadhaar (Indian Express, March 30, 2017.)

Statement on court proceedings on March 27 by petitioners.

No, the Supreme Court hasn't said that Aadhaar can be made mandatory for non-welfare schemes (Medianama, March 27, 2017)

Recent Supreme Court hearing did not affect status or permissibility of Aadhaar (Wire.in, March 29, 2017)

Reminder: Text of Supreme Court order that says Aadhaar is not and cannot be made mandatory (March 22, 2017)

Parliament Update Issues Raised By Mps On Aadhaar In Parliament

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The following are links to, and text of discussion by members of parliament in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha this week:

Bhupendra Yadav's private member resolution to hold Lok Sabha and Assembly elections simultaneously to be taken up tomorrow in RS. He suggests linking of Aadhaar number with Election Card.

(list of business for- http://164.100.47.5/newlobsessions/sessionno/242/310317.pdf)

2. Full text of March 29 Rajya Sabha proceedings where Aadhaar was discussed - ( http://164.100.47.5/newdebate/242/29032017/Fullday.pdf)

KTS Tulsi -

Sir, through you, I wish to raise three concerns with regard to the Finance Bill. The first is with regard to making Aadhaar mandatory for various schemes, the second is, removing the cap on corporate funding, and the third is, rubbishing several tribunals in a jiffy.

Sir, with regard to the Aadhaar, I want to bring to the attention of this august House that Section 29 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, as notified, categorically provides that the core biometric information collected by the Unique Identification Authority of India under the Act shall not be shared with anyone for any reason whatsoever. Now, that is a legislative provision. Now, when the Act was notified under the Rules, what is being provided is that any individual agency or entity, which collects the Aadhaar Number and the document containing it, shall obtain consent.

When the Act says, “It cannot be shared for any reason whatsoever”, how can you prescribe a procedure of voluntary consent? Consent could also be by force. When the use of this Card is forbidden for any other purpose whatsoever, it cannot be allowed to be introduced. The rules are in conflict with Section 29 and Section 8(3) is also in conflict with Section 29. This is going to create a huge problem.

The provisions therefor permitting sharing of biometric information by merely informing, which is taken to be consent, is fraught with danger. It was meant only for the purpose of delivering public services.

The question is: How safe is our data? It has already been scrapped in the UK as well as in France. The then Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister, Theresa May, in 2010, announced the end of the ID Card project of 2010 and said, “We need to balance national security and civil liberties.” Australia in 2007 cancelled the Social Services Access Card because of the dangers which were inherent with the hacking or the leakage of that information.

France in 2012 sought to justify this but the Identification Protection Act was declared to be unconstitutional by the highest Court in France. Today, there are petitions pending in the Supreme Court which have been referred to a 9-Judge Bench. We are permitting doing of things through subterfuge of a rule what was prohibited by the Act.

The Supreme Court on 15th October, 2015 allowed Aadhaar Card to be used only for the six Government schemes of Public Distribution, that is, LPG, rural employment, employees’ provident fund, pension scheme and so on. Now, there are several Government agencies which have begun to insist on Aadhaar Card for even opening a bank account and for various other purposes.

This can jeopardize the privacy and security of the citizens and no attention is being paid for safeguarding the data from hackers. We must be able to guard against hackers, particularly in the context of China and Pakistan getting into our systems all the time, and many a time succeeded. How we intend to safeguard the personal information? Not only that, we are completely blissfully unaware of the dangers of that information.

Anybody’s fingerprints can be planted anywhere because fingerprints will be available. My fingerprints can be planted; my iris impression can be planted. If that information becomes available to anyone, it will become extremely dangerous and it is precisely for this reason that a number of democratic countries have abandoned this project. Unless we can safeguard the data, only then can it be permitted to be used for the purpose for which the Act was enacted and only for the use of services.

The second point that I want to submit, Sir, is regarding removing a cap on donations and also making them anonymous. It only achieves one purpose. It manages to multiply political corruption. If that is the aim of the Finance Bill, then they must be clear about it.

The third is with regard to winding up of the Tribunals by a notification of the mere rules. There are several statutes, which will have to be amended, but in the process, what is being provided is that by virtue of the rules, the Government will decide the qualifications and the method of appointment of members.

There is no regard paid to the law which has been declared by the Supreme Court that even with regard to the appointment of the members of various Tribunals, the Courts must be consulted to ensure that they are independent and they are not the persons with questionable integrity.

In this regard, I submit that you cannot permit the delegation of essential legislative function. What will be the qualifications for the members is an essential legislative function and if it is delegated to the Government, it will amount to abdication of the legislative responsibility and I strongly oppose this. There are 27 Tribunals, and seven are sought to be shut down immediately. They can be paid three months' salaries and told to go home. That is what is left of all the Tribunals. I strongly oppose these three provisions in the Finance Bill.

Citizens Aadhaar Data And Digital Trails To Be Used To Go Cashless But For Whose Benefit At What Costs To Citizens

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The National Democratic Alliance has stated that the decision to withdraw Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 currency notes is aimed to make India a “cashless economy”.

Aadhaar, is being presented as a crucial tool in the hands of the government and financial institutions to enforce a transition to digital payments and new opportunities built on “digital footprints” of individuals.

The coercion and illegal manner in which the biometrics-linked digital identity number which in the last few years has been been made mandatory for accessing essential services is now being repeated in forcing a switch to electronic payments, rather than this being a matter of choice of users.

National biometric identifications projects have been discussed and debated in other countries such as the United Kingdom (the UK started and then dismantled its biometrics database in mid-2000s). But an important difference is what is being built upon and surrounds UID/Aadhaar, is initiatives like India Stack being built by software “think-tank” and lobbyist group ISpirit, that several former UIDAI employees have now joined as “volunteers”: IndiaStack is building layers of applications on top of Aadhaar for use by financial services sector companies. Aadhaar is being designed such that citizens' data will be collected coercively by the government but made available for use both by the state, and private companies through systems that are built upon Aadhaar.

Where are citizens’ rights and freedoms within such a system?

Where are the safeguards and what are the protections? What have we learnt from the massive bank data breach experienced earlier this year when over Rs 1 crore of individuals savings were wiped out? Did Aadhaar-based system play a role in it?

With the attempt to route all payments through UPI which comes under the NPCI, lack of clarity about legal safeguards, data protection etc, it is time to think through these issues.

Aadhaar An Assault On Welfare Privacy And Democracy Need For An Urgent Debate

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

The Aadhaar project, to provide a unique number to all residents in India, was packaged as a welfare-enabling programme. It was sold as an initiative for greater inclusiveness in welfare, a tool against corruption, greater efficiency and so on. Six years down the line, there is mounting evidence of the destruction of welfare programmes due to Aadhaar-linkage. Moreover, the Aadhaar project has a sinister side to it – it is a surveillance-enabling programme, which threatens privacy and democratic practice. People have been lulled into believing that privacy is the price we have to pay for better implementation of welfare programmes. In fact, the Aadhaar project is endangering both – welfare, as well as privacy.

The UIDAI claims that over a billion people have been enrolled into the system, several legal challenges to the project have been filed (but not heard for over a year), a law has been passed, and the interim orders of the Supreme Court that attempted to rein in the project still stand. These orders have been regularly flouted with impunity. The Aadhaar project with all its fundamental weaknesses and dangerous effects, is steadily becoming a part of daily life for millions.

Below are excerpts from articles which discuss each of these aspects: the propaganda on welfare, exclusion and disruption of welfare programmes due to Aadhaar, the legal concerns, surveillance-enabling aspects of the programme, as well as some indications of the commercial interests that might be behind it. These different links represent some of the writings that have been published in the media. The last part of this email contains a short explanation of the current status of the project and the Supreme Court orders in the context of the passage of the law.

Overview

“Aadhaar was built on a techno-utopian foundation to plug leakages. It abridges the rights of citizens, and imposes severe hardships on the poor.” (Threats to Citizen’s Rights, Usha Ramanathan)

“The Aadhaar Bill, passed as a money bill, has uncertain benefits, and opens the door to mass surveillance. This danger needs to be seen in the light of recent attacks on the right to dissent.” (The Aadhaar Coup, Jean Drèze)

“In view of the afore-mentioned concerns and apprehensions about the UID scheme, particularly concerning the contradictions and ambiguities within the Government on its implementation as well as its implications, the [Standing] Committee categorically convey their unacceptability of the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 in its present form…The committee would, thus, urge the Government to reconsider and review the UID scheme as also the proposals contained in the Bill in all its ramifications and bring forth a fresh legislation before Parliament.” (And the UID juggernaut keeps rolling on, Reetika Khera)

Propaganda on welfare and savings

“UID cannot prevent exclusion errors. Other technologies, simpler, safer and cheaper than UID, can help reduce corruption and improve portability.” (UID: Does Evidence Matter?, Reetika Khera)

“Aadhaar was supposed to be a "game-changer" and improve the implementation of welfare programmes. Indeed, it is living up to its game-changing promise - except, it is doing this by wrecking welfare programmes.” (Yes, Aadhaar is a game changer in wrecking welfare, Reetika Khera)

“While the government painted a highly exaggerated picture of savings from the direct benefit transfers for LPG, the media played along with this portrayal.” (Big Media’s Take on Aadhaar-LPG Savings Saga Highlights Why We Can’t Trust It, Reetika Khera)

In Andhra Pradesh Software Flaws Aid Land Grab From Tribal And Dalit Farmers

Rethink UID — 2025-11-05 00:00:00

Land record columns changed or deleted, NRIs claiming tribal lands, Dalit farmers losing welfare schemes — Andhra Pradesh’s digitalisation dream – linked with the Aadhaar database – deepens marginalisations. Read the report here.

Yet Another Man Killed By Denial Of Food And Social Security In Aadhaar Related Hunger Death

Rethink UID — 2025-10-30 00:00:00

Right to Food Campaign Odisha has highlighted that Risa Mankadia, an elderly man from a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) community, has died of #hunger after he failed to complete the Aadhaar linking and updating #ekyc for his Antodaya ration card.

Being single person on his card, he tried to complete it multiple times, RTF reports, but failed. He was being denied his entitled ration since June and Mankadia died on October 22.

No Blinking No Mobile Sim Indian Activists And Acid Attack Survivors Take Their Fight To Cought

Rethink UID — 2025-10-28 00:00:00

My face changes with each surgery. How many times will I update my Aadhaar?”: Indian acid attack survivors take their fight against exclusionary digital ID update and verification norms to Supreme Court and win. Report by Scroll.in

From The Trenches Of Aadhaar Distress Kagaz

Rethink UID — 2025-10-28 00:00:00

For this report, journalist Aparna Kalra interviewed Delhi residents who have had to make multiple rounds of Aadhaar correction centers to be able to access basic services such as school admission for their children

Statement Condemining The Malnourishment Death Of A Child In Jajpur District Odisha

Rethink UID — 2023-04-09 00:00:00

Bhubaneswar, 5th April, 2023

On 3rd March 2023, 11-year-old Arjun Hembram, known to his family as Juna Hembram, from the Keonjhar district of Odisha, passed away in the early hours of the morning, because of severe malnourishment. The child, who was born with a disability, had not had any rice to eat for two days, and passed away after developing a fever. The child was buried the next day, without a post-mortem.

The tragic incident of a child’s death due to malnourishment, was reported by the local media. A fact-finding team, of journalists, social workers and social scientists, visited Ghatisahi under Ragada revenue village of Ranagundi Grampanchayat, Keonjhar district of Odisha, to look into the matter. The team’s report (which can be accessed here) found that the child’s family had not received rations for 21 months, most likely due to another Aadhaar-enabled exclusion, because “Aadhaar seeding” or linking the ration card to Aadhaar had not happened. Arjun’s mother was not able to understand why her ration card had been cancelled, but it was most likely due to her name being spelt differently on her Aadhaar card and ration card.

Expressing their deep concern at Arjun Hembram’s tragic death, the experts noted that this was not the first time that such an incident has taken place in Jajpur district. As the local news has reported, hundreds of children from this community have been excluded from the PDS as they do not have Aadhaar.

“No words of condemnation would be enough to censure this act by the very state whose primary responsibility is to protect the lives of its citizens,” said Sameet Panda, from Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhiyan, Bhubaneswar.

Rethink Aadhaar stands in support of the key demands made by the Civil Society Forum on Human Rights (CSFHR), Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhijan and Jan Swasta Abhiyan, outlined below:

Exclusion of children without Aadhaar from PDS is an issue of concern in this community. Steps must be taken to ensure all left out children and adults are added to the PDS immediately and the onus of submitting Aadhaar should not be left to the community. Administration must take steps to ensure not a single person is excluded from the system for want of Aadhaar.
As per the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India’s interim orders on the PUCL Vs. Union of India and others (Civil Writ Petition 196 of 2001) and also the New Education Policy, 2023, Aadhaar seeding is not necessary/mandatory for availing Government supported social security and food and nutritional security schemes and programmes. No child/family should be excluded from their entitlements due to Aadhaar seeding related issues.
The district administration needs to initiate weighing of all children in the AWCs across the regions in a mission mode to identify children suffering from malnutrition and take immediate steps for community management of malnutrition amongst children. The weighing and malnutrition measurement of children should be done every month judiciously and all AWCs should be provided with necessary equipment and training with regular monitoring.
The team understood that Mid Day Meal in the school is the first and primary meal for the children in the community. The administration must take steps to introduce nutritious breakfast programmes in the schools which can be supported under DMF. Also the families especially the children go through extreme food crises during summer holidays, steps must be taken to ensure MDM is continued even during summer breaks for the children.
Even under a universal entitlement approach, aged and disabled people, dalits, and tribal groups would need specific unconditional support of food, health services and benefits. Community kitchens could provide a cohesive solution for families with precarious food and nutrition conditions.
Out-of-school children are left out of the school meal programme, despite being the most vulnerable; they should be allowed to access all feeding programmes unconditionally.
Three children with disability from the deceased’s family, though eligible for social security pension, have not been added under the scheme till the time of visit. All AWCs have details regarding children with disability, steps must be taken by the district administration to arrange necessary documents and include children and adults with disability under the pension scheme. All eligible but left out families must be included under the pension scheme as soon as possible which would strengthen financial and food security of the families.
Numbers of old age pension beneficiaries are said to be facing problems after the transition in the pension scheme from cash in hand to bank transfer. This can lead to extreme hardship and hunger among the aged persons. State must take steps to ensure no pension beneficiaries are excluded or cease to receive pension due to the transition and they are given cash in hand as soon as possible.
The MGNREGA which has consistently proved to be a lifeline when it comes to rural work and income security, the team was told that work under the scheme has been put on hold due to the problem faced with the NMMS app. The steps must be taken to sort out the issue immediately and all households must be provided with job cards and necessary numbers of work is allocated to the village. District Mineral Fund (DMF) and MGNREGS funds can be utilized for developing private agricultural lands and community lands, especially for soil and water conservation, development of village infrastructure and community assets. The initiation of MGNREGA should also be with a functional crèche in the community which would free the mother to work under public work programs.
The team also understood that none of the households have cultivable agricultural land, necessary steps must be taken to include the households under FRA and land is being allocated looking at the feasibility under the Act.
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) members need to play a more proactive role to address issues of chronic hunger and malnourishment, right to quality education, health services and benefits, food and nutritional security, social security benefits and wage employment, especially during the lean periods of the year. There is a greater need for better co-ordination with the Block and District administration.
The companies which have benefited from the land and natural resources have hardly taken any measures to give back to the communities other than hardship and pollution. They are no less accountable than the administration to ensure no family lives with hunger in their vicinity. The companies like Tata Steel and others must allocate necessary resources and develop a clear integrated and overall development strategy and implemented on a Mission mode in the tribal pockets of Jajpur district. Focus should be on food and nutritional security, gender equality and women’s empowerment, promotion of Climate-resilient regenerative agriculture systems and practices to ensure food and income security of the communities.

The Fact Finding Report can be accessed here.

Missing Aadhaar Missing Identity

Rethink UID — 2021-09-20 00:00:00

Where do lost Aadhar numbers go? For many people who lose their Aadhaar numbers, retrieving them is close to impossible.

For example many daily-wage labourers in APMC mandi, have lost their Aadhaar card, don't remember their Aadhaar number, don't have a registered mobile number and have no idea where or how to retrieve it.

Jheenak Prasad is a migrant labourer from Azamgarh (UP). He lost his Aadhaar six months ago, doesn't have a registered mobile number, can't remember his date of birth, and is running around to retrieve the lost card as he needs it for COVID vaccination - without which he cannot find work.

Problem In School Admissions Due To Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

Shanta Devi of Barjal, Bhim Block, Rajsamand Dist, Rajasthan explains that she has been trying to get Aadhaar for her daughter Basanta who is in 8th standard. She tried four times to enroll but is clueless why she isn't receiving it

9Roe4Axuruprxujk1Sh3Nptx29Sch6

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

In Madhya Pradesh, a woman was being asked to show Aadhaar number even while she was in labour pain, because government has made it mandatory for Janani Surksha Yojana, a scheme for a maternity benefit cash transfer" Tukaram Malave said "We were managing fine without Aadhaar, with bank passbooks, why is government forcing Aadhaar?"

No Aadhaar No Education

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

UIDAI Regional Office, Pragati Maidan, 19.07.2017 With Ration and Education refused, Aadhaar causing much of exclusion than inclusion. "No Aadhaar, No Education." Ration refused as he has not enrolled his children in Aadhaar (voluntary service).

Kali Salvi Says Our Fingerprints Are Taken 4 Times Only Kerosene Is Handed Where Is Our Ration

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

Kali Salvi of Theekarvas Panchayat of Rajsamand District did not get her rations for 2 years straight. This started after the Aadhaar linked Biometric machines started being used. She speaks of her issues with the Aadhaar machine.

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

राशन की दुकानो पर पीओएस मशीने ठीक से काम नही कर रही है और इसका खामियाजा राशन उपभोक्ताओ को उठाना पड़ रहा है। कहीं पर नेटवर्क की परेशानी है तो कहीं पर फिंगर इम्प्रेशन नही आने से लोगो को राशन नही मिल रहा है। सब्र का बांध टूटता देख अब

Tell The Government To Take Away The Biometric Machines

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

I Do Not Get Rations They Say Machine Does Not Recognise Your Fingerprints

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

Vardi Devi, a resident of Kukarkheda Panchayat in Bhim Tehsil of Rajasthan has not gotten any ration after the Aadhar linked PDS system started functioning because the machine does not recognise her fingerprints. A sack of wheat from the market costs Rs. 2000 and for a widow, this is an unjustifiable price to be paid for her food.

Ration Dealer Pratap Singh Of Hamela Ki Ver Climbs On A Hill Daily To Be Able To Distribute Rations

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

Pratap Singh, Ration dealer of 'Hamela Ki Ver' Village of Brar Panchayat speaks of his experience of going to the hill in the village after Aadhaar recognised machines are being used for distribution. People walk along to the hill for their fingerprints to get verified.

After The Machine Has Come Of Course It Receiving Pension Has Become More Difficult

Rethink UID — 2018-01-17 00:00:00

Kanku Devi w/o Nathu Singh, a resident of Kukarkheda Panchayat, Bhim Tehsil, Rajasamand District in Rajasthan speaks of her difficulties with respect to receiving her Old Age Pensions.

I Cannot Get Pensions In Village After Aadhaar Introduced

Rethink UID — 2017-06-10 00:00:00

This is Fefi Devi W/o Nathu Singh from village and Panchayat Kukerkheda, Block Bhim, Distt Rajsamand, Rajasthan. Both are above 90 years and they haven't got ration from Fair Price Shop after Aadhar based biometric authentication was introduced. The PoS machine doesn't detect their biometrics.

Is Anyone Accountable For Aadhaar Errors

Rethink UID — 2017-04-11 00:00:00

Babu Singh and Punni Devi, Jawaja

Deprived Of 10 Kilo Grains Because Dont Have Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2017-04-11 00:00:00

Description

Does Aadhaar Work For The Elderly

Rethink UID — 2017-04-11 00:00:00

Chhattisgarh government made Aadhaar authentication mandatory in two districts - in Dhamatar and Raigarh - six months back. All beneficiaries have to go to the ration shop and carry out fingerprint authentication or get photographed when they go to the ration shope before they can collect their 7 kilo rations per month.

Hands Washed But Biometrics Dont Match

Rethink UID — 2017-04-11 00:00:00

Sanganer, Jaipur

No Network At Ration Shop Biometric Machine Hung On Jamun Tree

Rethink UID — 2017-04-11 00:00:00

At this ration shop in East Mehram Nagar, there is no network coverage. The department officials insisted that the shopkeeper find a way to make the machine work. Therefore, the machine was hung on top of a tree! The shop keeper explains the situation.

What Happens When Aadhaar Biometrics Dont Match

Rethink UID — 2017-03-19 00:00:00

Masada block, Ajmer, Rajasthan

No Aadhaar So No Pension Daakhu Devi

Rethink UID — 2017-03-15 00:00:00

Uploaded by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, Rajasthan, India on 2016-11-08.

Sharing Aadhaar Data Hcnotice To Centre Reliance

Rethink UID — 2017-03-01 00:00:00

A ration cardholder explains how they are unable to get their rations as the biometric machine does not recognize their fingerprints in the winter when the skins of the fingers develop cracks

Toi 6459.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2026 04 30+At+1.08.35%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2026 03 31+At+10.22.00%E2%80%Afam.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2025 07 10+At+5.08.19%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Pngtree Prohibition Sign For Fingerprinting Do Not Process Biometric Data Vector Png Image 12756843.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2024 12 12+At+2.16.46%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2024 12 12+At+2.16.35%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

आधार फैसले के पांच साल

Rethink UID — Wed, 04 Oct 2023 06:33:23 +0000

Updates

आधार फैसले के पांच साल

October 04, 2023

26.09.2023 को सुप्रीम कोर्ट की संविधान पीठ द्वारा आधार निर्णय (के एस पुट्टास्वामी और अन्य बनाम भारत संघ और अन्य (2019) 1 एससीसी 1) को सुनाए हुए आधा दशक हो गया है। ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि एक सुविधाजनक भूलने की बीमारी हमारी सरकार को प्रभावित करती है क्योंकि यह आधार अधिनियम में नए नियम और ऐसे संशोधन बनाती है जो उस निर्णय द्वारा आधार के उपयोग पर लगाई गई सीमाओं को नज़र अंदाज करते हैं। निर्णय का लिंक यहां है

संक्षेप में: आधार के उपयोग पर पाँच महत्वपूर्ण सीमाएँ जिन्हें बहुमत के फैसले ने मान्यता दी:

आधार को केवल कल्याणकारी योजनाओं के लिए अनिवार्य बनाया जा सकता है (पृष्ठ 389, पैरा 320 - 322 देखें)। यह विशेष रूप से अभिनिर्धारित किया गया था कि आधार को पेंशन जैसे अर्जित लाभों के लिए अनिवार्य नहीं बनाया जा सकता है। बहुमत के फैसले में यह भी कहा गया है, "साथ ही, हम आशा करते हैं कि उत्तरदाता 'सब्सिडी, सेवाओं और लाभों' के दायरे का अनुचित विस्तार नहीं करेंगे, जिससे आधार का दायरा बढ़ेगा, जहां इसकी अन्यथा अनुमति नहीं है।" (पृ. 391)
निजी कंपनियां आधार का इस्तेमाल नहीं कर सकतीं. आधार अधिनियम की धारा 57 जो निजी कंपनियों द्वारा आधार प्रमाणीकरण के उपयोग की अनुमति देती है, असंवैधानिक है (पैरा 219 (ई), 412, 447(1)(डी))।
आधार को बच्चों के स्कूल में प्रवेश या सर्व शिक्षा अभियान के तहत लाभ के लिए अनिवार्य नहीं बनाया जा सकता है। आधार की कमी के कारण बच्चों को लाभ से वंचित नहीं किया जा सकता है (पृष्ठ 393, पैरा 325; पृष्ठ 401, पैरा 332 देखें)।
आधार (प्रमाणीकरण) विनियम, 2016 के विनियम 26 के अन्तर्गत अधिप्रमाणन संव्यवहार डेटा का संचयन अस्वीकार्य माना गया था। (पैरा 219 (बी))
आधार (प्रमाणीकरण) संव्यवहार डेटा का प्रतिधारण छह महीने की अवधि से अधिक नहीं रखा जाना चाहिए (पैरा 219 (ए))

फैसले द्वारा स्थापित सीमाओं की घोर उपेक्षा करते हुए, सरकार मौलिक अधिकारों की कीमत पर यूआईडी को बढ़ावा देने के लिए आधार के उपयोग का विस्तार जारी रखे हुए है।

मूडीज क्रेडिट रेटिंग एजेंसी ने आधार की आलोचना की

इस बीच, एक अनुस्मारक - बायोमेट्रिक्स अविश्वसनीय हैं। यह व्यापक रूप से बताया गया है कि क्रेडिट रेटिंग एजेंसी, मूडीज़ ने एक रिपोर्ट जारी की है जिसमें आधार के साथ चिंताओं को उजागर किया गया है, जिसमें कहा गया है कि "इस प्रणाली के परिणामस्वरूप अक्सर सेवा से इनकार हो जाता है, और मैनुअल मजदूरों के लियें बायोमेट्रिक प्रौद्योगिकियों की विश्वसनीयता, विशेष रूप से गर्म, आर्द्र जलवायु में कम हो जाती है। सरकार ने रिपोर्ट का खंडन किया है और किये गए दावों को “निराधार” बताया है।

दुनिया में सबसे भरोसेमंद आईडी

मूडीज को जवाब देते हुए मोदी सरकार ने अविश्वसनीय दावा किया है कि आधार दुनिया में सबसे भरोसेमंद डिजिटल आईडी है। वहीँ अपराधी, किसी भी खेल से हमेशा दो कदम आगे रहते हैं, इस सबसे भरोसेमंद आईडी के साथ धोखाधड़ी करने के नए तरीके खोजने में बेहद नवीन और आविष्कारशील रहे हैं। हमारी एक व्यक्तिगत पसंदीदा कहानी यूपी गैंग की थी जो आधार कार्ड बनाने के लिए पैर की उंगलियों के निशान (टो प्रिंट) का इस्तेमाल करता था, जिसका इस्तेमाल धोखाधड़ी से बैंक ऋण लेने वाले कई लोगों द्वारा किया जाता था।

डिकोड ने इस महीने रिपोर्ट दी थी - ''बिहार पुलिस आधार सक्षम भुगतान प्रणाली के माध्यम से धोखाधड़ी से थक गई है।” यह रिपोर्ट आधार सक्षम भुगतान प्रणाली (AePS) की व्याख्या करती है। आधार सक्षम भुगतान प्रणाली (AePS) के तहत लोगों को अपने खाते से पैसा निकालने के लिए अपने बॉयोमीट्रिक्स (उंगलियों के निशान) का उपयोग करना पड़ता है। लोगों को बैंक जाने या एटीएम कार्ड रखने की आवश्यकता नहीं है, वे बैंक द्वारा नियुक्त बिजनेस कॉरेस्पोंडेंट (या CSP) के पास जा सकते हैं। वे बिजनेस कॉरेस्पोंडेंट को अपना आधार नंबर देते हैं, पीओएस (POS) मशीन पर अपना अंगूठा लगाते हैं। यदि उनके उंगलियों के निशान वेरीफाई हो जाते है, तो वे पैसे निकाल सकते हैं। रिपोर्ट में लिखा है कि - “इस साल जुलाई में, नवादा पुलिस ने दो लोगों को गिरफ्तार करने के लिए एक विशेष जांच दल का गठन किया और प्लास्टिक जैसे पदार्थों से बने 512 क्लोन अंगूठे के निशान बरामद किए।” विस्तृत कहानी देखें जिसमें पुलिस अधिकारियों के साक्षात्कार शामिल हैं जो बताते हैं कि वे कैसे मानते हैं कि धोखाधड़ी हुई है।

महीने की शुरुआत में, द हिंदू ने रिपोर्ट किया था कि गुजरात में दो लोगों को कथित तौर पर आधार और पैन कार्ड जैसे दो लाख पहचान प्रमाण दस्तावेज़ों को जाली बनाने और प्रत्येक को ₹15 से ₹200 में बेचने के आरोप में गिरफ्तार किया गया था।

डिजिटल व्यक्तिगत डेटा संरक्षण अधिनियम, 2023

आप सभी आधार पर नजर रखने वालों के लिए डेटा संरक्षण अधिनियम का क्या मतलब है? आधार परियोजना किसी कानून के अभाव में 2009 में शुरू हुई। लगभग दस साल बाद, आधार मामले में बहस के दौरान सरकार ने सुप्रीम कोर्ट से वादा किया था कि वह डेटा सुरक्षा कानून पारित करेगी। अंततः, भारत में अब तक एक सबसे बड़े डेटा उल्लंघनों से के कुछ ही सप्ताह बाद, केंद्र सरकार ने डिजिटल पर्सनल डेटा प्रोटेक्शन बिल, 2023 पारित किया। जो बाद मैं राष्ट्रपति की अनुमति के बाद 11 अगस्त को अधिनियम बना

यह कानून हमें पर्याप्त डेटा सुरक्षा प्रदान करने में विफल है, यह सरकार के लिए छूट भी बनाता है। इसका मतलब यह है कि व्यक्तिगत डेटा संरक्षण अधिनियम आधार परियोजना पर भी लागू नहीं होगा (धारा 17 देखें)। यह उस प्रश्न का उत्तर देता है जो हममें से कुछ लोगों ने कुछ साल पहले उठाया था - क्या आधार परियोजना डेटा संरक्षण अधिनियम के साथ मौजूद हो सकती है? इसका उत्तर हाँ है, क्योंकि डेटा संरक्षण अधिनियम इस पर लागू नहीं होता है।

आधार डेटा साझा करने के बारे में आधार अधिनियम क्या कहता है?

आधार अधिनियम 2016 की धारा 29 में कहा गया है कि मूल बायोमेट्रिक जानकारी कभी भी किसी के साथ साझा नहीं की जा सकती है और इसका उपयोग केवल आधार संख्या उत्पन्न करने और प्रमाणीकरण के लिए किया जा सकता है। धारा 29 (2) कहता है कि “ इस अिधिनयम के अधीन संगृहीत या सृजित कोर बायोमैक सूचना से भिन्न पहचान सम्बन्धी सूचना, केवल इस अधिनियम के उपबंधों के अनुसार और ऐसी रीति से, जो विनियमों द्वारा विनिर्दिष्ट की जाए, साझा की जा सकेगी।” इसका मतलब है कि कोर बोमेट्रिक इनफार्मेशन सिर्फ आधार अधिनियम के तहत इकठ्ठा की गयी है वह सिर्फ इसी अधिनयम और विनियमों के अनुसार ही साझा की सकेगी.

धारा 29 (3 ) कहता है कि “ पहचान संबंधी जानकारी जो की अनुरोध करने वाली इकाई या ऑफ़लाइन सत्यापन चाहने वाली इकाई के पास उपलब्ध होगी-

(क) का उपयोग, प्रमाणीकरण या ऑफ़लाइन सत्यापन के लिए कोई भी जानकारी जमा करते समय व्यक्ति को लिखित रूप में सूचित किए गए उद्देश्यों के अलावा, किसी भी उद्देश्य के लिए उपयोग नहीं किया जाएगा ; या

(ख) का खुलासा, प्रमाणीकरण या ऑफ़लाइन सत्यापन के लिए कोई भी जानकारी जमा करते समय व्यक्ति को लिखित रूप में सूचित किए गए उद्देश्यों के अलावा, किसी भी उद्देश्य के लिए नहीं किया जाएगा।

बशर्ते यह कि खंड (ए) और (बी) के तहत उद्देश्य व्यक्ति को समझने योग्य स्पष्ट और सटीक भाषा में होंगे।

डेटा सरंक्षण अधिनियम 2023 के अंतर्गत छूट आधार अधिनियम की अवहेलना नहीं करती है. ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि आधार अधिनियम की धारा 29 के तहत नोटिस की आवश्यकता अभी भी अधिनियम के तहत एकत्र और उपयोग की जाने वाली "मुख्य बायोमेट्रिक जानकारी" के अलावा किसी भी पहचान जानकारी पर लागू होनी चाहिए। साथ ही आधार (सूचना की सहभाजित) विनियम, 2016. क्या कभी किसी को अपनी पहचान संबंधी जानकारी साझा करने के बारे में प्राधिकरण या अनुरोधकर्ता इकाई से कोई नोटिस मिला है? यदि हाँ तो हमें बताएं!

निजता का उल्लंघन और पुलिस आपको कैसे ट्रैक कर सकती है

दो दिलचस्प मामले जी की आधार और पुलिस की लोगों को ट्रैक करने की क्षमता पर सवाल उठाते हैं। दोनों मामले लापता ऐसे व्यक्तियों से संबंधित हैं जो खोजे नहीं जाना चाहते थे। दिनाँक 01.09.2023 को, टाइम्स ऑफ इंडिया ने रिपोर्ट किया कि, “धोबे गांव के किसान भोला यादव अपने बेटे को जाने नहीं देना चाहता, जिसके साथ वह सात साल बाद गुरुवार को फिर से मिला था। हालाँकि, बेटे ने कहा कि वह कभी घर लौटना ही नहीं चाहता था। बेटा 15 साल की उम्र में लापता हो गया और पुलिस ने उसके आधार नंबर को ट्रैक करके उसे ढूंढ लिया। रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है कि “जांच के दौरान पुलिस टीम को लापता युवक के आधार नंबर से जुड़ा एक बैंक खाता मिला। फिर उन्होंने खाते से जुड़े उसके सेल फोन को ट्रैक किया और उसे ढूंढने में कामयाब रहे.”

टाइम्स ऑफ इंडिया की एक अन्य रिपोर्ट जो कि दिनाँक 14.09.2023 को प्रकाशित हुई थी उसमें कहा गया है कि 2018 में एक महिला लापता हो गई और उसका गायब होना उसके पति के साथ विवाद से जुड़ा था। वर्षों की खोज के बाद, जांचकर्ताओं को पता चला कि उसने अपना आधार कार्ड अपडेट कर लिया है। रिपोर्ट में कहा गया है कि "चेहरे की पहचान और डिजिटल जांच तकनीकों का उपयोग करके, पुलिस ने सफलतापूर्वक उसे गोवा तक ट्रैक किया जहां वह पाई गई जहाँ वह एक नया जीवन जी रही थी।"

पुलिस ने इन लोगों को इनका आधार नंबर का प्रयोग करके कैसे खोजा? क्या पुलिसकर्मी एक ही आधार नंबर का उपयोग करके कई लिंक किए गए डेटाबेस तक पहुंचने में सक्षम हैं? क्या डेटाबेस एकल आधार संख्या के लिए खोजे जाने योग्य हैं? लोगों की आधार से जुड़ी जानकारी तक पहुंचने के लिए पुलिस किस सॉफ्टवेयर और तकनीक का उपयोग कर रही है? क्या चेहरे की पहचान तकनीक को आधार से जोड़ा जा रहा है और निवासियों को ट्रैक करने के लिए इसका उपयोग किया जा रहा है?

महात्मा गाँधी नरेगा और आधार

लिबटेक इंडिया के मित्रों ने मनरेगा में आधार की शुरूआत और योजना से श्रमिकों के नाम हटाने से संबंधित एक महत्वपूर्ण अध्ययन प्रकाशित किया है। एक वर्ष से अधिक समय तक मनरेगा में विलोपन पर नज़र रखते हुए, उन्होंने अक्टूबर 2022 और जून 2023 के बीच 600 से अधिक श्रमिकों का साक्षात्कार किया, और दिसंबर 2022 और मई 2023 के बीच में मनरेगा से जुड़े अधिकारियों का साक्षात्कार लिया। उन्होंने आंध्र प्रदेश (एपी), गुजरात, झारखंड, ओडिशा और तेलंगाना सहित विभिन्न राज्यों को कवर किया। वे इकनोमिक एंड पोलिटिकल वीकली में लिखते हैं की, ““हमारा तर्क है कि आधार-आधारित हस्तक्षेपों की जटिलता और उनके कार्यान्वयन के तरीके का विलोपन की घटनाओं के साथ संबंध है। हम आधार हस्तक्षेपों को खोलकर और उनके औचित्य और जटिलता का आकलन करके शुरुआत करते हैं। हम आगे इस बात पैर भी चर्चा करते हैं कि आधिकारिक मनरेगा दस्तावेज़ विलोपन के बारे में क्या कहते हैं, और जमीनी स्तर पर विलोपन प्रथाओं और समाधान प्रक्रियाओं की संक्षेप में जांच करते हैं। अंत में, हम केंद्र सरकार की तकनीकी-समाधानवादी प्रवृत्तियों के एक लक्षण के रूप में आधार अनिवार्यता पर टिप्पणी करते हैं।”

रिमाइंडर! याद रखे आधार का वोटर पहचान पत्र से लिंक करना अनिवार्य नहीं है! इसको आगे तक पहुँचाइये!

जबकि आधार को लगभग हर चीज के लिए लगभग अनिवार्य बताया जा रहा है, इस बात को आगे तक शेयर करना न भूले कि - आपके आधार को अपने मतदाता पहचान पत्र के साथ जोड़ना अनिवार्य नहीं है, और इस बात को चुनाव आयोग ने भी सुप्रीम कोर्ट में स्पष्ट किया है।

हम किधर जा रहे हैं?

पांच साल पहले भारत के सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की संविधान पीठ ने कहा था कि आधार का उपयोग केवल कल्याण कार्यों के लिए किया जा सकता है। एक अलग फैसले में इसने आधार और पैन कार्ड को अनिवार्य रूप से जोड़ने की अनुमति दी थी। आर्टिकल 21 ट्रस्ट के मित्रों ने 2016 के बाद से यूआईडी परियोजना में विकास की एक संक्षिप्त सूची भी तैयार की है। आज, केंद्र सरकार आधार को हमारे दैनिक जीवन के हर क्षेत्र और पहलू में शामिल करने की कोशिश कर रही है, और इसने एक डेटा सरंक्षण कानून भी बनाया जो कि सरकार और इसके द्वारा चुने गए किसी भी व्यक्ति को देटा सरंक्षण अधिनियम 2023 के अनुपालन से छूट देता है।

प्रौद्योगिकी को लेकर चर्चा खोखली बनी हुई है। एक तरफ जहाँ हम से अपेक्षा की जाती है कि हम आधार योजना को राष्ट्रीय गौरव के प्रतीत के रूप में स्वीकृत करें तो वहीँ दूसरी ओर आधार को भूख से होने वाली मौतों और धोखा धरी से भी जोड़ कर देखा जा रहा है.

यह खोखला राष्ट्रवाद इंडिया स्टैक प्रोजेक्ट में उत्पन्न हुआ है, जिसकी बुनियाद और शुरुआत आधार है। इंटरनेट गवर्नेंस प्रोजेक्ट ने इंडिया स्टैक पर जो एक निजी कंपनी है जो सार्वजनिक रूप से रखे गए संसाधनों का उपयोग करती है, एक गहन रिपोर्ट प्रकाशित की है. एक नए "डिजिटल सार्वजनिक बुनियादी ढांचे" के रूप में आधार की पुनः ब्रांडिंग विशेष रूप से चिंताजनक है क्योंकि यह बेहद भ्रामक है, जो इस परियोजना के तहत जबरदस्ती और बहिष्करण के इतिहास को अस्पष्ट करता है। यह सार्वजनिक बुनियादी ढांचा किसके लिए है? कैसे लाखों भारतियों का डेटा का उपयोग किया जाएगा? आधार फैसले के पांच साल बाद, भविष्य गरिमा, निजता और स्वतंत्रता के लिए नई चुनौतियों से भरा दिख रहा है।

हम सभी को शुभकामनाएँ जो अभी भी विरोध कर रहे हैं, लिख रहे हैं, सोच रहे हैं! हम उम्मीद करते हैं कि इस सप्ताह तत्काल अपडेटस के लिए एक व्हाट्सएप चैनल लॉन्च करेंगे जिसके बारे आप सभी को सूचित किया जाएगा।

जैसा कि हम आधार फैसले के बाद के पांच वर्षों पर विचार करते हैं और भविष्य की ओर देखते हैं, हम खुद को याद दिलाते हैं कि हमारी आलोचनाएं और हमारा प्रतिरोध मजबूत बना हुआ है। और साथ ही प्रौद्योगिकी, सत्ता के केंद्रीकरण, राज्य और हमारी अपनी स्वतंत्रता के बारे में दस्तावेजीकरण और चिंतन का कार्य जारी है।

एकजुटता में,

Image of the Hercules Globular Cluster by Astrophotographer Rajat Kumar

Screenshot+2023 10 04+At+11.45.16+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Five Years Since the Aadhaar Judgment

Rethink UID — Wed, 27 Sep 2023 04:30:34 +0000

Updates

Five Years Since the Aadhaar Judgment

September 27, 2023

Today 26.09.2023, marks half a decade since a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court delivered the Aadhaar judgment (KS Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 1 SCC 1). It appears that a convenient amnesia affects our government as it creates new rules and amendments to the Aadhaar Act that ignore and forget the limitations placed on the use of Aadhaar by that judgment. A link to the judgment is here.

To recap: Five significant limitations on the use of Aadhaar that the majority judgment recognised:

Aadhaar can only be made mandatory for welfare schemes (see Pg. 389, para 320 - 322). It was specifically held that Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for earned benefits, like pension. The majority judgment also stated “At the same time, we hope that the respondents shall not unduly expand the scope of ‘subsidies, services and benefits’ thereby widening the net of Aadhaar, where it is not permitted otherwise.” (Pg. 391).
Private companies cannot use Aadhaar. Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which allowed the use of Aadhaar authentication by private companies (body corporates) is unconstitutional (para 219 (e), 412, 447(1)(d)).
Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for children’s admission to school or for benefits under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. Children cannot be denied benefits for lack of Aadhaar (See Pg. 393, para 325; Pg. 401, para 332).
The storage of transaction data as per Regulation 26 of the Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016, was considered impermissible. (para 219 (b))
Authentication records are not to be kept beyond a period of six months (para 219 (a))

In blatant disregard of the limitations established by the judgment, the government continues to expand the use of Aadhaar to promote the UID at the cost of fundamental rights.

Moody’s criticizes Aadhaar

Meanwhile, a reminder - biometrics are inaccurate. It has been widely reported that the credit ratings agency, Moody’s has released a report which highlights concerns with Aadhaar stating that “The system often results in service denials, and the reliability of biometric technologies, especially for manual laborers in hot, humid climates, is questionable”. The government has rebutted the report and says that the claims made are “baseless”.

Most Trusted ID in the world

While rebutting Moody's, the Modi government has made the incredible claim that Aadhaar is the most trusted Digital ID in the world. Criminal groups, always two steps ahead of any game, have been wildly innovative and inventive finding new ways to commit fraud with this most trusted ID. A personal favourite of ours was the UP gang which used toe prints to forge Aadhaar cards, then used by several people fraudulently taking bank loans.

Decode reported this month - “The Bihar police is tired of frauds through the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System. In July this year, the Nawada police formed a special investigating team to arrest two people and recovered 512 cloned thumb impressions made of plastic like substances”. Check out the in depth story which includes interviews with police officials who explain how they believe the frauds are committed.

Earlier in the month, the Hindu reported that in Gujarat two persons were arrested allegedly for having forged two lakh identity proof documents like Aadhaar and PAN cards and sold them for ₹15 to ₹200 each. Just remember, there’s no need to panic because we have a 13ft wall which protects the Aadhaar compound.

Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

What does the Data Protection Act mean for all you Aadhaar watchers out there? Five years after promising the Supreme Court that it would introduce a privacy bill, fourteen years after the cabinet note which led to the beginning of the Unique Identification project, and just a few weeks after one of the largest data breaches India has witnessed yet, the government passed the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2023, which fails to provide us with adequate data protection and creates blanket exemptions for the state and therefore the Aadhaar programme (see Section 17), answering the question that some of us had posed some years ago - Can the Aadhaar project exist along with a Data Protection Act? The answer is yes, because the Data Protection Act does not apply to it.

What does the Aadhaar Act say about sharing Aadhaar data?

Section 29 of the Aadhaar Act 2016, states that core biometric information can never be shared with anyone and can only be used for generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication. S. 29 (2) says that “The identity information, other than core biometric information, collected or created under this Act may be shared only in accordance with the provisions of this Act and in such manner as may be specified by regulations”. S. 29 (3) states that no identity information available with a requesting entity or offline verification-seeking entity shall be—

used for any purpose, other than the purposes informed in writing to the individual at the time of submitting any information for authentication or offline verification; or
disclosed for any purpose, other than purposes informed in writing to the individual at the time of submitting any information for authentication or offline verification:

Provided that the purposes under clauses (a) and (b) shall be in clear and precise language understandable to the individual.

Exemptions under the DPDP Act do not override the Aadhaar Act. It would appear that the requirement for notice under S. 29 of the Aadhaar Act must still apply to any identity information other than “core biometric information” collected and used under the Act. As well as the Aadhaar (Sharing of Information) Regulations, 2016. Has anyone ever received any notice from the UIDAI or a Requesting Entity about the sharing of their identity information? Let us know if you have!

Violations of privacy and how the police can track you

Two interesting cases raise questions about Aadhaar and the ability of the police to track people. Both cases relate to missing persons who did not want to be found. On 01.09.2023, the Times of India reported “Bhola Yadav, a farmer of Dhobe village, would not let go of his son with whom he was reunited on Thursday after seven years. However, the son said that he never wanted to return home”. The son went missing at the age of 15 and the police traced him by tracking his Aadhaar number. The report says that “During the probe, the police team found a bank account linked with the missing youth’s Aadhaar number. They then tracked his cell phone linked with the account and managed to find him…”

Another report dated 14.09.2023 from the Times of India states that a women went missing in 2018 and her disappearance was linked to a dispute with her husband. After years of pursuit, investigators discovered she had updated her Aadhaar card. The report states that “Police successfully tracked her to Goa where she was found, leading a new life, utilising facial recognition and digital investigation techniques.”

How did the police trace these people using their Aadhaar numbers? Are police personnel able to access multiple linked databases using a single Aadhaar number? Are databases searchable for single Aadhaar numbers? What software and technology is the police using to access people’s Aadhaar linked information? Is facial recognition technology being linked with Aadhaar and used to track residents?

NREGA and Aadhaar

Friends at Libtech India have published an important study correlating the introduction of Aadhaar and deletion of workers names from the MGNREGA. Tracking deletions in the MGNREGA for over a year, they have interviewed over 600 workers between October 2022 and June 2023, and interviewed officials between December 2022 and May 2023. They covered various states, including Andhra Pradesh (AP), Gujarat, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana. They write in the Economic and Political Weekly - “We argue that the complexity of Aadhaar-based interventions and the manner of their rollout has a correlation with the spate of deletions. We begin by unpacking the Aadhaar interventions and assessing their rationale and complexity. We further discuss what official MGNREGA documents say about deletions, and briefly examine deletion practices and resolution procedures on the ground. Finally, we comment on the Aadhaar mandate as a symptom of the union government’s techno-solutionist tendencies.”

Libtech India’s working paper titled '“Assessment of wage payment delays for Aadhaar-based payments and impact on delays due to payments trifurcation by caste” examines technological interventions in the MGNREGA. They write “Many of these interventions were introduced without any consultation or scientific piloting. Consequently, some have violated the clauses of the Act, adversely afecting programme implementation. We demonstrate how two such digital technological interventions in MGNREGA - segregation of wage payments by caste, and Aadhaar-Based Payment System (ABPS) - have violated MGNREGA clauses. Our analysis is based on 31.36 million transactions across 10 states from Financial Year 2021-22 crawled from the programme’s Management Information System (MIS). 63% wage payments were delayed beyond the mandated 7 days by the union government and 42% were delayed beyond 15 days. We use the percentage of transactions processed within the mandated time by the union government as the metric to assess the performance. Notwithstanding delays in wage payments, we find there is a statistically significant diference in the time taken to process payments across caste. This is also the first large-scale data-based evidence demonstrating no statistically significant difference in the time taken to process wage payments through ABPS compared with traditional account-based payments.” This study demonstrates that the Aadhaar based payments system did not make improvements in MGNREGA payments.

Reminder! Spread the word! Aadhaar Voter ID linking is not mandatory!

While Aadhaar continues to be pushed as mandatory for almost everything, remember to spread the word - it is not mandatory to link your UID with your Voter ID, as the Election Commission has so helpfully clarified to the Supreme Court.

Where are we heading?

Five years ago the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India said that Aadhaar could only be made mandatory for welfare. In a separate judgment it had allowed the mandatory linking of Aadhaar and PAN cards. Friends at the Article 21 Trust have compiled a brief list of developments in the UID project since 2016. Today, the Union Government continues to try to thrust Aadhaar into every sphere and aspect of our daily lives, as it creates a data protection law that exempts itself and anyone it chooses from compliance.

The discourse around technology remains hollow. We are expected to treat the Aadhaar programme as a source of national pride while it continues to be linked to hunger deaths and fraud. This hollow nationalism is evoked in the India Stack project, of which Aadhaar forms the basis and beginning. The Internet Governance Project has published an in-depth report on the India Stack, "a set of APIs and associated platforms that operate across three critical sectors: identity, payments, and data". The report documents the use of Aadhaar in the creation of a structure of digital India through private companies that use publicly held resources. The re-branding of Aadhaar as a new “digital public infrastructure” is particularly concerning as it is deeply misleading, obfuscating the history of coercion and exclusion that the project carries. Who is this public infrastructure for? How will the data of millions of Indian residents be used? Five years after the Aadhaar judgment, the future looks full of novel challenges to dignity, privacy and liberty.

All the best to all of us still resisting, writing, thinking

This week we hope to launch a WhatsApp channel for more immediate updates and will keep all of you informed.

As we reflect on five years since the Aadhaar judgment and look to the future, we remind ourselves that our critiques and our resistance remain strong. The work of documenting and thinking about technology, concentration of power, the state and our own liberty continues.

In solidarity,

Images of the Hercules cluster by astrophotographer Rajat Kumar

Screenshot+2023 09 27+At+9.58.28+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar-related failures claim another victim: 11-year old child dies of malnourishment in Odisha

Rethink UID — Wed, 19 Apr 2023 10:24:25 +0000

Updates

Aadhaar-related failures claim another victim: 11-year old child dies of malnourishment in Odisha

April 19, 2023

In the last few years of documenting and collecting information about the Aadhaar project we have witnessed the impact of mandatory Aadhaar which has grievously, disproportionately and cruelly affected those who are poor, marginalised, or vulnerable. Many will remember the death of a young child Santoshi in 2017 whose family could not get rations as their Aadhaar was not linked to their ration card. In 2018, the Right to Food Campaign had reported that “At least 19 deaths were directly linked to Aadhaar: the deceased were denied food rations from government-run ration shops either because their ration cards were not linked or “seeded” with Aadhaar, or because of a failure of Aadhaar-based biometric authentication.”

We write to you today with sadness of the news of the death of another child, in Jajpur, Odisha.

Following news reports that a child had died in March of this year due to malnutrition, a fact-finding team of local activists, social scientists and journalists visited Ghatisahi village. Their fact-finding report can be found here.

The report found that Arjun Hembram was around 11 years old when he died on the morning of the 3rd of March, 2023. His parents Banku and Tulasi work as labourers. Banku works as a tractor driver cum daily wage labour; Tulasi works as an agricultural labour and daily wage labour. She is the major bread earner of the family. The family stays in a one-room Pradhan Mantri Awas building, which was sanctioned to Banku’s father. The family has neither agricultural land nor livestock. While Banku and his wife Tulasi have Aadhaar numbers, none of the children, including Arjun have Aadhaar numbers. The fact-finding team also found that the child’s family had not received rations through the PDS for 21 months. While Arjun’s mother Tulasi was not able to understand why her ration card had been cancelled, the team found that her name was spelt differently on her Aadhaar card and on her ration card, likely leading to the cancellation of the ration card in the process of attempting to link both.

The team found that Arjun Hembram was a child with a disability, however, no disability pension was received in his name. He was not enrolled in the local school and had no access to mid-day meals. The fact-finding report notes that – “the affected household faces multiple exclusion from different social protection programmes the family is without cultivable land and has been excluded from receiving ration for even after being eligible and were initially got a ration card, three children including the deceased were excluded from disability pension, their [the parents’] MGNREGA job card was deleted and reason for which is unclear leading to they being denied from MGNREGA work and not getting a house under PM-Awas scheme. According to the Sarpanch the MGNREGA work was stopped for some time being and he cited people's reluctance with NMMS app being one of the reasons for the same.”

Malnutrition and starvation deaths are caused by a complex interaction of many factors, and we have found that the imposition of Aadhaar exacerbates existing vulnerabilities.

Issues within the Aadhaar programme are given terms familiar to technological innovation that lighten and obscure the cost of the programme. When people are unable to link Aadhaar with ration cards due to a mismatch in their names on both, or when the internet fails, or when fingerprints don’t work, we are told to call these “teething problems” bringing to mind a small toddler who is just learning to eat solid food, rather than a state-owned programme mandatorily imposed on population which excludes many from their fundamental rights and entitlements. Exclusion is measured in the percentage of the total population, which is downplayed as being insignificant or not significant enough for action, and issues central to the functioning of the programme are seen as implementation issues rather than intrinsic failures of the programme leading to situations of crises, starvation, death and the destruction of welfare. Every instance of exclusion comes at a grave human cost.

When the Supreme Court held that mandating Aadhaar linkage was acceptable for people on welfare programmes, it had not adequately considered the vast exclusionary harms Aadhaar seeding caused.

In 2021, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a public interest petition, challenging the deletion of 3 crore ration cards, because they were not linked to Aadhaar. The petition documents starvation deaths taking place in Jharkhand, U.P., Odisha, Karnataka, M.P., Maharashtra, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana. These deleted cards were initially justified (and celebrated) as being due to fake ration cards, but subsequent investigation showed that the ration card holders were never given notice. Subsequent reports also concluded that the ration cards were genuine. The case is still pending in the Supreme Court.

We demand accountability from senior officials of the UIDAI who administer and implement the Aadhaar programme, as well as the relevant authorities under the National Food Security Act, 2013, whose mandate is to ensure that people are able to access their fundamental right to food.

Rethink Aadhaar stands in support of the key demands made by the Civil Society Forum on Human Rights (CSFHR), Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhijan and Jan Swasta Abhiyan, outlined below:

Exclusion of children without Aadhaar from PDS is an issue of concern in this community. Steps must be taken to ensure all left out children and adults are added to the PDS immediately and the onus of submitting Aadhaar should not be left to the community. Administration must take steps to ensure not a single person is excluded from the system for want of Aadhaar.
As per the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India’s interim orders on the PUCL Vs. Union of India and others (Civil Writ Petition 196 of 2001) and also the New Education Policy, 2023, Aadhaar seeding is not necessary/mandatory for availing Government supported social security and food and nutritional security schemes and programmes. No child/family should be excluded from their entitlements due to Aadhaar seeding related issues.
The district administration needs to initiate weighing of all children in the AWCs across the regions in a mission mode to identify children suffering from malnutritionand take immediate steps for community management of malnutrition amongst children. The weighing and malnutrition measurement of children should be done every month judiciously and all AWCs should be provided with necessary equipment and training with regular monitoring.
The team understood that Mid Day Meal in the school is the first and primary meal for the children in the community. The administration must take steps to introduce nutritious breakfast programmes in the schools which can be supported under DMF. Also the families especially the children go through extreme food crises during summer holidays, steps must be taken to ensure MDM is continued even during summer breaks for the children.
Even under a universal entitlement approach, aged and disabled people, dalits, and tribal groups would need specific unconditional support of food, health services and benefits. Community kitchens could provide a cohesive solution for families with precarious food and nutrition conditions.
Out-of-school children are left out of the school meal programme, despite being the most vulnerable; they should be allowed to access all feeding programmes unconditionally.
Three children with disability from the deceased’s family, though eligible for social security pension, have not been added under the scheme till the time of visit. All AWCs have details regarding children with disability, steps must be taken by the district administration to arrange necessary documents and include children and adults with disability under the pension scheme. All eligible but left out families must be included under the pension scheme as soon as possible which would strengthen financial and food security of the families.
Numbers of old age pension beneficiaries are said to be facing problems after the transition in the pension scheme from cash in hand to bank transfer. This can lead to extreme hardship and hunger among the aged persons. State must take steps to ensure no pension beneficiaries are excluded or cease to receive pension due to the transition and they are given cash in hand as soon as possible.
The MGNREGA which has consistently proved to be a lifeline when it comes to rural work and income security, the team was told that work under the scheme has been put on hold due to the problem faced with the NMMS app. The steps must be taken to sort out the issue immediately and all households must be provided with job cards and necessary numbers of work is allocated to the village. District Mineral Fund (DMF) and MGNREGS funds can be utilized for developing private agricultural lands and community lands, especially for soil and water conservation, development of village infrastructure and community assets. The initiation of MGNREGA should also be with a functional crèche in the community which would free the mother to work under public work programs.
The team also understood that none of the households have cultivable agricultural land, necessary steps must be taken to include the households under FRA and land is being allocated looking at the feasibility under the Act.
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) members need to play a more proactive role to address issues of chronic hunger and malnourishment, right to quality education, health services and benefits, food and nutritional security, social security benefits and wage employment, especially during the lean periods of the year. There is a greater need for better co-ordination with the Block and District administration.
The companies which have benefited from the land and natural resources have hardly taken any measures to give back to the communities other than hardship and pollution. They are no less accountable than the administration to ensure no family lives with hunger in their vicinity. The companies like Tata Steel and others must allocate necessary resources and develop a clear integrated and overall development strategy and implemented on a Mission mode in the tribal pockets of Jajpur district. Focus should be on food and nutritional security, gender equality and women’s empowerment, promotion of Climate-resilient regenerative agriculture systems and practices to ensure food and income security of the communities.

Screenshot+2022 04 10+At+6.55.37+Pm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

E184Fbef Fa96 4072 80Ff 3E2Eaffd5B8A.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Updates

Resist linking Voter ID and Aadhaar!

September 19, 2021

Resist this grave threat to our democracy

The Election Commission has claimed that this will help clean up voter rolls, and that any linkage will be “voluntary”. As we noted in our earlier representation, and as the Constitutional Conduct Group has recently noted, we are deeply concerned that this will almost certainly lead to mass disenfranchisement, could increase voter fraud, given the mass discrepancies in the Aadhaar database, and could violate people’s right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of data sets. This proposal would violate the judgment of the Supreme Court of India inJustice K.S. Puttaswamy (retd.) & Anr. v. Union Of India (Aadhaar judgment) which limited the use of Aadhaar authentication solely to welfare programmes and to link with PAN numbers for the purposes of income tax. Any proposal to link the UID with Voter IDs must be rejected.

We are concerned about the following harms from such a proposal

Third, such a proposal is more likely to increase voter fraud. Linking Aadhaar would dilute the sanctity of the Voter ID database. As we pointed out in 2019, self-reported errors in Aadhaar data are reportedly one-and-one-half times higher than errors in the electoral database. The assumption behind the proposal to link the two databases is that the authenticity of people’s records in the Aadhaar database will be used to determine the authenticity of a record in the Voter ID/ EPIC database. However, given widespread data quality issues in the Aadhaar database, this exercise would diminish the sanctity of records in the Voter ID database. Data quality issues in the Aadhaar database – a result of inadequate enrolment practices and lack of effective correction mechanisms – have been extensively documented - including fake entries and incorrect details. The UIDAI has itself admitted this, before various courts, and multiple Courts have refused to accept Aadhaar as proof of birth, or of identification. More recent research has also shown that Aadhaar-PAN linking has introduced fraudulent entries into the system.

Fourth, Biometric authentication for voting must not become a requirement. There are numerous reports of starvation deaths across states due to a lack of Aadhaar linkage, biometric failures, absence of adequate infrastructure and lack of adequate grievance redressal mechanisms in UIDAI’s implementation which has been painstakingly exposed by the Right to Food campaign. Fingerprints don't work for the vast majority of Indians, especially those who work with their hands and older persons, and facial authentication is inaccurate and error-prone. The UIDAI has sought to circumvent the inaccuracy and issues in biometric authentication through an ill-conceived "nominee system", and OTPs in the case of welfare programs. How will this work in the case of voting? Will we have to send family members to vote instead, if our fingerprints don’t work? It’s also pertinent to mention that election booths are sometimes set up in remote locations, where voting has to be processed manually. Even EVMs are not connected to an internet connection, to prevent any kind of tampering. In such locations, how will biometric verification work in absence of the internet?

Call to action

You can read the statement with the signatories here.

I. Organisations

Adivasi Women's Network
Association for Democratic Reforms
Article 21 Trust
The Bachchao Project
BlockSurvey, Inc.
Center for Women and Children Solidarity Network
Forum Against Oppression of Women
Forum for Electoral Integrity
Free Software Movement of India
Honavar Foundation
Internet Freedom Foundation
J&K RTI Movement
Maadhyam
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)
NAPM, Jharkhand
National Platform for the Rights of the Disalbed 17. Oddjoint Art
OpenSpace
People's Union for Civil Liberties
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Karnataka
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Maharashtra
People's Union for Civil Liberties, Rajasthan
Rethink Aadhaar
Socialist Party (India) Telangana

Individuals

Aarti
Aavishkar Rangari
Abani K Bhuyan, PSU
Abbasbhai
Abdul
Abha Rao
Abhayraj Naik, Azim Premji University
Abhi
Abhijit Nagendranath
Abhijith S
Abhilash Paul
Abhimanyu Chandra
Abhishek Gupta
Abhishek Sagar
Abhradip Acharya
Adaikala Regan
Aditi Chowdhury
Aditi Mehta, Constitutional Conduct Group
Aditi P. Kaur
Aditya Banerjee, Conservation Initiatives
Aditya Panwar
Aditya Vikram
Adv. Manoj, Manoj Harit & Co
Adv. Milind Babar
Advait Dharap
Afreen Khan
Afried Raman
Agnibesh Mukherjee
Ahesanali
Ajesh Narayanan
Alagammai
Alstrin Cyrus, Kofluence
Alwyn D'Souza
Ameya
Ameya Kelkar
Amina Yasmeen
Amit kumar
Amit Prakash Ambasta
Amitadyuti Kumar, APDR
Amitava Choudhury, Information and Action for Peoples' Right
Amogh Barakol
Amrita Johri, SNS
Amrita Shodhan
Anand Arni
Ananya Jain
Aneesh Correa
Angela
Anil Sadgopal, All India Forum for Right to Education
Anilkumar
Anirudh
Anita Das, Infosys
Anjali Bhardwaj, SNS
Ankita Aggarwal
Annapurna Menon, University of Westminster
Annie T
Anubhav
Anupama Datta, HelpAge India
Anushka
Anwesha Bhattacharya, Harvard Kennedy School
Apurva Bamezai
Archana Dwivedi
Archismita Choudhury, Internet Freedom Foundation
Ardhendu Sen
Arnav Mathur
Aroon Mohan
Aroon Raman
Arun Agnihotri
Arun I
Aruna Burte
Aruna Rodrigues
Arundhati Dhuru, NAPM
Arup Kumar Sen
Arvind
Ashish Asgekar
Ashish M
Ashok Choudhary, AIUFWP
Ashok Nehru
Ashok Sharma, Constitutional Conduct Group
Ashwin Santhosh
Ashwini
Ayush
Ayushi
Baba Fakruddin
Balaji
Bandish Soparkar
Barath N
Beena Choksi
Bernard D'Mello
Bharat Varma
Bharati Jagannathan
Bhaskar
Bidisha M
Bishakha
Bishakha Bhanja
Boma
Brindaalakshmi K
Brinelle D'souza
Britts
C B
C. Balakrishnan, Retired from the Govt of India
Chaitali Dixit
Chandrasekar R
Chantal
Chayanika Shah, Forum Against Oppression of Women
Chetan
Chhavi Sachdev
Daniel Umi
Danish Mukadam
David Bodapati, The Cedars
Deb Mukharji
Deepak Kaushik
Deepak Sanan, Constitutional Conduct Group
Deepthi
Denice Mathew Thomas
Deonis Baghwar
Derick
Divij Joshi
Divya
Divyangi
Diwan Singh
Dr V Rukmini Rao
Dr. Yogitha S, GFGC, Saragur
Dr. Mira Shiva
Dr. Shakeel
Dr. Suvajeet Duttagupta
Dr. Tony PM, Social Research and Training Centre Ranchi
Dr.Deepak Viswanath
Dr.Sudhir Vombatkere
Dunu Roy, Hazards Centre
Eesha
Elsa Muttathu
Fareeha Jabeen
Firoz Ahmad
Francis Colaso
Francis Parmar
Gabriele Dietrich, NAPM
Garima
Gaurav
Gautam Chaudhury
Gautam Mukhopadhaya
Gautam Sonti
Gayatri Singh, Sr Advocate, Bombay High Court
Geo Peter Tharappel
Gopal Krishna Pillai, Rerd. Government Officer
Gopalan Balagopal
Goutham
Gudu Sharma
Hamid Ansari
Hannan Mollah, All India Kisan Sabha
Hardik
Harikumar TP
Haritha P.E
Hemal
Himan
Himmat Singh Ratnoo
Hiren Gandhi, Darshan
I Pillai
Ibrahim
Imrana Qadeer
Indranee Dutta
Irfan Engineer
Ishwari
Jagdeep Chhokar
Jahnavi Visvanathan
Jairus Banaji
James Herenj, Convenor, Jharkhand NREGA Watch
Jaskaran Singh
Jayan
Jayati Ghosh, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
Jibraan Mansoor
Jitesh Gautam
Jittu Varghese
John Varghese
Jomy Joseph
Joseph
Jyoti Punwani
K Paul
K S Gopal
K. Sudhir, Peoples' Architectural Commonwealth
Kabir
Kalyani Menon Sen, Independent researcher
Kamayani Bali Mahabal
Kannalmozhi Kabilan, The New Indian Express
Karan
Karan Garg
Kartar K Sainani
Karthik Govil
Karthik Narayana V, Sahyadri College of Engineering and Management
Kaushik Tadvi
Kaushiki Rao
Kaustubh Mangam
Kavita Srivastava, People's Union for Civil Liberties
Keerti bhandary
Kiara
Kingshuk Dasgupta
Kingshuk Roy
Kinshuk Goyal
Koninika Ray, National Federation of Indian Women
Krishnadarsan
Kumkum Roy
Laavanya, LibTech India
Lakshmi Venkatesan
Lapanoha
Lavneet
Leon Morenas
Lizmary BC
M B Nataraj
Madhava Prasad
Madhu Bhaduri
Madhura Chakraborty, Activist
Madhura Padhye
Mahinder Pal singh
Mahua Kamat
Malaika Mathew Chawla
Malay Tewari, CPI (ML) Liberation
Malvika, Matterhorn Projects LLP
Manan
Manpreet
Mansi Mehta
Manu
Maqbool Saleem
Maria Aurora Couto, Writer
Mayuresh Vaidya
Meena Gupta
Meera Dewan
Meera. R
Megha
Megha Singh
Melroy C F Fernandes
Mit
Mohini Mullick
Mona Ambegaonkar
Mrinalini Nayak
Mubeen
Mukesh
Mukesh Malik
Mukta Srivastava
Murugu
Nafisa Barot, Utthan
Nakul Kishore Dumblekar
Nandini Nayak, Ambedkar University Delhi
Narayan Rao
Nasruddin Shaikh
Natashia Gonsalves, SUCDEN
Navamita Chandra
Navdha Malhotra
Naveen Purushothaman
Nayonika Bose
Nazar Mohammad Shavadi
NB Murthy
Neela D’सूजा
Neelakantan
Neha
Neha Chopra
Neha Das
Neil Fernandes
Nidhi
Nihar
Nikhil
Nilanjan Dutta
Nimmi
Niranjani Iyer
Nirvan, WIPRO
Nisha Biswas
Nishant Kumar
Nishi Sharma
Nitin
Nivedh
Omkar
P Chaudhuri
P K Mahesh
P. R. Dasgupta, IAS Pensioner
Padma Srinivasan
Padma Velaskar
Pallavi Sobti Rajpal
Parampath Joy Oommen
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, Independent journalist, author, publisher, documentary film-maker and teacher
Paras Katiyar
Parmu Singh
Parul Soni
Pascal Alan Nazareth
Pat
Pervin Jehangir
Phani
Philip Pinto
Piyush
Pooja Monani
Poorna
Praavita
Prabhat Patnaik, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Pracheta
Prajit Basu
Pranami Rajb
Prasad Chacko
Praveen, Times
Preeti Sampat
Prema
Primus Kerketta
Pritha Taraphder
Priti
Pritom Ghosh
Priyam
Priyanka Singh
Priyesh Pavithran
Procheta Mallik
Prof. K Satchidanandan, Indian Writers Forum
Prof.Mohan Rao
Purwa Bharadwaj
Pushkar Raj
Pushpendra, Tata Institute of Social Sciences
R K Grandhi
R Ravishankar
Rabin Chakraborty
Radha Holla
Raghavendra Rao
Raghunandan Hegde
Ragvendra Gadage
Rahul Nair, Delhi University
Rahul Saunik, Quikr India Private Limited
Rajdeep Singh Puri
Rajendran Narayanan, Azim Premji University, Bangalore
Rajesh Krishnan
Rajesh Mehar
Raju Sharma, Retired Civil Servant
Rakesh Shekhawat
Rakhi Sehgal
Ram
Ramani Atkuri, Public Health Professional
Ramani Venkatesan, Retired Civil Servant
Ramesh Tikamdas Bajaj
Ramyak Rohan Mohanty
Ranabir Chakravarti
Ranjeet Verma
Raufa Shaikh, Students for Liberty
Ravi Theja
Revathi
Ricky Saldanha
Rishav Kundu, IIIT Hyderabad
Rita Puthenkalam
Riyaz
RK Singh, Save Democracy
Rohan Mathew
Rohini Hensman
Rohini Lakshané
Rohith
Roja Mathew
Romar Correa, University of Mumbai
Roop Kaur Brar
Rosamma Thomas
Roshan
Raju
Rudi Warjri, Constitutional Conduct Group
Rupa
Rupsa Mallik
S Bharatwaj
S.Durga Bhavani
Sabih Ahmad
Sadhna Arya, University of Delhi
Sagar
Sahil Gupta
Sakina Dhorajiwala, LibTech India
Samali Banerjee
Sameet Panda, Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhijan
Samrudha Surana
Samyak Jain, Advocate
Sandeep Kumar Pattnaik
Sandeep Manudhane
Sandeep Yadav
Sandhya Gokhale, Forum Against Oppression of Women
Sandip
Saniya Khan Golandaz
Sanjay Palshiakar, University of Hyderabad
Sanjay Upadhyay, SWORD
Sanket
Sanketh D S
Sarada Mahesh
Sarath, Motherleaf
Sarika sinha
Sarosh
Satyabhama, IAS Retired CMD NSC Ministry of Agriculture
Saudha Kasim
Saumya
Saumya Kaul
Sautabh
Sayantan Chaudhuri
Shadab Ahmad
Shahvir Aga
Shaleen Jain
Shankar Gopalakrishnan, Chetna Andolan, Uttarakhand
Shantha Sinha
Sharachchandra Lele
Sharad Chandra Behar
Sharada Ganesh
Shardul Gopujkar, Parichay Legal Clinic
Shashi
Sheetal Fernandes
Shekar
Shevon Abraham Samuel
Shewli Kumar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Shilpaa Anand, BITS-Pilani Hyderabad Campus
Shirish B Patel, Shirish Patel & Associates
Shiv
Shivangi, Amity Law School, Delhi
Shivani Yadav
Shobhit Sinha
Shounak Dewal
Shubham
Siddharth K J
Sikandar Warsi
Simrandeep
Siraj Dutta, Right to Food Campaign Jharkhand
Snehan Kekre, Streamlit, Inc
Solomon
Sonia Soni, SK Finance Ltd.
Sowjanya Chandrasekhar
Sowmya Dechamma, UoH
Soumya Chakraborty
SP Ambrose, Constitutional Conduct Group
Spandana L P
Sravya D
Sreechand
Sreedev Krishnkumar
Sreeharsha Thanneeru, Rythu Swarajya Vedika
Srishti
Srujana Bej
Stuti Guha
Subhodip Mukherjee
Sudeshna Sengupta
Sudha N
Sudipto GhoshSuhail Ahmad
Suhas Kolhekar
Suhasini Mulay
Sujata Patel, Kerstin Hesselgren Visiting Professor, Umea University
Sujay Monga
Sujay Naik, Zephyr
Sukla SenSumender
Sunaina
Sundar Burra, Member, Constitutional Conduct Group
Sunil Thamizh Kumar
Suprateek Bose
Suranjan Sinha, Independent researcher
Susan Dhavle
Sushant
Swati Bishnoi
Swati Narayan, Right to Food Campaign
Syed Ali Mujtaba
Syeda Hameed, Muslim Womens Forum
T Ramakrishnan
Taj Aingh
Tamanna Khan
Tanima Xavier
Tarangini, Azim Premji University
Teesta Setalvad
Tony, ATC
Tousif Tamboli
Tushar
Uma Shankari
Upendra R
Usha Raman, University of Hyderabad
V.P.Raja, Retd. IAS officer
Vandana Prabha
Varada Balachandran
Varsha Harisubramaniam
Varun
Vasudha Verma
Vasundhar, Exceleron
Venkat
Veronica Dungdung, Samajik Seva Sadan
Vicky Rathore
Vidya Subramanian
Vidyut Gore
Vignesh Balaji Velu
Vijay Bharatiya
Vijayendra Mohanty
Vinayak Varma
Vindhya
Vinish Gupta, Centre for Holistic Learning
Vir Bharat talwar
Vishal Talreja
Visvanathan V
Vivek
Vivek Dandekar
Vivek Jindal
Vivek Mathur
Yash Marwah, Let India Breathe
Yashasvi Karnena
Zakir Husain Memaya
Zishan
Zuber

#Action Update #campaign, #voter ID, #Aadhaar, #Aadhaar linkage

Joint+Statement+ +Vaccine+Access+For+All.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Updates

Update January - February 2021

February 27, 2021

COVID-19, Co-WIN and curtailing the constant hunger for data

In this round-up of Aadhaar related updates, we cover the issues related to Aadhaar and vaccine delivery; the continued expansion of Aadhaar; what’s wrong with the proposed ONOR scheme (a lot); how Kerala is forcing Aadhaar upon people who want to access e-governance measures, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Aadhaar review petition.

Aadhaar and the Vaccine

First, what’s happening with the government's proposal to link Aadhaar to the Co-WIN app, for vaccine delivery?

While the government has clarified that Aadhaar usage for authentication will be voluntary, states are being pushed to use Aadhaar as the “preferred mode.” According to Medianama, the Government has been recommending that States and Union Territories use Aadhaar in the COVID-19 vaccine rollout in order to “weed out proxies”.

A few weeks into its debut, there have already been complaints of glitches in the Co-WIN application, which has slowed down the vaccination drive. The experience with Aadhaar has taught us that the word voluntary can mean its exact opposite. Last week, Rethink Aadhaar released a statement expressing it’s concerns with this proposal.

India has a steady track record of vaccine delivery; and routing all vaccinations through an application, and introducing Aadhaar as a “voluntary but preferred” mode of authentication creates a dependance on technology, and forces citizens to hand over their privacy in exchange for a fundamental right.

The vaccine drive can turn into a large-scale data collection process for the Government, and connected private players. The link between data collection and the upcoming Digital Health ID system remains to be seen.

Beyond glitches, privacy violations abound

The entire process is rife with privacy violations. Neither the trial nor the Co-WIN application have privacy policies, which puts the health data of citizens from the world’s largest vaccination drive at risk.There have been reports of hospital administrations sharing Aadhaar details (without consent) of its staff to register them on the Co-WIN application.

Distinct extremely sensitive data silos are being integrated without any safeguards. For instance, the Election Commission of India has agreed to provide the Ministry of Home Affairs with electoral data for the vaccine drive. The Commission claims it will only provide “booth-wise information of voters above the age of 50”, directly to the respective states, as opposed to handing the entire data to one Ministry. While it is a welcome step that an attempt is being made to limit the extent of data being shared, the usage of voter data without adequate safeguards or notice, threatens their right to privacy.

Any intrusion into the fundamental right to privacy has to be necessary and proportionate. Voters have not given their consent to use their data in this manner; and this decision has been made without consulting relevant stakeholders. According to established data sharing principles, and the provisions of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, data collected for a particular purpose must be used for that purpose only. Usage for any other reason can only be done after getting the informed consent of the data subjects (in this case, the voters whose IDs are going to be transferred).

There has been a rise in the number of Aadhaar enrollments ahead of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout (4.5 million registrations in December and 2.9 million in January). According to a news report by the Economic Times, this came right after the Prime Minister’s announcement in which it was said that the Aadhaar would be used to identify people for the vaccination. An official went so far as to call Aadhaar the ‘backbone of the vaccination’.

Rethink Aadhaar firmly stands against the pressure being put on citizens to link their Aadhaar numbers. When the Aarogya Setu application was made mandatory in 2020, many pushed back against this illegal surveillance mechanism, with some success when the Government, and Courts took a step back and decided that it could not be made a condition for exercising basic rights like the freedom of movement.

There is a need for a similarly strong community push to encourage people to stand firm and exercise their right to provide other identity cards as proofs, like the voter ID or a drivers license, in line with the objectives of purpose limitation, data privacy and the fundamental right to privacy of all citizens.

II. The Threat of “One Nation One Ration”

A parliamentary panel is being set up to discuss how to take forward the One Nation, One Ration (ONOR) scheme. The scheme aims to modify the current Public Distribution System (PDS), which currently allows ration cards holders to get subsidies only from the ration shops located in their States, to permit them access to other states. The government claims that the lack of “portability” affects communities like inter-state migrant workers, who are left to fend for themselves when they move to another State for employment. The Central government proposes to seed the Aadhaar number with ration cards, enforce biometric authentication of beneficiaries across the board, and “automate” fair price shops located across the country. As the experience with Aadhaar showed us, this would be a recipe for disaster.

While the idea for the scheme has been on the cards for some years now, the urgency of its implementation was expressed during the lockdown that began in March 2020 - as scores of migrants were left to fend for themselves. The benefits of the scheme however, are overstated. It promises more than it can deliver.

It is important to pose the following questions:

How are the logistical and supply chain management issues that are likely to arise to be fixed? Not all states offer the same PDS entitlements.
It ignores the realities of migration where often only one person from a family - usually a male member - migrates. Who will benefit from ONOR?
This will only apply to existing ration card holders. Remember that in 2020 the government temporarily added 8 crore migrants to the PDS lists - an indication that scores of vulnerable people have been left out of the PDS.

As with Aadhaar, ONOR promises a big-ticket, big-database without studies on migration patterns, and in place of less intrusive alternatives. You can read more about it in our explainer here.

Universalization of the PDS (i.e. wherein any citizen can walk in to buy subsidized grains from the PDS) is far more important than implementing a technologically intensive system of portability (ONOR).
For migrant workers who are in urban areas, community kitchens like Amma Canteens have proved to be a vital source of support, and a much more viable solution.

A bleak reminder of how Aadhaar continues to affect peoples’ lives

The excellent team at Roadscholarz has put together a summary of the exclusions caused because of Aadhaar.

Please also see this report on how JAM has impacted pensions and PDS delivery in Odisha.

As we know Aadhaar has enabled a whole parallel industry of frauds.

The latest story is how a 26-year old man from Bareily learnt how to clone fingerprints and hacked nearly 500 bank accounts.
The team at Roadscholarz have pulled together video-testimonies of victims of Aadhaar-enabled fraud through the Aadhaar-enabled payment scheme.

III. Updates from the Courts

Disappointingly, the Supreme Court in S.G. Vombatkere and Another versus Union of India and Others (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 829 of 2013) dismissed a petition asking for a review of the Aadhaar judgement (2018). Justice Chandrachud was the only judge on the Bench to dissent.

The majority felt that no grounds for review were made out as a “change in the law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.” This ignored all the other grounds raised in the review petition.

Justice Chandrachud in his dissent referred to the judgement in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. in which it was held that decisions of the Speaker on whether a Bill is a money bill (Article 110 (3) of the Constitution) is subject to judicial review. The bench in the Aadhaar judgement however did not deal with the issue of what the repercussions would be if the Bill was found not to satisfy the necessary conditions of Article 110.

It is important to remember that the Bench strength in the Rojer Mathew case and in the Aadhaar judgement were the same - constitution benches (5 judges). Thus, this unanswered issue posed a conflict between two coordinate judgements. The Rojer Mathew judgment decided that the issue would be referred to a larger bench in the Supreme Court for its consideration.

One of the main points that the review petitions challenged was the question of whether the Aadhaar Act constituted a Money Bill or not. Justice Chandrachud observed that it was a constitutional error to think that there was no grounds for review. While the larger Bench’s eventual judgement on the above question would be impactful, it was equally important for this Bench to decide on the current issue. He relied on the judgement in Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Lawyers Association, (which was decided by a nine judge bench in the Supreme Court) - instead of dismissing the review petitions, they could be kept pending until the judgement of the larger Bench comes through.

IV. Kerala: Aadhaar as Gatekeeper

In August 2020, Kalyani Menon-Sen and Bezwada Wilson had sent the Kerala Government a representation challenging the use of Aadhaar for user registration for the Integrated Local Self Governance Management System (ILGMS), an portal to access e-governance services.

The Kerala Government responded saying that there were alternate means through which citizens could apply through offline means, such as for instance, by visiting the local body in person.

Kalyani’s response raises some pertinent questions about how Aadhaar is being used as a gatekeeper to mediate the citizen’s right to the internet, and to access governance services remotely:

If Aadhaar is not required for the offline mode, then why make it mandatory for the online mode of registration?
Due to the pandemic, it might be difficult for citizens to physically go to the offline centres. In that case, applying through the e-filing mechanism might be a more convenient option for them. By making the Aadhaar number mandatory, it may act as an obstacle for citizen users.
In 2019, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala recognized the right to access internet as a fundamental right. By making Aadhaar number mandatory for the e-filing process, it might restrict a citizen to completely enjoy this right. If they do not have an Aadhaar number they will not be able to register with the website.
Alternate IDs like the voter ID can be made an option for the e-filing registration. These IDs can also be used to authenticate the user.

V. What we’re watching, reading, thinking about

This excellent excerpt of an essay by Sandeep Mertia from a book titled ‘Lives of Data’ - 14 essays on the computational culture in India. The foreword has been written by Ravi Sundaram, from the Institute of Network Cultures. Please also look for Anumeha Yadav’s summary of her years documenting the impact of Aadhaar, in the same book which is available to download.

Usha Ramanathan’s talk on the need to reimagine what tech can do for us.

Jean Dreze, Reetika Khera, Isabel Pimenta, and Prankur Gupta spoke to the Economic and Political Weekly about the problem of food security in India, and what Aadhaar has got to do with it.

Whose Data? Our Data!

India has claimed that FastTag will be made mandatory from February 16, 2021, while we have a minimal understanding of how this data is going to be used. In February 2021, the Government admitted that it made Rs. 11 crore from selling peoples’ vehicle data to private parties.

Get in touch!

Please write to us if you have stories of Aadhaar-related coercion to share - schools, private employers, or for accessing essential services.

Engage with our legislators:

We encourage you to send in questions or issues related to Aadhaar or data protection which can be raised in Parliament during the Budget Session. (From March 8 to April 8, 2021) You can email Maadhyam at maadhyam.connect@gmail.com.

Ask friends and family to subscribe!

Please email <rethink-aadhaar-subscribe@lists.riseup.net> to sign up to Rethink Aadhaar's mailing list.

Screen+Shot+2020 11 25+At+10.12.42+Pm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

02.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Shoili+ +Aadhaar+Linkage+.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

What%27S+Wrong+With+Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

01.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

02.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

03.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

04.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

05.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

06.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

07.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

08.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

09.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

10.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

11.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

12.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2019 10 13+At+12.57.18+Pm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2019 10 13+At+12.58.53+Pm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Common+Man 2.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rally+Edited.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Dharna+Edited.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Dharna+Edited.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Varanasi.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Photo 2019 02 05 18 10 55.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Photo 2019 02 05 18 10 55%282%29.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Photo 2019 02 05 18 10 55%283%29.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Photo 2019 02 05 18 10 55%281%29.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.14.55+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.17.01+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.21.43+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.21.53+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.22.00+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screen+Shot+2018 09 22+At+9.22.07+Am.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Updates

Vol. I : latest from courts, parliament and the grassroots

August 27, 2018

We are almost at the end of August, and the wait for the Supreme Court Constitution Bench's judgment in the final Aadhaar hearings continues. All we know for now is that the judgment will be out, and soon...

Most recently the Delhi High Court issued notice to the UIDAI and the Union government on a petition filed by academic Shamnad Basheer, seeking allowing people to opt out and request deletion of existing Aadhaar data, and asking for payment of exemplary damages for all Aadhaar data breaches.

The Income Tax department finally allowed online filing of tax returns without quoting the Aadhaar number, as stipulated by the Supreme Court last year in Binoy Viswam for those without Aadhaar. Multiple petitions were filed all over the country, with courts granting relief for petitioners alone, until finally on 24th July 2018, a two judge bench of the Delhi High Court in Shreya Sen v. Union of India directed the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to rework their software so that people can file their tax returns online without having to furnish their UID number or any proof of having enrolled.They said it: "This court is of the opinion that at least till 31.3.2019, the CBDT shall issue an appropriate direction, and also create a platform by amending the digital form of (sic or) substituting them properly to enable ‘opt-out’ from the mandatory requirement of having to furnish Aadhaar registration or Aadhaar linkage, for the duration, the exemption subsists, that is, till 31.3.2019."

While the CBDT seemed in no hurry to follow the order of the court, one of us tried to file returns online, and to our pleasant surprise, Aadhaar was not required!

We strongly recommend that those still waiting to file their tax returns make their accountants and/or tax consultants aware of the latest court order and aim to file their returns without quoting Aadhaar.

I. Updates from Parliament

From misinterpreting the Supreme Court's judgments and misleading citizens to link Aadhaar with mobile phones to the open challenge issued by the TRAI Chairman Ram Sewak Sharma, many issues around Aadhaar were raised and discussed in Parliament in the recently concluded Monsoon Session. Some highlights:

One MP pointed out that farmers, already reeling under several losses, were finding it difficult to claim timely payment under the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana because of mandatory linking of Aadhaar to claim compensation. He stated that amidst the Supreme Court challenge and several Central Govt notifications, there was no clarity among citizens on whether Aadhaar is mandatory or not.
Another MP demanded an explanation from the Central Govt for misinterpreting the Supreme Court's judgments and making Aadhaar linking with mobile phones mandatory and wondered about the Govt's stand on the Fundamental Right to Privacy.
The issue of the mysterious inclusion of the UIDAI helpline number in millions of Android phones was also raised and it was claimed that 'big brother' is watching.
In response to a Question raised on the TRAI Chairman Ram Sewak Sharma revealing his Aadhaar number on Twitter, the Government did not clarify whether any action would be taken against him, but simply stated that he is a public figure and his personal details are already out in public domain.
In response to several Questions on making Aadhaar mandatory for obtaining rations through PDS and the same leading to hunger deaths, the Government first claimed that no starvation or hunger death has been reported in the country in last four years. Then it clarified that instructions have been given to States/UTs not to delete any person / household from list of eligible beneficiaries or deny subsidized foodgrains or cash transfers for not possessing Aadhaar or for failure of biometric authentication. It also stated that beneficiaries under NFSA, who did not have an Aadhaar needed to make an application for one by 30th September, 2018.
In response to another Question on complaints received by UIDAI against registrars and enrollment agencies, a list of such Registrars and Enrollment Agencies whose services were suspended and terminated was provided which included the Govt-promoted CSC e-Governance. It also stated that everyday, on average, UIDAI contact centres for grievance redressal receive 2 lakh calls most of which are for seeking information.
With respect to the Tribune report of getting access to 1 Billion Aadhaar details for as little as Rs.500, the Govt stated that it was a case of 'misreporting and completely false'.
There was a news report of online leakage of Aadhaar and bank details of 1.34 lakh employees of Andhra Pradesh State Housing Corporation. In response to a Question on this, the Govt evaded answering the actual question and simply stated that there has been no leakage of Aadhaar data from UIDAI database.
In response to another Question, the Govt stated that in 2015-16, National Population Register data was shared with State Governments to update it and to seed it with Aadhaar numbers. But it also stated that the Aadhaar seeded Population Register data has not been shared with State Governments.
In an RTI filed earlier this year, UIDAI had refused to disclose information on Aadhaar promotion and branding. When a Question on the same was raised in Parliament, it was denied that UIDAI hires any agencies to undertake image makeover of Aadhaar.

II. Protests against ICDS-Aadhaar linking in Gujarat

A group of concerned citizens from Gujarat had begun investigating the Aadhaar scheme in 2017. On 17th April 2018, the Gujarat State ICDS Department released a circular mandating production of Aadhaar for disbursement of salary. The department wanted Anganwadi workers to open new accounts that were Aadhaar linked into which they could transfer salaries through DBT, and demanded that Anganwadi workers submit photocopies of Aadhaar cards to the ICDS department. Four Anganwadi workers reached out to the group of concerned citizens asking for help in resisting the order making Aadhaar mandatory because they believed Aadhaar was a breach of their privacy.

Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) is a government programme in India which provides food, preschool education and primary education to children under 6 years of age and their mothers. The ICDS department governs and manages various sub-schemes including Anganwadi services. The salaries of Anganwadi workers had been stopped for the past 3 months due to non-linking of Aadhaar. After forcefully imposing this scheme, some of workers were given the choice of either submitting their Aadhaar or quitting the job. Such coercion was not limited to salaries alone - they were also mentally tortured to submit their Aadhaar card and collect Aadhaar cards of their students by any means necessary.

Activists from the area report that they had met the Department’s Director at the Gandhinagar office several times and were initially given assurances that salaries would not be stopped. In their latest meeting, however, officials stated that salaries would not be disbursed until and unless Aadhaar cards were linked. The Anganwadi workers have tried to submit other government IDs such as Voter ID, Ration card, etc. but have been refused their salaries until submission of their Aadhaar cards.

A petition challenging this mandatory linking has been filed by one of the Anganwadi workers in the Gujarat High Court.

The team of concerned citizens has been reaching out to those affected when Aadhaar is made mandatory. Adil Patel in Gujarat can be reached on 09638177097.

III. Aadhaar Fraud in PDS

On 26.08.2018, the Times Of India reported:

Vol. II of this update on how to delink your bank account and aadhaar number, data protection, and more will follow soon.

Toi+Pds+Fraud.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Updates

Statement of solidarity - RTI and RTP activists

July 27, 2018

A day long workshop on the issues of the Right to Information (RTI), the Right to Privacy (RTP), the proposed data protection legislation and their intersections was held on 17th July 2018. The consultation was attended by members of various peoples' campaigns and movements, researchers, legal scholars and citizens interested in, and affected by, issues pertaining to transparency and privacy.

This workshop was organised in the light of the government’s doublespeak on the rights to information and privacy. Privacy is cited by the government to deny information crucial to hold those in power to account while, at the same time, privacy is denied to citizens when it comes to collecting excessive information for projects such as Aadhaar.

As a statement of solidarity within the civil society among those promoting the rights to information and privacy, the following resolutions were passed:

The citizens' Rights to Information and Privacy are both fundamental rights under the Constitution of India and the State must protect, promote and fulfill both these rights to further democratic values and protect constitutional freedoms.
There is a need for legislation on Privacy and Data Protection in order to adequately protect the privacy of citizens and protections in such a law should be oriented on the rights of natural persons and extend against both State and non-State actors.
This legal framework for giving effect to citizens' right to privacy should emerge from a pre-legislative consultative process so that the relevant legislation incorporates concerns of the wide set of stakeholders that such a law will inevitably affect.
Neither the recognition of the Right to Privacy nor the legislation of a privacy and data protection law requires any amendment to the RTI Act. The legal framework for privacy and data protection should complement the RTI Act and in no way undermine existing statutory framework that enables citizens to use transparency for holding power structures to account.

These resolutions are endorsed by the National Campaign for the Peoples’ Right to Information (NCPRI), SaveOurPrivacy, IT for Change and Rethink Aadhaar. Those interested in endorsing this statement may do so here.

Fa60D01D Caea 40A0 8F00 Ba0C38Df6651.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

8Af4C65D 293B 4Fa9 Ac85 5D759E04Aed3.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

34422D57 Bd44 40B1 9Dfc 163017D444Cf.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

De13Ca70 9Bcc 4Cae 9Abd 816F2Aed5C4F.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

24628D57 9E96 45F8 Bf0B 92933E74A710.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mhrd+Parliament+Reply.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Ppheaders Copy.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Museum+Of+The+Aadhaar+Abused%2C+Novel+Protest+By+People+Denied+Their+Entitlements%2C+18Th+Sep+2017.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+1.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+2.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+3.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+4.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+5.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Mumbai+6.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Kolkata+1.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Kolkata+2.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Kolkata+3.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Kolkata+4.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Puducherry+1.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Puducherry+2.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Puducherry+3.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Puducherry+4.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Jaipur+4.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Jaipur+1.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Jaipur+2.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Jaipur+3.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Dfe261Af Fb43 44Ba Bc07 F4542B2F46B6.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+7.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+1.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+2.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+3.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+4.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+5.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi+6.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20171208 121558626 Hdr.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Whatsapp+Image+2017 12 08+At+12.31.04.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20171208 131400218.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Whatsapp+Image+2017 12 08+At+12.31.06.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delink5.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Constant+Surveillance.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar+Advisory.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Workers+Demand+Fair+Wages%2C+Rights%2C+Accountability%2C+Not+Biometrics+Collection.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20170913 163336 Hdr.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20170913 160111.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20170913 151150.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Img 20170913 163537 Hdr.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Uid Idealboy Highres Final.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Exclusion 1.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Sunibai.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Updates

Protest Against making Aadhaar compulsory in Mid Day Meal

March 19, 2017

Today the National Federation of Indian Women and the Right to Food Campaign held a protest outside the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Shastri Bhawan to protest against the move of the Central Government to make Aadhaar mandatory for Mid Day Meal Scheme. People from more than ten states including UP, West Bengal, Odisha, Rajasthan, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Delhi participated in the protest. A memorandum was handed over to the Minister regarding the issue. The notification is in complete violation of the orders of the Supreme Court which have time and again stressed that Aadhaar cannot be made mandatory for receiving entitlements or benefits. This move of the Central government will put millions of children across India at risk of starvation as the MDM is often the only complete meal that children have access to and is essential for their survival and welfare.

We strongly opposes the central government's move to make Aadhaar compulsory for children under the midday meal scheme in government schools. This is nothing but an attempt to coerce people to enrol their children under Aadhaar.

School meals are an important entitlement of Indian children, legally enforceable under Supreme Court orders as well as under the National Food Security Act. Numerous studies show that India's midday meal scheme has made an important contribution to higher school attendance, better child nutrition and more effective learning. Midday meals also help to break the barriers of class and caste by imparting to children of diverse backgrounds a habit of sharing meals.

No conditionalities can be imposed on this critical entitlement of Indian children. Making Aadhaaar compulsory for the midday meal would serve no purpose, and is bound to disrupt instead of helping this important programme. Further, this move is a violation of Supreme Court orders.

In a series of orders, the Supreme Court has made it clear that Aadhaar cannot be made compulsory for any services to which people are otherwise entitled. It has also made it clear that the Aadhaar Act does not supersede these orders, until such time as the Court settles the issue of compatibility of Aadhaar with the right to privacy.

During the last few years, Aadhaar has been made compulsory for a growing list of welfare schemes, under the garb of making them more effective. In fact, this imposition has led to serious disruptions, such as elderly people without Aadhaar being bumped off pension lists, NREGA workers being denied their wages due to Aadhaar seeding errors and PDS cardholders being deprived of their food rations because of technical glitches with Aadhaar-based biometric authentication. The government has paid no attention to the mounting evidence of these disruptive effects. Reason: the real purpose of this drive is to put pressure on people to enrol with Aadhaar. The need of the hour is to stop this rampage, not to extend it further, least of all to programmes like midday meals that are critical for the wellbeing of Indian children.

The NFIW and the right to food campaign demands immediate withdrawal of the illegal notification seeking to make Aadhaar compulsory for midday meals. It also calls on state governments to desist from implementing this illegal notification.

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Frequently Asked Questions

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

FAQs

Why should you care about privacy when you have nothing to hide? →

You may not be making bombs, hiding weapons, selling illegal drugs or participating in other unlawful activities in your home, but that doesn’t mean you are willing to let the police enter and search it at any time of night or day without your permission, or a good legal reason and a search warrant.

Welfare needs Aadhaar like a fish needs a bicycle →

Does welfare need Aadhaar, or is it the other way around.

Comparison with SSN →

Social Security Number (SSN), the nine-digit number, which is used widely by government agencies in the US, is often used as an example of an advance economy successfully doing something similar to India’s unique identity project. But there are important differences between the two, starting with the fact that the Social Security Number is, well, not an identity number.

1488379783214

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Ill7.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1504013398222

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Exclusion

In Andhra Pradesh, software flaws aid land grab from tribal and Dalit farmers

05 / 11 / 2025

Yet another Aadhaar related hunger death

30 / 10 / 2025

Being single person on his card, he tried to complete it multiple times, RTF reports, but failed. He was being denied his entitled ration since June and Mankadia died on October 22.

https://x.com/rozi_roti/status/1983744249624719760

There is a recent history of a large number of Aadhaar related denials causing a large number of starvation deaths, particularly in interior villages in this and Jharkhand region, as documented here in 2020 by Siraj Dutta, an activist living in Jharkhand, where 27 people died in the five years after Aadhaar was made mandatory. It worsened chronic hunger and under-nutrition when the poorest communities could not access digital technologies that had been made compulsory to access their welfare rights.

Rethink Aadhaar demands investigation into Mankadia’s death and accountability from central and Odisha officials and companies running Aadhaar systems for the denial of vital social security in Mankadia’s final months.

No Blinking, No Mobile SIM: Indian activists and acid attack survivors take their fight to court and win

28 / 10 / 2025

From the Trenches of Aadhaar Distress | कैसे आधार ने भारत को आँसुओं, कतारों और Kagaz में डुबो दिया

28 / 10 / 2025

इसी तपती दोपहर में बाहर निकलती हैं गुड्डी कुमारी। ग़ुस्से में कांपती हैं, फिर जैसे ग़ुस्से का भार आँसू बनकर बह निकलता है। उनकी बच्ची रजनंदिनी कुमारी का आधार रद्द कर दिया गया है—एक ऐसी सज़ा, जिसका कोई अपराध नहीं। उनके हाथ में कुछ कागज़ हैं—सादे से, पर शायद ज़िंदगी के सबसे भारी कागज़। एक कर्मचारी ने काले अक्षरों में लिख दिया है: “Aadhar Cancelled” और नीचे लिखा है – “Supreme Court Metro Station, Gate No. 2, Aadhar Seva Kendra.” Aadhaar एक पहचान बना, लेकिन जो इस देश के सबसे हाशिये पर हैं, उनके लिए यह पहचान अब गुमनामी बनती जा रही है। ये पहचान अब शिक्षा छीन रही है, राशन छीन रही है, और साथ ही साथ वह आत्मसम्मान भी, जो हर नागरिक का जन्मसिद्ध अधिकार है। देखिए ये वीडियो और जानिए गुड्डी जैसी शबनम की कहानी जो रहती हैं दिल्ली की कुसुमपुर पहाड़ी में, उनका कहना है कि पाँच साल से उनका आधार कार्ड अमान्य हैं। देखिए वीडियो।

Statement Condemning the Malnourishment death of a Child in Jajpur district, Odisha

10 / 04 / 2023

Bhubaneswar, 5th April, 2023

Rethink Aadhaar stands in support of the key demands made by the Civil Society Forum on Human Rights (CSFHR), Odisha Khadya Adhikar Abhijan and Jan Swasta Abhiyan, outlined below:

Exclusion of children without Aadhaar from PDS is an issue of concern in this community. Steps must be taken to ensure all left out children and adults are added to the PDS immediately and the onus of submitting Aadhaar should not be left to the community. Administration must take steps to ensure not a single person is excluded from the system for want of Aadhaar.
As per the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India’s interim orders on the PUCL Vs. Union of India and others (Civil Writ Petition 196 of 2001) and also the New Education Policy, 2023, Aadhaar seeding is not necessary/mandatory for availing Government supported social security and food and nutritional security schemes and programmes. No child/family should be excluded from their entitlements due to Aadhaar seeding related issues.
The district administration needs to initiate weighing of all children in the AWCs across the regions in a mission mode to identify children suffering from malnutrition and take immediate steps for community management of malnutrition amongst children. The weighing and malnutrition measurement of children should be done every month judiciously and all AWCs should be provided with necessary equipment and training with regular monitoring.
The team understood that Mid Day Meal in the school is the first and primary meal for the children in the community. The administration must take steps to introduce nutritious breakfast programmes in the schools which can be supported under DMF. Also the families especially the children go through extreme food crises during summer holidays, steps must be taken to ensure MDM is continued even during summer breaks for the children.
Even under a universal entitlement approach, aged and disabled people, dalits, and tribal groups would need specific unconditional support of food, health services and benefits. Community kitchens could provide a cohesive solution for families with precarious food and nutrition conditions.
Out-of-school children are left out of the school meal programme, despite being the most vulnerable; they should be allowed to access all feeding programmes unconditionally.
Three children with disability from the deceased’s family, though eligible for social security pension, have not been added under the scheme till the time of visit. All AWCs have details regarding children with disability, steps must be taken by the district administration to arrange necessary documents and include children and adults with disability under the pension scheme. All eligible but left out families must be included under the pension scheme as soon as possible which would strengthen financial and food security of the families.
Numbers of old age pension beneficiaries are said to be facing problems after the transition in the pension scheme from cash in hand to bank transfer. This can lead to extreme hardship and hunger among the aged persons. State must take steps to ensure no pension beneficiaries are excluded or cease to receive pension due to the transition and they are given cash in hand as soon as possible.
The MGNREGA which has consistently proved to be a lifeline when it comes to rural work and income security, the team was told that work under the scheme has been put on hold due to the problem faced with the NMMS app. The steps must be taken to sort out the issue immediately and all households must be provided with job cards and necessary numbers of work is allocated to the village. District Mineral Fund (DMF) and MGNREGS funds can be utilized for developing private agricultural lands and community lands, especially for soil and water conservation, development of village infrastructure and community assets. The initiation of MGNREGA should also be with a functional crèche in the community which would free the mother to work under public work programs.
The team also understood that none of the households have cultivable agricultural land, necessary steps must be taken to include the households under FRA and land is being allocated looking at the feasibility under the Act.
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) members need to play a more proactive role to address issues of chronic hunger and malnourishment, right to quality education, health services and benefits, food and nutritional security, social security benefits and wage employment, especially during the lean periods of the year. There is a greater need for better co-ordination with the Block and District administration.
The companies which have benefited from the land and natural resources have hardly taken any measures to give back to the communities other than hardship and pollution. They are no less accountable than the administration to ensure no family lives with hunger in their vicinity. The companies like Tata Steel and others must allocate necessary resources and develop a clear integrated and overall development strategy and implemented on a Mission mode in the tribal pockets of Jajpur district. Focus should be on food and nutritional security, gender equality and women’s empowerment, promotion of Climate-resilient regenerative agriculture systems and practices to ensure food and income security of the communities.

The Fact Finding Report can be accessed here.

Aadhaar's Bermuda Triangle: Mission impossible to retrieve misplaced Aadhaar

21 / 09 / 2021

Where do lost Aadhar numbers go? For many people who lose their Aadhaar numbers, retrieving them is close to impossible.

Jheenak Prasad lost his Aadhaar 6 months ago but has not been able to retrieve it.

Problem in school admissions due to Aadhaar

17 / 01 / 2018

'In MP, pregnant woman forced to show Aadhaar card even while she was in labour pain'

17 / 01 / 2018

No Aadhaar, No Education

17 / 01 / 2018

Kali Salvi says, "our fingerprints are taken 4 times, only kerosene is handed. Where is our ration?"

17 / 01 / 2018

Screenshot+2025 10 30+At+11.12.07%E2%80%Afam.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Myths About Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Myths

Myth: "Aadhaar is identity for those who lack an identity."

Fact: To get Aadhaar, you need a Proof of identity and Proof of address.

In fact, 99.97% of those who have Aadhaar, used existing identity cards and proof of address to get it. According to a reply to an Right to Information request, UIDAI replied that only 0.03% of those who have the Aadhaar number got Aadhaar without showing two existing proofs of identity and address.

As far as closed doors are concerned, Aadhaar does not guarantee any benefits: work through NREGA, widow or old-age pensions or ration foodgrains. There are separate eligibility conditions for those programmes which continue to apply.

Myth: "Aadhaar is a voluntary ID scheme. No services are linked to Aadhaar per se."

Fact: The Aadhaar project was sold to the public based on the claim that enrolment was “voluntary”.

Though the government stated in court and in parliament, that Aadhaar is voluntary, or it is "just a identity number" not linked to anything, it has over the years, repeatedly made Aadhaar mandatory for an ever-widening range of facilities and services: to receive scholarships, food grain and cooking gas subsidies, access pensions and provident fund, to open bank accounts, to vote, and even to register a marriage, or adopt a child.

It was made clear, life without Aadhaar would be very difficult. In these circumstances, saying that Aadhaar is voluntary is like saying that breathing or eating is voluntary.
This has suited the UIDAI very well, since it has led people to rush to Aadhaar enrolment centres.

Myth: "Aadhaar is based fully on consent."

Fact: You may have to compulsorily enrol under Aadhaar, despite your privacy concerns.

If a service agent asks for Aadhaar mandatorily, then as a beneficiary, citizens have no option but to get an Aadhaar number.
The new Aadhaar Act does not incorporate a categorical clause saying Aadhaar will be voluntary, or that it will NOT be made mandatory. Instead, it broadens the scope of Aadhaar. In parliament in March, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley said the Aadhaar Act will allow the government to ask a citizen to produce an Aadhaar number to avail of any “government subsidy”.

But section 7 of the Bill is phrased more broadly, and refers to not just subsidies but any “subsidy, benefit or service” for which expense is incurred on the Consolidated Fund of India, or the government treasury. This is a sweeping scope, and we are seeing the impact in the notifications issued by the government in the past few weeks: government is demanding Aadhaar, or proof of enrolment in Aadhaar, from everyone from trafficked women seeking assistance to children in government schools for getting their school meals.
Section 7 of Aadhaar Act says:

“Provided that if an Aadhaar number is not assigned to an individual, the individual shall be offered alternate and viable means of identification for delivery of the subsidy, benefit or service.”

In the recent notifications, Government has got around the proviso for an "alterntate" ID, by making the proof of applying for enrolment in Aadhaar itself as the alternate ID it will recognise! Talk of arm-twisting citizens.

Aadhaar law allows private companies too use it, such as an application used by a company doing authentication for those applying to jobs, even if a prospective employee or tenant shares his/her Aadhaar number, it does not amount to free consent since getting a job or a house may hinge on providing the Aadhaar number.

Myth: "Aadhaar law has privacy protections comparable to the best in the world."

Fact: Aadhaar Act allows authorities to share your personal data in the "interest of national security", a term that remains undefined.

The Aadhaar law allows sharing your ID information and all authentication record in interest of "national security", even as the phrase “national security” is undefined in the present bill, as well as the General Clauses Act. Thus, the circumstances in which an individual's information may be disclosed remains open to interpretation.

Aadhaar Act allows sharing your ID information, all authentication records on direction of an authorised officer of rank of Joint Secretary.

Section 33(1) permits the disclosure of an individual's demographic information following an order by a district judge. It says that in such a matter, prior hearing will be given to the UIDAI , NOT the person whose data is being disclosed!

Section 33(2), which permits disclosure of your data "in interest of national security", says such disclosures will be for three months initially, and a fresh renewal can be granted for another three months, with NO limitation on the number of such renewals.

This can lead to a user being under continuous surveillance, and without ANY notification to the user even after the surveillance ceases, violating one of necessary and proportionate principles on communications surveillance related to user notification and right to effective remedy. In some countries, this principle has been incorporated in law. For example, in Canada, the law limits the time of wiretapping surveillance, and imposes an obligation to notify the person under surveillance within 90 days of the end of the surveillance, extendable to a maximum of three years at a time.

Aadhaar also lacks provisions on giving notice to a person in case of breach of information, in case of third party use of data, or change in purpose of use of data, which were recommended by the Justice Shah Committee on Privacy in 2012.

Myth: Aadhaar is meant to "target subsidies."

Fact:

During the debate in Lok Sabha in March, Congress MP Rajeev Satav, raised a question on clause 57 of the Aadhaar Bill which permits private entities – airlines, telecom, insurance, real estate companies – to use the Aadhaar number. Finance minister Jaitley did not respond to the question.

UIDAI's founder chairperson software billionaire Nilekani in an interview in 2012 spoke about creating a "thriving application system" using Aadhaar for both the public and private sector.

In fact, the authority entered into agreements with private companies well before the Aadhaar law was passed in Parliament. The companies were running ahead of legislation in a space unbounded by law, and the UIDAI supported them.

Rajya Sabha passed an amendment was to drop use of Aadhaar authentication by private companies and businesses in clause 57 entirely. This clause said that the Bill does not prevent the wider use of Aadhaar number of users by other bodies including private companies. Even while Bill was in parliament, there were instances of private companies advertising that they can use Aadhaar to collate information about citizens at a price.

1489927978274

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1489927978274

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1489989831737

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1489928027552

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1489928052137

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

1491897712252

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

More than a decade later, evidence and testimony show the continuing destruction of welfare programmes due to their Aadhaar linkage. The Aadhaar project also presents the potential to enable mass surveillance, which threatens privacy and democratic practice. Indians residents and citizens have been lulled into believing that their privacy is the price they have to pay for better implementation of welfare programmes. In fact, the Aadhaar project threatens both our welfare, and right to privacy; and yet, even with its fundamental weaknesses and dangerous effects, it continues to grow.

Beware of Aadhaar

A Warning on India’s Biometric Identity Model

Collective Statement

The statement below, endorsed by more than 50 Indian organisations aside from many individual signatories, was released on 10 December, 2025(human rights day).

We are deeply concerned that efforts are being made to promote biometric identity systems similar to Aadhaar in other countries.

Aadhaar is India’s unique identity number, linked with a person’s biometrics (fingerprints, iris and photograph as of now). The number was rolled out with fanfare from 2009 onwards. The use of this number, and of Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA), was promoted to the hilt by the Indian government in close collaboration with the IT industry. Aadhaar was supposed to be voluntary, but it quickly became clear that living without it would be very difficult for most. Today, it is as good as compulsory. Most social benefits are out of reach without Aadhaar.

Aadhaar was rolled out in an explicitly “evangelistic” mode from day one. In recent years, it has been projected as a grand success by its promoters. Their friends in high places (like Davos, the World Bank, and the B&M Gates Foundation) are on board. There is an attempt, partly successful already, to project Aadhaar as a model and “export” it to other countries.

For our part, we view Aadhaar as a failed and objectionable model that should not be replicated in other countries.

Our main concerns:

Aadhaar involves the creation of a centralised database that includes biometrics as well as demographic information (e.g. name, gender, date of birth and address). This could turn into a dangerous tool of social control, especially, but not only, in the hands of an authoritarian government.
The linkage of numerous databases with Aadhaar magnifies the danger of it becoming a tool for profiling, surveillance, exclusion and worse. Centralised databases also pose data security risks by creating a single point of failure.
While the “core biometrics” (biometrics minus photograph) in the Aadhaar database are supposed to be secure, the rest is freely shared with authorised users of Aadhaar authentication, with minimal safeguards. This is a major infringement of privacy.
The demographic details attached to Aadhaar numbers in the database are full of errors, partly due to hasty rollout. Yet severe restrictions have been placed on correcting this information. Meanwhile, people are expected to align other documents with this unreliable information. This is causing endless hassles to poor people. Many of them are excluded from some or all social benefits.

The trials of having an “updated” Aadhaar are numerous, reports Devahuti Sarkar in TheWire.in

5. Biometric failures are another major source of social exclusion, especially for the elderly. Aadhaar was rolled out without any transparency about the reliability of biometric authentication.

6. A significant minority of people, mainly from marginalised groups (including disabled persons), do not have Aadhaar for multiple reasons, and for no fault of their own. They are excluded from most social benefits.

7. If an Aadhaar number is lost, it can be very difficult to retrieve. Poor people have been forced to make long and expensive trips to regional assistance centres for this purpose. Some never managed to retrieve it, and are now deprived of all social benefits.

8. The coercive “seeding” of Aadhaar with endless databases (ration cards, job cards, pension lists, bank accounts, voter lists, what not), associated with function creep, is a monumental waste of time for functionaries and citizens. Seeding sounds simple but it requires biometric or demographic verification. Both can be very cumbersome.

9. The rush for correction or update of Aadhaar details has led to humongous queues at many assistance centres, where people often wait in line for hours with no guarantee of remedy. There are no facilities for tracking of grievance redressal, continuity of assistance, or other relief. People’s time and money are wasted to no end.

10. Far from rooting out corruption, Aadhaar’s centralised database has enhanced information asymmetries and reduced transparency. Integration of Aadhaar with the banking system has magnified exposure to new vulnerabilities such as identity fraud.

11. At every step, the Aadhaar project has been a law unto itself. It began without any legal backing. Later, the Aadhaar Act was passed by bypassing the Upper House of Parliament. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) often violates orders of the Supreme Court of India (e.g., protections for children and against use by private entities). It has enormous power and regularly issues rules that make life difficult for millions, without any serious feedback from affected people. A critical provision for parliamentary oversight of UIDAI was dropped in the final version of the Aadhaar Act.

The promoters of Aadhaar were never able to justify this particular identity model or to explain what ills it is supposed to remedy. Instead, they relied on propaganda to push for it. Many countries have functional identity systems that are less coercive, invasive, exclusionary and unreliable than Aadhaar.

We urge the greatest caution from countries that are considering a replication of the Aadhaar model. We would be happy to facilitate field visits for anyone interested in understanding these problems in more detail.

List of signatories, including 50 organisations and several individual signatories is here

A growing list of articles and reports documenting the risks of Aadhaar

Lets rethink aadhaar

Take action now!

Updates

Exclusion

Image Asset.Jpeg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Screenshot+2025 11 10+At+3.37.01%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Resources

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Resources

A collection of documents related to the UIDAI and the implementation of the Aadhaar project, sourced from various persons and websites. The copyrights for all documents rests with the original creators. The documents are re-shared here unconditionally.

PRIMERS

Primer on Aadhaar Judgment and Amendments Act

Short 2-pager on Aadhaar Judgment and Amendments Act

Government documents

Court documents, UIDAI documents, here.

Gazette notifications

Hunger Deaths in 2015-18

Overview

25 hunger deaths caused by Aadhaar issues

2015-18 में भूख से मौतें

Case documents

All documents pertaining to the cases that challenged the constitutional validity of the UID project in the Supreme Court, including petitions, applications, rejoinders, orders, oral arguments, etc.

templates

Letter protesting schools mandating quoting of Aadhaar number for admissions

Letter to send to members of parliament on Aadhaar Rules, which are in parliament.

Letter for contempt if forced to give Aadhaar.

COLLECTION OF Articles critical of aadhaar since 2010 TILL TODAY

CAMPAIGN MATERIAL

Please feel free to use any graphic material from here to raise awareness about Aadhaar issues. Contact us if you have ideas for more publicity material, or if you'd like print versions, or if you would like to contribute your creative talent towards making more such material.

1. Posters for Online and Print

2. Misc collateral

Aadhaar leaflet / handout for distribution

T-shirt front graphic

T-shirt back graphic - 1

T-shirt back graphic - 2

Badge

Advisory after the Hearings in SC on 3rd Nov 2017

Rethink Aadhaar on GCCS

Rethink Aadhaar on CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Advisory after the Mentioning in SC on 7TH DEC 2017

Advisory after the Hearings in SC on March 8 2018

3. Posters from 30th June 2017, Day of Action across India

4. Posters from protests across India

Common Man 1200.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Baalak%2C Adarsh Baalak 800Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Uid Quantity Fraud 800Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Nahi%2C Adhikar To Do 800Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Nahi%2C Anaaj Chahiye 800Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aapka Aadhaar Sahi Nahi Hai 1200Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delink+Aadhaar+1+ +Online.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delink+Aadhaar+2+ +Online.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

No More Sw Dadagiri Online.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Reduced To A Number Online.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Say+No+To+Aadhaar+ +Online.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Looking For Problems 1.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Looking For Problems 2.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Exclusion 2.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Purpose.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar Savings.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar+Leaflet.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Side+1.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Side 2.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Side 2 Alternate.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Badge.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar+Advisory.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Gccs+Advisory.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Consitutuion+Day.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Linkage+Advisory.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Aadhaar+Advisory Mar8.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+0+ +Day+Of+Action.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+2+ +Day+Of+Action.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+4+ +Day+Of+Action+Delhi.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+5+ +Day+Of+Action+Ranchi.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+5+ +Day+Of+Action+Jaipur.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Protest+0+ +Day+Of+Action+ +All+Places.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Museum Of Aadhaar Abused.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Breakaadhaarchains.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Delhi Conversation.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Public Hearing 1000Px.Jpg

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

About Us

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

About

We are a non-partisan campaign concerned about the Unique Identification or Aadhaar project.

The campaign began in the context of an ongoing case in the Supreme Court regarding the Aadhaar project, the aftermath of the enactment of Aadhaar Act 2016 as Money Bill and subordinate legislations. The campaign shares relevant data, and findings from the ground on experience of citizens in the Aadhaar project. New technological initiatives dependent on the Aadhaar project proliferate and we continue to resist.

#No2UID #AadhaarNahiSudhaarChaahiye

Friends of Rethink Aadhaar

Aashish Gupta, Amrita Johri, Amit Bansal, Aniruddh Menon, Ankita Aggarwal, Ankita Anand, Anjali Bhardwaj, Anivar Aravind, Aruna Roy, Budhaditya Bhattacharya, Dr. Anupam Saraph, Dr. Dipa Sinha, Dr. Rajendran Narayanan, Harsh Bora, Jessica Pudussery, Kanika Sharma, John Simte, Laavanya Tamang, Lovey Pant, Nachiket Udupa, Nandini Dey, Nikhil Dey, Nikhil Srivastav, Nir Aadhaar Collective, Praavita, Raghu, Rakshita Swamy, Reetika Khera, Rohith Jyotish, Ria Singh Sawhney, Sandhya Visvanathan, Shruti Narayan, Srinivas Kodali, Suren Makkar, Venkatesh Nayak

Interns

Sheetal Shrimali, Shrenik Mutha, Aditya Ranjan, and many others who have given us their valuable time

CODE OF CONDUCT

This code of conduct may be edited and changed upon occasion following collective deliberation by members of the Campaign and/or members of the Complaints Committee along with members of the Campaign.

Rethink Aadhaar is a non-partisan campaign and a network of volunteers concerned about the Unique Identification/ Aadhaar project, and issues related to digitization of the welfare state. We are a campaign and network that works across administrative, national and international boundaries.
All decisions are taken by consensus of the Steering Committee (or quorum) and under the guidance of friends and advisors of the campaign and network.
All members of the informal network which comprises Rethink Aadhaar are committed to ensuring all interactions will happen with integrity; treating every individual with dignity, respect, and fairness; acting responsibly towards the people and communities that we work with; and being responsible, transparent, and accountable for all our actions.
We have a zero tolerance policy towards discrimination, harassment, bullying, or sexual harassment. Rethink Aadhaar is committed to maintaining a collaborative campaign environment free from sexual, racial, ethnic, caste-based, class-based religious, age-based, disability, sexual orientation, and gender expression harassment and bullying. Any instance of such harassment is expressly prohibited.

II. Who does this apply to?

5. This policy covers conduct related to campaign work conducted by Rethink Aadhaar, which includes conference calls, seminars, webinars, press briefings, meetings, internal administrative work, and other specified event/meeting/communication. This also applies if you present yourself as a member of Rethink Aadhaar in any public forum.

III. How to report violations

6. We believe that it takes courage to report cases of harassment, and we salute that courage. We also understand that survivors of harassment, often are in a less privileged position than the person conducting the harassment, and face more barriers to speaking out, including social stigma. We commit to continually improving our support for survivors and efforts to prevent future harms.

7. If you become aware of discrimination or harassment in violation of the principles and policies stated above, please do reach out to the Complaints Committee at <conductrethinkaadhaar@gmail.com> with the subject line “Re. Violation of Code of Conduct.” This email account is accessed by members of the Complaints Committee. You can also copy contact@rethinkaadhaar.in, which is accessed by two members of Rethink Aadhaar, or reach out personally to anyone you feel comfortable with, who is associated with the Rethink Aadhaar Campaign.

8. Once the complaints are received, the Complaints Committee will endeavour to take it up within one week. Given the urgency of the complaint, the Committee will communicate with the complainant within two days at minimum and 2 weeks at maximum from the date of communication. If you have not received a response, we request you to write to contact@rethinkaadhaar.in to indicate that there is a pending complaint which has to be looked into.

IV. Implications of violating this Code

9. Rethink Aadhaar is within its rights to revoke, suspend, and/or permanently ban anyone from participating in some or all Rethink Aadhaar-related activities; and asking them to refrain from presenting themselves as a member of the campaign.

V. Complaints Committee

10. We also have a specific 3 person Complaints Committee, to hear complaints, which can be contacted at <conductrethinkaadhaar@gmail.com>.

11. The Complaints Committee will have the power to take the following steps:

Conduct a prompt and thorough investigation of all complaints of harassment or discrimination. The scope of the investigation will depend upon the specific circumstances.
Make every effort to respect the privacy of those involved in an investigation under this procedure. However, it should be understood that Rethink Aadhaar might need to disclose certain information to complete our investigation or otherwise address the matters raised in the complaint. A request not to investigate a reported violation of this policy cannot always be honored.
The results of the investigation will be discussed with those individuals involved, and the Complaints Committee will determine whether any action is warranted in response.
Individuals who are found to have violated this policy will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action up to and including warnings, probation, and termination of affiliation with Rethink Aadhaar. The specific action taken will be consistent, reasonable, fair, and match the severity of the incident.
The Complaints Committee will not retaliate against any person for making a good faith complaint under this policy, regardless of the outcome of the investigation. Similarly, the Complaints Committee will not retaliate against any person for providing truthful information in connection with an investigation under this policy.
If, in the course of an investigation, the Complaints Committee learns that a crime has been committed, the Campaign may be obligated to report that crime to the relevant authorities. Should the complainant decide to report the authorities, the committee will support them in taking it up with the relevant authority.
Similarly, the Complaints Committee will comply with any requests for records or information made in connection with any police investigation as required by law, or with any subpoena issued lawfully in any legal proceeding. However we are committed to pushback against overbroad requests for information.
Implications of a false report: Any person who knowingly provides false information in connection with an investigation under this policy will be subject to discipline, upto removal from membership with Rethink Aadhaar.
The Committee is committed to principles of transparency and accountability.

Last updated: 17 July 2022

Take Action

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Take Action

What can I do?

Perhaps the better question is:

WHAT CAN'T WE DO?

Sign on to resist VOTER ID - AADHAAR LINKAGE

Embed Block

Enter a valid embed URL or code.

JOIN BEWARE OF AADHAAR CAMPAIGN 2025

no aadhaar for vaccination, essential medical services!

Joint Statement: Ensure equitable access to the COVID-19 vaccines, and health care resources

COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on India, as the second wave of the pandemic continues to ravage India's health infrastructure. In such desperate times, ensuring equitable, fast and easy access to healthcare, medicines and the vaccines is fundamental. Rethink Aadhaar joins the Forum For Medical Ethics Society, Internet Freedom Foundation, and Swathanthra Malayalam Computing in this joint representation. statement. We urge all government and administrative authorities to ensure that:

1) The vaccination drive is inclusive, equitable, and accessible,

2) The manacles of Aadhaar are not imposed as a condition for accessing critical healthcare services,

3) The vaccination programme is not used as a laboratory to test new technologies, and

4) Health data is not exploited under the pretenses of the pandemic.

For the government to listen to this, we need your support. Please sign the statement by filling up this form and share it with your friends and family to help the citizens of India gain better and equitable access to healthcare services! You can read the entire statement here.

Please sign the following public statement by the Internet Freedom Foundation, Rethink Aadhaar, the Forum for Medical Ethics Society and Swathantra Malayalam Computing to say no to Aadhaar!

click here to sign!

Add your voice to the "Opt-out from Aadhaar" Campaign

Petition to be delivered to GoI (PMO), UIDAI & Supreme Court:

I demand that the Government of India stop asking citizens to link one identity card - Aadhaar - to multiple services. The multiple problems surrounding the Aadhaar have convinced me that such linking serves no purpose except to create a surveillance state.

Since Aadhaar was introduced in September 2010, citizens have been cut off from essential services such as food rations, students have had problems in receiving their scholarships, people have been turned away from medical treatment for not carrying Aadhaar cards, pensioners have stopped getting their pensions due to Aadhaar-related errors, and there are growing concerns around big data collection and identity theft.

I do not want one identity number and card, and do not want one identity card linked to multiple citizen services, and therefore I wish to opt out of Aadhaar entirely.

I want the Government to answer one question: Which new service does it need us to make an Aadhaar for that doesn't already require another identity document?

We already have ration card to get rations, school certificates to show completion of schooling, driving license for motor vehicles, passport as a national ID when going abroad, PAN to pay taxes, and an electoral card for voting.

Therefore, please tell us which new service do you need our Aadhaar for?

Since there is no new such service, and because I do not want one ID card linked to multiple services, I wish to opt out of Aadhaar entirely.

Launch a local campaign where you are

Use Rethink Aadhaar's Resources.

Add yourself to the mailing list

Noun 1067645.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

RTC statement 27th July 2017

Press Coverage

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Press Coverage

Aparna Kalra in the news site TheWire.in documents the distress of Indian residents excluded from basic services such as schools over lack of timely and accurate Aadhaar updates and enrolment. Introduced with a promise of efficiency, the real everyday experience of those forced to get Aadhaar is captured by Kalra who found that “slight spelling anomalies and mismatched fingerprints keep a child out of school or a family from their ration entitlements.” https://thewire.in/special/tears-queues-and-a-never-ending-search-for-kagaz-the-real-story-of-aadhaar Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty in TheWire.in

March 2026

Venkateswarlu Kuruva and Chakradhar Buddha explain in IDR how India’s digital welfare system is producing life-altering exclusions by prioritising administrative control over constitutional guarantees of access and dignity, and how the entire onus of correction is passed on to the people least equipped to bear it.

The Delhi government plans to replace the pink ticket system for women’s free bus travel with the Saheli smart cards. In the absence of public evidence that such a change is needed, this is yet another example of technology-driven welfare that will exclude the people who will benefit the most from affordable transport.

The government’s proposal to pre-install the Aadhaar app to enable a single sign-on feature for all online services that require Aadhaar authentication or identity verification has received resistance from the Manufacturers’ Association for Information Technology (MAIT), an industry body representing manufacturing companies, citing privacy and security concerns and manufacturing and operational ramifications for global smartphone companies.

The draft policy for Responsible Digital Use Among Students, released by the Karnataka government, has a provision for linking social media accounts to Aadhaar to ensure age, authenticity and restrict fake or multiple accounts. This has been criticized by internet advocacy groups because it is not only unconstitutional but also can be used as a tool for extensive profiling of individuals.

The Parliamentary Standing Panel on Rural Development and Panchayati Raj has recommended making the Aadhaar-Based Payment System optional for wage transfers under MGNREGA and shifting to other alternatives because of low biometric authentication success in remote areas and for the elderly.

The AI transition in India can disrupt the labour market and have multiplier effects on household income, urban migration patterns and consumption demand. This article makes the case for an "AI Transition Scheme" when AI-led task automation will gradually replace entry-level to mid-skills jobs before new jobs can emerge at scale.

February 2026

The Indian government is pushing Aadhaar deeper into everyday life through a new app and offline verification support, a step that raises new questions about security, consent, and the broader use of the massive database.

In this blog, Shruti Rajgopalan from the Mercatus Center dives deep to explain the political economy of the AI race.

India is chasing the AI dream, but there are other less visible costs of AI that have grave implications. Data centres will significantly drive up India’s energy and water demands, while generating noise and air pollution and affecting the health of neighboring communities. This comes amid a growing number of studies highlighting the rising environmental, economic and health impacts of data centres in the US. India needs to pave its own way during this AI boom while ensuring transparency, sustainability and efficiency in the whole process.

This report highlights how prominent AI claims obscure information about the benefits and environmental impact of traditional AI versus generative AI models, and how these claims of traditional AI climate benefits often tend to draw on weaker forms of evidence.

January 2026

As per a report in The Times of India, across Uttarakhand, residents are skipping work and school and queuing outside post offices to rectify errors in their Aadhaar cards. The situation worsened after Aadhaar updation was discontinued at several common service centres (CSCs) due to data irregularities. These complications are worse in hill districts and remote villages, where people have to travel to overcrowded district headquarters, where long waits are a routine.

In an article in The Washington Post, Rana Ayyub explains how India has become a laboratory for a massive state digital surveillance system. This has created an information symmetry between those who control the system and those who use it.

December 2025

The government cleared the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Rules, which dilute the transparency rights and safeguards for investigative journalists and others probing the government. The independence of the body set up to ensure accountability is being questioned, as it will operate under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. The rules can be seen as a way of indirect censorship and surveillance of lawful newsgathering activities.

This article in The Economic Times sheds light on the hidden costs of AI, from its environmental impact to risking the development of cognitive skills in children. Unregulated access and lax data privacy laws further complicate solving the issues.

This report in The Wire explains how the current government weakened MGNREGA before VB-G RAM G was tabled. This can be partially attributed to forced technocracy through in the form of the Aadhaar-based payment system (ABPS) for wage transfers, which has wrongfully excluded multiple people from the system.

OCTOBER 2025

Keir Starmer said he may consider Aadhaar as model for ID for UK, but Indian lawyers, activists warn of #Aadhaar 's ‘digital coercion’, data breaches "Your basis to live is checked at each and every step", warn civil liberty activists.

Previously, The Guardian has reported how a glitch in Aadhaar system led to starvation when linked to essential food security. And, the personal data of a billion Indians were sold online for £6

Indians activists reiterated that there is no way to know if there has been a reported data breach and no oversight into how Aadhaar data may be bundled with other databases. Ultimately, it’s a system that undermines access to essential social security and welfare, they said.

septemBER 2025

Activist Srinivas Kodali filed a complaint that Telangana Govt used EPIC election photos for facial recognition “Government of Telangana used photographs from Electoral Rolls to build a facial recognition/AI system.” He said: “This has happened because ECI has shared our data during Aadhaar Voter ID linking exercise”

News coverage of this in NewsMinute , Medianama, Hindustan Times

Central government mandates Aadhaar now in an armistice agreement

At same time as Rajasthan, Maharashtra considers proposal to monetise resident voters’ data

Even as residents struggle with Aadhaar coercion and lack of redress, tech firms profit. Companies such as this company’s shares surge after it bags orders from UIDAI

Aadhaar: Costs of Digital Red Tape’

A recent study by Reetika Khera and Amod Moharil based on a survey of nearly 300 people interviewed at centers trying to correct and update Aadhaar in centers in the national capital Delhi found excessive bureaucracy, dysfunctional or closed centers, residents having to make multiple trips with no accountability

Here in New York Times Opinion, Khera’s analysed why and how the so-called “Big Fix” of Aadhaar has turned out to be Big Flub , and in The Washington Post earlier how the digital ID is costing people their privacy and even their lives

Customer ID verification framework USING AADHAAR makes life difficult for the poor

Jean Dreze investigates and explains in The Economic Times how poor people find themselves locked out of their own bank accounts over minor Aadhaar and data mismatches with not even a prior notice; the stress and the hurdles of correcting it even proved fatal such for this elderly man Ramman in Uttar Pradesh

ON PROBLEMS OF ‘LOST AADHAAR’

‘Without Aadhaar, without identity’

Vyom Anil, Jean Dreze write in The Indian Express: People who lose their Aadhaar number may not be able to retrieve it, and risk losing all social benefits. They point out the problem that the only record many people have of their Aadhaar number is their Aadhaar card. If they misplace it, such as in the case of Reena Devi, such individuals are rejected when they try to re-enroll and resolving this is not easy, takes months; and they get cut off from all essential services in the interim. Read this article without paywall here

INFRASTRUCTURES OF EXCLUSION

A study by scholars at LibTech, how Aadhaar-centered digital systems requiring constant updates threaten people’s access to food under the public distribution system

E-KYC verification involves confirming the identity of a person through biometric authentication, followed by matching the demographic data on their Aadhaar card with their ration card. The process requires all members listed on a ration card to link it to their individual Aadhaar numbers, and to undergo biometric or IRIS authentication through electronic point-of-sale (e-POS) machines at a fair price shop. Activists and observers reported that marginalised communities have encountered major disruptions to accessing food in this process.

Earlier, in February 2025, LibTech scholars documented how mandatory Aadhaar OTPs are depriving the marginalised of food rations in Jharkhand, and arbitrary new requirement create new hurdles for vulnerable groups and women with poor digital literacy and access

AUGUST 2025

Aadhaar continues to be arbitrarily inaccessible and unworkable:

A detailed investigation into the working of an Aadhaar Seva Kendra in Ranchi illustrates the bureaucratic ordeals imposed on people trying to update or enrol in Aadhaar.
Assam’s government announced it will stop issuing Aadhaar numbers to adults to prevent non-Indian citizens from obtaining them, despite the fact that Aadhaar can be legally provided to non-citizens, and this move will likely disenfranchise people seeking access to benefits.
The endless cycle of KYC continues as DBT beneficiaries are set to be audited again.
Aadhaar is the new “weak link” in insurance processes, allowing an opening for identity-based fraud through insurance claims.

Digitisation fails to serve the people’s interests, but continues to expand:

A look at the impact of corporate-driven tech initiatives in agriculture.
Mandating Aadhaar linkage, digital data entry, and unreliable tech has led to exclusion of 89 lakh potential scholarship beneficiaries from the most vulnerable groups including SC, ST, and OBC beneficiaries.
Unique IDs and digitisation do nothing to stop corruption or false claims: thousands of fake teacher IDs were created in Maharashtra in a Rs.3000 crore scam.
The Rajasthan Government’s attempt to build digital “golden data” records on every citizen has led to the most vulnerable being denied pensions, wrongly declared “dead” or absent.
In Maharashtra, tribal children are turned away from school because of lack of Aadhaar.
The UP government plans to introduce AI tools in MGNREGA operations without consideration for the impact on beneficiaries.
The Delhi government is expanding mandatory ID requirements for public schemes, to exclusionary effect. The pink ticket free bus scheme for women is being replaced with a “smart card” which requires Delhi residency, excluding vulnerable women who work in the NCR or have other difficulty getting address proof. Simultaneously, Aadhaar enrolment is set to get more onerous in Delhi.
Odisha’s mass ration card deletion is yet to be revoked despite clear problems in the KYC process and people’s reliance on ration to correct the high burden of malnutrition.
More than 23% of Jan Dhan bank accounts are inactive, reflecting the lack of actual access and ease of digitisation and banking.
Telangana plans digitisation of health systems in partnership with Estonia.

Aadhaar, data, and surveillance:

The MHA wants prison authorities to conduct Aadhaar authentication for persons imprisoned and their visitors, a move that has no link to welfare benefits, and could only serve to further surveillance of imprisoned people and affect their legal defences and the privacy and dignity of their families. Family members without Aadhaar are being turned away in a violation of human rights.
In Mizoram, refugees are being forced to give up biometric data, making them even more vulnerable to targeting persecution.
Parents and experts urge the Karnataka Government to not introduce facial recognition systems for school attendance, warning of misuse.

JULY 2025

Getting, keeping, and “verifying” Aadhaar becomes more difficult:

‘From the trenches of Aadhaar distress’, a video story by Aparna Kalra
The Manipur government is adopting a stringent verification process to enroll and update Aadhaar, including mandatory biometric updates at ages 5-7 and after 15, and headquarter approval for “adult Aadhaar” cases.
The Assam government has proposed requiring District Commissioners’ approval for adult Aadhaar applications.
The Odisha government plans to suspend 20.58 lakh ration cards for lack of e-KYC verification, forcing people to come to PDS stores or face deactivation of their ration cards. Previously, 19 lakh people were denied the right to food when the Odisha PDS mandated linking Aadhaar with ration cards.
Jan Dhan bank accounts, which were supposed to enable DBTs, are at risk of closure in an ongoing re-KYC exercise. (needs verification as the link is paywalled; the Govt insists there will be no closure of inactive accounts)
De-activating an individual’s Aadhar after their death is slow: only 1.15 crore Aadhaar numbers have been de-activated, leading to inflated numbers which spark rumours of Aadhaar fraud or duplication.

Digitisation drawbacks: The push for UPI adoption is leading to GST notices for small vendors in Karnataka, with plans to expand nationally.

Tech and state power:

How technology companies are furthering colonial oppression through “colonial algorithms”, with AI-targeting software, surveillance mechanisms, and censorship tools to enable violence against Palestinians, and maintain repressive power structures.
An exploration of how the Indian state is expanding its powers and undermining democracy as the relationship between the governed and the governors is increasingly controlled through digital technologies.

From around the world: the Aadhaar experience serves as a cautionary tale for the Sri Lankan digitisation project.

JUNE 2025

In spite of all the reports of hardship and exclusion as well as continuing fraud from the use of Aadhaar, the government keeps expanding its scope and making it mandatory for legal entitlements as well. We are sharing a round-up of recent developments. We urge you to share these updates with your networks as well.

Exclusions continue

Difficulties faced by victims of acid attacks in enrolling for Aadhaar – they had to go to Court to find a way, by John Simte | A video story on this from Scroll.in

Here’s another by him on the same issue, in The India Forum

Problems – and queues – to keep Aadhaar up to date and usable, by Aparna Kalra.

On Aadhaar and adivasis, by Chakradhar Buddha and BDS Kishore

…Its usefulness continues to be questioned:

Andy Mukherjee (Bloomberg columnist): https://x.com/andymukherjee70/status/1934939679125917703

…Fraud continues in spite of Aadhaar or even because of Aadhaar

Mastermind who cheated 26 crores, only 'alive' on Aadhar card, Dainik Bhaskar

Using Aadhaar to defraud people of their PDS rations in UP, Daily Pioneer

Its role in helping candidates cheat in MP constable exam, Indian Express

Yet, the use of Aadhaar keeps expanding

Mandatory for tatkal bookings: https://x.com/AshwiniVaishnaw/status/1930292913579147360

“Facial recognition” mandatory for ‘take-home rations’ given to pregnant women at anganwadis.

Many reacted angrily (as they should): see Sucheta Dalal, Rathin Roy, Martin Haus, Neel Kolhe.

In Jan 2024, Anganwadi workers in Andhra Pradesh were already raising issues related to over-use of apps.

Book on facial recognition by Amber Sinha and old article on this by Gautam Bhatia

Related news, wider reading and from around the world

Biometrics of arrestees being collected in Rajasthan and Delhi, Vijaita Singh

https://www.medianama.com/2025/06/223-uidai-anonymised-aadhaar-data-risks/

Two perspectives on doorstep delivery of PDS grain –– a rollback in AP and one that never took off (perhaps just as well that it didn’t) in Delhi (from 2021)

Three stories on the growing worries about Palantir: The Daily Show, Rob Reich’s subtack, in The New York Times

JULY 2019

Jaipur teens tampering with Aadhar details to watch ‘Kabir Singh’

https://www.thehindu.com/entertainment/movies/teens-tampering-with-aadhar-details-to-watch-kabir-singh/article28271056.ece

Pay Interest For Delaying Salary Of Employee Who Did Not Link Aadhaar: Bombay HC To Port Trust

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/pay-interest-for-delaying-salary-of-mbt-employee-who-did-not-link-aadhar-145922

The Aadhaar Amendments Bill has reinstated many of the provisions of Section 57 of the original Aadhaar Act which was struck down by the Supreme Court in September 2018 as unconstitutional.

https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/aadhaar-amendment-bill-new-rules-uidai-5829226/

#MyBodyMyRights: Will Aadhar prevent you from getting an abortion?

http://www.hidden-pockets.com/mybodymyrights-will-aadhar-prevent-you-from-getting-an-abortion/

The imposition of Aadhaar to avail benefits and subsidies “is nothing but the state’s arrogance towards the poor”, says INC MP from Koraput, Saptagiri Ulaka

https://caravanmagazine.in/politics/congresss-lone-mp-from-odisha-on-food-security-aadhaar-and-the-condition-of-his-party

Aadhaar Card Not A Valid Document For Travel To Nepal: NCDRC

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/aadhar-card-not-a-valid-document-for-travel-to-nepal-ncdrc-read-order-146469

Aadhaar verification no more in use for driving license

https://www.livemint.com/news/india/aadhaar-verification-no-more-in-use-for-driving-license-1563251433918.html

Economic Survey has based Aadhaar impact on MGNREGS on false assumptions, say researchers

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/economic-survey-has-based-aadhaar-impact-on-mgnregs-on-false-assumptions-say-researchers/article28313214.ece

Madras HC seeks EPFO response on plea against mandatory Aadhaar-UAN linking

https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/plea-in-hc-against-linking-aadhaar-to-uan-to-avail-pf-pension-119070900224_1.html

TISS study: Aadhaar fraud rampant in Kalyana Lakshmi

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/tiss-study-aadhaar-fraud-rampant-in-kalyana-lakshmi/articleshow/70135322.cms

For whom is the Aadhaar Amendments Bill: only to please Telecom companies

https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/governance/for-whom-is-the-aadhaar-amendments-bill-reliance-jio-airtelvodafone-and-tata

November 2018

An imaginary friend (The Indian Express, Sakina Dhorajiwala and Rajendran Narayanan, November 1, 2018)

SEPTEMBER 2018

https://www.deccanherald.com/national/least-56-died-due-hunger-2015-693791.html

https://thewire.in/rights/of-42-hunger-related-deaths-since-2017-25-linked-to-aadhaar-issues

JULY 2017

Forthcoming Supreme Court decision on right to privacy one of the most important legal decisions in the world this year (Times of India, Elen Maglen and Mishi Chaudhary, July 25 2017)

Aadhaar rebels find ways to avoid PAN linkage (Times of India, Namita Devidayal and Lubna Kalby, July 23, 2017)

Govt has been speaking in two tongues on right to privacy: Reetika Khera (Business Standard, Ranjita Ganesan, July 22, 2017)

Parliamentary committee questions MHA officials on security, Aadhar (Money Control, July 21, 2017)

UIDAI says it won’t act on alleged Jio data leaks till police complete investigation (The Wire, Mayank Jain, July 21, 2017)

Errors and Exclusion Mark Jharkhand’s Aadhaar-MGNREGA Link (The Wire, Jahnavi Sen, July 20, 2017)

Fake caller held for threatening to kill activist Shabnam Hashmi (Hindustan Times, July 19, 2017)

The Different Ways in Which Aadhaar Infringes on Privacy (The Wire, Reetika Khera, July 19, 2017)

Nine months of no ration: Villagers pleas fall on deaf ears (Times of India, July 17,2017)

In One Police Officer’s Threat, a Glimpse of How Aadhaar Drive Could Be Misused (The Wire, Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, July 16, 2017)

Aadhaar Card will now be mandatory for students of State Government-run schools to get mid-day meals (India Live Today, Avinash Nandakumar, July 14, 2017)

The Aadhaar scramble in Uttar Pradesh schools might keep some children out of the classroom (Scroll, Shreya Roy Choudhary, July 12 2017)

Corruption in Aadhaar enrolment raises fears of compromising biometric details (Hindustan Times, Saubhadra Chatterji, July 12, 2017)

Aadhaar jolt for PF pensioners in Karnataka (The Hindu, Sharath S. Srivatsa, July 11, 2017)

June 2017

No Aadhaar, no banking and threat to privacy: Do you have a choice? (India Today, Prabash K Dutta, June 17, 2017)

The Supreme Court’s Refusal To Stay The Requirement Of Aadhaar For Income-Tax Returns Raises Several Troubling Questions (The Caravan, Anupam Kumar, June 12, 2017)

Four pressing questions that emerge from the Supreme Court’s judgment on PAN-Aadhaar linking (Scroll, Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, June 12, 2017)

Banks say no to customers sans Aadhaar (The Hindu Businessline, Priyanka Pani, June 12, 2017)

Aadhaar Must For Filing Tax Returns, New PAN From July 1: Government (NDTV, PTI, June 11, 2017)

Government needs to look at security issues of Aadhar: Congress (Business Standard, IANS, June 9, 2017)

Unique ID proposed to be made mandatory for flight booking (Business Standard, IANS, June 8, 2017)

Government’s claims of Aadhaar savings for the LPG scheme are overstated (Mediumnama, Anand Venkatanarayanan, June 8, 2017)

Criminals will be able to crack UID system easily: Jacob Appelbaum (Business Standard, Indulekha Aravind, June 1, 2013)

Aadhaar: It’s Not Black &White (Outline Survey)

Aadhaar, aid decisions: TISS students protest, seek rollback (Indian Express, Priyanka Sahoo, June 6, 2017)

300TISS students refuse to pay fees, demand withdrwal of #Aadhaar circular (Kractivist, Mitaksh Jain, June 6, 2017)

In case of mixed-up identities, 2 men end up with same Aadhaar number (The Times of India, Prachi Raturi Misra, June 5, 2017)

Excluded by Aadhaar (Indian Express, Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey, June 5, 2017)

Aadhaar mandatory for kerosene subsidy, Atal Pension Yojana (Money Control, PTI, June 2, 2017)

The Aadhaar Holdouts: Living Life Without UID (The Wire, Priscila Jebaraj, June 2, 2017)

The real beneficiary (Indian Express, Reetika Khera, June 2, 2017)

No midday meal without Aadhaar in UP schools (The Hindu, Mohammad Ali, June 1, 2017)

Aadhaar:Ushering in a Commercialized Era of Surveillance in India (Electronic Frontier

Foundation, Jyoti Panday, June 1, 2017)

Privacy is culture specific, MNCs hit by Aadhaar, says TRAI chief (Indian Express, Pranav Mukul, June 1, 2017)

MAY 2017

Online Trolls Attack Critics of India's Aadhaar State ID System (Global Voices, Rohith Jyotish, May 31, 2017)

UIDAI is not India’s data watchman (LiveMint, Arghya Sengupta, May 31, 2017)

Virtual safe spurs rush for Aadhaar- Centre's DigiLocker facility extended to ICSE and ISC candidates (The Telegraph, Bureaue, May 28, 2017)

TISS makes Aadhaar card must for students (Indian Express, Priyanka Sahoo, May 27, 2017)

In Gujarat, Cows Get Digital Ear Implant As 'Aadhaar' IDs For Cattle Begins(NDTV, Rohit Bhan, May 26, 2017)

TISS Stops Financial Aid to SC, ST and OBC Students (The Quint, Meghnad Bose and Manvi, May 26, 2017)

Aadhaar must to buy fertilizers from June 1 (Times of India, TNN, May 25, 2017)

Lawyer Zoheb Hossain to assist Delhi HC on issues of ration benefits under Aadhaar (Livemint, Priyanka Mittal, May 25, 2017)

Visit ration shops to ascertain Aadhaar troubles, Delhi HC tells UIDAI lawyer (The Times of India, TNN, May 25, 2017)

Co-founder of UIDAI-associated outfit admits to anonymously trolling Aadhaar critics on Twitter (Scoll, Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, May 23, 2017)

Will Aadhaar leaks be used as an excuse to shut out scrutiny of welfare schemes? (Scroll, Anumeha Yadav, May 20, 2017)

Man claiming to be BBMP official seeks Aadhaar numbers (Economic Times Bureau, May 18, 2017)

Inside the mind of India’s chief tech stack evangelist (Medium, Kiran Jonnalagadda, May 17, 2017)

Hospital faces the heat for demanding Aadhaar (The Hindi, Aloysius Xavier Lopez, May 16, 2017)

In these Rajasthan villages, all born on Jan 1, as per Aadhaar records (Times of India, Vimal Bhati, May 15, 2017)

Long queues, snags as government offices and hospitals in Mumbai link attendance, salary to Aadhaar (Scroll, May 14, 2017)

Aadhaar: My body, My rights ((Mitali Saran, May 11, 2017))

आधार से नागरिकों की जान माल को भारी खतरा। तेरह करोड़ नागरिकों की जानकारी लीक (Hastakshep.com, Palash Vishwas, May 9, 2017)

Journey from Civilian Application to Defence Application (The Live Law, Gopal Krishna, May 9, 2017)

Can Aadhaar be used to snoop on you? Experts say it very well can be (Business Standard, Rohith Jyotish, May 8, 2017)

Dissent and Aadhaar- We have been numbered by a series of lies, myths and fictions about the project (The Indian Express, Jean Dreze, May 8, 2017)

Supreme Test- Aadhaar Related Cases can tell us whether our jurisprudence is fit for an age of technology. (Indian Express, By Pratap Bhanu Mehta, May 6, 2017)

Surveillance and data collection are putting the journalists and the sources at risk (The Wire, Julie Posetti, May 6, 2017)

Aadhaar v. Security:Is the biometric system a tool for surveillance?” (Business Standard, By Rohith Jyotish, May 6. 2017)

Aadhaar Database is leaky by design by keeps on growing (Business Standard, Rohith Jyotish, May 5, 2017)

Aadhaar Case: Mukul Rohatgi is wrong. Bodily Integrity is Sacrosanct. (Hindustan Times, May 5, 2017)

Aadhaar is an electronic leash on citizens (Hindustan Times, Editorial, May 5, 2017)

Govt wants digital India, but what about digital security? (The business insider, May 4, 2017)

Aadhaar Security: Why government needs to develop a framework for analysing privacy issues (Financial Express, By T.K. Srikanth & V.k. Sridhar, May 4, 2017)

Aadhar data leak: It's shocking state of governance, says Congress (Business Standard, IANS, May 4, 2017)

Aadhaar data leaked, but not from UIDAI, Centre informs SC (Deccan Herald, Ashish Tripathi, May 4, 2017)

Karnataka’s no Aadhaar, no fodder rule is inhuman and illegal (Hindustan Times, Editorial, May 2, 2017)

130 Million Aadhaar numbers were made public, says new report (The Wire, May 1, 2017)

Haryana is making babies enroll in aadhaar before it issues the, birth certificate (The Scroll, by Menaka Rao, May 1, 2017)

April 2017

Aadhaar concerns and same consolation (The HIndu, Anil Manchanda, April 30, 2017)

Why not have aadhaar ear tags for humans also? (The Hindu, G. Sampath, April 29, 2017)

The man in charge of aadhaar vouches for its safety, but there's no stopping the leaks. (The Scroll, by Devjyot Ghoshal, April 27, 2017)

Aadhaar Case: An imagined appeal before the Supreme Court as it decides, how we live laugh and die (The Scroll, by Aspi Mistry, April 27, 2017)

Government Websites are lekaing aadhaar details- who will take action against? (Business Standard, By Anumeha Yadav, April 26, 2017)

Aadhaar Privacy Concerns: See what Facebook, election commission Knows (Financial Express, April 25, 2017)

Aadhaar And The Supreme Court’s Sense Of Urgency (Livelaw, by Gopalkrishna, April 25, 2017)

The function creep that is Aadhaar (The Wire, by Usha Ramanathan, April 25, 2017)

Not just a privacy issue, Aadhaar will hurt Poor (Business Standard, Derek O’Brien, April 15, 2017)

Destroy the Aadhaar or reform the aadhaar (The Wire, by Sushil Kambampati, April 7, 2017)

March 2017

A shaky Aadhaar (Usha Ramanathan, March 30, 2017)

UIDAI received 1390 complaints against enrolment agents, but took no legal action (Anumeha Yadav, March 30, 2017)

After Aadhaar "sting", UIDAI files FIR against journalist (March 29, 2017)

How people are caught in the middle of unique number web (Sarika Malhotra, March 28, 2017)

Are Ghosts really getting mid-day meals? (Jean Dreze, March 28, 2017)

Hello Aadhaar, Goodbye Privacy (Jean Dreze, March 24, 2017)

Privacy, security and legality are not the only serious problems with Aadhaar. Here are four more (Scroll, March 23, 2017)

Central Government, State government departments publicly expose personal data of lakhs of Indians (Wire Staff, March 23, 2017)

Aadhaar is a legal right, but the Government can suspend a citizen's number without prior notice (Anumeha Yadav, March 23, 2017)

Privacy, Security, Legality are not the only problems with Aadhaar. Here are four more (Senthil, March 22, 2017)

No ID, no benefits: thousands could lose lifeline under India’s biometric scheme (Vidhi Doshi, March 2017)

Aadhaar linked to mid-day meals: Why put the burden on children (Kiran Bhatty, Dipa Sinha, March 2017)

Four videos that show why Rajasthan needs to fix its public distribution system (Reetika Khera, March 2017)

Need internet to buy PDS rations? Go climb a tree (Geetha Sunil Pillai, TOI, March 2017)

Aadhaar number: Udaipur BTech student gets Aadhaar jitters (Rosamma Thomas, March 2017)

Article says Aadhaar can be hacked, FIR against writer (Abhishek Angad, March 2017)

Force Feeding Aadhaar (Economic and Political Weekly, editorial, March 2017)

Let’s not push for Aadhaar: How can a voluntary programme suddenly become mandatory? (Hindu Businessline editorial, March 2017)

Linking Aadhaar to mid day meals wrong (Deccan Herald editorial, March 2017)

Aadhaar may be getting too big for its own good (Mihir Sharma, March 2017)

Feb 2017

Misuse of Aadhaar data (Business Standard editorial, February 2017)

In Jharkhand, compulsory biometrics authentication for rations sends many away empty-handed (Jean Dreze, February 2017)

Big Brother is winning (Pratap Bhanu Mehta, February 2017)

As security violations erupt, operator of India's biometric database stand at troubling crossroad (Srinivas Kodali, February 2017)

What exactly is a money bill (Suhrith Parthasarthy, February 2017)

Privacy is a fundamental right (Chinmayi Arun, The Hindu)

Jan 2017

UID/Aadhaar Enabled Bio-Metric Attendance System (AEBAS) Violates Supreme Court’s Orders (Gopal Krishna, 10 January 2017)

Project of defiance (Apar Gupta, Prasanna S, January 13, 2017)

On the cards: From having too little identity we Indians now have too much of it (Jug Suraiya, 11 January 2017)

Aadhaar wont be accepted as age proof: Transport dept and banks (TOI, 12 January 2017)

Aadhaar in MNREGA likely to be hugely disruptive for workers (Inayat Sabhikhi, January 2017)

Watch: India's Ambitious UID programme often fails to deliver (Wall Street Journal, Jan 13, 2017)

‘O Brave New World’: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Doctrine of Constitutional Evasion (Gautam Bhatia, Jan 6 2017)

Mission Cow ID: Govt spreads 1 lakh technicians across country to map cattle populations (Aman Sharma, ET, January 2017)

Aadhaar card data collection under cloud as Supreme Court red flags privacy concerns (Indu Bhan, 6 January 2017)

Aadhaar wont be accepted as age proof: Transport dept and banks (TOI, 12 January 2017)

A rant on Aadhaar (Kiran Jonnalagadda, January 2017)

2016

Despite the comparisons, India's Aadhaar Project is nothing like America's Social Security Number (Anumeha Yadav, December 2016)

Chhattisgarh's way of dealing with Aadhaar: When fingerprints fail, take photos (Anumeha Yadav, 21 December 2016)

What happens to privacy when companies have your Aadhaar number? (M Rajshekhar, 23 December 2016)

Why the Aadhaar regulations introduced in Parliament need more debate (Anumeha Yadav, 24 December 2016)

Cashless Economy - A Ploy to Profit the Private Players (Interview with Usha Ramanathan, 28 December 2016)

Opinion: Data is the new gold and Aadhaar is the tool to get it (Usha Ramanathan, 30 December 2016)

The mother of all disruptions (Jean Dreze, December 2016)

Resisting violations of the Supreme Court Orders on Aadhaar (Anupam Saraph, 12 December 2016)

Sharing Aadhaar data: HC notice to Centre, Reliance (Special Correspondent, The Hindu, 14 December 2016)

Can biometrics stop the theft of food rations? No, shows Gujarat (Anumeha Yadav, 17 December 2016)

Aadhaar Regulations grant UIDAI unchecked power, and offer little convenience to users (Prashant Reddy Thikkavarapu, November 2016)

India's Aadhaar project: An assault on welfare, privacy, and democracy (Reetika Khera, Praavita, Aashish Gupta, November 2016)

Dark clouds over the PDS (Jean Dreze, September 2016)

On Aadhaar Success, it's all hype, that includes the World Bank (Reetika Khera, September 2016)

India is enrolling infants and children in Aadhaar, but what about their consent? (Kritika Bhardwaj, September 2016)

Last chance for a welfare state does not rest in the Aadhaar system (Sumandro Chattapadhyay, 2016)

Aadhaar Act is not a Money Bill (Amber Sinha, 2016)

Screenshot+2025 10 23+At+4.19.57%E2%80%Afpm.Png

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Campaign 2025

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Campaign 2025

Despite a mountain of evidence on Aadhaar’s failure, "Aadhaar evangelism" (efforts to convert other countries to the Aadhaar biometric identity model) is spreading across the world. Rethink Aadhaar campaigned to caution other countries and share our concerns. This statement below, endorsed by more than 50 Indian organisations aside from many individual signatories, was released on 10th December 2025(human rights day).

Beware of Aadhaar

A Warning on India’s Biometric Identity Model

We, concerned Indian citizens and organisations, are alarmed to note that efforts are being made to promote biometric identity systems similar to Aadhaar in other countries. Aadhaar is India’s unique identity number, linked with a person’s biometrics (fingerprints, iris and photograph as of now). The number was rolled out with fanfare from 2009 onwards. The use of this number, and of Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA), was promoted to the hilt by the Indian government in close collaboration with the IT industry. Aadhaar was supposed to be voluntary, but it quickly became clear that living without it would be very difficult for most. Today, it is as good as compulsory. Most social benefits are out of reach without Aadhaar.

For our part, we view Aadhaar as a failed and objectionable model that should not be replicated in other countries, certainly not in its Indian version.

Our main concerns are as follows:

1. Aadhaar involves the creation a centralized database that includes biometrics as well as demographic information (e.g. name, gender, date of birth and address). This could turn into a dangerous tool of social control, especially, but not only, in the hands of an authoritarian government.

2. The linkage of numerous databases with Aadhaar magnifies the danger of it becoming a tool for profiling, surveillance, exclusion and worse. Centralized databases also pose data security risks by creating a single point of failure.

3. While the “core biometrics” (biometrics minus photograph) in the Aadhaar database are supposed to be secure, the rest is freely shared with authorised users of Aadhaar authentication, with minimal safeguards. This is a major infringement of privacy.

4. The demographic details attached to Aadhaar numbers in the database are full of errors, partly due to hasty rollout. Yet severe restrictions have been placed on correcting this information. Meanwhile, people are expected to align other documents with this unreliable information. This is causing endless hassles to poor people. Many of them are excluded from some or all social benefits.

5. Biometric failures are another major source of social exclusion, especially for the elderly. Aadhaar was rolled out without any transparency about the reliability of biometric authentication.

6. A significant minority of people, mainly from marginalised groups (including disabled persons), do not have Aadhaar for some reason and no fault of their own. They are excluded from most social benefits.

A protest by Delhi residents against imposing Aadhaar for social services.

Articles and reports amplifying these concerns are available on our Updates page.

This statement was released to media and public on 10th December 2025.

A growing list of articles and reports documenting the risks of Aadhaar

List of signatories:

Signatory Organisations

1. All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA)

2. All India Lawyers Association for Justice (AILAJ)

3. All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA)

4. All India Students’ Association (AISA)

5. Ambedkarijame Punadi (Andhra Pradesh)

6. Bahutva Karnataka

7. Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD)

8. Dalit Bahujan Front

9. Democratic Students’ Federation (DSF)

10. Gig and Platform Services Workers Union

11. Grakoos Union

12. Hamal Panchayat (trade union)

13. Human Rights Law Network (HRLN)

14. Internet Freedom Foundation

15. Jan Jagran Shakti Sangathan (JJSS)

16. Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (JSA)

17. Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha (JJM)

18. JNU Students Union

19. Karwan e Mohabbat

20. Khudai Khidmatgar India

21. LibTech India

22. Maadhyam (a civic engagement initiative)

23. Maharashtra Shramik Ustod & Vahtuk Kamgar Sanghatana (trade union)

24. Manjeera Dalitha Seva Samithi (Telangana)

25. Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS)

26. Moneylife Foundation

27. National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM)

28. National Alliance for Justice, Accountability and Rights (NAJAR)

29. National Campaign Committee for Central Legislation on Construction Workers

30. National Campaign Committee for Unorganised Sector Workers (NCCUSW)

31. National Campaign Committee on Eradication of Bonded Labour (NCCEBL)

32. National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI)

33. National Confederation of Dalit Organisations (NACDOR)

34. National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW)

35. National Platform for the Rights of the Disabled (NPRD)

36. New Trade Union Initiative (NTUI)

37. NREGA Sansharsh Morcha

38. NREGA Watch (Jharkhand)

39. Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity (PBKMS)

40. Pension Parishad

41. People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)

42. People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR)

43. RANG Foundation

44. Rethink Aadhaar

45. Right to Food Campaign

46. Safai Karmachari Andolan (SKA)

47. Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust (SAHMAT)

48. Samalochana Association (Andhra Pradesh)

49. Sangatin Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan (SKMS)

50. Satark Nagrik Sangathan

51. Social Accountability Forum for Action and Research (SAFAR)

52. SR Sankaran Adivasi Sahaya Kendram (Andhra Pradesh)

53. United Forum for RTI Campaign (Andhra Pradesh)

54. United Milli Forum (Jharkhand)

Individual Signatories

1. Aakar Patel, Writer

2. Aban Raza, concerned citizen

3. Abha Bhaiya, India coordinator, One Billion Rising campaign

4. Aditi Mishra, Jawaharlal Nehru University

5. Adv Albertina, National Alliance of People’s Movements

6. Advocate Dr Shalu Nigam, Lawyer and researcher

7. Advocate Vertika Mani, Org. Secretary, People's Union for Civil Liberties

8. Akhila Phadnis, concerned citizen

9. Akshay S Dinesh, Action for Equity

10. Alok Laddha, Chennai Mathematical Institute

11. Alphonse Raj, concerned citizen

12. Amber Sinha, Tech Policy Press

13. Ambika Tandon, University of Cambridge

14. Anand Mazgaonkar, concerned citizen

15. Anand Patwardhan, Filmmaker

16. Anand Teltumbde, Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, Mumbai

17. Anantha, concerned citizen

18. Anivar A Aravind, concerned citizen

19. Ankita Aggarwal, concerned citizen

20. Annie Raja, concerned citizen

21. Anjor, Dialogues on Democracy and Development

22. Anupam Pachauri, Indira Gandhi National Open University

23. Anuradha Talwar, Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity

24. Anurag Mehra, Retired IIT Faculty

25. Arun Khote, National Movement for Land, Labour & Justice

26. Arun Kumar, Retired Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University

27. Aruna Rodrigues, concerned citizen

28. Aruna Roy, School for Democracy

29. Arundhati Dhuru, NAPM Convenor

30. Arundhati Roy, Writer

31. Ashish Ranjan, National Alliance of People’s Movements

32. Ashlesh Biradar, Brave New Web

33. Ashok Bharti, National Confederation of Dalit Organisations

34. Ashokan Nambiar, C MAHE, Manipal, Karnataka

35. Avantika Tewari, Jawaharlal Nehru University

36. Baghamabar Pattnaik, Anti-slavery India

37. Bela Bhatia, Lawyer and writer

38. Bezwada Wilson, National Convenor, Safai Karmchari Andolan

39. Bhanuj Kappal, Independent journalist

40. Bhanwar Meghwanshi, People’s Union for Civil Liberties

41. Bhargav Oza, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability, and Rights

42. Bhoomika Pandhare, concerned citizen

43. Bhupen Singh, University of Sussex

44. Bittu K R, Women against Sexual Violence and State Repression

45. Brinda Crishna, concerned citizen

46. Budhaditya Bhattacharya, concerned citizen

47. Chirashree Das Gupta, Jawaharlal Nehru University

48. Clifton D'Rosario, advocate

49. Colin Gonsalves, advocate

50. Danish Ali, concerned citizen

51. Dayamani Barla, concerned citizen

52. Deep Chandra Joshi, concerned citizen

53. Devi, All India Democratic Women’s Association

54. Dorothy Vallado, concerned citizen

55. Dr Indu Prakash Singh, Facilitator, CityMakers Mission International

56. Dr Sudhir Vombatkere, concerned citizen

57. Dr Sylvia Karpagam, Public health doctor

58. Dwiji Guru, National Alliance of People’s Movements

59. Edwin, OpenSpace

60. Firoz Ahmad, school teacher

61. Francis Bosco, National Federation of Unorganised and Migrant Workers

62. Gangaram Paikra, concerned citizen

63. Gautam Bhatia, Constitutional law scholar and Professor of Law

64. Gouranga Mohapatra, Jana Swasthya Abhiyan Odisha

65. Gowramma, Akila Bharath Janavadi Mahila Sangatane (Karnataka)

66. H M Sunasara, concerned citizen

67. Harish Dhawan, concerned citizen

68. Harsh Mander, Karwan e Mohabbat

69. Hemant Sareen, concerned citizen

70. Himmat Singh Ratnoo, Former Secretary MDU Teachers' Association (MDUTA) Rohtak

71. Hindolee Datta, concerned citizen

72. Indira C, Public health researcher

73. Indira Unninayar, Advocate, Supreme Court and Delhi High Court

74. Jagdish Patel, concerned citizen

75. Jayati Ghosh, Economist

76. James Herenj, NREGA Watch Jharkhand

77. Jean Drèze, Development economist

78. John Dayal, Writer

79. John Simte, Lawyer

80. Justice A.P. Shah, Retired Judge and former Chairman of the Law Commission of India

81. JT D’souza, concerned citizen

82. K.A. Verghese, Green Kerala

83. Karen Gabriel, St Stephen's College, Delhi

84. Karuna M, NREGA Sangharsh Morcha

85. Kalyani Menon Sen, Independent researcher

86. Kelvin, concerned citizen

87. Kiran Jonnalagadda, concerned citizen

88. Koninika Ray, National Federation of Indian Women

89. Krishnakant Chauhan, Activist

90. Laavanya Tamang, Independent researcher

91. Lawrence Liang, Legal academic

92. Laxmi Murthy, Journalist and researcher

93. Lubna Sarwath, Advocate

94. M S Sriram, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore

95. M. Balakrishnan, concerned citizen

96. Maimoona Mollah, Women's rights activist

97. Martin Macwan, concerned citizen

98. Matthe Mautarelli, concerned citizen

99. Meera Sanghamitra, National Alliance of People’s Movements

100. Meghna Jayanth, concerned citizen

101. Meghna Yadav, Researcher

102. Mritiunjoy Mohanty, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta (retd)

103. Mukul Kesavan, Retired teacher

104. Nandini Sundar, University of Delhi

105. Nandita Narain, Associate Professor (Retd), St. Stephen's College, Delhi University

106. Nandita Sengupta, Journalist, Times of India

107. Navsharan Singh, Researcher activist

108. Nayanjyoti, Lecturer in Development Studies, Delhi

109. NB Murthy, concerned citizen

110. Neeraj Hatekar, Researcher

111. Nikhil Dey, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan

112. Nishant S, Researcher

113. Nishi, concerned citizen

114. Nitish Kumar, Former JNUSU President

115. Nivedita Menon, Jawaharlal Nehru University

116. Om Damani, concerned citizen

117. P. Sainath, journalist

118. Padmini Ramesh, Johns Hopkins University

119. Paran Amitava, PhD Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University

120. Parth Sharma, Nivarana

121. Parthasarathi Paul, concerned citizen

122. Persis Ginwalla, concerned citizen

123. Praavita, Rethink Aadhaar

124. Pradeep E, concerned citizen

125. Pradyumna Behera, Independent researcher

126. Prafulla Samantara, President, Lok Shakti Abhiyan

127. Prakash Louis, Bihar migrant hub

128. Prasad Chacko, Social worker, Ahmedabad

129. Prasanna S, Advocate, Supreme Court of India

130. Praveer Peter, National Alliance of People’s Movements

131. Prof Ritu Dewan, Director (Retd), Mumbai School of Economics & Public Policy

132. Prof. Mohan Rao, concerned citizen

133. Purbayan C, Advocate

134. Pushpendra, Former Professor, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai

135. Rahul Basu, concerned citizen

136. Raj Shekhar, Right to Food Campaign

137. Rajaraman, Independent journalist and researcher

138. Rajesh Ramakrishnan, concerned citizen

139. Rajinder Chaudhary, Former Professor of Economics, MD University, Rohtak

140. Rama Teltumbde, concerned citizen

141. Raman Jit Singh Chima, Lawyer

142. Ramdas Rao, Member, People’s Union for Civil Liberties

143. Rammanohar Reddy, Editor

144. Reetika Khera, Development economist

145. Renuka Kad, concerned citizen

146. Ritash, RANG Foundation

147. Rohini Hensman, Writer and independent scholar

148. Rohith Jyothish, concerned citizen

149. Rosamma Thomas, concerned citizen

150. S.Q. Masood, ASEEM

151. Sakina Dhorajiwala, LibTech India

152. Sameet Panda, Right to Food Campaign

153. Sandeep Khurana, Retired professional

154. Sandeep Mertia, Stevens Institute of Technology

155. Sarah M, concerned citizen

156. Seema Mahi, concerned citizen

157. Shabnam Hashmi, Independent social activist

158. Shahjahan, concerned citizen

159. Shahvir Aga, concerned citizen

160. Shailja Tandon, concerned citizen

161. Shailly Gupta, concerned citizen

162. Shantha Sinha, Independent advocate of children's rights

163. Sharanya, Indigenous People’s Land, Life and Knowledge Collective

164. Shishu Ranjan, All India Forum for Right to Education

165. Shiva Shankar, Retired academic

166. Shreekant Gupta, Professor (retired), University of Delhi

167. Shruti Narayan, Lawyer

168. Siddharth de Souza, concerned citizen

169. Siddhartha Das, Public health activist

170. Snehan Kekre, Technologist

171. Sookthi K, concerned citizen

172. Srikanth, CashlessConsumer

173. Srinivas Kodali, Independent researcher

174. Srujana Bej, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University

175. Stella James, Independent legal consultant

176. Sucheta Dalal, Founder Trustee, Moneylife Foundation

177. Sudhir Gandotra, concerned citizen

178. Sunil Kaul, Right to Food and Information

179. Suresh Chandra Joshi, concerned citizen

180. Suruchi, concerned citizen

181. Swathi, Eddelu, Karnataka

182. Swati Desai, concerned citizen

183. Swati Narayan, National Law School of India University, Bengaluru

184. Syed Asif Ali Zaidi, Lawyer

185. T M Krishna, Musician and author

186. T. Ramakrishnan, concerned citizen

187. Tarangini Sriraman, King's College, London

188. Timir Basu, Frontier Weekly

189. Trilochan S, concerned citizen

190. Uma Chakravarti, historian

191. Usha Ramanathan, Independent law researcher

192. V Rukmini Rao, Feminist activist

193. V Upadhyay, Retired professor

194. Vasavi Kiro, concerned citizen

195. Vasundhar, concerned citizen

196. Veena Shatrugna, Independent researcher

197. Vickram Crishna, Independent researcher

198. Vimala k.s., concerned citizen

199. Vipul Paikra, Independent researcher

200. Vivek K, concerned citizen

201.Winona D'Souza, Lawyer, Mumbai

Delhi%2B5.Webp

Rethink UID — 2026-05-05 00:35:15

Rethink Aadhaar

News Update: Harrassed over onerous paperwork after sister's death, Jitu Munda compelled to carry her body to a bank in Odisha

In News: India’s digital welfare system is producing life-altering exclusions

2025: A year of resisting coercive technologies

Digital coercion causes one more hunger death; APAAR ID derails education

Re-post: APAAR ID the latest in "voluntary-mandatory" double-speak, worsens exclusion of poorest children

A warning on India's biometric identity model

Aadhaar mandates violate human rights increase discrimination but governments continue to treat it as a solution | August 2025 Newsletter

Aadhaar casts a shadow on voting rights | July 2025 Update

De-link Aadhaar from voting and welfare rights in Bihar SIR, and elsewhere

Right to Food: Stop Exclusionary Facial Recognition Mandate in Nutrition Schemes

Bihar as the Laboratory of Electoral Mismanagement: Rethink Aadhaar Statement on the Special Intensive Revision of Voter Rolls

Exclusions continue, yet the Aadhaar net expands | June 2025 update

Statement on the proposal to link Voter IDs (EPIC database) and Aadhaar

Joint submission on the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 by Article 21 Trust and Rethink Aadhaar

Civil society open letter to MEITY calls for open consultations of the DPDP Act draft rules

KYCEpidemic in Jharkhand Deprives Poor People of their Own Money

जाजपुर में एक बच्चे की मौत की भयावय खबर

Update Rethink Aadhaar And Onevote

Cag Report Confirms Criticism Of Aadhaar Time To End Project

Oppose The Election Laws Amendment Bill Oppose Linking Voter Id And Aadhaar

Press Release Resist Linking Voter Id And Aadhaar

Resist linking Voter ID and Aadhaar!

Joint Statementnbspensure Equitable Access To The Covid 19 Vaccines And Health Care Resources

Joint Statement Facial Recognition Cannot Be Used For The Covid 19 Vaccine

Co Win Is Aadhaar Linking Being Used As Cover For Digital Health Id

Yet Another Aadhaar Enabled Scam When Will The Government Wake Up

Aadhaar-based Scholarships Scam in Jharkhand Shows How Aadhaar Leaks Public Funds, Deprives Citizens

Report Of The Peoples Tribunal On Aadhaar Related Issues 1

5Tesn475Qe4Vwaepok94T876Vkuwpd

Odisha Government Rolls Back Order On Aadhaar Pension But Is That Enough

Surveillance And Technology Session At Janta Parliament 18 August 2020

Statement Against Mandating Aadhaar For Covid 19 Tests

More Than 11 Lakh Pensioners Could Lose Benefits After Odisha Governments Move To Mandate Aadhaarnbsp Verification For Pensionsnbsp

Legal Notice To Halt Mandatory Aadhaar For Keralas Self Governance Portal

New Aadhaar Rules For Good Governance Are Constitutionally Impermissible

Press Statement Aadhaar Related Starvation Death In Odisha

The Government Of Kerala Must Withdraw Compulsory Aadhaar For State Government Jobs

Statement On Delhi Government Mandating Aadhaar Number For Compensation Forms

A Peoples Tribunal Taking Stock Of The Impact Of Aadhaar Project And New Coercive Databases

A Cultivated Ignorance

Press Statement Verify 19 Lakh Beneficiaries Left Out Of Odisha Pds After Mandatory Aadhaar Linking Demand Activists

Rethink Aadhaar Newsletter October 2019 Vol I

Deadline for linking Aadhaar to PAN EXTENDED yet again

ECI proposes amendments to the RP Act to allow Aadhaar-Voter ID linking

Madras HC dismisses Aadhaar-social media linking; SC tosses issue to Centre

Biometrics of people excluded from NRC and unable to prove citizenship to be flagged

Adivasis from Pathalgadi villages publicly reject Aadhaar

40-year old Jharkhand woman dies in childbirth, child sold for Rs. 10,000

Marking the first anniversary of the Aadhaar judgment

Aadhaar in the News

Series: One year after the Aadhaar judgment….

Other recent news articles on Aadhaar

An Appeal For Support On Article 21 Trust

Citizens Write To Election Commission Demanding Opposition To Aadhaar Voter Id Linking I

Over 200 civil society organisations and concerned citizens endorsed the letter

Rethink Aadhaar Newsletter July 2019 Vol I

Celebrating Mr. Ramesh Kurhade’s fight against mandatory Aadhaar linking

What to do about Aadhaar linking with PAN, quoting Aadhaar in Income Tax returns?

Aadhaar Amendments Bill passed by both Houses of Parliament

Rethink Aadhaar statement on Economic Survey

Delhi HC asks ECI to consider plea on Aadhaar-Voter ID linking

Aadhaar in the news

Budgets Economic Survey Pushes For Interlinking And Selling Citizens Data For Private Purposes

Aadhaar Amendments Bill In Parliament Again Help Us Oppose The Bill

Letter To Cbdt Protesting Pan Aadhaar Linking

TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER

Governments Aadhaar Ordinance For Commercial Use Is Another Fraud Upon The Constitution

Hundreds Of Adivasi Farmers Protest Denial Of Foodgrain By Use Of Aadhaar In Public Distribution System

Newsletter February 2019 A Call To Arms

Pre-election push against Aadhaar: A Call to Arms

Supreme Court reiterates Aadhaar-PAN linking mandatory; deadline March 31 :(

Workers in Varanasi district protest denial of rations due to e-POS issues

Hundreds Of Labourers In Varanasi Protest Against Biometric Authentication For Food Rations

Citizens Write To Vice President Prime Minister Regarding Aadhaar Amendments Bill And Dna Bill

Government Violating Sc Orders By Introducing Amendments For Commercial Use Of Aadhaar

More Aadhaar Related Starvation Deaths Reported In Jharkhand

Press Statement On Supreme Court 5 Judge Bench Ruling On Aadhaar Challenges

Of 42 Hunger Deaths In 2017 2018 25 Deaths Related To Aadhaar Issues Rtf

Hunger Deaths in 2015-18